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Abstract 
The majority of academic and popular studies on the South African participation in the 
Second World War historically focus on the military operations of the Union Defence 
Force in East Africa, North Africa, Madagascar and Italy. Recently, there has been a 
renewed drive to study the South African participation from a more general war and 
society approach. The South African home front during the war, and in particular the 
Axis and Allied maritime war waged off the southern African coast, has, however, 
received scant historical attention from professional and amateur historians alike. The 
historical interrelated aspects of maritime insecurity evident in southern Africa during 
the war are largely cast aside by contemporary academics engaging with issues of 
maritime strategy and insecurity in southern Africa. 
 The all-encompassing nature and extent of the maritime war waged off southern 
Africa during the Second World War have been far more extensive than suggested in 
traditional sources. A key understanding of the maritime war is, in effect, incomplete 
without separate detailed discussions about the opposing Axis and Allied maritime 
strategies off the coast of southern Africa, the wartime shipping quandaries experienced 
by the Union of South Africa, and the South African coastal defences. The Axis maritime 
operations in southern African waters, the so-called maritime intelligence war, and the 
extended anti-submarine war waged in these waters are equally integral to the 
discussion. 
 This dissertation aims to provide a critical, comprehensive analysis of the Axis 
and Allied maritime operations around the coast of southern Africa between 1939 and 
1945. The study investigates this inclusive topic through the aforementioned research 
objectives. The study does not fall into the general ambit of a regimental, campaign or 
personal military history. Instead, it straddles the strata of war and offers fresh insights 
into an episode of the South African military history uncommonly investigated by 
contemporary military historians.  
 The dissertation finds that the Axis and Allied maritime operations off the 
southern African coast were complex in nature, especially regarding the several 
strategic, military and economic aspects that have always underpinned them. Moreover, 
in gaining an understanding of these complex operations, the study reveals the general 
interrelatedness between the rival Axis and Allied maritime strategies and operations 
around the southern African coast. Previous studies have failed to recognise this 
interrelatedness, and have instead offered a one-sided, compartmentalised discussion 
on single aspects associated with the maritime war waged off southern Africa. This 
study thus distances itself from previous academic and popular historiography on the 
subject. It offers, rather, a fresh, in-depth discussion underpinned by extensive archival 
research, access to previously classified material, and a wealth of secondary sources. 
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Opsomming 
Die historiese fokus van die meerderheid akademiese en populêre werke wat handel 
oor die Suid-Afrikaanse deelname aan die Tweede Wêreldoorlog, is gefokus op die 
Unieverdedigingsmag se militêre operasies in Oos-Afrika, Noord-Afrika, Madagaskar en 
Italië. Hedendaags is daar ŉ fokus om dié Suid-Afrikaanse deelname aan die oorlog 
eerder te bestudeer uit die oogpunt oor hóé die oorlog die samelewing beïnvloed het. 
Die impak van die oorlog op die Suid-Afrikaanse tuisfront, asook die maritieme oorlog 
wat tussen die Spilmagte en Geallieerdes rondom die suider-Afrikaanse kuslyn gewoed 
het, het histories karige aandag van beide professionele en amateur historici ontlok. Dit 
is ŉ onomkeerbare feit dat historici dié interafhanklikheid van die maritieme 
onveiligheid rondom die Suid-Afrikaanse kus vir gerieflikheidshalwe opsy gesit het. 
 Die allesomvattende aard van die maritieme oorlog wat rondom die suider-
Afrikaanse kuslyn gewoed het gedurende die oorlog, is veel groter as wat die 
tradisionele historiese bronne voorgee. Dit is ŉ feit dat die maritieme oorlog selde 
verstaan kan word sonder ŉ gedetailleerde bespreking oor die Spilmagte en 
Geallieerdes se maritieme strategieë rondom suider-Afrika, die uitdagende probleme 
van die verskeping van goedere en die Suid-Afrikaanse kusverdedigingstelsel. Die 
Spilmagte se maritieme operasies in suider-Afrikaanse waters, die sogenaamde 
maritieme inligtingsoorlog, sowel as die uitgebreide anti-duikboot operasies in hierdie 
waters vorm ook ŉ integrale deel van hierdie bespreking. 
 As gevolg hiervan is die doel van hierdie proefskrif om ŉ kritiese, 
allesomvattende analise te bied ten opsigte van die Spilmagte en Geallieerdes se 
maritieme operasies rondom die suider-Afrikaanse kus tussen 1939 en 1945. Die 
proefskrif ondersoek die allesomvattende onderwerp deur die voorgenoemde 
navorsingsdoelwitte. Hierdie proefskrif val nie in die tradisionele bestek van ŉ 
regiments-, veldtog- of selfs persoonlike geskiedenis nie. Inteendeel bied dit ŉ nuwe 
analise oor ŉ episode in die Suid-Afrikaanse krygsgeskiedenis wat selde deur 
kontemporêre krygshistorici ondersoek is. 
 Die proefskrif bevind dat die Spilmagte en Geallieerdes se maritieme operasies 
rondom die suider-Afrikaanse kus uiters kompleks was, veral rondom die verskeie 
strategiese, militêre en ekonomiese aspekte wat dit ondersteun het. Verder bevind die 
studie ook dat daar ŉ definitiewe verwantskap was tussen die Spilmagte en 
Geallieerdes se maritieme strategieë en operasies rondom die suider-Afrikaanse kus. 
Die feit dat die meerderheid publikasies die verwantskap ignoreer, en eerder ŉ 
eensydige, gekompartementaliseerde, bespreking en analise bied, bly kommerwekkend. 
Dié proefskrif distansieer homself dus van die voorheen gepubliseerde akademiese- en 
populêre geskiedskrywing oor die onderwerp. In stede daarvan bied dit ŉ vars in-
diepte ondersoek en bespreking, gestaaf deur uitgebreide argivale navorsing, toegang 
tot voorheen geklassifiseerde inligting, en ŉ magdom sekondêre bronne. 
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Introduction 
1. Background 
In recent years, the global maritime domain has grown in stature and in importance. 
This argument is expressed by editors Francois Vreÿ and Thomas Mandrup in their 
introduction to Towards Good Order at Sea: African Experiences (2015). This rise in 
prominence is particularly visible in the spheres of innovation, competition and 
knowledge, where the principal aim is to make more constructive naval use of the 
oceans. The outcome is the tendency for both traditional and new maritime powers to 
position themselves strategically to utilise the political, economic, and military potential 
of the vast oceans. The visible increase in cases of maritime insecurity is associated with 
this strategic positioning, especially due to the lucrative maritime offerings of 
commerce, information and resources. Moreover, the willingness or ability of littoral 
countries with large ungoverned maritime spaces to enforce maritime jurisdiction over 
these areas remains problematic. Amid the growing global maritime dynamics, Africa, 
and southern Africa in particular, faces unique problems in ensuring good order at sea. 
Vreÿ and Mandrup further argue that the customary strategic outlook of Africa 
has been largely continental. African coastal states, have, by tradition, tended to neglect 
their oceans, maritime resources, naval forces, related affairs and other matters that 
culminate in creating a general state of maritime insecurity in African waters. As a result 
of this neglect, a general maritime deficit exists today. The shortfall is exacerbated by an 
observed lack of capacity of both naval forces and national legislative bodies to enforce 
jurisdiction over the territorial waters of coastal countries.1 
 A somewhat similar state of maritime insecurity existed around the southern 
African coastline shortly before and during the Second World War. This distinct 
historical case of maritime insecurity was the result of the strategic location of the 
Union of South Africa astride major shipping lanes rounding the Cape of Good Hope. Its 
physical positioning was coupled with the general interwar apathy shown for all 
matters relating to naval and coastal defence, as well as the overreliance on Britain to 
secure the Union’s territorial waters during hostilities. The Axis naval forces thereupon 
exploited the situation. They launched a series of naval operations with the explicit aim 
of disrupting merchant shipping traffic along the South African coast. They also sank 
sufficient Allied vessels in pursuit of the so-called war of tonnage. 
The evident state of maritime insecurity has, however, received scant scholarly 
attention. What has been notably overlooked is the interrelatedness of the Axis and 
Allied maritime strategies employed in the waters off southern Africa. Concomitant 
                                                             
1  F. Vreÿ and T. Mandrup, Towards Good Order at Sea: African Experiences (Stellenbosch: SUN 
MeDIA, 2015), p. 5. This sentiment is incidentally shared J. Black, War in the New Century 
(London: Continuum, 2001), pp. 86-90. 
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matters relating to said strategies include wartime shipping, coastal defences, naval 
operations, the naval intelligence war and anti-submarine warfare (ASW). An informed 
study regarding the maritime war off the South African coast thus remains wanting. Few 
historians and popular writers have been willing to engage with the wealth of primary 
archival material available on this particular subject in South Africa, the United Kingdom 
(UK), and further afield. 
 In Rethinking Military History, the renowned British historian Jeremy Black 
cautions the intrepid military historian to remain ever-aware of the marked distinction 
between air, land, and naval warfare. He argues, however, that the uniqueness of naval 
history requires it to be studied by taking the adjoining conflict on land and in the air 
into account. Despite Black’s forewarning, contemporary naval histories, and 
particularly those focusing on the naval war off the southern African coast between 
1939 and 1945, have generally fallen into the trap of isolating naval history to a mere 
tactical and operational study of the conflict at sea.2 In South Africa, this isolationist 
approach is particularly evident, with the vast majority of historiographical works only 
addressing the operational level of the naval war. 
Black further draws attention to the benefit of re-examining historical events, 
particularly when the military historian can reconcile a variety of primary and 
secondary sources on a subject. This allows the military historian the unique 
opportunity to reinterpret previous historical accounts, probe largely untapped primary 
archival sources, and provide a fresh analysis on crucial moments in military history.3 
The unique occasion to do so has presented itself in this dissertation. This opportunity 
allows for a re-examination of the Axis and Allied maritime operations off the southern 
African coast during the Second World War. Black, citing Rory Muir’s Salamanca 1812, 
highlights the unique undertaking created with this dissertation, particularly in 
addressing the research gap. Muir states: 
… while the sources are plentiful, they do not always fit neatly together; 
indeed, they are riddled with contradictions, inconsistencies, gaps and 
uncertainty … Normally the historian deals privately with these problems … 
This method is inescapable in addressing a large, sweeping subject if the 
narrative is not to lose its momentum and the reader to miss the thread of 
the argument. However, it can also mislead the reader by suggesting that our 
understanding is far more securely based than is the case.4 
  
                                                             
2  J. Black, Rethinking Military History (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004), pp. 22-23. 
3  Black, Rethinking Military History, pp. 30-32. 
4  Black, Rethinking Military History, p. 30. 
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2. Literature Review 
A study of the historiography of the Axis and Allied maritime operations around 
southern Africa during the Second World War, requires a multidisciplinary approach. 
The discussion that follows initially addresses the historiographical works from a broad 
perspective, with a particular focus on sources dealing with the relevant aspects of naval 
strategy, the naval war, the course of the war, U-boats, intelligence and the war 
economy. The discussion then narrows its focus to include all the relevant source 
material specifically dealing with aspects correlating directly to Axis and Allied 
maritime operations in the South African sphere of influence during the war. These 
facets include interwar naval development, the naval war, coastal defences and 
intelligence, as well as general sources. What follows is a brief description of these 
varied historiographical works. 
 The historiography on naval strategy, in general, is vast. Several sources, 
however, deserve specific mention as they form the basis for an understanding of the 
Axis and Allied maritime strategies employed during the Second World War. These texts 
provide a detailed discussion on the evolution of naval strategic thought, and are 
recognised primers in the field of naval history and broader maritime studies. These 
works served as the foundation for the dissetrtation, particualry in forming a key 
understanding of naval strategy, naval warfare theory, the wartime application of 
seapower, as well as critical developments and moments in the naval sphere during the 
twentieth century. In this respect, the work of Julian Corbett, Paul Kennedy, Greg 
Kennedy, Alfred Mahan and Ernst King proved most insightful, especially from a 
strategic point of view.5 
Several other works add to the ongoing discussion surrounding the evolution of 
strategic naval thought. Of particular interest to this dissertation were works that 
focused on the operational level of naval warfare, with a specific emphasis on the 
changing nature and extent of naval operations throughout history. The work of Wayne 
Hughes, Christopher McMahon and Douglas Peifer proved immensely valuable sources 
to consult in this regard, especially as to their varied discussions on the operational 
application of seapower.6 In addition, the works of Andrew Lambert, E.B. Potter and 
                                                             
5  J.S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (London: Longmans Green, 1918); P.M. Kennedy, 
The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (New York: Humanity Books, 1986); G. Kennedy, 
Britain’s War at Sea, 1914-1918: The war they thought and the war they fought (Basingstoke: 
Routledge, 2016); G. Kennedy, The Royal Navy and Imperial Defence, 1919-1945 (London: 
Routledge, 2008); A.T. Mahan, Naval Strategy: Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and 
Practise of Military Operations on Land (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Company, 1911); E.J. 
King, ‘The Role of Sea Power in International Security’ in Proceedings of the Academy of Political 
Science, 21(3), 1945, pp. 79-86. 
6  W.P. Hughes, ‘Naval Operations: A Close Look at the Operational Level of War at Sea’ in Naval War 
College Review, 65(3), 2012, pp. 23-46; C.J. McMahon, ‘Maritime Trade Warfare: A Strategy for the 
Twenty-First Century?’ in Naval War College Review, 70(3) 2017, pp. 15-38; D.C Peifer, ‘Maritime 
Commerce Warfare: The coercive response of the weak?’ in Naval War College Review, 66(2), 
2013, pp. 83-109. 
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Chester Nimitz, Geoffrey Till and Frank Uhlig also provide a strong sense of the changing 
nature of naval warfare and strategic thought.7 An article by P.A. Stemmet, ‘Mahan se 
Teorie van Seemag’,8 augments the above discussion from a South African perspective, 
by using Mahan’s theory of seapower as a cursory lense to investigate the importance of 
the maritime trade routes traversing the Cape of Good Hope. Stemmet’s analysis is, 
however, superficial at best. In addition, Francis Carroll’s ‘The First Shot was the Last 
Straw: The Sinking of the T.S.S. Athenia in September 1939 and British Naval Policy in 
the Second World War’,9 give an insightful account of the changing nature of British 
naval policy and strategy on the eve of the outbreak of the Second World War. It is 
regrettable that these sources are largely general and add little to the discussion on the 
Axis and Allied maritime strategies employed in the waters off southern Africa during 
the war. 
 The strategic and historical importance of the maritime trade routes that round 
the Cape of Good Hope has received scant historiographical attention. There are, 
however, some sources of merit. An article by C.M. Meyer, ‘From Spices to Oil: Sea Power 
and the Sea Routes around the Cape’,10 discusses the strategic importance of the 
maritime trade routes around the Cape of Good Hope. The article primarily examines 
the post-war period, principally against the backdrop of the Cold War. Its contents are 
noteworthy, especially when read in tandem with B.H. Malyon’s article entitled ‘South 
African Shipping’.11 Malyon gives an interesting account of the state of pre-war shipping 
in South Africa, especially regarding the strategic value of South African ports which 
allowed shipping to pass through. In addition, a few texts highlight the strategic 
importance of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans and Mediterranean during the war, which 
naturally had a bearing on the shipping situation in South African waters. The foremost 
authors that engaged with this topic include Rashid Khan, Richard Hammond, Joseph 
Roucek, Simon Ball, Warwick Dörning and R.W. Close.12 
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11  B.H. Malyon, ‘South African Shipping’ in Journal of the Royal African Society, 36(145), 1937, pp. 
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 There are two official history series that deserve attention when discussing the 
general historiographical sources surrounding the naval war. The first is the three 
volumes of The War at Sea13 produced by Capt RN Stephen Roskill. Roskill was the 
erstwhile appointed historian of the Royal Navy, and author of the official histories on 
Britain’s naval contribution to the Second World War. The first two volumes, ‘The 
Defensive’ and ‘The Period of Balance’, are most informative. They deal with the naval 
war fought in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans throughout 1941-1943, especially from a 
staunch British perspective. Roskill discusses the strategic direction of the British war 
effort, and most notably that of the British Admiralty regarding ASW at great length. As 
this naturally has a bearing on the South African approach to ASW during the war, these 
volumes remain an extremely valuable historical source. Roskill had unprecedented and 
unlimited access to both the official UK war records and the captured German naval 
records, which adds a certain depth to these works.  
The second series was written by Stanley Woodburn Kirby, a former British army 
officer who saw service in both world wars. He formed part of a committee that 
produced five volumes entitled The War against Japan.14 The second volume of this 
series, ‘India’s Most Dangerous Hour’ devotes an entire chapter to the Madagascar 
campaign. It thus contains a wealth of information on the limited Japanese submarine 
offensive in the Mozambican channel in June and July 1942. 
Next to several South African sources pointed out supra, these volumes help to 
complete the narrative on the Axis and Allied maritime operations around the South 
African coast during the war. It is true that these sources are overtly British centric and 
principally considered with the Allied conduct of the war. They form, however, key texts 
for any study focusing on the maritime aspect of the Second World War. The two official 
histories are evidently supplemented by the comprehensive official German history 
series, Germany and the Second World War. The series is not yet completed, and is 
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Office, 1961). 
14  S. Woodburn Kirby (et al.), The War against Japan: The Loss of Singapore (Vol. I) (London: H.M. 
Stationery Office, 1957); S. Woodburn Kirby (et al.), The War against Japan: India’s Most 
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mainly available through on-demand prints. Nevertheless, its volumes allow for valuable 
grist on the nature and course of the German naval war.15 
 Two personal memoirs of great significance add to the historiography on the 
overall Axis naval strategy, as well as the nature and course of the war at sea. First and 
foremost is the personal memoir of Großadmiral Karl Dönitz, Zehn Jahre und Zwanzig 
Tage.16 The account offers an in-depth account of his experiences as the supreme 
commander of the U-boat Arm of the German Navy for the period 1939-1943, as well as 
of his later appointment as the commander of the German Navy from 1943 to 1945. This 
publication offers a unique perspective on the combined Axis naval strategy during the 
war, with an emphasis on German submarine operations. As the work deals with the 
operations around the coast of South Africa throughout the war, it is a precious source 
of consultation. Furthermore, the publication provides an invaluable insight into the 
combined German-Japanese naval strategy in the Southern Oceans. Dönitz’s memoir 
remains one of the most important sources on the German submarine operations to 
date.  
A second personal narrative is that of Großadmiral Erich Raeder, and is entitled 
Grand Admiral: The Personal Memoirs of the Commander in Chief of the German Navy 
from 1935 until the final break with Hitler in 1943.17 This text offers a valuable insight 
into the development of the Axis maritime strategy during the interwar period, as well 
as the initial operational deployments at the start of the Second World War. When read 
in conjunction with Dönitz’s memoir, Raeder’s work provides the researcher with a 
clear understanding of the strategic direction, command and control of the German 
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Navy during the war. Keith Bird’s Erich Raeder: Admiral of the Third Reich further 
supplements these works, by providing a more contemporary analysis of the key role 
that Erich Raeder played in the spheres of maritime strategy and naval operations 
during the first years of the Second World War18 Moreover, the two personal accounts 
offer somewhat of an in-depth explanation of the German decision to launch dedicated 
submarine offensives around the coast of South Africa, and are thus of great importance 
to this study. 
 Several general works on the subject of the naval war during the Second World 
War offer valuable insights into the submarine war, anti-submarine matters, merchant 
losses and, above all, naval strategy. The general sources consulted place the 
dissertation into the broad context of the Second World War. The texts consulted 
include works by amongst other Winston Churchill, Williamson Murray and Allan Millet, 
Andrew Stewart, Hew Strachan, Martin Thomas, Andrew Boyd, James Neidpath, Marc 
Milner and Ashley Jackson.19 The texts succeed in confirming concurrent military 
operations that influenced the course and conduct of the maritime war waged off the 
South African coast. 
 Of similar interest are several texts pertaining to the strategic importance of 
ocean convoys in hauling key logistical needs across the globe during the war. The 
significance of the convoys, as well as their vulnerability to Axis naval operations, are 
addressed in the works of John Slader, Kevin Smith, the US Navy Department, and 
Bernard Brodie amongst other.20 
The immense importance of signals intelligence and codebreaking during the 
war, especially regarding its relation to the conduct of the naval war and ASW in 
general, is also discussed by various authors. Even though these authors do not 
concentrate on the naval intelligence war waged in southern Africa specifcally, the 
works of David Khan, Jürgen Rohwer, Donald Steury, Jock Gardner and Marcus Faulkner 
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proved extremely insightful and served as a basis for understanding the complex realm 
of signals intelligence and codebreaking during the Second World War.21 
 A significant number of sources deal directly with the Axis U-boat operations 
during the war, and while not entirely concerned with the naval operations along the 
South African coast, provided useful material for research on the topic. The most 
important works consulted in this regard include those authored by Harold Busch, 
Holger Herwig, John Keegan, V.E. Tarrant, Theodore Savas, Bob Whinney, Karl 
Lautenschlager, Stephen Howarth and Derke Law, Eberhard Rossler, John and Chant 
Batchelor, Mochitsura Hashimoto, Harry Spong, Richard Osborne and Tom Grover, 
Malcom Llewellyn-Jones and Stephanie Cousineau.22 The above works, combined with 
the texts previously mentioned, offer a clear understanding of the Axis and Allied 
maritime operations during the war. The combination of the two groups of sources 
allows for an additional understanding of several strategic and operational factors that 
underpinned the maritime operations off the southern African coast. 
 The economic aspect of the war, particularly its relation to the Axis and Allied 
maritime operations around southern Africa, is of vital importance to this dissertation. 
The continued operation of the strategic maritime trade routes around the Cape of Good 
Hope had a direct correlation with both the Allied and South African war economies 
throughout the war. It has thus been necessary to consult a wide array of 
historiographical sources. The most prominent sources in this regard are authored by 
William Hancock and Margaret Gowing, Iain Johnston-White, Stephen Roskill, Richard 
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Leighton and Robert Coakley, Charles Feinstein, Michael Postan, Arthur Lewis and H.S. 
Perry.23 
 Additionally, there are several publications dealing with the African war 
economy and the broader aspects that affected it. The interrelatedness of the African 
war economies, particularly those countries in southern Africa reliant on the shipping 
passing through South African ports, highlights the importance of consulting this wide 
array of source material. The most relevant sources in this regard are those of Carolyn 
Brown, Judith Byfield, William Clarence-Smith, Raymond Dumett, Peter Henshaw, 
Milton Katz, Yolandi Albertyn, William Martin, Alfred Tembo and the Union Office of 
Census and Statistics.24 
 The literature review next turns its attention to the narrower ambit of South 
Africa specific historiographical works. The sources of particular interest are those 
relating to the Axis and Allied maritime operations around the southern African coast 
during the war. These varied texts proved integral in the completion of this dissertation.  
The first set of sources that deserve discussion relates to interwar naval 
development in South Africa. Those focussing on the establishment of the South African 
Naval Service (SANS), the Seward Defence Force (SDF) and the South African Naval 
Forces (SANF) were critical to the study. Three general articles are also noteworthy. 
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These works incidentally all appeared in the peer-reviewed South African Journal of 
Military Studies, Scientia Militaria. They are André Wessels’ ‘The South African Navy and 
its Predecessors, 1910-2010: A Century of Interaction with Commonwealth Navies’,25 as 
well as Thean Potgieter’s ‘Maritime Defence and the South African Navy to the 
Cancellation of the Simon's Town Agreement’ and ‘Guiding the Seafarers: The South 
African Hydrographic Office and the Contribution of the Three Proteas’.26 Not one of 
these articles are underpinned by the rigorous trawling of the Department of Defence’s 
Documentation Centre (DOD Archives) in Pretoria, South Africa, and are thus judged 
accordingly. 
While these three works may have points worth merit, their discussion of the 
interwar naval developments in South Africa is negligible. In particular, they overlook 
the deteriorating Anglo-South African naval relations leading up to the formation of the 
SDF. Several interrelated matters concerning the development of a South African coastal 
defence system during this period are also omitted. 
The publication of Johan Ellis’ ‘Oswald Pirow’s Five-Year Plan for the 
Reorganisation of the Union Defence Force, 1933-1939’,27 provided some insights into 
the warped reorganisation of the Union Defence Force (UDF) under Oswald Pirow 
during the 1930s. The article, however, consults limited archival sources and only offers 
a superficial discussion of the intricacies surrounding the reorganisation of the UDF 
mainly from a naval point of view. 
 Prof Deon Visser†, an erstwhile military historian at the Faculty of Military 
Science, published two articles between 2007 and 2008. The articles dealt with the 
reorganisation of the UDF during the interwar period, mainly from a naval point of view. 
The articles focussed on the so-called ‘Erebus Scheme’. They go some way to highlight 
both the political and military intricacies at the foundation of interwar Anglo-South 
African naval relations. These articles, ‘Anglo-South African Relations and the Erebus 
Scheme, 1936-1939’ and ‘‘Mutiny’ on HMS Erebus, September 1939’,28 are a 
commendable source on the naval development in South Africa leading up to the war. 
They offer a more in-depth discussion than the occasional drum and trumpet approach 
of the works mentioned before. 
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Several texts authored by Ian van der Waag also outdo the works discussed in the 
last few paragraphs on the interwar naval development in South Africa. His works 
include ‘The Union Defence Force between the World Wars, 1919-1940’,29 ‘The Thin 
Edge of the Wedge’: Anglo-South African Relations, Dominion Nationalism and the 
Formation of the Seaward Defence Force in 1939–1940’,30 ‘Smuts’s Generals: Towards a 
First Portrait of the South African High Command, 1912–1948’31 and ‘South African 
defence in the age of total war, 1900–1940’.32 These works provided useful subject 
matter, particularly on the developments of the SDF as well as South Africa’s coastal 
defences. What sets Van der Waag’s work apart is that it continuously engages with 
primary archival material located in both South Africa and the UK. He also brings to light 
a unique understanding of the formative years of the UDF. 
The historiographical works relating explicitly to South Africa, were 
supplemented by Reginald Pound’s Evans of the Broke: A Biography of Admiral Lord 
Mountevans KCB, DSO, LLD33 Sereld Hay’s History of the R.N.V.R. South African Division,34 
and Kenneth Dimbleby’s Hostilities Only.35 
 The quantity and quality of the military historical works produced on the South 
African participation in the Second World War drastically lag behind concurrent 
international historiographical trends. This is the argument of David Katz in his 2012 
article ‘A Case of Arrested Development: The Historiography Relating to South Africa’s 
Participation in the Second World War’.36 He maintains that the nadir in the writing up 
of the official history of South African participation in the war was ushered in when the 
Afrikaner Nationalist Party assumed power in 1948.37  
Despite this actuality, a number of official and semi-official histories on South 
Africa’s participation in the Second World War did appear. The Union War Histories 
Section was tasked with writing the official histories. However, the section was closed 
down permanently in 1961 after the appearance of only three publications.38 These 
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were: Crisis in the Desert (1952),39 The Sidi Rezegh Battles, 1941 (1957),40 and War in the 
Southern Oceans, 1939-1945 (1961).41 The latter is the first important work that warrants 
discussion. It was the first official narrative to be published on the SDF and SANF during 
the Second World War. War in the Southern Oceans primarily offers a large-scale 
operational study of both the Axis and Allied naval activities around southern Africa 
during the war. Its value is in its unrivalled account of the Axis maritime operations off 
the South African coast during the war. The book’s greatest strength is, however, also its 
greatest weakness because its primary focus is on the German maritime operations. 
 Some concerns may be raised about War in the Southern Oceans. First, it fails to 
critically discuss the development of the Allied countermeasures around the South 
African coastline during the war. The combined operations aimed at combatting the 
maritime threat around the southern Africa coast are also offered as a mere fait 
accompli. Second, a detailed appreciation of the German intelligence networks in South 
Africa and Portuguese East Africa during the war is lacking, principally regarding the 
involvement of Axis agents in gathering naval intelligence in pursuit of the maritime war 
off the South African coast. Thirdly, the Union War Histories Section collected a wealth 
of primary archival material on the Axis and Allied maritime operations around the 
South African coast, yet only a fraction of this was used in the final publication of War in 
the Southern Oceans. There is thus a rich collection of mostly untapped primary archival 
material available to researchers willing to engage with the documentation. 
 From 1961 the recording of South Africa’s war effort remained rather haphazard. 
This is because the Nationalist Government, as well as citizen force and ex-servicemen’s 
associations, all at one point or other undertook projects aimed at resuscitating the 
memories of South Africa’s participation in the Second World War. This led to the 
publication of a number of historiographical works, some of which are of dubious 
quality and often hagiographic in outlook.  
There are also only a few revisionary type scholarly works that have re-examined 
certain aspects of South Africa’s wartime history, despite the wealth of declassified 
primary archival documents available to researchers.42 Commander H.R. Gordon-
Cumming wrote the first draft narrative of the South African Naval Forces during the 
Second World War, which was completed by December 1950. The manuscript was not 
published outright, and was instead archived at the DOD Archives. Nonetheless some of 
Gordon-Cumming’s chapters were included in War in the Southern Oceans. Some of the 
most important works on the development of the SDF and SANF were, however, 
excluded from the publication. By December 1967 a shorter version of Gordon-
Cumming’s work, which he aptly titled Brief History (Sea), appeared in A Short History of 
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the SA Navy. This work was compiled by A.P. Burgers for the Directorate of Personnel at 
Naval Headquarters in Pretoria. During the 50 year celebration of the establishment of 
the South African Navy in 1972, a commemorative publication entitled South Africa’s 
Navy, The First Fifty Years appeared was produced. It also contained extracts from 
Gordon-Cumming’s Brief History (Sea). In 1992, some of the unpublished chapters from 
Gordon-Cumming’s narrative were collated by Mac Bisset and printed in a 
commemorative issue of the South African military journal Militaria.43 This publication 
coincided with the 70th celebration of the founding of the SA Navy. 
 The Advisory Committee on Military History was formed in the late 1960s with 
the sole purpose of ensuring that the publication programme of the Union War Histories 
Section would continue.44 Following initiatives from some veteran organisations, and 
run under the leadership of Neil Orpen, the primary aim of the Advisory Committee on 
Military History was to complete the history of South Africa’s participation in the Second 
World War. Regrettably, the publications which emanated from this endeavour can at 
best be classified as semi-official histories. They lack original research and rely too 
heavily on the unpublished manuscripts of the Union War Histories Section. They 
therefore add very little to the general body of knowledge on South African participation 
in the war.45 Nine volumes on the South African participation in the war did, moreover, 
appear between 1968 and 1982.46 Jeffrey Grey† has however argued that “…these 
volumes were neither as rigorous, as sophisticated nor as authoritative as the three 
books produced by [the] Union War Histories.”47 These volumes are also only be 
deemed as semi-official histories, and though varying in quality, add to the 
historiography surrounding the South African participation in the war. 
 Of these nine volumes, only one contains some valuable material on the Axis and 
Allied maritime operations around the South African coast during the war. South Africa 
at War: Military and Industrial Organization and Operations in connection with the 
conduct of the War, 1939-1945 includes discussions on the South African and Allied 
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countermeasures that were established to combat the threat of the Axis maritime 
operations in the Southern Oceans In the authors’ acknowledgements, Orpen and Martin 
categorically state that “The official history of naval operations off the South African 
coast, War in the Southern Oceans, has been continuously consulted to correlate 
information… with the common aim of combating the destructive efforts of the enemy at 
sea.”48  
Taking the above quotation into consideration, the general impression is that 
large tracts of the manuscript are a mere revision of material found in War in the 
Southern Oceans. The shortcomings of War in the Southern Oceans are thus perpetuated. 
In fact, at a cursory glance, it becomes rather apparent that the references in the 
chapters dealing with the Axis maritime operations around the southern African coast 
are all taken from War in the Southern Oceans. The strength of the publication is that it 
offers a description of the military and industrial organisation of the South African home 
front throughout the war. The secondary focus is on the Allied and Axis maritime 
operations around the coast of South Africa. While Orpen’s and Martin’s approach was 
anything but original, they did succeed in bringing together some missing aspects on the 
South African coastal defences and its development throughout the war. The 1991 
publication of C.J. Harris’ War at Sea: South African Maritime Operations during World 
War II,49 which formed part of the poorly regarded Ashanti South Africans at War series, 
unfortunately added no new analysis of the maritime operations around the South 
African coast during the war. It remains nothing more than a poorly formulated 
propaganda piece. 
 It was only in 2008, at the behest of the Naval Heritage Trust of South Africa, that 
Gordon-Cummings’ Official History of the South African Naval Forces during the Second 
World War (1939-1945)50 was published in its entirety. The complete work, generally 
referred to as the ‘long history’, was a welcome addition to the historiography on the 
SANS, SDF and SANF, as well as their development throughout the Second World War. 
This publication naturally filled some of the historical gaps created by the War in the 
Southern Oceans, though the research and analysis surrounding it primarily date back to 
the late 1940s and early 1950s. The document therefore remains dated and should be 
interpreted as such.  
Next to War in the Southern Oceans, Gordon Cummings’ manuscript is one of the 
most complete historical works on the maritime war off southern Africa during the war. 
The manuscript provides an unrivalled discussion of the development of the South 
African coastal defences during the war, as well as the formation and expansion of both 
the SDF and SANF. While one cannot fault Gordon-Cumming’s manuscript from a 
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historical point of view, the subsequent editorial process followed by the Naval Heritage 
Trust leaves a lot to be desired. The editors seemed to have accepted the manuscript as 
it was. The editors did not engage with the wealth of unpublished archival material 
available to researchers at the DOD Archives, thus missing the opportunity to enhance 
Gordon-Cummings’ text.  
 Several other texts have supplemented the afore-mentioned sources on the naval 
war off southern Africa. The first worth mentioning is Wessels’ ‘South Africa and the 
War against Japan 1941-1945’ and ‘Die stryd teen Nippon: Suid-Afrika en Japan, 1941-
1945’.51 While the former is the original article, the latter is a mere Afrikaans translation 
of the original. Wessels does, however, engage with an aspect of the South African war 
effort that has received limited interest. Neither of his articles, however, succeed in 
placing the limited Japanese submarine offensives of mid-1942 into the larger context of 
the total Axis maritime operations off southern Africa. The articles have also failed to 
engage with the wealth of primary archival material available at the DOD Archives.  
In 2008 Jochen Mahncke published a book entitled U-Boats & Spies in Southern 
Africa: Anecdotes, Legends, Stories.52 Mahncke is an avid enthusiast and an amateur 
historian, and his book is far from a professional publication. He has taken recourse to a 
number of secondary sources while writing the manuscript, including War in Southern 
Oceans. His book is also riddled with historical inaccuracies and careless mistakes. As 
Mahncke’s work is based on anecdotes, legends and stories, his book should thus be 
judged accordingly.  
The author’s own article, ‘‘Good Hunting’: German Submarine Offensives and 
South African Countermeasures off the South African Coast during the Second World 
War, 1942-1945’,53 focussed on the German U-boat operations off the South African 
coast in particular. The article was made possible through the discovery of valuable 
primary archival material at the DOD Archives, and focusses on the larger Axis maritime 
operations in these waters . This article also formed the basis for a more in-depth study 
on the complex and varied nature of the Axis and Allied maritime operations off 
southern Africa, and has thus led to this dissertation.  
 Several general sources have supplemented the available information on the 
development and functioning of the South African coastal defences during the war. Each 
of these sources thus complemented the available information found in War in Southern 
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Oceans and Official History of the South African Naval Forces during the Second World 
War. In some instances, they have added a new layer of discussion on pertinent issues.  
Other general sources deal with the wartime development of radar in South 
Africa and the work of Special Signal Services in helping to locate U-boats operational off 
the Union’s coastline. The most noteworthy works are authored by Brian Austin, A.C. 
Brown, the Documentation Centre, Neville Gomm, Frank Hewitt, Geoffrey Mangin and 
Sheilah Lloyd, as well as N.A. Stott.54  
A number of sources also provide useful background information on the interwar 
development of coastal artillery and air forces in South Africa, especially Mac Bisset’s 
‘Coast Artillery in South Africa’55 and Tilman Dedering’s ‘Air Power in South Africa, 
1914–1939’.56 Any discussion on the wartime development of Saldanha as a safe 
anchorage for Allied vessels travelling along the extensive South African coast would be 
incomplete without three particular texts. They are Deon Visser and Fankie Monama’s 
‘Black workers, typhoid fever and the construction of the Berg River – Saldanha military 
water pipeline, 1942 – 1943’,57 Jose Burman and Stephen Levin’s The Saldanha Bay 
Story,58 as well as Deon Visser, André Jacobs and Hennie Smit’s ‘Water for Saldanha: War 
as an Agent of Change’.59 
 Next, it is of interest to the dissertation to mention a number of texts that fall into 
the category of intelligence histories. These publications naturally serve as a point of 
departure for any discussion on the influence of Axis and Allied intelligence 
communities on the submarine war around the coast of South Africa. They similarly look 
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at the role which right-wing Afrikaner movements played in sabotage attempts and 
eavesdropping. Regarding the British Intelligence Service and its role and activities 
during the war, the five volumes of British Intelligence in the Second World War60 
produced by Harry Hinsley and his colleagues, provide an in-depth account of the 
British intelligence service throughout the war. Hinsley worked at Bletchley Park during 
the war, at a senior level, on naval intelligence, and had very full access to the records. 
Volume four in particular provides valuable information on Anglo-South African 
cooperation with regard to intelligence gathering and distribution, as well as an analysis 
of the German intelligence presence and its inner workings in southern Africa. It is far 
more informative than some of the recent publications on the British intelligence 
services during the war, despite the fact that a wealth of classified documentation has 
been declassified since these volumes first appeared. 
Several sources have supplemented Hinsley’s work and provided a more detailed 
description on the intelligence network and organisation in South Africa during the war. 
The works are Ernst Malherbe’s Never a Dull Moment,61 Andries Fokkens’ The Role and 
Application of the Union Defence Force in The Suppression Of Internal Unrest, 1912 – 1945 
and ‘Afrikaner Unrest within South Africa during the Second World War and the 
measures taken to suppress it’,62 and M.C. van Deventer’s ‘Die Ontwikkeling van 'n 
Militêre Inligtingsvermoë Vir Die Unieverdedigingsmag, 1937-1943’.63 
 The afore-mentioned intelligence histories are, however, extremely general, and 
do not readily engage with the maritime intelligence war waged in southern Africa 
during the war. In the 1976 publication of OB: Traitors or Patriots?, George Visser 
explores the intricacies of the German intelligence network active in southern Africa 
during the war.64 This publication is commendable, as Visser, a veteran policeman, was 
personally involved in several of the investigations and operations aimed at 
apprehending the known Axis agents in the Union. Unfortunately, Visser was never 
privy to the complete extent of the Axis intelligence network, as is evidenced by his 
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inability to identify the real identities of several of the key Axis agents. This criticism 
may, however, be somewhat unfair considering that a wealth of British intelligence files 
have been declassified since the appearance of his manuscript.  
Five peer-reviewed articles are then worth special mention. They are, Kent 
Fedorowich’s ‘German Espionage and British Counter-Intelligence in South Africa and 
Mozambique, 1939-1944’,65 Edward Harrison’s ‘On Secret Service for the Duce: 
Umberto Campini in Portuguese East Africa, 1941-1943’ and ‘British Radio Security and 
Intelligence, 1939-43’,66 Patrick Furlong’s ‘Allies at War? Britain and the ‘Southern 
African Front’ in the Second World War’67 along with Keith Shear’s ‘Colonel Coetzee's 
War: Loyalty, Subversion and the South African Police, 1939–1945’.68 These 
publications have proved instrumental in understanding the complex nature of the 
Allied counterintelligence organisations active in southern Africa. They have also drawn 
attention to the strained relationships and inter-service rivalry between these diverse 
organisations throughout the war. In addition, several of the articles discussed the 
counterintelligence operations during the war, particularly those that occurred in 
Portuguese East Africa. A reference to these works is vital for any study of the Axis and 
Allied intelligence networks in southern Africa during the war. 
 While the afore-mentioned intelligence histories all have their merits, they suffer 
from one common flaw. None of these authors gained access to the Ossewabrandwag 
(OB) Archives situated at the North-West University (NWU) in Potchefstroom, South 
Africa. They did thus not succeed in engaging with the wealth of primary archival 
material available on the Axis espionage network in South Africa. It does need to be 
mentioned that the OB documents are all in Afrikaans, and that, even if granted access, 
researchers from abroad would struggle with the language barrier.  
Several sources, mainly written in Afrikaans and of South African origin, have, 
however, proved instrumental while researching the Axis espionage networks active in 
southern Africa. They include the work of Lindie Koorts, Christoph Marx, Hans Strydom, 
Bob Moore, Will and Marietjie Radley, Hans Rooseboom, Hans Van Rensburg and Piet 
van der Schyff.69 
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Unfortunately, a certain gatekeeper mentality remained prevalent amongst the 
staff at the OB Archive regarding access to some of the available archival material. This 
gatekeeper mentality remained in place until very recently, and naturally affected 
contemporary research into the organisation. It is unfortunate that some embargoes 
restricting access to certain documentation at the OB Archive meant that even the afore-
mentioned works did not provide an accurate historical account. The lifting of these 
embargoes a few years ago means that the record on the nature and extent of the Axis 
espionage networks in southern Africa can finally be set straight. The same can be said 
for the principal role that the OB played in supporting this network during the war. 
 Finally, a few general works on the South African participation in the Second 
World War have been integral in complementing the previously discussed sources. 
These publications have proved especially valuable in qualifying certain facts and 
providing valuable military historical background material to supplement primary 
archival material. The first of these works is the 2015 publication of Ian van der Waag’s 
A Military History of Modern South Africa.70 This publication offers an in-depth analysis 
of the military history of South Africa during the twentieth century. It concurrently 
offers an unrivalled discussion on the interwar military developments in South Africa. 
Van der Waag’s discussion on the naval and coastal developments within the Union 
shortly before and during the war is equally commendable. The scope of his work is, 
however, particularly large, with the concomitant result that he fails to investigate 
certain prevalent issues relating to this dissertation.  
Two separate works by Fankie Monama have also proved useful. Both ‘South 
African Propaganda Agencies and the Battle for Public Opinion during the Second World 
War, 1939–1945’ and Wartime Propaganda in the Union of South Africa, 1939-1945,71 
provide a detailed discussion on the propaganda aspect of the South African war effort. 
As this formed an important aspect of the naval intelligence war off southern Africa, 
these works supplemented the primary archival material consulted in this regard.  
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(Potchefstroom: PU vir CHO, 1984). 
70  I.J. Van der Waag, A Military History of Modern South Africa (Cape Town: Jonathan Ball, 2015). 
71  F.L. Monama, ‘South African Propaganda Agencies and the Battle for Public Opinion during the 
Second World War, 1939–1945’ in Scientia Militaria, 44(1), 2016, pp. 145-167; F.L. Monama, 
Wartime Propaganda in the Union of South Africa, 1939-1945. PhD Thesis, Stellenbosch University, 
2014. 
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The last works worth mentioning are several contemporary South African 
academic works. Despite not focussing on the maritime war off the South African coast 
specifically, they have influenced the dissertation at one time or another. They are, 
David Katz’ Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk: Two South African Military Disasters Revisited and 
South Africans versus Rommel: The Untold Story of the Desert War in World War II,72 Tony 
Garcia’s Manoeuvre warfare in the South African campaign in German South West Africa 
during the First World War,73 and Karen Horn’s South African prisoner-of-war experience 
during and after World War II: 1939 – c.1950.74 
 It is evident from the above discussion that there has been no recent analysis of 
the Axis maritime operations off the South African coast during the Second World War, 
or for that matter, of the Allied response to this threat. This void in the historiography 
has persisted despite the wealth of primary archival material that is available in both 
South Africa and the UK. Moreover, the majority of the publications discussed supra are 
dated, and in several cases remain the objects of political interference. As a result, the 
texts have their natural limitations. These have left large historical gaps in the 
historiography of the South African involvement in the war, as well as the Axis and 
Allied maritime operations around the Union’s coastline.  
To conclude the literature review, it needs to be mentioned that there are no MA 
or PhD studies focussing on this specific subject. This study thus aims to fill the 
identifiable gap in the historiography surrounding the maritime war off southern Africa 
during the Second World War. 
3. Research Aim and Chapter Structure 
This study provides a critical, comprehensive analysis of the Axis and Allied maritime 
operations around Southern Africa between 1939 and 1945. The dissertation 
investigates this broad topic in terms of the research objectives outlined below and 
straddles the strata of war by offering fresh insights into an episode of South African 
military history which has heretofore received little scholarly attention. The 
dissertation furthermore distances itself from the majority of previous academic and 
popular works on the subject discussed supra. It offers a fresh, in-depth discussion 
based on extensive archival research supplemented by a wealth of secondary sources. 
 To achieve its primary aim, the study has the following secondary objectives. The 
narrative, constructed over five chapters, focusses on specific aspects of the maritime 
war waged off the South African coast during the war. The first chapter discusses the 
                                                             
72  D.B. Katz, Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk: Two South African Military Disasters Revisited, 1941-1942. MMil 
Thesis, Stellenbosch University, 2014; D.B. Katz, South Africans versus Rommel: The Untold Story 
of the Desert War in World War II (Maryland: Stackpole, 2017). 
73  A. Garcia, Manoeuvre warfare in the South African campaign in German South West Africa during 
the First World War. MA Thesis, University of South Africa, 2015. 
74  K. Horn, South African prisoner-of-war experience during and after World War II: 1939 – c.1950. 
PhD Thesis, Stellenbosch University, 2012. 
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Axis and Allied maritime strategies off the South African coast. The general aspects of 
naval warfare theory and the foundation of a maritime strategy thus receives specific 
attention. The British and German naval war plans, however, are evaluated to determine 
their influence on the rival naval strategies and naval operations in the Southern 
Oceans. The chapter then focusses on South African wartime shipping dilemmas, 
especially how they influenced the South African war effort. The final discussion of 
chapter one is on the strategic importance of South African harbours during the war, 
paying particular attention to the control, victualling and repair of merchant and naval 
vessels that visited the Union ports between 1939 and 1945.  
 The second chapter concentrates on the development of the South African 
coastal defence system between 1933 and 1945. The chapter first investigates the 
establishment of South Africa’s coastal and naval defences during the interwar period, 
especially against the backdrop of economic rationalisation and Imperial defence. The 
chapter then discusses the creation of the Seaward Defence Force (SDF), while drawing 
attention to the somewhat tense Anglo-South African naval relations at the outbreak of 
the war. The chapter concludes with a lengthy discussion focusing on the development 
of a comprehensive South African coastal defence system during the war years.  
The third chapter deals exclusively with the maritime operations of the Axis 
raiders, mines and submarines off the South African coast during the war. The chapter 
first investigates the operational successes of the Axis raiders and mines between 1939 
and 1942. It then discusses the limited Japanese submarine operations in the 
Mozambican Channel during 1942 against the background of the strategic German-
Japanese Naval cooperation in the western Indian Ocean during the war. A detailed 
evaluation, from a strategic and operational point of view, of the Axis submarine 
operations in South African waters concludes the chapter. The sustained U-boat 
operations from 1942 to 1943 are subsequently deliberated on. 
 The fourth chapter discusses the maritime intelligence war waged in southern 
Africa during the Second World War. The section commences with an investigation of 
the instances of sabotage and subversion within the naval sphere in South Africa during 
the war. It also addresses the initial operational contacts established between the 
Ossewabrandwag and Germany during the first years of the war. The chapter next 
focusses on the role, functioning and effectiveness of the FELIX Organisation in southern 
Africa during the war, with a slant towards its contribution to the gathering and 
distribution of maritime intelligence to Germany. The culmination of this section 
investigates the purpose, organisation and success of the Cape Naval Intelligence Centre 
in southern Africa, with a specific emphasis placed on the operations of each of its core 
sections – tracking, operational intelligence, security and naval press relations and 
censorship.  
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The dissertation concludes with a fifth chapter, which focusses on the anti-
submarine war off southern Africa between 1942 and 1944. Specific attention is paid to 
the evolution of ASW in South African waters. A comparison is drawn between the ASW 
measures put in place before the commencement of the main U-boat offensive in 
October 1942, and those in force during 1944 when the U-boat offensives ceased 
altogether. The chapter draws to a close with an evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
ASW off the South African coast by discussing the sinking of three German submarines 
between 1942 and 1944. These sinkings reflect positively on the improvements made 
with regards to ASW in these waters throughout the period concerned. 
4. Research Methodology 
This is a narrative, qualitative study, with extensive archival research underpinning the 
dissertation. The DOD Archives, situated in Pretoria, South Africa, serves as the primary 
point of departure. The archival sources located in this repository are abundant, with 
several archival groups having been consulted during the course of the research phase. 
The following groups form the foundation of the study: the Commander Fortress Air 
Defences (CFAD), Chief of the General Staff (CGS), Chief of the General Staff (War) (CGS 
War), Commander Seaward Defences (CSD), Diverse (Group 1), Secretary for Defence 
(DC), South African Air Force War Diaries (SAAF War Diaries) and the Union War 
Histories (Civil) (UWH Civil). The wealth of primary archival material in these groups 
that have previously been forgotten and disregarded has been of particular assistance. 
The DOD Archives have also yielded some photographs and maps which supplemented 
the primary material and added another dimension to the study. 
 The UWH Civil group, in particular, proved extremely important to this study, as 
a wealth of captured and translated Axis documents are found in this archival group. 
The primary captured documents are of German and Italian origin and are mainly 
concerned with the conduct of the war in the Western Desert. There are, however, a 
number of key documents concerned with the Axis conduct of the naval war, which 
includes: high-level strategic documents concerned with the naval war, personal 
reminiscences of individual U-boat commanders, operational orders and war diaries of 
U-boats and raiders, as well as post-war correspondence with former U-boat captains as 
well as naval staff officers. Unfortunately, the author cannot read the available German 
or Japanese sources. Fortunately, access to the range of archival material in the UWH 
Civil group, especially the translated diaries and memoirs of U-boat commanders, offsets 
this limitation. 
 The primary sources located at the National Archives of the United Kingdom 
(TNA), located in Kew, London, supplemented the South African material throughout, 
and at several times even surpassed them in addressing several aspects of the maritime 
war waged off the southern African coast during the Second World War. Publications 
that have added immense value to this dissertation include the Records of the Admiralty 
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(ADM), Records of the Cabinet Office (CAB), Records of the War Office (WO), Records of 
the Security Services (KV2/3) and the Records of the Air Ministry, the Royal Air Force, 
and related bodies (AIR). 
The lesser-known OB Archive has also proved immensely valuable. It forms part 
of the archival collections of the Records, Archives and Museums (RAM) Division at 
NWU, located in Potchefstroom, South Africa. The collection hosts a wealth of primary 
material relating to the maritime intelligence war waged off the South African coast. The 
primary material in this archive offered several new insights into the nature and extent 
of contacts that existed between the OB and Germany during the war – mainly as to its 
relation to the naval war waged off South Africa. Of particular value was the related 
correspondence and audio archival material, which had not been cited before due to the 
observed gatekeeper mentality. This archive also revealed several photographs of 
known Axis agents, which have not been in public circulation.  
 Where the primary sources in the afore-mentioned archives are abundant, 
secondary sources dealing specifically with the Axis and Allied maritime operations off 
the South African coast during the war are in short supply. While a number of 
publications appeared on the South African contribution to the Second World War, very 
few of these publications readily discuss the all-encompassing nature, course and extent 
of both the Axis and Allied maritime threat off the South African coast during the war. It 
was thus necessary to consult the broader field of available academic and popular 
secondary sources on the Second World War to probe the relevant information  referred 
to in the literature review. The primary archival material thus supplemented these 
secondary sources. In doing so, it allowed for a better understanding of several 
pertinent issues relating to the dissertation. In order to ensure uniformity throughout 
the study, the author sketched all the maps included in the dissertation. 
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Chapter 1 
The Axis and Allied maritime strategies off  
the southern African coast, 1939-1945 
Introduction 
Maritime trade routes passing along the South African coastline has historically always 
been considered of immense importance. During the Second World War, the strategic 
significance of these maritime trade routes was heightened due to a considerable 
increase in the volume of merchant and naval shipping rounding the Cape of Good Hope. 
As a result, large numbers of merchant and naval vessels called at South African 
harbours. The continued operation of the trade routes and harbours along the South 
African coastline was crucial to the overall Allied war effort, especially in terms of 
linking key operational theatres with one another and ensuring the continued 
throughput of vital supplies – such as oil from the Middle East. Moreover, the function of 
the South African war economy also depended on the trade routes as the country relied 
heavily on imports from and to British, American and Commonwealth markets. From 
the outbreak of the war, the threat of Axis maritime operations in South African waters 
remained constant. Naval operations further afield, however, also had a detrimental 
effect on the South African and Allied shipping programmes.  
This chapter has four objectives, which form the basis for understanding the Axis 
and Allied maritime strategies off the southern African coast during the war. The first 
objective is to briefly discuss naval warfare theory and the foundation of maritime 
strategy. The second facet is an analysis of the British and German naval war plans and 
their influence on naval strategy and operations in the Southern Oceans. Thirdly, South 
African wartime shipping problems during the war, and how they influenced the South 
African war effort will be evaluated. The final objective is to discuss the strategic 
importance of the South African harbours during the war, with a particular focus on the 
control, victualling and repair of all merchant and naval vessels within its ports.  
1.1 Naval warfare theory and the constructs of maritime strategy 
A maritime strategy revolves around the principles which govern the conduct of war at 
sea.75 The primary aim of any maritime strategy is to realise and preserve command at 
sea, where the ability to make full use of the sea waters and deny the enemy access, is of 
utmost importance. A secondary aim of maritime strategy is to create zones of maritime 
control across the globe during times of war. A maritime zone of control allows for the 
safe passage of commercial and military shipping. Such zones further restrict the enemy 
                                                             
75  Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 11. Also see Kennedy, Britain’s War at Sea, 1914-
1918; Kennedy, The Royal Navy and Imperial Defence, 1919-1945; Lambert, War at Sea in the Age 
of Sail; Lambert, A Naval History of Great Britain; Lambert, Naval History 1850-Present; Potter and 
Nimitz, Sea Power, A Naval Power; Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century. 
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from using this same area for its sea communications. Complete dominion over such 
zones is, however, rarely established. In fact, control instead remains disputed as 
sporadic attacks and incursions form a constant threat. The uses of command at sea are 
varied but are primarily either offensive or defensive in nature. The naval theorist 
Alfred Mahan suggests six principles that influence the maritime strategy of a seapower. 
These are geographical position, physical conformation, the extent of territory, the 
population size, the national character, and the character of the government.76 
 Stephen Roskill, the erstwhile historian of the Royal Navy (RN), and author of the 
official histories on Britain’s naval contribution to the Second World War, further 
suggests that maritime power rests on the possession of three essential elements. These 
facets – strength, security and transport – must be ever-present for the successful 
fulfilment of a nation’s maritime strategy. The strength element comprises all the 
different instruments of war which work on or beneath the surface of the sea or in the 
air. Maritime control greatly depends on the tenacity and availability of such naval and 
air forces. The security factor relates to the possession and safety of the bases from 
which all the instruments of maritime power must work. If bases are lacking or 
inadequately defended, the ships and aircraft cannot fulfil their functions. The transport 
element predominantly pertains to the Merchant Navy. An adequate Merchant Navy is 
able to feed the home population, carry exports from overseas, and transport armies to 
various theatres. The support of the Merchant Navy is crucial, especially regarding a 
competent shipbuilding and ship-repair industry which enables the replacement of 
losses and repair of damaged ships.77 
 Historically there are six principal methods identified for the use of naval forces 
in war. First, the defence of coasts and harbours has been the concern of armies and air 
forces. Local naval forces, such as small craft, submarines and minefields, can act in a 
mutually supportive role to defend coasts and harbours. Second, maritime power 
projection entails all offensive operations from across the sea. This projection can 
include aerial and offshore bombardments, amphibious raids ashore, and fully-fledged 
invasions. Strong navies normally conduct such operations against weaker navies, often 
along sparsely defended coasts. Third, the fleet-in-being principally requires a 
substantial naval presence in a strategically located area to inhibit the successful 
deployment of a more powerful naval power.  
The fourth method concerns the fleet battle, where the aim is to gain command 
of the sea. It thus involves the defeat or destruction of the enemy’s principal naval force 
at sea. After a successful fleet battle, friendly naval forces can redeploy to new 
operational areas to help destroy the enemy’s weaker warships or to capture, blockade 
                                                             
76  Brodie, ‘New Tactics in Naval Warfare’, pp. 210-211; Herwig, ‘The Failure of German Sea Power, 
1914-1945’, p. 70. Also see King, ‘The Role of Sea Power in International Security’, pp. 79-80; 
Stemmet, ‘Mahan se Teorie van Seemag’, pp. 35-37. 
77  Steury, ‘Naval Intelligence, the Atlantic Campaign and the Sinking of the Bismarck’, pp. 209-210; 
Roskill, The War at Sea: Volume I – The Defensive, pp. 6-7. 
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and destroy other military and commercial shipping. Fifth, stronger fleets often employ 
military blockades to confine weaker fleets to port. Blockades succeed in achieving what 
successful fleet battles fail to do. 
The last point is of significant importance to this study. It typically involves the 
weaker sea power taking recourse to commerce raiding in wartime.78 Also known as a 
guerre de course, maritime commerce warfare has the explicit objective of frustrating 
the enemy by destroying or capturing its commercial shipping during the war. 
Commerce raiding is, however, decidedly opportunistic, and is considered the indecisive 
strategy of the weak in contemporary naval theory. Against this theoretical backdrop, 
blockade and interdiction regularly underpin maritime coercion. This is the case where 
larger states have more powerful naval forces to employ during periods of war. 
Accordingly, weaker nations accept their naval inferiority, with the caveat, however, 
that their navies are still strong enough to provide certain offensive options during the 
war period. Commerce raiding winds up being their natural response to blockade and 
interdiction, though it has no history of success – but only of distraction and damage.79 
1.2 Rival maritime strategies off the South African coast – a question of shipping? 
On 6 September 1939, the Union of South Africa became an active participant in the 
Second World War when it joined the Allied cause and declared war on Germany. South 
Africa’s strategic position regarding geographical location would be a key determinant 
of both the Axis and Allied maritime strategies throughout the war.  
The waters off the Cape of Good Hope, which formed a critical maritime nodal 
point, became a vital link in the main Allied supply routes to and from the Middle East, 
the Indian Subcontinent and the Far East.80 Although geographically removed from the 
main area of naval operations in the North Atlantic, South Africa had to contend with a 
great increase to the usual sea traffic that flowed through its ports. South Africa also had 
to ensure the safe passage of all friendly shipping travelling along its coastline, and 
safeguard shipping that visited its ports. At that point in time, the South African 
coastline stretched from the mouth of the Kunene River on the Atlantic Ocean to Kosi 
Bay on the Indian Ocean. Thean Potgieter, a South African naval historian, came to the 
conclusion that the Cape of Good Hope was the real centre of the British Empire until 
perhaps the 1870s (see Map 1.1). This is because it was equidistant from Australia, 
                                                             
78  Uhlig, ‘Fighting At and From the Sea: A Second Opinion’, pp. 39-45; Hughes, ‘Naval Operations: A 
Close Look at the Operational Level of War at Sea’, pp. 23-26. 
79  Peifer, ‘Maritime Commerce Warfare: The coercive response of the weak?’, pp. 83-85; McMahon, 
‘Maritime Trade Warfare: A Strategy for the Twenty-First Century?’, pp. 15-38. 
80  Turner et al, War in the Southern Oceans, p. 1; Meyer, ‘From Spices to Oil’, pp. 1-10. See also 
Malyon, ‘South African Shipping’, pp. 438-446; Neidpath, The Singapore Naval Base and the 
Defence of Britain's Eastern Empire, 1919-1941, pp. 2, 6, 9, 13, 38. 
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China, India, Gibraltar, the West Indies and the Falkland Islands.81 The British historian 
Paul Kennedy supports this view. He maintains that Cape Town was perhaps “the most 
important strategic position in the world in the age of sea power.”82  
Jamie Neidpath, however, states that the Cape of Good Hope was only one of the 
five keys which locked up the British Empire, along with Singapore, Alexandria, 
Gibraltar and Dover. Neidpath, in contrast to Kennedy, suggests that the true centre of 
the British Empire was east of the Suez Canal in the Indian Ocean. He maintains that the 
three keys for continued control over the Indian Ocean was British possession of the 
Cape of Good Hope, Aden and Singapore. British control over Egypt and the Middle East 
remained crucial too, as such control guarded access to one of the principal maritime 
trade routes passing through the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean. Neidpath finally 
argues that a strong British naval presence in Singapore was essential to keep Australia 
and New Zealand within the imperial orbit, while it also acted as a gateway to the Pacific 
during the war.83 If the British, however, lost control over one of the three keys to the 
Indian Ocean – as it did after the fall of Singapore in February 1942 – there would be a 
series of drastic military, economic and logistical consequences to the overall Allied war 
effort. Moreover, control over the remaining two keys to the Indian Ocean would then 
became extremely important, in large degree due to the observed interconnectivity of 
the Allied war effort. 
 
Map 1.1: Strategic location of the maritime nodal point of the Cape of Good Hope 
                                                             
81  Potgieter, ‘Maritime Defence and the South African Navy’, p. 164; This view is further reinforced 
by Dörning, ‘The West and the Cape Sea Route’, pp. 46-47; Close, ‘South Africa's Part in the War’, 
p. 185. 
82  Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, pp. 129-131. 
83  Neidpath, The Singapore Naval Base and the Defence of Britain's Eastern Empire, 1919-1941, pp. 2, 
6, 9, 13, 38. 
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 On 30 January 1939 the Admiralty approved the RN’s war plans for the imminent 
global conflict. These plans primarily dealt with the waging of concurrent naval wars 
against Germany and Italy, as British defence planners did not expect Japan to initially 
side with the Axis Powers during the opening stages of the war. Nonetheless, the naval 
war plans stated, as a secondary consideration, that the RN should anticipate Japanese 
naval hostility aimed at both Britain and France. The British expected Germany in 
particular to dispute its maritime control in two distinct ways: through its available 
surface warships and disguised merchant raiders; and through a sustained submarine 
offensive aimed at destroying British and Allied seaborne commerce. The basis of the 
British maritime strategy during the war was thus to maintain command at sea and 
establish zones of maritime control at key locations across the globe.84 
 The Admiralty considered the continued operation of key ocean trade routes as 
imperative to its naval strategy. The ocean passages passing through the Mediterranean 
from the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent and the Far East were markedly crucial. 
The loss of these trade routes due to Axis naval operations would force the Admiralty to 
divert Allied merchant traffic along the longer but potentially safer sea route around the 
Cape of Good Hope.85 The RN thus deployed a number of anti-submarine (A/S) hunting 
units at strategic locations across the globe to help protect critical maritime trade 
routes. The protection of these maritime trade routes became the responsibility of the 
RN’s foreign naval commands. These commands were comprised of the North Atlantic 
Station (Gibraltar), South Atlantic Station (Freetown), the America and West Indies 
Station (Bermuda), the East Indies Station (Ceylon) and the China Station (Singapore 
and Hong Kong). The Dominion Navies also each accepted a measure of responsibility 
for control of the waters adjacent to their territories. Such acceptance of responsibilities 
was, however, dependent on their individual strengths and capacity. The British 
maritime strategy also called for the total economic blockade of Germany from the 
outset of war.86 
 The key to the Allied naval strategy in South African waters was the 
establishment of a definite maritime zone of control in order to ensure the continued 
safe passage of merchant shipping around the Cape of Good Hope. The defence and 
sustained operation of this key shipping route was thus not only a South African 
problem. Because of its vital importance to the war effort, it was also a combined Allied 
dilemma. British and South African defence planners estimated that the main aim of the 
Axis naval operations in South African waters would be to sever the Allied maritime 
trade routes to and from the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent and the Far East. The 
                                                             
84  Roskill, The War at Sea: Volume I – The Defensive, pp. 41-45; Carroll, ‘The First Shot was the Last 
Straw’, p. 407. 
85  Roucek, ‘The Geopolitics of the Mediterranean, I’, pp. 349-354; Roucek, ‘The Geopolitics of the 
Mediterranean, II’, pp. 71-80; Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, p. 7; Roskill, The War at Sea: 
Volume I – The Defensive, p. 42. 
86  Roskill, The War at Sea: Volume I – The Defensive, pp. 42-43; Jackson, ‘The 
Empire/Commonwealth and the Second World War’, pp. 67-70. 
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majority of maritime attacks were thus expected in the areas where the sea traffic 
would be most concentrated and congested – the ports of Durban, Port Elizabeth and 
Cape Town (see Map 1.2).87 
 
Map 1.2: Principal southern African harbours 
 The defence of South Africa’s maritime trade routes throughout the war fell into 
two broad categories. In order to ensure the maintenance of sea communications 
around the South African coast, the Union’s threat perception and counter-measures 
had to take into consideration the differing maritime perils prevalent in the Atlantic and 
Indian Oceans. The maritime menace off South Africa’s Atlantic coast was initially 
confined to German submarines and surface raiders operational in the South Atlantic. 
British Naval Intelligence estimated that German naval activity off the South African 
coast would be limited, especially owing to the vast operational distances involved. The 
combined threat was exacerbated by the fact that both U-boats and surface raiders were 
known to have the ability to mine vital coastal junctures along the South African 
coastline.88  
                                                             
87  Department of Defence Documentation Centre (DOD Archives), Diverse, Group 1, Box 126, File: 
Coastal appreciations general. A Japanese attack on South Africa: An appreciation from the enemy 
point of view, 29 Sept 1942; DOD Archives, Diverse, Group 1, Box 126, File: Coastal appreciations 
general. Most secret communication between DECHIEF and OPPOSITELY regarding the scales of 
attack by sea and air in South African waters, 8 Apr 1943. 
88  DOD Archives, Diverse, Group 1, Box 126, File: Coastal appreciations general. A Japanese attack 
on South Africa: An appreciation from the enemy point of view, 29 Sept 1942; DOD Archives, Chief 
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 The maritime threat along South Africa’s Indian Ocean coast was confined to that 
of Japanese and Italian naval forces operational in the area. Despite its nearest base 
being 5 000 miles away, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) posed a direct menace to the 
merchant traffic off the entire South African eastern seaboard. This was especially the 
case when the IJN was provisioned from the Vichy French in Madagascar and possible 
subversive elements in Portuguese East Africa.  
The closest maritime danger to South Africa in 1940 came from the Italian 
submarines known to be based in the Red Sea port of Massawa, a mere 3 800 miles from 
the strategic port of Durban. The presence of Japanese and German warships in the 
Southern Atlantic and Indian Oceans was deemed a possibility, but thought of as 
unlikely.89 The Chief of the General Staff of the Union Defence Force (UDF), Lt Gen (Sir) 
Pierre van Ryneveld, anticipated that the primary naval risk to South Africa was posed 
by the Japanese and Italian submarines active in the Indian Ocean. The German threat 
was considered, but discarded due to the vast operational distances involved in 
deployments to the Indian Ocean.90 These threat perceptions prevailed well into 1944, 
and even extended into 1945. 
 In May 1939 the Kriegsmarine, the German Navy, received its battle instructions 
for the impending conflict. In the event of war, the German Navy would be tasked with 
protecting the German coastline and its seaborne communications, attacking the 
shipping of its adversaries, and supporting land and air operations along the German 
coastline. Most importantly, it would act as a strategic-political instrument of war. 
Owing to the negligible strength of the Kriegsmarine, however, Germany had no specific 
maritime strategy to follow on the eve of the Second World War.91 The Oberkommando 
der Marine92 (OKM) accepted the naval inferiority of the Kriegsmarine from the outset. 
Along with the Seekriegsleitung93 (SKL), the OKM advocated the aggressive deployment 
of its available naval forces in operations against British and Allied seaborne trade in 
the North Atlantic.94 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
of the General Staff (CGS) War, Box 122, File: Raiders. Secret report on possible operation of Italian 
submarines in the Indian Ocean, 3 July 1940. 
89  DOD Archives, Diverse, Group 1, Box 126, File: Coastal appreciations general. A Japanese attack 
on South Africa: An appreciation from the enemy point of view, 29 Sept 1942; DOD Archives, 
Diverse, Group 1, Box 126 File: Coastal appreciations general. Most secret communication between 
DECHIEF and OPPOSITELY regarding the scales of attack by sea and air in South African waters, 8 
April 1943; DOD Archives, CGS War, Box 122, File: Raiders. Secret report on possible operation of 
Italian submarines in the Indian Ocean, 3 Jul 1940. 
90  DOD Archives, CGS War, Box 122, File: Raiders. Secret report on possible operation of Italian 
submarines in the Indian Ocean, 3 Jul 1940. 
91  Raeder, Grand Admiral, pp. 279-281. 
92  The Oberkommando der Marine was the High Command of the German Navy. As such it was the 
highest administrative and command authority of the Kriegsmarine. 
93  The Seekriegsleitung was the Maritime Warfare Command of the Germany Navy. 
94  Raeder, Grand Admiral, pp. 282-286. 
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 The German naval war plans explicitly focused on trade warfare on the open 
oceans. The aim was firstly a concentrated confrontation with British and Allied 
merchant shipping through surprise attacks by disguised merchant raiders. The war 
plans further called for the laying of a series of minefields at critical coastal junctures 
across the globe. Lastly, the naval war plans focussed on the use of the U-boats in 
operations aimed at disrupting and destroying British seaborne trade. The OKM 
intended to use its submarines to work against British and Allied shipping in the areas 
where its surface raiders were not operational, and where the sinking potential was 
significant.95 U-boat operations were hence earmarked for the North and Central 
Atlantic, the West Indies, the waters off the Cape Verde Islands, Freetown in Sierra 
Leone and the Bay of Biscay. As an additional measure, the German naval war plans 
called for surface raiders and submarines, along with a few capital ships, to deploy to 
their respective operational areas before the declaration of war, and to strike an 
immediate and decisive blow to British and Allied shipping.96 
 During the first two years of the war, the German maritime strategy was solely 
focussed on continuing its successes in the Battle of the Atlantic, where it managed to 
reduce British imports from 55 million tons in 1939 to a mere 35 million tons in 1941. 
By operating as far afield as the Mediterranean, Brazil and West Africa, the U-boats 
were on the brink of sinking Allied merchant shipping faster than it could be replaced. 
By 1942 the Battle of the Atlantic reached its pinnacle when the U-boat successes in the 
North Atlantic started to dwindle. These decreasing losses were the result of the 
increasing skill of Allied convoy and escort commanders; reliable submarine detection 
equipment and significant improvements in A/S weapons. Furthermore, the Allied 
ability to read German naval ciphers by mid-1941; a higher numbers of escorts, and the 
diminished ‘air gap’ in the North Atlantic contributed to the dwindling of U-boat 
successes. Along with these, the heavy loss of skilled personnel in the German Navy 
directly led to a decline of moral and combat effectiveness.97 
In 1941, a Befehlshaber der U-Boote (BdU)98 appreciation highlighted the fact that 
the Cape Town–Freetown convoy route would make an excellent target for a 
concentrated U-boat offensive. This possibility was highly conceivable especially as the 
closure of the Suez Canal would lead to the redirection of all seaborne trade around the 
Cape of Good Hope. The Cape Town–Freetown convoy route passed along the strategic 
maritime nodal point of the Cape of Good Hope, with a great number of ships passing 
through South African ports. By the end of October, the BdU had temporarily withdrawn 
                                                             
95  Cousineau, Ruthless War, pp. 100, 182-183; Roskill, The War at Sea: Volume I – The Defensive, p. 
55. 
96  Raeder, Grand Admiral, pp. 283, 287-288. 
97  Tarrant, The U-boat Offensive 1914–1945, pp. 100–101. For a more in depth discussion see for 
instance Rossler, The U-boat: The Evolution and Technical History of German Submarines and 
Howarth and Law (eds.), The Battle of the Atlantic 1939-1945; Milner, ‘The battle of the Atlantic’, 
pp. 45-66. 
98  It was the title of the supreme commander of the Kriegsmarine’s U-boat Arm during the war, but 
also referred to the Command HQ of the U-boat arm itself. 
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all U-boats from the West Coast of Africa. The disengagement was due to a considerable 
reduction in British shipping along this trade route, which effectively denied the area of 
the sinking potential required to sustain a U-boat offensive.99 By February 1942 the 
operational situation once more changed, especially after the B-Dienst100 reported that 
there was a definite increase in British transatlantic shipping along the Cape Town-
Freetown route.101  
 By the latter half of 1942, the BdU concluded that the sinking results in the North 
Atlantic had decreased to such an extent that a U-boat operation off the southern 
African coast proved viable. Such an endeavour would also cause a diversionary effect, 
forcing the Allies to split their naval forces between protecting the North Atlantic, the 
American Eastern seaboard and the Atlantic coast of Africa.102 Moreover, South African 
waters were still considered ‘virgin’ waters by the BdU. Despite some previous forays, 
the BdU did not favour sending single U-boats to operate off the southern African coast. 
Their independent actions would alert the Allies and force the adoption of stringent A/S 
measures. A single submarine operating off the South African coast would furthermore 
not reach the satisfactory sinking results needed to justify its deployment. The BdU 
realised that any operation in South African waters could only materialise once 
adequate numbers of U-boats were accessible to launch a concentrated attack, and 
sustain it for an indefinite period to allow for sufficient sinking results. The primary 
focus throughout the naval conflict was the waging of a war of tonnage through the 
sinking of Allied merchant shipping, and not merely the tying down of enemy naval 
forces through diversionary attacks.103  
1.3 South Africa, the Allied war effort, and the wartime shipping problem 
Some of the most enduring aspects of the Second World War were the problems 
associated with providing adequate shipping to implement the Allied war production 
plans, and for the Allies to keep abreast of the ever-changing military situation. Added 
to this was the accompanying problem of allocating enough shipping to meet the 
logistical and economic requirements of the civilian populations, and to help deploy 
Allied manpower and war equipment over geographically removed strategic areas.  
                                                             
99  Doenitz, Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days, p. 176. 
100  The B-Dienst was the cryptographic section of the Naval High Command, which helped to monitor 
Allied radio traffic and hence tried to decipher these messages. See Doenitz, Memoirs: Ten Years 
and Twenty Days, p. 242. 
101  Doenitz, Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days, pp. 213–214.   
102  Busch, U-Boats at War, pp. 146-147; Doenitz, Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days, p. 238. 
103  DOD Archives, Union War Histories (UWH) Civil, Box 341, File: U-Boat matters. Questions and 
answers submitted by UWH section to Fregattenkapitän Gunter Hessler re U-boat warfare in South 
African waters. Hessler incidentally also wrote the British confidential account of the U-boat war, 
which was published in 1989 as The U-Boat War in the Atlantic 1939-1945. 
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Unsurprisingly, shipping was vital to the overall Allied strategy throughout the 
war.104 It is a well-established fact that a British defeat would have been inevitable 
during the first two years of the war, had the RN been unable to keep the vital sea trade 
routes which linked the island nation to the rest of the Commonwealth and the United 
States of America (USA) open. The continued operation of these vital trade routes 
formed an essential pre-condition for ultimate victory in the war. Without the continued 
flow of seaborne trade between the Allied nations, it would have been impossible for 
the Allies to mobilise to their full strengths, coordinate and maximise their industrial 
and productive efforts, or conduct the final offensives which brought the war to a 
successful end.105 It is under these conditions that South Africa’s shipping requirements 
and associated problems during the war come to the fore. This aspect of the South 
African war effort has received little to no scholarly attention, despite its importance in 
understanding both the Axis and Allied maritime strategies off the Southern African 
coast during the war. 
 
Graph 1.1: Monetary worth of South African imports and exports, 1930-1945106 
                                                             
104  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 16, File: The War Time Shipping Problem. Introduction and 
Background to the Shipping Crisis of 1942/1943. 
105  Slader, The Fourth Service: Merchantmen at War 1939-45, pp. 13-17. Also see Roskill, A Merchant 
Fleet in War 1939-1945; Smith, Conflict over Convoys: Anglo-American Logistics Diplomacy in the 
Second World War. 
106  Union Office of Census and Statistics, Official Yearbook of the Union of South Africa, No. 23, 
Chapter XXIV, pp. 14-21. Also see for instance Gardner, Decoding History: The Battle of the 
Atlantic and Ultra. 
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 After the declaration of war, the maintenance of the South African civilian 
economy warranted two actions. These were the expansion of her wartime production 
and the full exploitation of the country’s natural and industrial resources (see Graph 
1.1). It also necessitated that the Union procure a broad range of imported supplies. 
Furthermore, the shipment of the Union’s exports to various global destinations, 
predetermined by London and later on by Washington, was required. These imports 
and exports were set in motion as a contribution to the Allied war effort.107 
During the first few months of the war, the Allies did not face a serious lack of 
commercial vessels for the transport of goods. Despite heavy shipping losses sustained 
during the Battle of the Atlantic, the Allies could more than compensate for these losses. 
They did so through the acquisition of merchant vessels from European nations overrun 
by German forces, or through the creation of new construction programmes.108 The 
German occupation of Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium and France in 1940 
eased some of the pressure placed on the British and Allied merchant fleets. This was 
due to their respective merchant fleets becoming available for the Allied shipping cause.  
The acessability of these merchant fleets subsequently caused several 
complications. While both the British and Germans naturally desired to press the 
majority of these merchant fleets into their service, this was no easy task. With the help 
of the Dominions, Britain was able to seize any such shipping that called at 
Commonwealth ports, thus preventing these vessels from escaping Allied control.109 
This often involved the detention of the vessels and the internment or repatriation of 
pro-Nazi, or reluctant masters and seamen – even in South Africa.110 On certain 
occasions, vessels that were technically treated as an enemy craft, were seized as prizes 
of war. This was particularly the case with Vichy French shipping. Upon agreement, 
these ships were then either allocated to South Africa or the United Kingdom (UK) for 
wartime usage.111 
 South Africa did not face any palpable difficulties of supply during this period, 
and the British export drive, which continued well into 1941, meant that sufficient 
export tonnage was earmarked to heed the Union’s every need. The shipping situation, 
however, soon deteriorated, especially when the Middle East, and both East and North 
                                                             
107  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 16, File: The War Time Shipping Problem. Introduction and 
Background to the Shipping Crisis of 1942/1943. 
108  For a more in depth discussion of the Battle of the Atlantic see Gardner, Decoding History: The 
Battle of the Atlantic and Ultra; Lautenschlager, ‘The Submarine in Naval Warfare, 1901-2001’, 
pp. 94-140; Cousineau, Ruthless War, 2007. 
109  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 73, File: Year Book, Section XI. Shipping. 
110  North-West University (NWU), Records, Archives and Museum Division (RAM Div) 
(Potchefstroom), Ossewabrandwag Archive (OB Archive), A.F. Schulz Versameling. Nazisme in 
Andalusia Interneringskamp, 9 Okt 1940 – 22 Nov 1944. For more on this, see Moore, ‘Unwanted 
Guests in Troubled Times’, pp. 63-90; Malherbe, Never a Dull Moment, p. 215. 
111  Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, p. 325; Clarence-Smith, ‘Africa’s “Battle for Rubber” in the 
Second World War’, p. 168. Also see Feinstein, An Economic History of South Africa. 
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Africa, became important theatres of military operations from around mid-1940.112 The 
closure of the Mediterranean to merchant shipping after the Italian entry into the war in 
June 1940, and the capitulation of France in the same month placed further strain on 
Allied merchant shipping. The burden on the Allies was heightened by the significant 
number of merchantmen diverted to Russia after the commencement of Operation 
Barbarossa.  
 
Fig 1.1: An Allied merchant convoy approaching Cape Town Harbour, 1940s113 
The Japanese and American entry into the war in December 1941 further served 
to exacerbate the matter.114 Their entry combined to trigger a grave shipping crisis, 
where the demand for shipping space vastly increased. This state of affairs held serious 
misgivings for South Africa, as the Union could obtain only such imports as were 
allocated to her through the process of combined planning overseen by the British 
Ministry of War Transport (MWT).115 
                                                             
112  Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943, p. 47; Stewart, The First Victory, 
pp. 48-52; Katz, Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk, pp. 6-8, 25. The latest South African work to appear on 
the campaign in North Africa is Katz, South Africans versus Rommel. 
113  South African National Museum of Military History, Masondo Reference Library. SA Navy Photo 
Collection, S.A. 459. 
114  Murray and Millett, A War to be Won, pp. 92-98, 110-120, 169-181; Hammond, ‘British Policy on 
Total Maritime Warfare’, pp. 789-790. Also see Ball, The Bitter Sea: The Struggle for Mastery in the 
Mediterranean, 1935-1949. 
115  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 16, File: The War Time Shipping Problem. Introduction and 
Background to the Shipping Crisis of 1942/1943. 
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Graph 1.2: Export of principal South African products in weight, 1938-1945116 
 Two main problems underpinned the South African shipping problem 
throughout the war. The first problem related to the available freight space for imports, 
especially those originating from the UK, North America and the rest of the 
Commonwealth. The second problem dealt with the freight space needed to export 
South African raw materials, agricultural produce and other finished products from its 
various industries (see Graph 1.2). These two problems were, however, interrelated. 
The securing of shipping for imports was entirely dependent on the importance, and 
destination, of the exports. 
The leading South African wartime exports, chiefly coal, were destined for the 
Middle East and the Eastern Group Supply Council countries (see Graph 1.3).117 
Moreover, the vessels used for exports did not suffer frequent diversions. Shipping 
space for South African exports to the UK and the USA was considered adequate, despite 
a persistent shortage of refrigerated space for fruit from the Union.118 The main South 
African exports to these markets were wool, maize, fruit, manganese and chrome ore.  
                                                             
116  Union Office of Census and Statistics, Official Yearbook of the Union of South Africa, No. 23, 
Chapter XXIV, pp. 26-28. 
117  The Eastern Group Supply Council was a wartime body established in 1940 with the sole 
intention of coordinating the build-up of war materiel in the British colonies and dominions east 
of the Suez Canal. Their ultimate aim was to reduce the amount of supplies shipped from the 
United Kingdom. 
118  Albertyn, Upsetting the Applecart, p. 11. DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 16, File: The War Time 
Shipping Problem. Introduction and Background to the Shipping Crisis of 1942/1943; Lewis, ‘The 
Inter-Relations of Shipping Freights’, pp. 58-59. 
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Cow Hides 18594243 19870026 18011020 23059559 14019241 6770022 4603226 5701111
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Meat 5121059 10107927 14805728 30367298 44984992 24657332 7806802 5413287
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Graph 1.3: Coal bunkered and exported from the  
principal South African ports, 1940-1945119 
As the war progressed, Britain irregularly furnished the various exporting 
countries with a list of articles that should receive preference for export. This list 
included certain foodstuffs, metals, ores and textile raw materials. The only item 
exportable from South Africa at the time was wool. By March 1940, after some initial 
delays, a notable increase in British imports of wool from the Union was observed. 
Despite this increase, nearly 230,000 bales of wool destined for export to Europe 
remained stockpiled at various South African ports, primarily due to inadequate 
shipping. However, the shipment of manganese ore to the United States during this 
period posed no problem.120 Although neutrality legislation precluded American vessels 
from entering areas proclaimed as war zones, South African waters at that stage were 
still not considered as such an area. The result was an increasing amount of American 
shipping diverted to the South African run. This diversion in shipping was organised 
principally through the South African Purchasing Commission in Washington, and 
                                                             
119  Union Office of Census and Statistics, Official Yearbook of the Union of South Africa, No. 23, 
Chapter XII, p. 16. 
120  Brown, ‘African Labor in the Making of World War II’, pp. 64-65; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 
73, File: Year Book, Section XI; Shipping; Postan, British War Production, p. 157. 
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through consultation with the American War Shipping Administration (WSA) and the 
British Merchant Shipping Mission in the USA.121 
 
Fig 1.2: South African agricultural produce ready for export to the United Kingdom122 
 The South African Department of Railways and Harbours (SAR&H) operated a 
fleet of three ocean-going vessels. The SS Dahlia, SS Aloe and SS Erica operated in a 
triangular service between the Far East, Philippines, Borneo, Australia, Mauritius, 
Madagascar, Reunion, Beira and other coastal ports en route to Cape Town. This 
facilitation was, however, abandoned shortly after the outbreak of war as a result of the 
Axis and Allied naval operations in South African waters.  
Several Vichy French merchant ships (henceforth merchants/merchantmen) 
became prizes of war during Operations Kedgeree and Bellringer – a joint action by the 
RN, South African Air Force and the Seaward Defence Force (SDF). These ships, together 
with other chartered and requisitioned vessels, including an oil-tanker, augmented the 
existing fleet to amount to no less than fifteen ships.123 This fleet was employed on a 
variety of duties to circumvent the restriction that the wartime shipping burden placed 
on South Africa. These responsibilities included the transportation of UDF troops to the 
                                                             
121  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 12, File: SA War Economy 1939-1945. Procurement of Supplies – SA 
Purchasing Organisation in USA; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 35, File PO/29. South African 
Purchasing Commission Inception and Organisation, 1940-1947. 
122  South African National Museum of Military History, Masondo Reference Library. SA Navy Photo 
Collection, S.A. 1703. 
123  Gordon-Cumming, Official History of the South African Naval Forces, pp. 47-54; Turner et al, War 
in the Southern Oceans, pp. 89-95. 
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Middle East and the conveyance of petroleum products from the Middle East to the 
Union. The said vessels ensured that a large part of the Union’s urgent import 
requirements was carried in bulk and dispatched promptly. Included were supplies of 
grain, phosphates, railway sleepers and other timber, as well as more general cargo.  
Following the Japanese conquests in the Far East, the Union had to search for 
new markets from which it could procure supplies of palm oil, rubber and oilseed, 
amongst others. South Africa was able to source these products from various countries 
in West Africa, who were able to meet the Union’s heavy demands for railway sleepers, 
timber, fish meal and coffee. In the course of 1942 a regular service was inaugurated by 
the SAR&H between the Union and a number of ports on the West African coast. Cargoes 
on the outward voyages consisted of South African exports, principally coal, cement, 
ore, manufactured goods and various foodstuffs. A lively business developed to the 
benefit of all the territories concerned.124 
 Imports to South Africa, especially from the UK, proved unproblematic up until 
July 1941. Some importers complained about general delays, diversions and the non-
delivery of imports, but these were inevitable consequences of the establishment of 
convoys coupled with mounting shipping losses in the North Atlantic. The available 
cargo space for imports was divided up between the urgent requirements of the South 
African war industries, basic civilian needs, and non-essential consumer goods. The 
South African ports also served the broader import and export requirements of 
Southern Africa for the duration of the war.125 Throughout this period the UK shipped 
more commercial cargo to South Africa than any other country. Up until that time, 
however, the inhabitants of South Africa rarely felt the strain of war. This state of affairs 
was only possible as long as the allocation of adequate shipping space was not a 
significant determinant in the country’s import policy.126  
 Two leading causes lay the foundation for this state of affairs. First, until 
September 1941 the Union Government avoided introducing any strict controls over 
imports and exports, partly due to the unique internal political climate within South 
Africa.127 Its reticence lay in stark contrast to the rest of the British Commonwealth. The 
Commonwealth abided by the controls instituted by the British Ministry of Economic 
Warfare early in the war to prevent any trading with the Axis powers. South Africa, 
however, required export permits from potential importers. The Department of 
Commerce and Industries introduced certificates of origin and interest in an attempt to 
effect a positive influence on the Union’s external trade. Importers were also required to 
                                                             
124  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 24, File: SA Railways and Harbours Departmental Civil War 
History Vol VIII. Ports & Shipping. 
125  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 73, File: Year Book, Section XI; Shipping. See for instance, Dumett, 
‘Africa's Strategic Minerals During the Second World War’, pp. 381-408; Tembo, ‘Rubber 
Production in Northern Rhodesia’, pp. 223-255. 
126  Henshaw, ‘Britain, South Africa and the Sterling Area’, pp. 208-209. 
127  For more on this unique political situation see Marx, Oxwagon Sentinel. 
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apply for Essentiality Certificates. They could, in turn, provide the certificates to 
overseas suppliers for furnishing to their respective export control authorities. These 
measures were an official attempt by the Union Government to provide legitimate 
support for South African imports of scarce commodities and raw materials.128 
 
Graph 1.4: South African wartime gold production, 1939-1944129 
Second, the British export policy during the first two years of the war indirectly 
discouraged the South Africans from introducing any effective measures to control 
goods entering the country. The British export drive throughout this period attempted 
to secure enough foreign exchange to finance the war effort. This state of affairs had a 
profound impact on South Africa, none more so than after the introduction of the Lend-
Lease Act in March 1941. South Africa enjoyed a relatively privileged position in the 
Commonwealth due to its rich gold deposits and accompanying industries. The country 
therefore played a crucial role in the British export drive throughout this period. South 
Africa largely funded its war effort through its rich gold deposits, which secured a 
significant amount of foreign currency. This situation only changed once the Lend-Lease 
Act came into effect (see Graph 1.4).130 
                                                             
128  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 16, File: The War Time Shipping Problem. Introduction and 
Background to the Shipping Crisis of 1942/1943; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 111, File: Import 
Control. Certificates of Essentiality. 
129  Union Office of Census and Statistics, Official Yearbook of the Union of South Africa, No. 23, 
Chapter XXII, p. 27. 
130  Martin, ‘The Making of an Industrial South Africa’, p. 84; Henshaw, ‘Britain, South Africa and the 
Sterling Area’, p. 208; Dumett, ‘Africa's Strategic Minerals During the Second World War’, pp. 
383-384; Van der Waag, A Military History of Modern South Africa, p. 191. 
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 The introduction of the Lend-Lease Act held a number of misgivings for South 
Africa, none more so than forcing the Union to source her main imports of steel, non-
ferrous metals, machine tools, oil and motor vehicles from the USA. The Lend-Lease 
Administration also obligated the Union Government to provide firm evidence for the 
need of imports for the Union’s war effort.131 This requirement coincided with an 
attempt by the American authorities to extend their export licensing. Lend-Lease 
material was either exempted or automatically licensed, as opposed to goods obtained 
from outside the parameters of Lend-Lease. Here, the requirement was for each 
country, including South Africa, to establish some form of import licensing to 
authenticate all orders placed in the USA by private traders.  
South Africa established the Union Priority Board on 11 July 1941 to deal with all 
privately ordered goods from the USA which were subject to export licensing. On 10 
September the Union Government instituted the Import and Export Control Board. The 
aim was to enforce a system of import control applicable to all non-sterling countries. 
The system of control was not comprehensive, yet it signalled the start of a radical 
change apropos import control. South Africa adopted a priority rating schedule to help 
facilitate imports from the USA. This structure eventually formed the foundation of a 
much stricter and more comprehensive system of import control from 1942 onwards.132 
 The UK’s export policy was influenced by the introduction of Lend-Lease, though 
it took some months for the British export drive to lose its momentum. A large number 
of British exporters were fearful of losing their business in South Africa to American 
exporters. They consequently clung to the South African market with much ardour. 
The introduction of import licensing for goods purchased in the USA gave the 
South African importers ample warning of the prospect of future import restrictions. 
This led to hefty private orders of goods placed towards the end of 1941. Two concerns 
led to a dire state of affairs. They were the absence of import control over South African 
orders placed in the UK, and the fact that hardly any South African importers applied for 
Essentiality Certificates unless the goods ordered were subject to British export 
licensing. Thus neither the Department of Commerce and Industries nor the British 
Board of Trade (BOT), had any inkling as to what products were on order and what 
goods were bound for South Africa.133 
                                                             
131  Byfield, ‘Producing for the War’, pp. 27-28. 
132  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 73, File: Year Book, Section XI; Shipping; Albertyn, Upsetting the 
Applecart, p. 13.  
133  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 16, File: The War Time Shipping Problem. Introduction and 
Background to the Shipping Crisis of 1942/1943. 
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Fig 1.3: An Allied vessels taking on important local supplies, 1940s134 
 By the end of 1941, the global shipping crisis became a stark reality, adding an 
immense pressure to the Allied forces during the war. The most immediate causes of 
strain included the heavy demands for military needs in the Middle East; the American 
and Japanese entry into the war; the Japanese conquest of the Far East, and the 
mounting successes of the German submarines during the Battle of the Atlantic.135 The 
British authorities had for some months, however, been aware of the changing military 
situation, and the impact that this would have on shipping requirements. The flow of 
imports to the Union during this period was nonetheless hardly interrupted. Both Union 
Government cargo and commercial goods were promptly shipped owing to the untiring 
efforts of the Stores and Shipping Branch located at South Africa House in London. 
Commercial imports duly amounted to between 40,000 and 50,000 tons per month in 
1941.136 
 Be that as it may, the Union authorities were warned that such ample shipping 
provision was not possible in the future, as the UK faced increasing shipping shortages 
due to a large number of priority imports and essential war supplies destined for the 
Middle East. The outcome was an immediate reduction in the number of sailings to 
                                                             
134  South African National Museum of Military History, Masondo Reference Library. SA Navy Photo 
Collection, S.A. 1227. 
135  This viewpoint is furthered by Boyd, The Royal Navy in Eastern Waters: Linchpin of Victory 1935-
1942 as well as Neidpath, The Singapore Naval Base and the Defence of Britain's Eastern Empire, 
1919-1941. 
136  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 16, File: The War Time Shipping Problem. Shipment of Union 
Government Cargo from the United Kingdom. 
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South Africa and the rest of the Commonwealth. Despite the warning passed by the 
MWT, none of the Commonwealth Governments fully grasped to what extent the 
shipping situation would deteriorate in 1942. The extension of the Allied war effort in 
that year created a heavy demand for shipping which far exceeded the available 
capacity of the Allies. The availability of shipping for imports became the main element 
influencing the South African economy and its accompanying war effort. Coupled with 
the question of port accessibility, was the lack of effective machinery for import control. 
The function of the machinery was to exclude non-essential goods from the ever-
lengthening shipping queues. The MWT, however, doubted whether the South African 
authorities appreciated the seriousness of the situation facing the planning authorities 
in London. The Union government was thus increasingly urged to cooperate and match 
its imports to the greatly reduced shipping tonnage on hand.137 
 From the beginning of 1942, and well into 1943, the shortage of shipping to 
South Africa remained burdensome. As a result, economy in shipping became vital, 
especially in terms of eliminating unnecessary cargoes and making the most economical 
use of the available shipping. In an early attempt to gain a measure of control over the 
outstanding shipments to the Union, the establishment of the South African Advisory 
Shipping Committee was undertaken in April 1942. It was composed of representatives 
from the Shipping Section of South Africa House, the BOT, MWT, the London Chamber of 
Commerce, and various export groups and shipping lines.  
The Advisory Shipping Committee’s arduous task was to sort essential orders 
from non-essential ones, as neither the BOT nor the Department of Commerce and 
Industries could provide any reliable data on outstanding cargo not yet shipped. 
Moreover, most of the orders from the UK were not covered by Essentiality Certificates 
and pre-dated the system of priority ratings. South African Importers were also often 
unaware that their orders were ready for shipment to South Africa. Similarly, British 
exporters with completed orders in their warehouses could not help in assessing the 
priorities of the goods for shipment.138  
                                                             
137  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 16, File: The War Time Shipping Problem. Introduction and 
Background to the Shipping Crisis of 1942/1943; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 16, File: The War 
Time Shipping Problem. The Beginning of Shipping Control over Commercial Cargo. 
138  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 73, File: Year Book, Section XI; Shipping; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, 
Box 114, File: Priority Rating. Backlog of Cargo from UK. 
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Fig 1.4: Key imports ready for delivery to Cape Town, 1940s139 
By May 1942 a central list of incomplete orders was drawn up through the 
assistance of the Chamber of Commerce in London, in an attempt to clear the substantial 
backlog of orders awaiting shipment to South Africa. This list was then matched with 
cables from South Africa requesting the shipment of selected goods. The cables enabled 
the MWT and BOT, in conjunction with South Africa House, the South African Trade 
Association and the South African Section of the London Chamber of Commerce, to draft 
a priority rating shipping schedule.140 
 The system of priority rating (see Table 1.1), along with Essentiality Certificates, 
formed the basis for the immediate control over the placement of shipping orders. It 
helped to determine which goods should be shipped, which goods should be shipped at 
a later date, and what cargo should not be shipped at all. At first, the priority rating 
schedule made allowance for ratings from 1 to 17, but the range was reduced to 
between 1 and 11 with the worsening of the supply position. No sooner than this had 
occurred, the BOT restricted future orders to South Africa to within the ratings 1 to 6.141  
                                                             
139  South African National Museum of Military History, Masondo Reference Library. SA Navy Photo 
Collection, S.A. 1201. 
140  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 16, File: The War Time Shipping Problem. The Beginning of 
Shipping Control over Commercial Cargo; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 107, File War/C/131: 
Coordination of Allied War Effort – Control of Supply and Shipping. Telegram from the Secretary 
of State for Dominion Affairs, London, to the Minister of External Affairs, Cape Town, 28 Jan 1942. 
141  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 108, File: Import Control. Priority Rating; DOD Archives, UWH 
Civil, Box 111, File: Import Control. Priority Rating Shipping. 
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 Shipping Category Shipping Priority 
Group 1 War Supplies 





Railways, Government Departments, 
Basic Industries (mining, explosives, 











Essential Industries (chemicals, cement, 
















Table 1.1: Priority rating schedule for the shipment of cargoes to South Africa142 
As an interim arrangement, the Union Government, provided a basis of division 
for the outstanding cargo. The cargo was to be apportioned into four main groups in 
order of importance to the South African war effort (see Table 1.2). This was, however, 
only a temporary solution to the overburdening South African shipping problem. 
Throughout the entire process, the South African authorities continually exacerbated 
the shipping problem by extending the system of priority rating. To their detriment, the 
authorities also issued Essentiality Certificates for goods not considered essential to the 
Union’s war effort. This action added to the accumulation of unshipped cargo, which by 
May 1942 amounted to at least 150,000 tons of cargo sitting aground in warehouses or 
at the docks in the UK. Orders held by exporters in various warehouses additionally 
amounted to 400,000 tons. To aggravate matters, the MWT could pledge a mere 5,000 
to 6,000 tons of shipping per month on the South African run for the immediate 
future.143 
  
                                                             
142  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 16, File: The War Time Shipping Problem. Appendix I. 
143  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 16, File: The War Time Shipping Problem. The Beginning of 
Shipping Control over Commercial Cargo. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
P a g e  | 23 
Good Ordered By Priority of Shipment 
Director General War Supplies, 
Department of Defence and the British 
Admiralty 
A1 
War Supplies ordered through any 
channel with a priority rating of 1 or 2 
A2 
Goods ordered by SAR&H, Government 
Departments and other Essential Public 
Services 
B1 
Good ordered through any channels with 
a priority rating of 3A or 3B 
B2 
Goods covered by Essentiality 
Certificates and shipped according to 
their respective priority ratings. 
C 
Other Goods According to Priority 
Ratings (as with above) 
D 
Table 1.2 Interim four group division for outstanding cargoes for South Africa144 
 After the Union Government and the MWT reached an agreement, a license for 
export to South Africa became a prerequisite from the BOT. During the months of June 
and July 1942, the entire staff of South Africa House worked overtime in an attempt to 
assess shipping priorities. They also worked to issue Essentiality Certificates for 
shipments with a rating between 1 and 8 – contrary to the restrictions imposed by the 
BOT. After scrutinising the entire backlog of cargo, South Africa House issued nearly 
23,000 Essentiality Certificates. It continued to issue Interim Certificates at a rate of 100 
per day. With this formidable task accomplished, the function of the Advisory Shipping 
Committee was reduced to merely reviewing the broader issues surrounding the 
shipping situation and advising whether or not goods should be shipped. By August, all 
shipments with a priority rating above five were suspended, due to further wartime 
demands on available shipping. This increase in cooperation between South African and 
British authorities drew export cargoes from Britain to within manageable proportions. 
This collaboration, coupled with the opening of a Central Shipping Register in London 
for all cargoes destined for South Africa, allowed for the increasing matching of shipping 
with cargoes in the correct order of priority.145  
 Despite these efforts, and the initial success of this scheme, the 5,000-6,000 tons 
of available shipping per month proved entirely insufficient in lifting the backlog of 
accumulated cargo. The Union Government estimated that it required at least 10,000 
                                                             
144  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 16, File: The War Time Shipping Problem. Appendix II. 
145  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 73, File: Year Book, Section XI; Shipping. 
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tons of shipping each month to merely lift the current cargo with a priority rating 
between 1 and 5. This ruled out the consideration of 60,000 tons of accumulated cargo 
with similar priority ratings. There was also a considerable tonnage of cargo rated 6 to 8 
that awaited shipping. The MWT undertook to improve the situation during the 
remainder of 1942 after several presentations to the British Minister of War Transport, 
Frederick Leathers, the 1st Baron Leathers. An immediate result of this effort was the 
provision of additional shipping for the South African run between July and September 
(see Table 1.3). The likely target of 10,000 tons of shipping per month in both October 
and November was accordingly exceeded. By the end of 1942, the backlog of shipping 
with a high priority had decreased to a somewhat manageable 35,000 tons.146 
 Union Government Cargo Commercial Cargo 
July 10,596 tons 12,400 tons 
August 4,355 tons 8,150 tons 
September 6,706 tons 15, 251 tons 
October 5,547 tons 38, 968 tons 
November 3,950 tons 30, 890 tons 
Table 1.3: Ministry of War Transport shipments to South Africa, Jul-Nov 1942147 
 In January 1943, Lord Leathers made it clear that the substantial liftings 
accomplished towards the end of 1942 would be impossible to repeat. He warned that it 
would even prove difficult to maintain the minimum of 10,000 tons of commercial cargo 
per month. The MWT realised that it needed a comprehensive long-term shipping 
programme to address the Union’s import needs. Without such a programme, it was a 
challenge to plan and allocate equitable tonnage to South Africa. This was because the 
shipping situation was as yet unstable and liable to sudden fluctuations due to 
unforeseen crises.  
In August 1942 the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board (CSAB) was created in 
Washington. The establishment of the CSAB helped to facilitate the process of combined 
planning of Allied shipping during the war. The MWT and the WSA became responsible 
for programming the shipping requirements of their respective areas of control.148 
                                                             
146  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 16, File: The War Time Shipping Problem. Clearing the 
Accumulation of Commercial Cargo, and the commencement of Combined Shipping Adjustment 
Board Procedure, Jun-Dec 1942; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 113, File: Shipping – Shipping for 
July and August 1942. Telegrams from South African Litigation, Washington to PrimeSec Pretoria, 
22 Jul 1942; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 113, File: Shipping – Position in June 1942. Telegram 
from Oppositely, London, to South African Litigation, Washington 17 Jun 1942.  
147  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 16, File: The War Time Shipping Problem. Clearing the 
Accumulation of Commercial Cargo, and the commencement of Combined Shipping Adjustment 
Board Procedure, Jun-Dec 1942. 
148  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 107, File War/C/131: Coordination of Allied War Effort – Control 
of Supply and Shipping. Telegram from Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, London, to Minister 
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Under this arrangement, South Africa were expected to provide the MWT with a 
detailed programme of its shipping requirements well in advance. These requirements 
were then assessed in combination with other claimants who were competing for the 
available, but limited, shipping space. The South African shipping programme 
thereupon received the required allocation of Allied shipping. Such detailed 
programmes of shipping allowed the CSAB to plan the global transportation of the 
maximum amount of goods in the minimum number of movements. It subsequently 
optimised return cargo opportunities and ensured the minimum wastage of shipping 
space.149 The result was a reduction of waste from production facilities, notably the 
manufacture of export goods which could not be shipped according to the system of 
priority ratings.  
From August 1942 until January 1943 the MWT stressed the need for a forward 
programme to help plan for adequate shipping space. South Africa, like other countries, 
was slow to comply with the new requirements. The CSAB thus found it very difficult to 
plan to meet the Union’s required shipping needs, as well as the needs of Southern and 
Northern Rhodesia, East Africa, Madagascar and other African destinations, whose 
cargo passed through South African ports. This complacency naturally had a pernicious 
effect on the South African war economy.150 
 After the establishment of the CSAB, the responsibility for securing shipping 
from North American ports was shifted from the office of the South African Purchasing 
Commission in Washington to the Union High Commissioner’s Office in London. By the 
end of 1942, a serious shipping concern developed at North American ports that held 
grave consequences for the Union. Throughout the preceding year, the flow of cargo 
from North America to the Union was hampered by recurring crises, which threatened 
to disrupt both the South African private and armaments industries.  
An American Economic Mission, headed by D.C. Sharpstone, visited South Africa 
in 1942 to evaluate first-hand the Union’s growing shipping requirements from the USA. 
This mission found that the Union’s war effort was largely dependent on raw materials 
and other crucial supplies shipped from North America. Upon its return to America, the 
Sharpstone Commission testified that the Union did indeed need a greater tonnage of 
shipping to maintain the function of its war economy. Sir Arthur Salter, head of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
for External Affairs, Cape Town, 27 Jan 1942. Also see Perry, ‘The Wartime Merchant Fleet and 
Postwar Shipping Requirements’, p. 527; M. Katz, ‘A Case Study in International Organisation’, pp. 
4-6. 
149  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 107, File War/C/131: Coordination of Allied War Effort – Control 
of Supply and Shipping. Telegram from High Commissioner, London, to Minister for External 
Affairs, Cape Town, 2 Mar 1942; Lewis, ‘The Inter-Relations of Shipping Freights’, pp. 58-59; 
Hancock and Gowing, British War Economy, pp. 412-417. 
150  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 16, File: The War Time Shipping Problem. Clearing the 
Accumulation of Commercial Cargo, and the commencement of Combined Shipping Adjustment 
Board Procedure, Jun-Dec 1942. For more on the South African war economy, see Johnston-White, 
The British Commonwealth and Victory in the Second World War. 
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British Merchant Shipping Mission in Washington between 1941 and 1943, took up this 
grave matter with Lord Leathers so as to further press the Union’s urgent shipping 
needs upon both the British and American authorities. By the end of 1942, the MWT and 
the WSA agreed on a joint target of providing six merchants per month for carrying 
commercial and government cargo from North America to South Africa, the Rhodesias 
and East Africa. Through this course of action, the shipping situation somewhat 
improved, and the monthly expected tonnage of imports from North America averaged 
at 50,000 tons of cargo.151 
 Union Government Cargo Commercial Cargo Total 
USA 100,406 tons 111,161 tons 211, 567 tons 
Canada 20,065 tons 36,491 tons 56,556 tons 
Total 120,471 tons 147,652 tons 268,123 tons 
Table 1.4: Summary of cargo awaiting shipment from  
North America to South Africa, Nov-Dec 1942152 
 In January 1943, there was nearly 270,000 tons of Union government and 
commercial cargo awaiting shipment from North America (see Table 1.4). Most of this 
consignment was needed by the Union armaments industries and for defence related 
matters. If shipping continued at the rate of 50,000 tons per month, it would take nearly 
six months to clear the accumulated cargo alone while making no allowances for new 
orders. The accumulation of steel at US ports destined for South Africa was also 
problematic. This was because the American authorities were adamant not to issue 
permits for new steel production for the Union because of a significant amount of 
unshipped steel at North American ports. The accumulated cargo also included smaller 
amounts of essential supplies. Included among the materials were industrial lubricants, 
sulphur and other chemicals for the munitions industry, ships stores for victualling 
convoys at Union ports, machine tools, timber, aircraft parts, textiles, agricultural 
machinery, paper and other necessities indispensable to the South African armaments 
industry and the civilian economy.153 Despite various representations at a ministerial 
level to stress the seriousness of the shipping state of affairs, there was no reserve 
shipping pool on hand to alleviate the matter. South Africa also had to contend with the 
UK and the rest of the Commonwealth for the available shipping space.154 
                                                             
151  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 16, File: The War Time Shipping Problem. The Effect of Combined 
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152  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 16, File: The War Time Shipping Problem. The Effect of Combined 
Shipping Procedure upon the Responsibilities of the Union High Commissioner’s Office 1942-1944. 
153  Close, ‘South Africa's Part in the War’, p. 187; Dumett, ‘Africa's Strategic Minerals During the 
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154  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 73, File: Year Book, Section XI; Shipping; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, 
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 South Africa met the shipping crisis head-on from January 1943. Henceforth the 
Inner Control Committee, of the Union Supply Coordinating Board, matched all import 
programmes to the Union. The Inner Control Committee decided between competing 
claims for shipping space to be allocated to the Department of Defence, the War 
Supplies Directorate, and urgent civilian needs. The system of priority ratings did, 
however, have one grave defect. Severe shortages were a constant threat since any 
order for a high priority commodity automatically took precedence over the shipment 
of goods of a lower priority. This occurred regardless of the date of the order, nor of its 
identified need. 
To meet this established lack of balance, a ‘shipping term’, indicating the year 
and quarter for shipment (e.g. 3/44), was authorised on the Essentiality Certificates. 
The combination of the priority rating and the shipping term, which indicated the 
urgency of a shipment, provided the WSA and MWT with a ‘shipping indication’ of the 
order in which shipments should proceed. Goods of a high priority, would, if not 
shipped in the indicated quarter, be given a higher indicator in the following quarter.155 
The Inner Control Committee was able to satisfy some of the urgent needs arising from 
the shipping crises. This was done by issuing immediate over-riding priorities and 
providing the MWT and WSA with a schedule of the Union shipping requirements 
covering the period of January 1943 to June 1944.  
South Africa’s shipping requirements from North America over this period were 
divided into three six-monthly periods, averaging 360,000 tons, 339,000 tons and 
360,000 tons respectively. These figures were more than double the target allotted by 
the WSA and MWT and were entirely unrealistic.156 Regrettably, the accumulation of 
unshipped cargo, especially steel, remained constant, so much so that the American War 
Production Board stopped the production of steel for South Africa until the level of 
unshipped steel had fallen below 25,000 tons.157 Towards mid-1943 the shipping 
dilemma for South Africa became even more acute with the reopening of the 
Mediterranean to commercial traffic following the Allied successes in North Africa. The 
direct result was a drastic reduction in shipping around the Cape of Good Hope.158 
 To meet the deteriorating shipping situation from North America, the MWT 
continuously tried to raise the shipping targets to South Africa. The British Merchant 
Shipping Mission also took up the matter with the WSA. Despite the general concern 
shown towards this affair, the new monthly target for shipping totalled only 45,000 tons 
– considerably less than the Union Government’s stated minimum requirement of 
                                                             
155  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 108, File: Import Control. Shipping Term Allocation; DOD Archives, 
UWH Civil, Box 110, File: Import Control. Shipping Term System. 
156  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 16, File: The War Time Shipping Problem. The Effect of Combined 
Shipping Procedure upon the Responsibilities of the Union High Commissioner’s Office 1942-1944. 
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158  Van der Waag, A Military History of Modern South Africa, pp. 200-203. 
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60,000 tons per month. By June of 1943, the MWT agreed to supply another ship for the 
North America/South Africa run for July and August. The provision would help ease the 
acute steel shortage in South Africa. This vessel shipped no less than 35,000 tons of 
steel, as well as an additional 6,000-7,000 tons of general cargo. By August, the shipping 
situation had improved despite the continuous accumulation of unshipped cargo at 
North American ports – then estimated at 224,000 tons, excluding steel. In September 
and October there was some respite, with eight additional ships dispatched from North 
America for the South Africa/Middle East coal service. The additional ships enabled the 
clearing of a substantial portion of the accumulated cargo. A gradual reduction in the 
Union’s shipping requirements from North America, coupled with the allocation of 
additional shipping space, thus greatly improved the shipping situation from North 
American ports by 1944 (see Graph 1.5).159 
 
Graph 1.5: Comparative statement of shipping tonnage from the United Kingdom  
and North America to South Africa, Jan-Dec 1943160 
 Even though South Africa’s shipping programmes from both the UK and North 
America proved satisfactory by mid-1944, shipments from the UK had improved 
somewhat earlier. In May 1943, there were only about 10,000 tons of accumulated 
cargo at British ports. As a result of improved priority ratings and larger shipments 
from Britain, there was a marked increase in the volume of non-essential goods that 
reached South African ports during the latter half of that year. In anticipation of further 
shipping improvements, the list of goods rated 1 to 5 was increased in February 1944 to 
include a host of non-essential goods. This period of ease in controls coincided with the 
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build-up to the Allied invasion of France, and the concurrent Allied campaign in Italy. 
These incidents caused severe congestion at British ports. Between January and August 
1944 the MWT was only able to reach the minimum target of 10,000 tons shipped to 
South Africa per month, and by June the accumulated cargo once more reached 30,000 
tons. This was, notwithstanding, only a temporary shipping crisis, and by September the 
MWT resumed its regular shipping programme to South Africa (see Graph 1.6). 
Throughout the remainder of the war, and despite the ever-present stringency of the 
circumstances in which shipping found itself, no further crises impinged on the South 
African shipping programme.161 
 
Graph 1.6: Shipments of commercial cargo from the United Kingdom  
to South Africa, 1943-1944162 
 The Union of South Africa emerged from the war without having faced a severe 
breakdown of its war economy, and without severe civilian austerity. This was a 
remarkable feat considering the earlier unreliable import controls and the lack of 
strategic foresight regarding planning of shipping freight. Had the Union Government 
previously adopted self-imposed restrictions of consumption at an earlier stage, it might 
have alleviated the shipping troubles it faced at the beginning of 1942. South Africa 
could do nothing to improve the position of shipping by itself, except to cooperate fully 
with the Anglo-American shipping authorities throughout. The fact remains that the 
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combined policies of the Union Government, the MWT, WSA, and even the CSAB, were 
unable to alter the global shipping situation throughout the war.  
Several geographic, economic and military variables imposed a number of 
limitations on the planners who aimed to meet the shipping predicament head-on. Some 
of these factors favoured South Africa from a shipping perspective. Others had such 
effects that troubles with shipping were merely perpetuated. South Africa’s saving grace 
was its geographic location astride the strategic shipping route to and from the Middle 
East, which meant that there was always plenty of shipping passing through South 
African waters. Had the Mediterranean remained open to shipping throughout the war, 
the Union would have fared much worse from a shipping point of view. Despite this 
geographic advantage, the Union was unable to produce significant export surpluses 
which formed a vital part of the British and American import programmes. This 
shortcoming naturally increased the difficulty of providing a higher regular tonnage of 
shipping for the Union. Without return cargoes, the loss to the UK import programme in 
particular, would have crippled the Allied war effort. 
1.4 The control, victualling, and repair of Allied shipping in South Africa 
The South African harbours were not duly strained at the outbreak of the war. The 
Union authorities did realise though, that as the war progressed, Union ports would 
increase in strategic value. This would result in an inevitable rise in the presence of 
Allied naval vessels, troop transports and merchant shipping calling at these ports. As 
follows, the SAR&H implemented a host of development plans to provide additional 
facilities in anticipation of the greater use of South African ports. This farsighted policy 
by the Union authorities was justified by 1940. Following the Italian entry into the war 
and the closure of the Mediterranean, a large number of Allied merchants and naval 
vessels were forced to make use of the strategic shipping lane around the Cape of Good 
Hope (see Graph 1.7). The Japanese invasion of the East Indies and Burma, as well as 
Japan’s occupation of Singapore and Hong Kong, only added to the complications. South 
African waters at once became a vital link in the main Allied supply routes to and from 
the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent and the Far East. The Union ports also 
provided vital anchorage, victualling, dry-docking and repair facilities to the visiting 
naval and merchant vessels.163 
                                                             
163  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 24, File: SA Railways and Harbours Departmental Civil War 
History Vol VIII. Ports & Shipping. 
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Graph 1.7: Total number of Allied naval vessels that called at  
the major South African ports, 1939-1945164 
 Along with the provision of a key connection between Allied supply routes, the 
South African harbours acted as the lifeline of the Union. The best part of the Union 
exports and imports passed through its ports at one stage or another. This turn of 
events naturally placed additional strain on the control measures and infrastructure of 
the SAR&H since 1940. 
At the outbreak of the war, most South African ports were considered 
inadequate to handle existing peacetime merchant traffic, despite upgrades in some 
harbours. South Africa was, however, fortunate that actual hostilities did not extend to 
any of its territories. Neither the Ossewabrandwag nor other Axis elements succeeded 
in destroying any of the SAR&H harbour facilities during the war, despite several 
attempts at sabotage by the former.165 
                                                             
164  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 24, File: SA Railways and Harbours Departmental Civil War 
History Vol VIII. Ports & Shipping. 
165  NWU, RAM Div, Ossewabrandwag Archive (OB Archive), Transkripsie/Bandopname D.J.F. 
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Fig 1.5: The return of the 1st South African Division from North Africa, 1943166 
Although the war placed severe pressure on South African manpower and 
materials, the development of the harbours continued unabated to ensure the speedy 
turn-around of shipping in South African ports. Pre-war development plans for SAR&H 
harbours, which included the provision of additional sheds, cranes and cargo-handling 
facilities did, however, have to be abandoned. The highest priority was given to 
essential work for the maintenance and expansion of vital harbour services. During the 
first few years of the war, inadequate use was made of the Port Elizabeth and East 
London harbours to relieve shipping congestion at Cape Town and Durban.167 Before 
these harbours became viable and offered a quicker turn-around time, adequate oil 
storage had to be constructed, and sufficient coal-bunkering and repair facilities 
established. Some of the most notable developments took place in Cape Town, Durban 
                                                             
166  South African National Museum of Military History, Masondo Reference Library. SA Navy Photo 
Collection, S.A. 4491. 
167  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 73, File: Year Book, Section XI. Shipping. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
P a g e  | 33 
and East London. Cape Town harbour saw the construction of the Sturrock and Duncan 
Docks and at East London the Princess Elizabeth Graving Dock was built. At Durban, the 
Maydon Channel was widened and deepened, the general Maydon Wharf, Point Area 
and Salisbury Island upgraded, and a Royal Air Force Flying Boat Base established.168 
 
Fig 1.6: The official opening of the Duncan Dock at Cape Town Harbour, 1943169 
 The suspension of airmail services and the irregularity of surface mail added a 
further dimension to the shipping predicament in South African harbours. This meant 
that ships often arrived ahead of the copies of their manifests or bills of lading, which 
naturally created delays in the handling and clearing of accumulated cargo at SAR&H 
sheds and along the wharves. The diversion of shipping from one South African port to 
another was also complicated, especially since the South African authorities had to 
match ship arrivals with an adequate number of rolling stock at each port. The system 
was complicated as long hauls marked the South African railway system and rolling 
stock, as a rule, remained scarce.  
Many of the merchant vessels which called at South African ports were, 
furthermore, bound for other destinations, and the cargo they brought to the Union was 
merely the result of topping up. These merchant ships invariably formed part of 
convoys which amassed in Union ports before continuing on their outward journeys. 
                                                             
168  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 23, File: SA Railways and Harbours Departmental Civil War 
History Vol VIII – Addenda to Volumes I and II Ports and Shipping. Port Development. 
169  South African National Museum of Military History, Masondo Reference Library. SA Navy Photo 
Collection, S.A. 4699. 
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This congestion proved a nightmare for the South African authorities. Not only did all of 
these vessels have to be accommodated, bunkered, watered, and replenished with 
logistical stores, a high proportion of them needed repairs. A further frustration 
experienced was that of procuring sufficient ships’ stores. This was partly because the 
priority ratings afforded to the import of ships’ stores by South African handlers in 
Britain and North America were too low to ensure that they obtained the required 
supplies posthaste. Given the strategic situation this was rather unreasonable, as the 
quick turnaround of naval and merchant vessels calling at South African ports remained 
imperative.170 
 It took the South African authorities a considerable amount of time to come up 
with adequate solutions to all of the shipping related problems within its sphere of 
influence. To start with, the Merchant Shipping Control Committee (MSCC) was 
established on 7 December 1939. The objective of the MSCC was to cooperate with the 
Union representative of the British Ministry of Shipping, the forerunner of the MWT. 
Their combined efforts would result in controling the supply of coal and oil for use as 
fuel in vessels and the use of South African harbours for docking and repairs. It would 
also enforce discipline amongst merchant crews and coordinate the supply of ships’ 
stores. Later on, the MSCC relinquished some of its responsibilities to other South 
African authorities.171  
 
Fig 1.7: HMS Illustrious calling at Cape Town during the war172 
                                                             
170  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 24, File: SA Railways and Harbours Departmental Civil War 
History Vol VIII. Ports & Shipping. 
171  Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, p. 136. 
172  South African National Museum of Military History, Masondo Reference Library. SA Navy Photo 
Collection, S.A. 951. 
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The Union harbours were the most taxed during the 1940/1941 fiscal year, 
especially after the closure of the Meditteranean to shipping, when the total number of 
merchant vessels that passed through South African waters reached record figures for 
the war. During this period, 11,082 merchant vessels, comprising 46,831,026 gross 
registered tons, called at South African ports. An accompanying total of 11,652,522 tons 
of cargo additionally passed through South African ports during this timespan, with a 
record figure of 5.5 million tons of cargo landed (see Graph 1.8).173 
 
Graph 1.8: Fluctuations in the handling of vessels and cargo at  
South African and South West African ports, 1939-1945174 
 It soon became imperative to appoint senior officials from the SAR&H to act as 
port directors at Cape Town and Durban. The functions of these Port Directors varied. 
They had to represent the Government, through the Minister of Railways and Harbours, 
in respect of administrative questions arising in connection with the administration and 
functioning of ports and shipping. They were expected to coordinate the activities of the 
civil and military departments at the respective ports, as well as coordinate their 
relations with the commercial community. They had full powers to act on behalf of the 
                                                             
173  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 24, File: SA Railways and Harbours Departmental Civil War 
History Vol VIII. Ports & Shipping. 
174  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 24, File: SA Railways and Harbours Departmental Civil War 
History Vol VIII. Ports & Shipping. Stats reworked from the information contained in the 
document. Please note that these stats are complete, unlike those contained in Turner et al, War 
in the Southern Oceans, p. 258 and Gordon-Cumming, Official History of the South African Naval 
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Government, except where important points of policy were concerned.175 The Port 
Directors also had the power to investigate, where necessary, items brought to their 
attention where the opinion was that improvements at the ports could be affected. 
When the supply of ships’ stores became critical, partly due to importing difficulties, the 
Port Directors took the responsibility of certifying and expediting all applications for 
import permits, and to ascertain that such stores remained in bond and not cleared for 
other purposes. The appointment of Directors at Durban and Cape Town met with 
considerable success in the coordination of the efforts and activities of the naval, 
military and civilian authorities. Their assingment also allowed for closer contact with 
the representatives of the MWT and the WSA. The results were so satisfactory that it 
was decided to extend the powers of the Directors at Durban and Cape Town to 
encompass the ports of East London and Port Elizabeth.176 
 By the middle of 1942, the offensive operations conducted by enemy submarines 
along the South African coast intensified and became an increasing menace to Allied 
shipping in the Southern Oceans. These operations, coupled with the somewhat heavy 
toll taken by Allied shipping as from October 1942, necessitated the Union Government 
to speed up the turnaround of merchant vessels visiting its ports. These operations also 
prompted the British Admiralty and the South African Naval Forces (SANF) to speed up 
and intensify its anti-submarine warfare measures. The SANF was tasked with provision 
of the safe conduct of merchant vessels along the South African coast. 177 
The MWT, in consensus with the Union Government, appointed a commission by 
mid-1942. Headed by R.B. Tollerton and C.E. Wurtzburg, the objective of the 
commission was to make an exhaustive analysis of the status of shipping in South 
African waters. One of the main points considered by the commission was the 
overbearing need for the quick turn-round of merchant shipping in South African 
harbours. The commission recommended the establishment of an organisation that 
could obtain accurate and advance information regarding all shipping under British 
control approaching South Africa, as well as their respective ports of call, specific 
logistical requirements, and expected times of arrival in port. This organisation would 
also have the power to divert shipping to appropriate anchorages when needed. In 
short, the commission would have the power to divert shipping, but would not have 
enough power to interfere with the day-to-day operation or control of the harbours 
operated by the SAR&H. The MWT made representations to the WSA, who duly agreed 
to cooperate in the functioning of this recommended organisation.178 
                                                             
175  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 73, File: Year Book, Section XI. Shipping. 
176  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 24, File: SA Railways and Harbours Departmental Civil War 
History Vol VIII. Ports & Shipping. 
177  Kleynhans, ‘Good Hunting’, pp. 173-183. 
178  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 24, File: SA Railways and Harbours Departmental Civil War 
History Vol VIII. Ports & Shipping. 
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 The South African Ports Allocation Executive (SAPEX), sanctioned by the Union 
Minister of Transport, was created on 1 January 1943. It promptly took over the 
responsibility of combatting the long turn-around time of shipping in South African 
harbours.179 VAdm (Sir) Campbell Tait, Commander-in-Chief of the South Atlantic 
Station, and the chief representative of the MWT in South Africa came to an agreement 
that Cape Town should became the headquarters of SAPEX. The Cape Town Port 
Director also acted as the Chairman of SAPEX.  
 
Fig 1.8: Vice Admiral (Sir) Campbell Tait – C-in-C South Atlantic Station (1942-1944)180 
The SAPEX committee comprised of representatives of the SAR&H, the MWT, the 
WSA, the RN, the SANF and the Union Controller of Ship Repairs. The committee, which 
sat daily in Cape Town, received advance information of all shipping approaching South 
African waters. This information included their cargo manifests and ultimate 
destination, along with their bunkering, stores and repair needs. The data gathering was 
made possible through the use of a universal form used by all ports of despatch across 
the globe. These were supplemented by VELOX and VESCA messages181 received 
                                                             
179  Hancock and Gowing, British War Economy, p. 420; Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, p. 136. 
180  https://artuk.org/discover/artworks/vice-admiral-sir-william-campbell-tait-18861946-175436 
(Accessed 29 June 2018). 
181  After the outbreak of the war in Europe the British Admiralty once more took recourse the 
Lloyds reporting system, the relationship dating back nearly 200 years, and hence modified it to 
meet wartime needs and augment it by including reports from routing officers, intelligence 
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through naval channels, that provided all the essential information needed without 
putting a strain on the already heavily taxed cabling facilities. The committee was, 
however, constantly aware of the security risks associated with the daily transmission 
of such shipping information, and took all possible means to prevent the leakage of 
shipping information to enemy agents.182 
 The SAR&H also provided SAPEX with additional findings. These included the 
daily returns of all the shipping in South African harbours; the amount of cargo being 
loaded and discharged and the amount of coal or oil being bunkered. Further 
information entailed whether water and stores were being taken on; whether repairs 
were being done – with estimates of when each of these would be completed –  and 
when the ship would be ready to sail.  
SAPEX was required to take into account the different harbour facilities for 
handling ships and cargo, along with the availability of rail connections and escorts by 
surface ships and aircraft, as well as the impact of delays on group sailings. Such 
information allowed SAPEX to order merchant shipping to the most suitable ports in 
each situation. Customs officers and port authorities would accordingly be alerted, 
crew’s mail redirected, and cargo manifests and other documents forwarded to the 
various ports concerned.183  
The question of final delivery, however, remained contentious for SAPEX, as it 
was essentially the concern of each shipping line. After the matter was referred to the 
MWT and the WSA, the various shipping lines were instructed to make out all Bills of 
Lading for cargo shipped to South African ports for a named port, or any other port in 
South Africa, as directed by SAPEX. The commission made a further effort to spread the 
load of imported traffic over the four main South African ports. It did so by 
recommending that the Allied exporting countries should load their cargo for discharge 
at each of the four main Union ports. Along with the Canadian authorities, the MWT 
readily accepted the proposal. The single caveat was that there be no unnecessary delay 
in cargo handling. The United States authorities did not welcome the suggestion at first. 
They did, however, subsequently agree to a three port loading scheme – also with the 
provision that there be no delay in the despatch of American ships.184 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
centres and additional reporting officers to permit a reasonably accurate plot of all merchant 
shipping world-wide. This system was called the "VESCA" (Vessel and Cargo) system. The VELOX 
messaging system allowed for confidential shipping information to pass between ports and the 
Reporting Officers in the Cape Intelligence Area. The VELOX telegrams was essentially a coded 
and re-coded message and comprised the VELOX message in plain language, the ship’s signal 
letter along with a dummy letter, the estimated time of arrival, and the time of origin and date in 
plain language. See US Navy Department, History of Convoy and Routing, p. 63. 
182  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 24, File: SA Railways and Harbours Departmental Civil War 
History Vol VIII. Ports & Shipping. 
183  Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, p. 136. 
184  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 24, File: SA Railways and Harbours Departmental Civil War 
History Vol VIII. Ports & Shipping. 
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 An off-shoot of this redistribution of shipping arrivals amongst South African 
ports, was the establishment of Saldanha Bay as a defended lay-by anchorage.185 
Saldanha is South Africa’s only natural protected anchorage. Even so, it lacked an 
adequate supply of water and harbour facilities, which prevented it from handling a 
large number of ships at any one time. From 1942 the South African authorities 
attempted to rectify this position. Initially, fresh water was conveyed from Cape Town 
by a water-tanker on a temporary basis. Lighters and temporary bunker facilities were 
conversely available on a more permanent basis. The harbour at Saldanha, also 
underwent several key developments. Among these were the installation of a pipeline 
from the Berg River to supply 1 million gallons of water per day, a reinforced concrete 
jetty, a ship-repair depot and oil storage tanks. Unfortunately, most of these projects 
only reached completion after the port’s greatest need had passed.186 
 
Graph 1.9: Total merchant shipping handled at South African ports, 1939-1944187  
                                                             
185  Burman and Levin, The Saldanha Bay Story, pp. 145-152. 
186  Gordon-Cumming, Official History of the South African Naval Forces, pp. 189-195. For more on the 
development of Saldanha during the war see Visser and Monama, ‘Black workers, typhoid fever 
and the construction of the Berg River – Saldanha military water pipeline’, pp. 196-198; Visser, 
Jacobs and Smit, ‘Water for Saldanha’, pp. 141-143. 
187  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 24, File: SA Railways and Harbours Departmental Civil War 
History Vol VIII. Ports & Shipping. Note that statistics on merchant shipping handled at Saldanha 
1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944
Walvis Bay 293 287 172 180 447 173
Cape Town 3157 3649 3786 3964 2259 1513
Port Elizabeth 1185 1120 1141 817 488 482
East London 1220 942 723 536 320 322
Durban 4603 4388 3346 3029 2553 1880
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 By early 1943 there was a drastic change in the war situation. The Allied success 
in North Africa and the opening of the Mediterranean shipping route meant that far 
fewer Allied naval vessels and merchantmen would use the strategic shipping lanes 
around the Cape of Good Hope. This had a dramatic effect on the South African shipping 
position, with a drastic decline in the volume of shipping calling at Union ports for the 
remainder of the war (see Graph 1.9). Despite this reduction in shipping, the tonnages 
of imported cargo handled at South African ports remained fairly constant. The Cape 
Town and Durban ports remained particularly busy owing to an increasing demand for 
South African exports. Throughout the war, the combined efforts of the SAR&H, MSCC, 
SAPEX, MWT and WSA ensured the quick turn-around of both the Allied merchant 
shipping and naval vessels which called at South African ports.188 
 Before the outbreak of the war, ship repairs in South Africa consisted mainly of 
minor overhauling of merchant vessels and the maintenance of fishing trawlers and 
whalers. Only two ports possessed graving docks, with nearly 150 men employed 
between them. By 1941, following the closure of the Mediterranean to Allied shipping in 
1940, nearly 60% of the merchant and naval shipping that rounded the Cape of Good 
Hope required repairs. This demand necessitated major repairs and overhauls to be 
facilitated at South African harbours.189 
On 31 January 1941, a Director of Merchant Ship Repairs was appointed to 
decide on the priority of repair work and its allocation. The Director of Merchant Ship 
Repairs further allocated repair work between various firms on a cost-plus pricing 
basis, which seemed the only feasible method. Unfortunately, the cost-plus pricing basis 
did not furnish a strong incentive on the firms to complete the work in the shortest 
possible time. Both the RN and SDF, however, allocated their own repair work, which 
received priority above the Allied merchants. This division between authorities 
naturally led to some challenges. By September 1941 a Controller of Ship Repairs was 
appointed with authority to decide on all priority repairs, and direct all shipping repair 
work in the Union. He also had a seat on SAPEX, and gave valuable advice to this 
committee, especially on the completion dates of vessel repairs. The Controller of Ship 
Repairs further centralised the supplies used in shipping reconditioning into the 
Merchant Shipping Repair Pool, upon which contractors could draw as the need arose. 
In addition, his office was responsible for the procurement and importation of the 
overseas material needed to undertake shipping repairs. The appointment of Deputy 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
during the war is incomplete, though there was a definite surge in merchant vessels visiting the 
port from the latter half of 1942 to mid-1943. 
188  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 73, File: Year Book, Section XI. Shipping. 
189  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 23, File: SA Railways and Harbours Departmental Civil War 
History Vol VIII – Addenda to Volumes I and II Ports and Shipping. Memorandum on the Ship 
Repair Organisation; Martin and Orpen, South Africa at War, pp. 136-137. 
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Controllers at each of the principal South African ports assisted the Controller of Ship 
Repairs in the execution of his duties.190 
 
Fig 1.9: Naval repair work undertaken at a South African port during the war191 
 Graving dock space, however, remained very limited, and by the middle of 1942, 
as many as 78 ships lay idle outside South African harbours awaiting repairs. This 
episode was largely due to the loss of docking facilities in the Middle and Far East, 
which especially confirmed the strategic importance of the Durban graving dock. A 
further imminent matter was the acute shortage of skilled labour. The scarcity of skilled 
workers was largely a result of artisans being transferred from the Witwatersrand 
against their liking. The resultant state of affairs occurred at the expense of the crucial 
munitions and engineering industries vital to the South African war economy. 
At the height of the shipping repair work period, nearly 1,300 men were 
employed at Durban, 932 men at Cape Town, 204 men at Port Elizabeth and a further 
135 men in East London.192 Despite the above-mentioned pitfalls, the number of ships 
repaired in South African ports was considerable. The weekly average of ships repaired 
                                                             
190  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 23, File: SA Railways and Harbours Departmental Civil War 
History Vol VIII – Addenda to Volumes I and II Ports and Shipping. Establishment and Functioning 
of Controller of Ship Repairs; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 23, File: SA Railways and Harbours 
Departmental Civil War History Vol VIII – Addenda to Volumes I and II Ports and Shipping. 
Memorandum on the Ship Repair Organisation. 
191  South African National Museum of Military History, Masondo Reference Library. SA Navy Photo 
Collection, S.A. 564. 
192  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 23, File: SA Railways and Harbours Departmental Civil War 
History Vol VIII – Addenda to Volumes I and II Ports and Shipping. Establishment and Functioning 
of Controller of Ship Repairs. 
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from March 1941 to March 1943 totalled sixty-two. A number of vessels were repaired 
after being torpedoed, while some craft were converted into armed cruisers and 
hospital ships. Some Allied liners had their boilers completely overhauled, while repairs 
to naval guns were also carried out. At least 4,451 ships were fitted with degaussing 
equipment, and many with radar and asdic equipment. Three floating docks were built 
along with the production of several general launches, cutters, dinghies, lifeboats and 
special equipment such as Fairmile motor launches. Most of this work had never been 
contemplated in South Africa before the war.193 By the end of 1943 there was a marked 
decline in the number of ships being repaired, especially after the Mediterranean was 
re-opened for naval craft. The ship repair organisation was, however, kept in readiness 
for the predicted Middle East offensive. By March 1944 this need no longer existed. As a 
result, the Ship Repair Control Organisation in South Africa was permanently closed 
down well before the Japanese surrender in 1945 (see Table 1.5).194 
 Merchant ships Naval ships Harbour craft Total 
Cape Town 2,964 844 115 3,293 
Durban 3,889 1,538 228 6,655 
Port Elizabeth 465 117 27 609 
East London 231 139 61 431 
Walvis Bay 19 11 0 30 
Total 7,568 2,649 431 10,648 
Table 1.5: Total number of ships repaired in South Africa, 1941–1944195 
Conclusion 
It is undeniable that a close study of shipping forms the basis to understanding the Axis 
and Allied maritime strategies in South African waters during the war, largely due to the 
interconnectivity of the Allied war effort particularly in the naval sphere. The 
availability of merchant shipping for imports and exports was crucial to the continued 
functioning of the South African war economy. Sourcing this shipping proved 
problematic, as South Africa often desired more imports than the Allied shipping 
programmes were able to provide. The introduction of a number of control measures, 
such as priority rating and the establishment of the CSAB, helped to ease South Africa’s 
wartime shipping dilemma. The strategic location of South Africa astride a main 
maritime trade route meant that large numbers of naval and merchant vessels visited 
                                                             
193  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 25, File: Shipping Repairs. South Africa’s Achievement in Wartime 
Shipping Repairs; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 73, File: Year Book, Section XI. Shipping. 
194  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 23, File: SA Railways and Harbours Departmental Civil War 
History Vol VIII – Addenda to Volumes I and II Ports and Shipping. Establishment and Functioning 
of Controller of Ship Repairs. 
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its harbours as they passed round the coast during the war. South Africa evidently had 
to exercise control over all the vessels which visited its ports. It also had to make 
adequate provision for the victualling and repair of these vessels.  
The establishment of SAPEX, and the appointment of the Controller of Ship 
Repairs, helped the South African authorities to exercise a large measure of control over 
the shipping situation in general. Despite its continued importance to the Allied war 
effort, the South African contribution with regard to shipping, remains under-
appreciated. The importance of the Cape Town/Freetown shipping route did, however, 
not go unnoticed by the OKM and SKL. They maintained that far-flung operations off the 
coast of South Africa were only feasible if there was sufficient sinking potential to justify 
a sustained U-boat offensive. It is thus rather unsurprising that the Axis and Allied 
maritime strategies off the South African coast during the war were reactionary rather 
than preventative in nature. This comes to the fore in the following chapters, where the 
execution of the Axis and Allied maritime strategies in South African waters are 
discussed at length. The first step of this discussion involves the measures taken to 
protect the South African coast, which are investigated in Chapter 2. 
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Chapter 2 
The development of the South African  
coastal defence system, 1933-1945 
Introduction 
The South African naval and coastal defences were in a state of constant development 
throughout the interwar period. South Africa, however, remained reliant on the United 
Kingdom (UK), and the Admiralty in particular, for its coastal and naval defence. At the 
outbreak of war, the Union Government was determined to re-establish a distinctly 
South African naval asset to control its maritime defence. The Admiralty, however, 
viewed these developments with concern. The idea of re-establishing the navy had an 
unequivocal effect on Anglo-South African naval relations and the conduct of the naval 
war in South African waters.  
The Seaward Defence Force (SDF) officially assumed the responsibility for South 
Africa’s coastal and naval defences in January 1940. Without delay, it took over the 
former British responsibilities of minesweeping (M/S), anti-submarine (A/S) duties, 
Port War Signal Stations, Examination Services, and other fixed naval and harbour 
defences at the principal South African ports. South Africa, however, remained 
somewhat reliant on the Admiralty for technical and training support, and for the 
provision of specialised equipment needed for coastal defence. The exigencies of the 
naval war in the Southern Oceans naturally tested the Union’s coastal and naval 
defences.  
This chapter has three broad objectives. Its first objective is to investigate the 
formation of South Africa’s coastal and naval defences during the interwar period, 
especially against the backdrop of economic rationalisation and Imperial defence. The 
second objective is to critically discuss the creation of the SDF and Anglo-South African 
naval relations at the outbreak of the war. Last, the chapter evaluates the development 
of a comprehensive South African coastal defence system during the war. 
2.1 Interwar rationalisation, Imperial defence and the South African Naval Service 
A number of part-time naval volunteer units preceded the formal establishment of a 
permanent South African naval force. The earliest of these volunteer units to come 
about were the Port Elizabeth Naval Volunteer Brigade in 1861, the Natal Naval 
Volunteers in 1885, and the Cape Colonial Division of the Royal Naval Volunteer 
Reserve (RNVR) in 1905. These forces formed the foundation of South Africa’s coastal 
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defence organisation, despite several organisational and financial constraints that 
plagued these units.196  
The South African Defence Act of 1912 formalised the amalgamation of the Cape 
Colonial Division and Natal Naval Volunteers in July 1913 into a single unit known as 
the South African Division of the RNVR (RNVR (SA)). Though not a permanent naval 
force, the RNVR (SA) was funded by the Union Government and essentially formed part 
of the Union Defence Force (UDF). The Royal Navy (RN) did, however, remain 
responsible for its peacetime organisation, training, administration and discipline. The 
RNVR (SA) was therefore at the disposal of the Admiralty during the war. The RNVR 
(SA) rendered valuable service to the RN in the course of the First World War by 
mobilising men for service aboard vessels and at various shore establishments. 
Moreover, the RNVR (SA) facilitated a measure of naval interaction between South 
Africa, the UK and other Dominions. The post-war demobilisation of the RNVR (SA) once 
more highlighted the dire state of naval affairs in the Union.197 
 In 1921, South Africa took a drastic step in terms of its coastal and naval defence. 
Until then, South Africa maintained no permanent naval forces, and despite the 
existence of the RNVR (SA), it continued to rely on the Admiralty for its naval and 
coastal defence. This defence, and the concomitant politics of the ‘naval contribution’, 
however, came at a price, and amounted to an annual levy of £85,000. South Africa 
suspended its payment of this regular financial imposition in 1921, and decided to 
develop its own naval capability henceforth. Unsurprisingly, the establishment of the 
South African Naval Service (SANS) on 1 April 1922 held far-reaching consequences in 
terms of naval and coastal defence.198 For the first time, South Africa possessed a 
permanent naval force of its own. The service was primarily tasked with the protection 
of its territorial waters and extensive coastline.  
The establishment of the SANS allowed for different sections for general duties, 
M/S and hydrography, while also allowing for the expansion and training of the RNVR 
(SA). Furthermore, the Admiralty allocated three naval vessels to South Africa: a survey 
ship HMSAS Protea199 and two M/S trawlers, HMSAS Sonneblom and HMSAS 
Immortelle.200 The former conducted a number of hydrographic surveys along the South 
African coastline, while the latter was used for the training of all RNVR (SA) officers and 
ratings. The first officer commanding SANS was Cdr N.H. Rankin, a retired RN captain. 
The Admiralty further transferred a depot ship to the SANS, and HMSAS Africander 
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became the nominal administrative headquarters of the embryonic naval force, 
consisting of a mere 16 officers and 117 ratings.201 
 In 1923, an Imperial Conference was held in London. This conference gave 
special attention to the question of mutual assistance and cooperation in the Imperial 
defence. The meeting recognised the legal right of Dominion Governments to decide on 
both the nature and extent of any military action it would take in the defence of the 
British Empire during future wars. The guiding principles required each portion of the 
Empire to be primarily responsible for its own local defence. Furthermore, adequate 
provision to protect maritime communications was called for. The provision of naval 
bases across the globe with repair and refuelling capabilities would also ensure the 
strategic and operational mobility of the RN. Finally, the maintenance of a minimum 
standard of naval strength would be assured, and the development of air forces 
established throughout the Empire. South Africa, however, took no immediate steps in 
this regard. Their reticence was partly due to the new National Party Government’s 
policy of resigning its responsibility of colonial policing, and focusing instead on the 
protection of its neutrality. In 1926, Col Frederic Creswell, the Union Minister of 
Defence, reiterated South Africa’s stance on Imperial defence at the Imperial Conference 
in London, and confirmed that there was no legal provision for the UDF to render war 
service outside the confines of southern Africa.202 
 Despite South Africa’s strong position on its commitments to Imperial defence, 
defence matters in the Union were acute. Amid a general reorganisation of the structure 
of the UDF in 1922, and an amendment of the Defence Act during the same year, the 
South African defence establishment was in a dire state of affairs. By the mid-1920s, the 
UDF faced the prospect of further reorganisation largely due to manpower and 
budgetary constraints. Further, by 1927, the effective strength of the Permanent Force 
had plateaued at 151 officers and 1,259 other ranks. The manpower concerns were, 
however, a triviality when compared to the worsening financial climate due to the onset 
of the Great Depression. The destabilising effect of the Great Depression had a profound 
impact on the Union’s defence budget, which by 1932 amounted to a meagre £736,831. 
By 1933 the cumulative effect of manpower and budgetary constraints left the UDF in a 
precarious position. All told, the UDF was ineffective, undermanned and incapable of 
effectively defending South Africa.203  
 The maintenance of the SANS also proved somewhat too costly amidst growing 
budgetary confines. The annual budget was £62,000, with an additional £12,000 
allocated for the continued operation of the RNVR (SA) – amounting to nearly 10% of 
the entire 1932 defence budget. Naval defence, it seemed, indeed proved too costly for 
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the UDF. The post of the Officer Commanding SANS disappeared in November 1932, and 
the command and administration of the SANS reverted to the Commander-in-Chief (C-
in-C) of the RN Africa Station headquartered in Simon’s Town. In the course of 1933, the 
HMSAS Protea was returned to the Admiralty, whereafter the effective strength of the 
SANS fell to 64 men. The resultant domino effect also saw the laying up of HMSAS 
Sonneblom and HMSAS Immortelle, which were returned to the Admiralty in 1934. The 
SANS was virtually dissolved as a seagoing force, and with a complement of only four 
officers and twelve ratings, it could do little more than assist in the administration and 
training of the RNVR (SA).204 
 In 1933, however, a number of drastic changes occurred within the military and 
political spheres of South Africa, which had a decided influence on both the naval and 
coastal defence of the Union. The focus of Imperial defence also shifted, with attention 
concentrated on the rise of the Fascist Powers of Germany, Italy and Japan. In the same 
year, a coalition government, composed of the National Party and South African Party, 
came into power. With the new coalition government came the appointment of a new 
Minister of Defence – the controversial Oswald Pirow of German descent.205 In the 
months of 1934, the South African economy started recovering from the effects of the 
Great Depression. The defence budget also increased for the first time since 1924. The 
boost in defence expenditure held the promise of transforming the UDF into a modern 
military organisation.  
Pirow, in turn, immediately set about reorganising the UDF. To start with, he 
initiated a process of transforming the South African General Staff into more specialised 
portfolios. The most drastic changes in the General Staff occurred in the office of the 
Chief of the General Staff (CGS). The former CGS, Maj Gen Andries Brink, now occupied 
the new position of Officer Commanding UDF, and concurrently held the position of 
Secretary of Defence. After the abolition of the post of Director Air Services, Pierre van 
Ryneveld became the new CGS of the UDF. Unfortunately neither Brink nor Van 
Ryneveld had any affinity or respect for one another. Additionally, with the 
establishment of five major sections under the control of the CGS, several changes 
occurred at the Defence Headquarters (DHQ) in Pretoria. The five new positions were 
Director Military Operations and Training, Adjutant General, Quartermaster General, 
Director Technical Services, and a Director Medical Services.206 
 Amid profound structural and financial changes, the need to expand the UDF 
soon became apparent. The shift in military threat perception in South Africa was the 
foremost driving factor of this expansion. While a direct attack on South Africa still 
seemed improbable, the continued threats of civil unrest, coupled with the persistent 
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impending commitments to Imperial defence in the event of a world war, remained 
ever-present. At the foundation of the expansion and reorganisation of the UDF, was 
Pirow’s notorious five-year plan. This scheme would come to fruition between 1939 and 
1941.207  
It is also noteworthy that under Van Ryneveld’s guidance, the South African 
Defence Policy accepted its continued reliance on the RN to safeguard the Union against 
all external maritime threats. As a precondition, South Africa was to provide adequate 
warning in the case of a maritime threat so as to allow for the necessary British 
countermeasures. In circumstances where early warning proved impossible, the UDF 
was relied on to delay the attacking navy long enough to enable the RN to mobilise and 
redeploy to South African waters. While the procurement of naval vessels still proved 
too costly, the UDF accepted the responsibility of protecting the Union’s harbours and 
coast against external maritime aggression. Minesweepers were earmarked to protect 
the harbours, while the static defences of the Coastal Garrisons were to be 
supplemented by mobile artillery and infantry. The presence of the South African Air 
Force (SAAF) also bolstered the overall strength of forces available for coastal 
defence.208  
 In theory, the naval aspects of Pirow’s five-year plan seemed progressive and 
somewhat unrealistic. They were therefore difficult to implement in practice. The 
reorganisation of the UDF in 1934 led to several changes in the naval sphere, especially 
in terms of coastal defence. The closure of the SANS in 1934 particularly disturbed the 
Admiralty, despite the rampant expansion of the RNVR (SA). While South Africa 
recognised its responsibility for Imperial defence and the continued protection of the 
maritime trade routes around the Cape of Good Hope, the primary focus of the UDF 
shifted towards the protection of the Union’s harbours and extensive coast.209 As a 
result, the South African coastal defences expanded without delay. The establishment of 
the Coastal Artillery Brigade in Cape Town, with several units across South Africa, was 
at the heart of this increase. The rapid expansion of the SAAF, largely through the 
goodwill of Van Ryneveld, led to the establishment of SAAF bases in close proximity to 
the principal South African ports of Cape Town and Durban. These SAAF bases 
supported the fixed and movable coastal defences, and provided additional aerial 
support to the RN base in Simon’s Town. The Admiralty were, however, sceptical of the 
South African insistence of defending its own coast, and regarded it as a strategic over-
investment.210 
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 During Pirow’s tenure as Minister of Defence, the Cape Town coastal defences 
received particular attention. According to the military historian Deon Visser, Pirow 
considered a Japanese attack on Cape Town’s fixed defences extremely likely in the 
event of war. This is rather surprising. As discussed in chapter one, the threat 
perception identified the Kriegsmarine as the primary naval menace to South Africa in 
the Atlantic Ocean, and only considered limited Japanese and Italian naval operations 
along the Union’s Indian Ocean coastline.211 Nevertheless, Pirow called for the 
upgrading of the coastal defences around Cape Town. These would include a 15-inch 
gun battery on Robben Island and more 9.2-inch guns near Duiker Point to dominate 
and protect approaches to Table Bay. The British, however, regarded the request as 
excessive, as the anticipated scales of attack on Cape Town did not warrant the 
installation of such large calibre coastal defences batteries. The British maintained that 
9.2-inch gun batteries were more than sufficient to ward off any attacks by surface 
raiders, especially when supported by the SAAF. 
Despite Britain’s apprehensions, Pirow insisted on the installation of the 15-inch 
guns to protect Cape Town. This action would place South Africa’s security interest 
directly above that of the UK and of the shared Imperial defence. In order to appease 
Pirow, however, Britain acknowledged South Africa’s important role in Imperial defence 
matters, and reluctantly agreed to the request. As completion of the proposed defences 
would take several years, an interim arrangement to temporarily augment the Cape 
Town coastal defences was decided on. The Admiralty agreed in June 1936 to loan the 
monitor HMS Erebus to the Union Government for this purpose. The HMS Erebus needed 
an overhaul before undertaking the voyage to South Africa, and a shortage of dockyard 
space in Britain forced the Admiralty to extend the intended overhaul to December 
1938. Pirow accepted the offer amid much secrecy, and only informed the South African 
parliament in March 1939 of the so-called Erebus scheme. The Erebus scheme, however, 
never materialised. In contrast to Visser’s view on the augmentation of the Cape Town 
coastal defences, Pirow’s insistence on 15-inch guns for the defence of Table Bay was 
entirely far-fetched and unrealistic considering the proposed scales of attack and 
identified threat perception.212 
 It is fortunate that the rest of the South African coastal defences also received 
attention during this period. The reformulation of the South African coastal defence 
policy occurred towards the end of the 1930s. This took place after the Admiralty, the 
Committee on Imperial Defence and the UDF agreed on the maximum scale of possible 
naval attacks on the Union. Among the defence measures recommended first and 
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foremost, were adequate local seaward defence which included M/S, submarine 
detection, and the installations of A/S defences.  
The coast defence policy explicitly stated that 36 whalers and trawlers registered 
in South Africa be earmarked for conversion to auxiliary M/S vessels. The proposed 
allocation was: Durban – 6; Cape Town – 12; Port Elizabeth and East London – 6; 
Saldanha – 6 and Walvis Bay – 6. The UDF further proposed that 15 similar vessels be 
equipped for A/S duties. Their suggested allocation was: Durban – 3; Cape Town – 6; 
Saldanha – 3 and Walvis Bay – 3. The coast defence policy further proffered the erection 
of a series of double A/S nets at Cape Town harbour.213 The next recommendation was 
the establishment of a ‘fortress’ at Cape Town, Durban and Simon’s Town. The word 
‘fortress’ encompassed the complete defence organisation at each location including 
searchlights, anti-aircraft guns, and minor ordnance at harbour entrances. Under this 
proposal, a further 2 X 9.2-inch and 2 X 6-inch guns were earmarked for installation at 
Cape Town, Durban and Simon’s Town to augment the existing armament. The coastal 
defence policy called for further fixed batteries of 6-inch guns at East London, Port 
Elizabeth and Saldanha Bay. These artillery batteries would supplement the existing 
defences, which included a mobile battery of sixty pounders at Walvis Bay, as well as the 
Achilles Reserve in Table Bay comprising 2 X 6-inch naval guns, 2 X 6-inch fixed guns 
and 2 X 4.7-inch fixed guns.214  
In hindsight, one can see that the afore-mentioned coastal defence policy and 
proposals for modernisation thereof, in all their grandeur, had Pirow’s name written all 
over it. Moreover, such policy and proposals were entirely unrealistic and unnecessary 
with regard to South Africa’s defence needs. As van der Waag correctly points out, 
however, Pirow was a man to whom “the big things rather than the adequate and 
unspectacular” mattered.215 
 At the strategic level, contact between the Admiralty, the Department of Defence 
and the UDF proved problematic. This connection continued to deteriorate as the geo-
strategic position in Europe worsened. The South African defence leaders, and 
especially Andries Brink, Pierre van Ryneveld and Oswald Pirow became the 
scapegoats. The British views on Brink and Van Ryneveld in particular, especially their 
varied stances on naval matters in general, are particularly significant. The British, and 
especially the then C-in-C Africa Station VAdm (Sir) Edward Evans, regarded Andries 
Brink as “no lover of England or the Royal Navy”. He also stated that Van Ryneveld 
“knows and cares little about the navy… [and will press for the] expansion of the Air 
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Force to the exclusion of all else.”216 It is interesting to contrast these views to Evans’ 
opinion of Pirow, whom he regarded as his “greatest friend in the Southern 
Hemisphere” and who’s “company to me was like a glass of champagne after a 
successful Admiral’s inspection.”217 These quotes, as van der Waag duly points out, only 
served to highlight the dire state of naval affairs in South Africa. The country had been 
severely hamstrung by dominion nationalism with a primary focus on land and air 
forces. The accompanying financial stringency of the 1930s also exacerbated the 
problem.218  
 
Fig 2.1: Admiral (Sir) Edward Evans – C-in-C Africa Station (1933-1935)219 
Throughout the latter half of the 1930s, Pirow and his libertine five-year plans 
for the reorganisation of the UDF received a considerable amount of criticism – 
especially from Gen Jan Smuts and his faithful supporters. The South African General 
Staff also became increasingly convinced that the UDF needed modernisation due to the 
continued deterioration of the geo-strategic situation in Europe. It was of the opinion 
that Pirow’s five-year plan was particularly ill-suited in this regard.220 Van Ryneveld, 
when commenting on Pirow’s coastal defence policy, went as far to say that the 
programme for the rejuvenation of the South African naval defences was far too 
extravagant. He stated that it could “only be justified on an assumption that South Africa 
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might be required to defend its neutrality against the rest of the commonwealth.”221 
Thus, on the eve of the Second World War, South Africa occupied a rather precarious 
position regarding its naval and coastal defences. The former remained virtually non-
existent, while the latter was largely in a state of flux owing to the process of 
modernisation. 
2.2 Naval ambition, Anglo-South African relations, and the Seaward Defence Force 
Van der Waag maintains that both the structure and organisation of South Africa’s 
maritime defence changed considerably at the outbreak of the Second World War. He 
further argues that these changes had a profound effect on Anglo-South African naval 
relations. At the heart of the transformation of South Africa’s maritime defence, was the 
formation of the SDF in September 1939. The SDF was created through the merger of 
the remnants of the SANS and the SANS War Reserve, as well as through volunteers 
from the RNVR (SA). The British, however, viewed the establishment of the SDF with 
much concern and regarded it as altogether unnecessary. In fact, the formation of the 
SDF not only marked a low-point in Anglo-South African naval relations but revealed 
several cracks in South Africa’s coastal and naval defences.222  
 Anglo-South African naval relations remained uneasy when, on 6 September 
1939, South Africa declared war on Germany. This tension persisted despite the general 
euphoria surrounding the declaration of war. There was little to no cooperation 
between DHQ in Pretoria and the staff of the RN Africa Station in Simon’s Town. The 
lack of collaboration abided despite the addition of an RN Officer, Cdr James Dalgleish, 
to DHQ. Dalgleish’s official designation was Staff Officer (SO) SANS, and he was tasked 
with acting as a liaison officer in Pretoria. To the Admiralty’s advantage, the Africa 
Station War Order (ASWO) offered the British two strategic resources in South Africa 
during the war. First, the South African coastal artillery would play a key role in 
defending South African ports. Second, the RNVR (SA) was crucial in the Admiralty’s 
planning for a naval war in South African waters. The RNVR (SA) men, along with 
several retired RN officers living in South Africa, would coordinate shipping control and 
examination services at South African ports. They would also provide signallers for 
shore stations, man 30 minesweepers, and provide crews for four armed merchant 
cruisers equipped in South Africa. Together they formed the first line of Britain’s naval 
defence in South Africa. The ASWO, redrafted as early as February 1939 by the office of 
the newly created C-in-C South Atlantic Station, VAdm George D’Oyly Lyon, furthermore 
guaranteed complete British control over all naval assets in South Africa in the event of 
war. These naval assets then reverted to the operational and administrative control of 
the C-in-C or the Senior Naval Officer South Atlantic. In addition, the ASWO undermined 
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South Africa’s role regarding naval and coastal defence. The SANS was thus left with the 
trivial task of overseeing administrative and liaison arrangements.223 
 
Fig 2.2: Vice Admiral (Sir) George D’Oyly Lyon – C-in-C Africa Station (1938-1939)224 
 By mid-1939, the RN had started preparations for a possible naval war. In the 
event of war, only a few RN cruisers and armed merchant cruisers – chiefly manned by 
RNVR (SA) personnel – would operate in South African waters. When Lyon left to 
administer the South Atlantic Station in Freetown in June 1939, Capt Charles Stuart RN 
assumed complete responsibility for the activation of the ASWO when war broke out. As 
the Senior Naval Officer in Simon’s Town, Stuart was at the centre of Anglo-South 
African relations. He was in a tricky position. He had to fulfil his wartime duties to the 
Admiralty, while staying in the good books of the South African General Staff.225  
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Underpinning Stuart’s precarious position were fears expressed by the 
Admiralty before the outbreak of war. First, the Admiralty remained concerned about 
Hertzog’s and Pirow’s anti-British, and increasingly pro-German, attitude in the years 
preceding the outbreak of the war. The South African government continued to remain 
indifferent to the requirements of the ASWO, leaving the British rather in doubt as to 
what might transpire in the event of naval mobilisation in South Africa. Nevertheless, 
Lyon chose to circumvent the South African authorities in the event of war and mobilise 
the RNVR (SA) regardless.  
Second, the Erebus scheme had become a point of contention by March 1939 as 
matters over the control of the naval reserves had come to the fore. The key to the 
problem was the question of manning the monitor, especially since DHQ demanded that 
South Africans operate the vessel. The Admiralty Staff in Simon’s Town were naturally 
concerned since they feared that if RNVR (SA) personnel would serve on board the HMS 
Erebus, its reserve pool of trained officers and men would dwindle.226 
 The third and most pressing concern on the British side was elicited by an 
announcement made by South Africa in August 1939. At the heart of this announcement 
– which was to re-establish a South African naval asset – was South Africa’s insistence 
on controlling its maritime defences. The Director of Coast Defence, Col H.T. Newman, 
would assume complete control over all Local Seaward Defences, and develop a new 
South African naval organisation. By the end of August, DHQ decided to establish an 
Active Citizen Force unit called the South African Local Seaward Defence Corps. The 
Corps would materialise in addition to the RNVR (SA), and had the sole purpose of 
providing the required personnel for M/S and A/S duties as well as administering the 
local examination services. This signalled the re-birth of a South African-controlled 
naval force, and the Admiralty was naturally concerned, particularly since these duties 
were the responsibility of the RNVR (SA).  
The effects of the reestablishment of a South African naval force were drastic. 
Within a week, Van Ryneveld ordered Newman to assume complete control over all 
South African coastal defence matters. These comprised of all of the military, air and 
naval measures crucial to the protection of the Union’s harbours, as well as extensive 
coast and the vital shipping lanes rounding the Cape of Good Hope. The naval measures 
also included the provision and operation of M/S and A/S patrols, shipping control 
service, war and port signal stations, contraband control service, examination service 
and the provision of A/S defences.227  
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Van der Waag accurately points out that a situation marked by duality arose at 
the outbreak of the war. While the RN had the use of Simon’s Town from which to 
project offensive power, the UDF took complete control of the overall defence of the 
South African ports and territorial waters. The apparent duality held serious misgivings 
for the already tense Anglo-South African naval relations, particularly with regard to 
command and control. The crucial factor sustaining this conundrum was that Newman 
issued direct instructions to Dalgleish. He did so without any reference to Stuart in 
Simon’s Town, even though Dalgleish was only detached to DHQ as an SO from the RN 
Africa Station. South African naval politics, it appears, were, certainly rather complex 
during the late 1930s.228 
 As a result of the dire state of naval affairs in the country, the outright 
implementation of the ASWO was recommended. The South African naval reserves were 
accordingly unofficially mobilised upon the British declaration of war on 3 September. 
The question over who actually controlled the naval forces soon came to the fore, and 
on 5 September, Stuart approached Van Ryneveld in this regard. The British had hoped 
that the timely departure of Pirow would ease defence relations. However, the status 
quo remained. Van Ryneveld duly informed Stuart that the Smuts Government 
demanded complete control over local seaward defences, since it was the only way in 
which South Africa could ensure the protection of her harbours. Unsurprisingly, DHQ 
realised it needed British cooperation in this regard, and Van Ryneveld immediately 
requested Stuart’s assistance.229 Stuart promised his unwavering support in terms of 
naval matters. He did, however, remind the South Africans that though the RNVR (SA) 
had not been mobilised at the outbreak of war, the ASWO, once activated, placed the 
war organisation of all naval forces and harbour defence organisations on a war footing. 
In practise, this meant that these would revert to British control. In separate 
correspondence with the Admiralty, Stuart was somewhat more blunt. He warned that 
the naval mobilisation in South Africa was under threat. He maintained that Smuts was 
key to this debacle, as Smuts was highly unlikely to authorise the mobilisation of the 
RNVR (SA) or allow RN officers to exercise command over South African harbours.230 
 The South African naval forces were mobilised on 8 September, and RAdm Guy 
Halifax, a retired RN officer, assumed command of the defunct SANS and the RNVR (SA) 
in his capacity as Deputy Director Coast Defence. Newman next met with Stuart to 
convey a South African compromise proposal regarding naval and coastal defence. The 
Union Government, in an effort to avoid a political backlash from the nationalists, and 
for Smuts to be able to go to war as intended, suggested that the naval mobilising 
officers at each of the South African ports be appointed as officers in the SANS.231 These 
                                                             
228  Van der Waag, ‘The Thin Edge of the Wedge’, pp. 434-436. 
229  TNA, Admiralty Papers (ADM) 116/4344. SNO to Admiralty, 3 Sept 1939; TNA, ADM 116/4344. 
SNO to Admiralty, 6-7 Sept 1939. 
230  Van der Waag, ‘The Thin Edge of the Wedge’, pp. 436-437. 
231  Potgieter, ‘Maritime Defence and the South African Navy’, p. 169; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 
240, File 215: Union Coast Defences. South African Naval Forces, 15 Aug 1940. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
P a g e  | 56 
officers were, however, still under the effective command of Stuart, and DHQ instructed 
Halifax to cooperate closely with Stuart on all matters relating to naval defence. For 
Stuart the situation proved problematic, especially relating to the division of command 
and considering the overall inexperience of the South African General Staff. 
Nevertheless, Stuart agreed to cooperate with the South Africans despite his 
reservations, and in principle agreed with Halifax on the suggested compromise.232 
 The compromise, however, needed Admiralty approval, and had serious 
ramifications. One of the main consequences was that RNVR (SA) personnel could no 
longer serve outside South African territorial waters, as the South African Defence Act 
specifically precluded it. The immediate effect was that no RNVR (SA) personnel could 
serve on RN armed merchant cruisers unless they volunteered for such service. 
Surprisingly, the Admiralty yielded. They did so despite the fact that Van Ryneveld 
created a new dilemma by ordering the amendment of the Regulations of the RNVR (SA) 
on 12 September to provide for complete South African control.233  
Despite the South African insistence on taking control over its own naval and 
coastal defences, the mobilising of the RNVR (SA) proved problematic. Since the South 
African Defence Act bound the RNVR (SA) to the RN, it needed amendment. Such an 
amendment could only be authorised by the Union Parliament, though Smuts and his 
cabinet wished to keep the matter sub rosa. As a result, the mobilisation of the RNVR 
(SA) stalled, and South Africa was made to rely on volunteers to help operate its naval 
and coastal defences.  
Stuart, regarded the state of affairs as chaotic, and throughout September, 
relations between DHQ and Simon’s Town continued to deteriorate alarmingly.234 While 
Stuart’s frustration at the status quo is understandable, he made matters worse by 
appointing several sea transport officers at Cape Town and Durban without consulting 
Pretoria. By October, matters had still not improved, and despite Newman’s and 
Halifax‘s visits to DHQ to rectify matters, the compromise system was yet to be officially 
implemented. Politically, the situation remained fraught. Even though the Dominion 
Office and the British High Commissioner, Sir William Clark intervened, the Admiralty 
had to remind Stuart of the importance of fully cooperating with the South African 
authorities and maintaining the status quo.235 
 On 19 October, a fresh set of proposals for cooperation were discussed. The 
discussions took place between Halifax, the South African Director General of 
                                                             
232  TNA, ADM 116/4344. SNO to Admiralty, 9 Sept 1939. 
233  Van der Waag, ‘The Thin Edge of the Wedge’, pp. 438-439. 
234  TNA, ADM 116/4344. SNO to Admiralty, 21 Sept 1939; TNA, ADM 116/4344. SNO to Admiralty, 13 
Sept 1939; DOD Archives, Secretary for Defence (DC), Box 1973, File: DC 396/38. SNO to Secretary 
for Defence, 28 Sept 1939; DOD Archives, DC, Box 1973, File: DC 396/38. Secretary for Defence to 
SNO, 30 Sept 1939. 
235  Van der Waag, ‘The Thin Edge of the Wedge’, pp. 439-441. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
P a g e  | 57 
Operations, Col Pieter de Waal, and Stuart. Following this meeting, Smuts informed 
Clark that South Africa would take complete ownership of the defence of its harbours 
and coastline. He also stated that the SDF had been created for the specific purpose of 
operating and manning the M/S and A/S vessels, the examination service, the coast 
watching service, as well as the boom and other harbour defences.  
The SDF was then formed as a new Active Citizen Force unit. This occurred when 
the SA Local Defence Corps, the remnants of the SANS, the SANS War Reserve and 
volunteers from the RNVR were absorbed into it. As noted earlier, Halifax was assigned 
to command the SDF and carried the official designation of Director of Seaward 
Defence.236 According to Stuart, this appointment signalled the effective end of the 
RNVR in South Africa. The SANS and SANS War Reserve where thus integrated into the 
SDF without the cancellation of existing arrangements with the RN. This meant that 
Stuart, somewhat contentiously, would be obliged to find staff from the Africa Station 
and avail them to train the new force. Stuart regarded the whole undertaking as a waste 
of time, especially in view of the lack of cooperation from and inactivity within the UDF. 
The Admiralty, however, continued to stress the importance of cooperation with the 
South Africans in the naval sphere. As a result, the Admiralty had no other option but to 
recall Stuart, as he was the single most decisive obstacle standing in the way of the naval 
compromise.237 
 In December 1939, the Admiralty evinced their formal readiness to cooperate 
with the functioning and training of the SDF. The only caveat was that the seaward 
defence of Simon’s Town remained firmly under British control. According to van der 
Waag, the Admiralty had reason to be satisfied. This was because the RNVR (SA) 
continued as before and personnel from the RNVR would only be seconded to the SDF on 
a temporary basis for training purposes. Moreover, the Admiralty maintained complete 
control over all M/S and A/S work and the shipping control service at Simon’s Town.  
The SDF formally commenced its duties with regard to the coastal and naval 
defence of South Africa on 15 January 1940, though the retroactive establishment of the 
unit dated back to 1 September 1939.238 South Africa could claim something of a political 
victory in the whole matter. It hence assumed far greater responsibility regarding its 
own naval and coastal defence. These newfound responsibilities would severely tax, and 
test, the nascent SDF throughout the naval war in South African waters. 
2.3 The development of a comprehensive South African coastal defence system 
During the month of January 1940, the SDF formally took over the operational 
responsibilities of the RN. These responsibilities entailed the operation of M/S and A/S 
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duties, the Port War Signal Stations, and the Examination Services at South African 
ports. An administrative ‘shakedown’ characterised this period when matters of 
uniform, discipline, command and control were arranged. Before January 1940, the 
RNVR (SA) had played a crucial role in manning the various South African naval and 
coastal defence services at the ports of the Union. Also, 82 South African naval ratings 
from the RNVR had been drafted to the four RN armed merchant cruisers fitted out in 
South Africa after the declaration of war. They were HMS Carnarvon Castle, HMS Bulolo, 
HMS Comorin and HMS Esperance Bay. Concurrently, the Department of Railways and 
Harbours (SAR&H) workshops started with the conversion of trawlers and whalers for 
M/S and A/S duties, with private firms taking over the task by February 1940.239 
 From March 1940, the ranks of the SDF rapidly expanded and continued to 
enlarge well into 1945. By October 1940 the strength of the SDF stood at 183 officers 
and 1,049 ratings, though the training of recruits took a considerable time due to a lack 
of suitable instructors and equipment. This naturally affected the ability of the SDF to 
contribute to the Union’s war effort early on. There was, however, somewhat of an 
operational respite as the exigencies of the naval war were yet to take full effect in 
South African waters. The RNVR training establishment, moreover, continued to 
provide the agreed-upon quota of South African recruits for service in the RN.240  
 
Fig 2.3 Seaward Defence Force officers in training at Cape Town Castle, circa 1940241 
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On 28 March 1941, Halifax succumbed in an aircraft accident north of Saldanha. 
He was returning from a routine inspection of the SDF detachment in Walvis Bay. 
Halifax was instrumental in the formative years of the SDF, especially in dealing with 
some administrative difficulties during the inaugural period of the force. The next 
Director of the SDF was the newly promoted Capt Dalgleish, who took command of a 
force numbering 216 officers and 1,472 men. The ranks of the SDF also opened for non-
Europeans in April of that year. Men from the coloured fishing communities along the 
Cape coast were earmarked for service in the SDF in various non-specialist capacities. 
By October, this number had increased to 830 men. The SDF also continued to provide 
personnel for the RNVR (SA) – which by July 1941 numbered 66 officers and 1,702 
ratings. Among these, about 1,200 were serving aboard RN warships and defensively 
equipped merchant ships.242 
 In 1941, however, several naysayers within the ranks of the RNVR (SA) 
speculated that the Union Government intended to close down the organisation 
completely. Underpinning their fears, were the definite successes of the SDF since its 
inception, particularly the fact the some of its vessels were serving with RN forces in the 
Mediterranean.243 They felt that the SDF was only formed for the local naval defence of 
South Africa, and that naval service abroad remained the responsibility of the RNVR 
(SA). The large increase in the strength of the SDF also did little to stem their fears, as 
this had an inherent effect on the recruitment of the RNVR (SA). The drastic wartime 
requirements placed on the South African workforce for service with the UDF, was 
indeed the deciding factor in this matter. It was Smuts who correctly pointed this out.  
The RN authorities, however, remained suspicious of South Africa’s actual 
intentions. They were particularly concerned that the SDF would soon take over RNVR 
bases, due to the rapid increase in their numbers. The crisis came to a head at the port 
of Alexandria in Egypt, where SDF and RNVR (SA) personnel, due to no fault of their 
own, served on the same South African vessels. The men of the RNVR (SA) had become 
increasingly dissatisfied over issues of pay, leave and general service conditions. They 
were particularly angered by the fact that their fellow countrymen serving in the SDF 
were better off with respect to these matters. For this reason, RNVR recruiting in South 
Africa had waned considerably by June 1942, with several of the serving men 
reconsidering their service within the RNVR (SA).244 
 In February 1942, Smuts laid the cornerstone of the South African Naval Training 
Base, designated HMSAS Unitie for administrative purposes. He hinted that the event 
signalled the start of the amalgamation of the SDF and RNVR (SA) into a single naval 
service. By the middle of the year it became clear that the RNVR (SA) and SDF would 
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merge. At a conference held at DHQ on 20 July, representatives of the Adjutant General, 
the SDF, RNVR (SA), Admiralty and the Secretary of Defence had a meeting. They 
discussed and fixed a host of administrative arrangements supporting the creation of a 
new unified South African naval service. The meeting came to a favourable 
understanding, and the South African Naval Forces (SANF) was officially established on 
1 August 1942. Except for the change in name, as well as in the conditions of service of 
ex-RNVR (SA) men, there were no drastic amendments of practical importance. During 
the remainder of the war, SANF personnel, along with the Women’s Auxiliary Naval 
Service, continued to render valuable service in the naval and coastal defence of South 
Africa.245 
 In order to fully comprehend the development, functioning and effectiveness of 
the South African coastal defence system during the Second World War, it is necessary 
to discuss a number of further matters in detail. These include command, control and 
combined operations; coastal radar stations; coastal batteries; the examination services; 
A/S duties; other fixed naval and harbour defences; M/S duties, and coastal air patrols. 
 
Fig 2.4: Semaphore signals pass between South African minesweepers, circa 1940246 
 On 26 March 1942, the headquarters of the South Atlantic Station moved to Cape 
Town. Soon thereafter, Smuts decided to establish a Coastal Area Command to 
centralise control over South Africa’s coastal defences. An additional Inland Area 
Command would be responsible for the defence of the rest of the Union. By July, Maj Gen 
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George Brink and Maj Gen Isaac de Villiers took charge of the Inland Area Command and 
Coastal Area Command respectively. These officers controlled all military operations 
and security-related matters within their respective areas and were also responsible for 
the training and discipline of their respective troops. DHQ, however, continued to 
determine the direction of training, and took control over all matters affecting the 
provision of equipment, depots and stores.247 The Coastal Area Command was 
responsible for the defence of an area roughly 100 miles wide along the entire South 
African coast. This portion of land was divided into several smaller commands, each 
with its own commanders, commonly referred to as ‘Fortresses’. These ‘Fortresses’ 
were established to correspond with the principal South African ports. As such, there 
were six such commands at the Cape, Walvis Bay, Outeniqua, Port Elizabeth, East 
London and Durban. Each so-called Fortress had a Combined Operations Room, which 
collated all local information on the movement of shipping, reports from coastal air 
patrols, radar plots, troop locations, and the position of patrol vessels. All the A/S 
measures and fixed defences were also linked to them. The combination of this 
information allowed for accurate military decision making, which resulted in minimum 
delays when dealing with emergencies or false alarms. As a rule, the various operation 
rooms passed all of their information to Coastal Area Command, which could then 
allocate the necessary military forces to the various ‘Fortresses’ when necessary.248  
 The formation of the Coastal Area Command coincided with the formal 
establishment of the Combined Operations Room in Cape Town on 1 July 1942. The 
Combined Operations Room collated all the relevant information regarding the 
movement of shipping, intelligence and reconnaissance, troop dispositions and A/S 
matters. It also provided joint control over all South African and British military forces 
operational along the South African coast. The Coastal Area Command, along with the 
Combined Operations Room in Cape Town, not only proved paramount in the coastal 
defence of South Africa, but allowed for closer Anglo-South African naval relations at the 
operational level during the war.249 
 The Special Signal Services, under the command of Dr Basil Schonland, a 
professor of geophysics, provided radar cover along the South African coastline. At the 
outbreak of war, the Allies realised that radar could be used to provide early warning 
against seaborne attack through the use of coast defensive radars as well as airborne 
equipment.250 The UDF initially sent several individuals to undergo the required radar 
training at Bawdsey Manor near Ipswich in the UK. These included its Director of 
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Technical Services, Brig F.R.G. Hoare, Maj H.G. Wilmott and other Dominion 
representatives. These men were, however, out of their technical depth. The British Air 
Ministry subsequently dispatched a New Zealand Scientist, Dr Ernest Marsden, to South 
Africa to train the necessary technical personnel on the workings of radar. In due 
course, Schonland also met with Marsden. After this, Schonland turned the Bernard 
Price Laboratory at the University of the Witwatersrand into a rudimentary factory for 
producing local radar sets. These radar sets followed the so-called searchlight principle. 
This is where a radar beam from a transmitting antenna would be regularly swept 
across a section of space and then receive a signal from the same antenna when 
switched to ‘receive’. This process facilitated the procedure of direction finding, which 
held immense promise for use during A/S operations. 
 
Map 2.1: Predicted radar coverage along the South African coast, 1939-1945 
The first of this locally produced radar equipment, the JB1 radar, was installed 
on Signal Hill in Cape Town on 22 May 1941. Schonland and his team of engineers and 
scientists formed the core of the Special Signal Services, who fell under the command of 
the South African Corps of Signals. Schonland travelled to the UK in March 1941 in an 
attempt to speed up the delivery of suitable British radar equipment. His visit paid 
dividends, and several new radar sets arrived in the Union. These radar sets 
supplemented the locally produced units, and by the end of the war, there were at least 
30 radar stations operational along the entire South African coast (see Map 2.1). These 
radar stations were instrumental in providing accurate information of enemy contacts 
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to the South African coastal defence organisation, as well as the SAAF, and could quite 
reliably provide accurate enemy positions through direction finding.251  
 
Fig 2.5: A coastal gun defending Cape Town Harbour, circa 1940252 
 Several coastal batteries defended the South African ports, and volunteers from 
the South African Garrison Artillery operated the batteries. The local defence of South 
African ports was initially the responsibility of the part-time Naval Volunteer Brigade. 
By February 1941 the Naval Volunteer Brigade was reorganised, and hence became 
known as the Coast Defence Corps with garrisons at Durban, East London, Port 
Elizabeth and Cape Town. The Coast Defence Corps came under the charge of the 
individual Fortress Commanders. Following the meeting of the British War Cabinet Sub-
Committee on Defence Arrangements for the Indian Ocean in February 1942, the South 
African threat perception was reassessed.253 The South African coastal defence policy 
was accordingly amended. The new establishment called for the installation of an 
additional number of naval and AA guns at South African ports. The Commander Coastal 
Air Defences assumed complete control over the coastal anti-aircraft defences in South 
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Africa, which included six anti-aircraft regiments comprising both heavy and light 
batteries, as well as searchlights at Saldanha, Cape Town, Simon’s Town, Port Elizabeth, 
East London and Durban. While the fixed coastal defence and anti-aircraft batteries at 
South African harbours never fired in anger during the entire course of the war, they 
nevertheless rendered excellent service. Their deterrent value was also immense since 
no direct attacks by enemy surface raiders or warships on South African harbours 
occurred.254 
 
Fig 2.6: A South African exanimation officer boarding a merchant ship, circa 1940255 
 Since the outbreak of the war, provision was made for Examination Services at 
Walvis Bay, Saldanha, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and Durban. The Examination Services 
at each of these ports helped to identify merchant shipping and, along with the fixed 
coastal defence, controlled their movements. Saldanha Bay was furthermore identified 
as a Contraband Control Base where suspicious merchant shipping could be 
searched.256 The Services were initially centralised under the Senior Naval Officer in 
Simon’s Town. The SDF took over these services in January 1940, with Cdr Dalgleish, Lt 
Cdr G.V. Thomas, Lt C.S. Peers and Lt Cdr H.B. Stocken appointed as the Commanding 
Officers of the naval forces at each of the principal ports. The SDF personnel at each port 
averaged about 30 and included five officers for the Examination Services and a further 
two Extended Defence Officers. 
There were four months of operational inactivity following the formation of the 
SDF. This allowed for several misunderstandings, operational friction, and a general 
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lack of efficiency to be resolved between the Examination Services, the Extended 
Defence Officers and the coastal defence batteries. The result was a high standard of 
cooperation. There was a palpable increase in the work of the Examination Services at 
Cape Town and Durban in 1942, and by August the SANF assumed complete 
responsibility for this work. By 1944 the addition of several Harbour Defence Motor 
Launches at the principal ports further facilitated the work of the Examination Services 
and the Extended Defence Officers. The Examination Services at all South African ports 
ceased in September 1945, shortly after the defeat of Japan.257 
 The development of suitable A/S protection at South African harbours proved 
rather slow. The majority of the merchant traffic passed through Cape Town and 
Durban, and shipping rarely had to anchor outside the other harbours while awaiting 
berths. Regular A/S patrols were therefore only necessary at these two ports. At Cape 
Town, these vessels patrolled the northern approaches between Robben Island and 
Bloubergstrand, as well as the main approaches between Robben Island and Green 
Point. At Durban, the A/S patrol line was approximately six miles from the shore and 
continued for a length of nearly six miles.  
By June 1940 the SDF establishment made provision for fifteen A/S vessels 
through the conversion of whalers and trawlers.258 Initially, the only fully operational 
A/S vessels were the HMSAS Rondevlei and HMSAS Smalvlei. After additional asdic sets 
arrived, however, the conversion of the following vessels neared completion: HMSAS 
Mooivlei, HMSAS Blomvlei, HMSAS Odberg, HMSAS Blaauwberg, HMSAS Cedarberg and 
HMSAS Sydostlandet. The conversion of HMSAS Tordonn, HMSAS Sonneblom and HMSAS 
Immortelle was completed by the end of 1941. These vessels, along with those deployed 
in the Mediterranean, brought the numbers of the A/S Flotilla up to fifteen. Between 
May and October 1942 a further four A/S vessels, HMSAS Pretoria, HMSAS Vereeniging, 
HMSAS Turffontein and HMSAS Standerton were commissioned, which allowed for the 
provision of further A/S protection at Saldanha.  
In 1941, HMSAS Rondevlei, HMSAS Smalvlei and HMSAS Odberg were deployed to 
Durban where they carried out regular A/S patrols, with either one or two vessels 
continuously on patrol. By February 1942 the addition of HMSAS Cedarberg, HMSAS 
Blaauwberg and HMSAS Sydostlandet brought the Durban A/S Flotilla up to full 
strength, allowing for three ships to conduct patrols at any one time. The Cape Town 
A/S Flotilla at this stage consisted of HMSAS Mooivlei, HMSAS Blomvlei, HMSAS 
Sonneblom, HMSAS Immortelle and HMSAS Tordonn. The Durban A/S Flotilla suffered its 
first operational loss in April 1942 when HMSAS Sydostlandet ran ashore near the 
Umgeni River mouth during rough weather. By May 1942 the arrival of HMSAS Tordonn 
brought the Durban A/S Flotilla back up to strength, while the Cape Town A/S Flotilla 
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was increased to nine vessels after the addition of HMSAS Pretoria, HMSAS Vereeniging, 
HMSAS Turffontein and HMSAS Standerton. For the remainder of the war, the strength of 
the South African A/S Flotilla was plateaued at fourteen vessels (see Table 2.1). These 
vessels, apart from their A/S patrols, assisted the M/S Flotillas in carrying out patrols 
within the anchorages, ready to drop depth-charges at a moment’s notice or engage 
small enemy surface craft with its naval guns.259 
 When the German and Japanese submarine attacks along the South African 
coastline started from the latter half of 1941 through 1942, the A/S Flotillas were 
increasingly called on to provide intensive patrols and help search for survivors. These 
operations were, however, difficult to say the least, as the South Atlantic Command had 
no A/S vessels, while the Eastern Fleet only comprised three corvettes and five 
destroyers at Mombasa. Moreover, the lack of suitable vessels also negatively affected 
the escort of merchants travelling along the South African coast.260 By December 1942, 
group sailings were introduced for the slower merchant traffic travelling between South 
African ports and along its coastline.  
Name Type Fuel Gross Tonnage First Came into Service 
HMSAS Blomvlei Trawler Coal 252 tons 11 October 1939 
HMSAS Mooivlei Trawler Coal 252 tons 13 November 1939 
HMSAS Rondevlei Whaler Oil 247 tons 8 June 1940 
HMSAS Smalvlei Whaler Oil 233 tons 8 June 1940 
HMSAS Blaauwberg Whaler Oil 307 tons 27 December 1940 
HMSAS Sydostlandet Whaler Oil 258 tons 4 January 1941 
HMSAS Cedarberg Whaler Oil 307 tons 14 March 1941 
HMSAS Odberg Whaler Oil 351 tons 1 May 1941 
HMSAS Sonneblom Whaler Oil 335 tons 14 August 1941 
HMSAS Immortelle Whaler Oil 335 tons 5 November 1941 
HMSAS Tordonn Whaler Oil 314 tons 25 November 1941 
HMSAS Pretoria Whaler Oil 374 tons 8 May 1942 
HMSAS Vereeniging Whaler Oil 355 tons 27 June 1942 
HMSAS Turffontein Whaler Oil 355 tons 17 August 1942 
HMSAS Standerton Whaler Oil 357 tons 26 October 1942 
Table 2.1: South African A/S vessels operational in South African waters, 1939-1945261 
The Coastal Area Command approached the C-in-C South Atlantic in December 
1942, and proposed that the larger A/S vessels assist in escort work, as they were faster 
than the RN assets currently employed. The Coastal Area Command also argued that the 
introduction of larger vessels would be a welcome change to the monotony of A/S 
duties, and that escort work would be beneficial for both training purposes and the 
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morale of the men. The C-in-C South Atlantic and DHQ agreed to the proposal. When the 
group sailing scheme commenced on 20 January 1943, one of the five escort groups was 
entirely allocated to SANF vessels. The SANF A/S vessels rendered valuable service in 
this regard while employed on escort work between Cape Town and Durban where they 
mainly functioned under RN operational control. HMSAS Vereeniging was also the only 
SANF vessel to be present during two separate attacks on convoys in South African 
waters, during which it handled itself well.  
 
Fig 2.7: Two South African anti-submarine vessels out on patrol, circa 1942262 
Group sailings between Durban and Mombasa came into effect when 
independent sailings between Union ports were reintroduced in September 1943. 
Owing to a shortage of coal for the RN coal-burning A/S trawlers of the Eastern Fleet, 
the C-in-C South Atlantic approached the SANF with a request for the secondment of the 
best South African A/S vessels for escort work along the East African coastline. For the 
next eighteen months, the South African A/S vessels formed part of the 3rd and 4th 
Escort Groups. They rendered sterling work throughout, and did not encounter any 
enemy contacts.263 These vessels temporarily returned to South African waters between 
March and August 1944 after renewed U-boat attacks. Throughout 1943 and 1944 the 
                                                             
262  South African National Museum of Military History, Masondo Reference Library. SA Navy Photo 
Collection, S.A. 5044. 
263  DOD Archives, Commander Seaward Defences (CSD), Box 15, File: Group sailing operations Union 
waters. Note on commencement and ceasing of group sailings, 1944; DOD Archives, CSD, Box 15, 
File: Policy (escort groups). Note on commencement and ceasing of group sailings, 1944. DOD 
Archives, CSD, Box 15, File: Policy (escort groups). CSD Approval of exchange with RN of A/S 
vessels, 15 Nov 1943; DOD Archives, CSD, Box 15, File: Policy (escort groups). Personal 
correspondence between CSD and GOC coastal area re SANF vessels and A/S warfare, 30 Oct 1942; 
DOD Archives, CSD, Box 15, File: Policy (escort groups). Correspondence between CSD and 
SANOi/c Durban re SANF A/S vessels on escort duties, 28 Apr 1943; DOD Archives, CSD, Box 15, 
File: Policy (escort groups). Correspondence between CSD and SANOi/c Durban re participation of 
SANF vessels in convoy escorts from SA ports, 23 Jan 1943. 
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SANF A/S vessels took part in several operations against German and Japanese 
submarine blockade-runners, particularly as part of Operations Barrage, Throttle, 
Steadfast, Tricolour and Wicketkeeper.264 The A/S vessels continued operations well 
into 1945, regularly conducting A/S patrols and undertaking escort duties. 
 The provision of boom defences as a means of harbour protection was the only 
fixed naval defence considered, and partly prepared for, by South Africa before the 
outbreak of war. During the interwar period, the South African government already 
accepted complete responsibility for this form of protection at its harbours, including 
Simon’s Town. By March 1938 Dalgleish, while still the SO SANS, warned DHQ that no 
one in particular was responsible for the installation of anti-torpedo (A/T) and anti-ship 
booms (A/B) at South African ports, after which the SAR&H would assume 
responsibility for their assembly and maintenance. Incidentally, however, only the 
Assistant Port Captain of Cape Town received the necessary training at the Boom 
Defence School at Rosyth in the UK in 1938. Upon his return, he visited each South 
African port to plan its respective boom defence system. While his suggestions were 
accepted outright by DHQ, the Director General of Operations only authorised A/T and 
A/B booms at the two entrances to Cape Town harbour. The boom defence at the 
harbours of Port Elizabeth, East London and Durban would only comprise the A/B type. 
Once war broke out, the proposed scales of attack on the ports –  and the availability of 
material – largely influenced the provision and installation of boom defences at the 
various South African ports. It is rather disturbing to note that South Africa had no 
facilities for the production of boom gear or A/T nets at its disposal. Moreover, the 
available gear was insufficient, with the majority on order from Britain. Only at 
harbours where shipping lying inside the booms was exposed to attack by torpedoes, 
were A/T nets considered. The A/T nets, however, only guaranteed 60% protection. 
The cost of double boom systems proved far too expensive and was thus at first not 
even considered.265 
 The installation of the boom defence system at Cape Town proceeded 
immediately after the outbreak of war. By 1939, the two A/B booms were operational 
with a further two A/T nets covering the New Basin and Victoria Basin. Initially, the 
Cape Town booms were not functioning, but once the SDF took over local naval defence, 
the operation improved. The construction of boom defences across the entrance to the 
Durban channel was only authorised in June 1940 and became operational by mid-July. 
A series of fixed A/B extensions also covered the shallow waters between the north and 
                                                             
264  DOD Archives, Diverse, Group 1, Box 126, File: Operation “Throttle”. Operation Throttle ops order, 
30 May 1944; DOD Archives, Diverse, Group 1, Box 126, File: Operation “Steadfast”. Operation 
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south shores. These boom defences, like those in Cape Town, were initially only 
regularly employed. By 1942 the South African government authorised extensive 
additions to the Durban boom defences. These included the provision of A/T nets, an 
A/T boom in the Graving Dock Basin, as well as a combined A/B and A/T boom across 
the harbour entrance which became operational by November 1943. As a matter of 
routine, the booms closed at night, but this practice came to an end when the threat of 
surprise attack subsided in the latter half of 1943. By June 1943, it was decided to also 
install a catenary net at Durban, which was completed by mid-November 1944. The net 
only became operational in February 1945.266 
 The installation of an A/B boom at the East London harbour was authorised in 
mid-1940, with an additional A/T net also installed. This boom, as at other ports, was 
not closed at night until May 1942. By the end of that year, a renovated boom had been 
installed. At Port Elizabeth, an A/B was also considered in mid-1940, but the plan was 
shelved because of the large size of the harbour entrance. By 1942 the scheme was 
revived to include A/T nets as well. After the Admiralty agreed to help provide the 
necessary materials, the A/B and A/T boom became operational in April 1943. In April 
1942, the Union authorities decided to provide an A/T boom for the defence of 
Saldanha, but once again due to the considerable size of the entrance to the bay, the 
Admiralty had to provide the materials and help install the boom. The A/T boom was 
completed on 29 May 1943, nearly eight months later.267  
Following the significant expansion of boom defences during the course of 1942, 
the SDF established a special Boom Defence Branch of its own with trained personnel, 
storage depots and repair facilities. By September, Lt Cdr A.G. Jones was appointed as 
the first Boom Defence Officer in the SANF. The main storage depot of the Boom Defence 
Branch was established at Saldanha, with headquarters and workshops in Cape Town. 
Work parties were then dispatched from Cape Town to the ports when needed, though a 
shortage of trained personnel severely affected its performance. This state of affairs was 
only remedied by mid-1943, once a sufficient number of trained personnel became 
available. After the Admiralty requested South Africa to start producing its own A/T 
nets in 1943, Jones and his men set about expanding their organisation and produced 
approximately 20 A/T nets per month. The majority of the A/B and A/T booms at South 
African ports remained operational until June 1945, whereafter they were lifted.268 
                                                             
266  TNA, ADM 1/10262. Circular by Director of Local Defences re South African Boom Defences, 23 Mar 
1942; TNA, ADM 1/10262. Remarks on the Underwater Defence of Cape Town, Simonstown, East 
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 The Axis use of magnetic mines in European waters prompted the Admiralty to 
request the establishment and operation of degaussing ranges at some Dominion ports. 
Cape Town and Durban were included among these. Degaussing was a method used to 
neutralise the magnetic field of a ship, where special circuits were installed through 
which electric currents of alternating strength could travel. Due to the alteration of 
these magnetic fields over time, the magnetic field of vessels was then measured 
occasionally and the neutralising currents adjusted when ships steered over a line of 
submerged units connected to a shore station. The Union government accepted the cost 
of this commitment on 31 July 1940. According to Gordon-Cumming, this decision was 
South Africa’s first external contribution to the Allied war effort. It was agreed that the 
SDF would lay and operate these ranges, while the Admiralty provided the technical 
equipment and some initial assistance.  
Professor B.L. Goodlet of the University of Cape Town was nominated to attend 
specialised training on the supervision of the laying of these ranges. The instruction 
would take place at Portsmouth in the UK that August. On his return in November, 
Goodlet became the head of the SDF Electrical Branch and oversaw a number of key 
tasks. This branch expanded considerably, especially during the installation of A/S fixed 
defences between 1942 and 1943.  
In December 1941, Goodlet received his commission as an Electrical Cdr in the 
SDF. The degaussing range at Cape Town, established on the eastern shore of Robben 
Island, became operational on 6 June 1941. By the end of that year, it was dealing with 
an average of 100 ships per month. The increased volume of shipping around the South 
African coast prompted the Admiralty to request the installation of both deep and 
shallow degaussing ranges at Durban during February 1942. Only a deep degaussing 
range could be laid immediately South of the Umgeni River mouth, which only became 
operational on 20 February 1943. By the end of the year, the Durban degaussing range 
dealt with 80 ships per month on average. A unit for the deperming of small ships was 
also installed at Durban in 1942, to help magnetise vessels and reset their fore-and-aft 
magnetic polarity. By 1945 at least 3034 ships had been ranged at Cape Town, with a 
further 1292 ranged at Durban. This was the third largest output during the war 
according to Gordon-Cumming, next only to that of the degaussing ranges at the Thames 
and Clyde Rivers.269 
 A host of other fixed naval defences were also installed at South African ports 
throughout the war. While the Union Government committed to the establishment of 
such defences, the Admiralty agreed to provide the necessary materiel and personnel 
free of charge. As a result, all technical equipment came from the UK, and had to be 
installed by RN specialists seconded to the SANF. South African personnel were then 
trained to operate the equipment and took over the installations as soon as they became 
functional.  
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During June of 1942 the British War Cabinet Sub-Committee on Defence 
Arrangements for the Indian Ocean Area made a series of recommendations for further 
underwater fixed defences at South African ports.270 The constant fear of attack by 
midget-submarines, especially after the Japanese attack on the harbour of Diego Suarez 
in Madagascar, prompted South African authorities to provide for the detection thereof. 
As no suitable Admiralty apparatus was available, Goodlet devised a makeshift device 
that consisted of two loops of electric cable that were connected to a small control 
station. Each of these circuits passed through a flux meter, which upon crossing by a 
vessel would ring an electric bell. The ‘Goodlet Loops’ acted in unison, with the outer 
loop providing the first warning, and the second loop confirming the presence of any 
midget-submarine. In such an event, the appropriate A/S defensive measures could be 
activated. By 1943 the ‘Goodlet Loops’ at Durban were supplemented by the installation 
Type 135 Harbour Defence Asdic (HDA) units, while the installation of similar units at 
Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and East London occurred up until 1944.271  
 The South African government decided in 1942 to provide A/S fixed defences at 
Cape Town, Durban and Saldanha. After observing the prevailing local conditions and 
carefully investigating each intended installation site, Goodlet drew up a proposed 
layout for each location. In July, Goodlet received Admiralty approval to continue. At 
Cape Town four indicator loops, with an average length of four miles each, were fitted in 
an arc from Clifton Beach to Melkbosstrand passing outside of Robben Island. These 
indicator loops were supported by a further four Type 131 HDA units situated to the 
north-east and south-east of Robben Island. The electronic circuit was broken when any 
vessel crossed that particular loop. The system became operational on 20 November 
1942, shortly after the first sustained U-boat offensive in South African waters.  
The installation of the rest of the South African loop systems proceeded slowly 
due to cable-laying difficulties and for want of suitable craft. By June 1943 the Durban 
indicator loops became active and were positioned in an area between the Bluff and the 
control station at Umhlanga Rocks. By the end of October, a further five Type 131 HDA 
units had been fitted. The establishment of indicator loops at Saldanha, Walvis Bay and 
Simon’s Town were soon shelved due to the changing war situation. Instead, Port 
Elizabeth became the final South African harbour to receive a comprehensive scheme of 
A/S fixed defences.  
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This system only came into operation on 27 March 1944.272 The loop systems, 
once completed, were linked up to the other harbour defences through the local 
Fortress Command Operation Room. In the event of a loop crossing, the appropriate 
vessels were dispatched to investigate. Such a crossing also provided a further early 
warning to shore batteries and searchlights at night. The British submarines HMS P614 
and HMS Otus also carried out a practical test on the Cape Town and Durban A/S fixed 
defences during 1943. The results were positive. While the South African A/S fixed 
defences proved extremely elaborate, they naturally served as an excellent deterrent 
throughout the war despite their costly installation. For the duration of the war, there 
was no definite instance of an enemy submarine crossing the indicator loops at any 
South African harbour, despite two unconfirmed instances in February and May 1943, 
where an enemy U-boat may have entered the Cape Town Harbour.273  
 The so called ‘Goodlet Loops’, HDAs and Indicator Loops assisted the coastal 
depth-charge throwers in obtaining a fix.274 After this, depth-charges were dropped as 
near as possible to the position of the A/S contact or loop crossing. The depth-charge 
throwers were installed at Simon’s Town and Durban in July 1942, and at other Union 
ports towards the end of the year. They only became operational in November, 
however. These throwers were manned by artillerymen when in close vicinity to coastal 
batteries, and by SANF personnel in all other instances. A number of controlled 
minefields were contemplated for several of the South Africa ports. Be that as it may, 
only one was laid at Saldanha due to its use as a convoy assembly port.  
Saldanha Bay was also the largest natural harbour in Southern Africa, where a 
relatively small and sheltered minefield could accomplish the protection of a large 
number of naval vessels.275 The decision to lay the minefield was taken in August 1942. 
By September, several RN Coastal Mining specialists had arrived to oversee the 
positioning and installation of the Saldanha minefield. Two separate minefields were 
proposed, one minefield with three loops covering the northern entrance between 
Hoedjies Point and Marcus Island, and another with five loops guarding the southern 
entrance between Marcus Island and Eland Point. Each mine loop contained 12 mines, 
and each loop was on average 600 yards long. These loops naturally overlapped one 
another to form a formidable series of defences. 
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The minefield was completed between January and August 1943 through the 
assistance of the SANF who gradually took over the responsibility from the RN. By the 
end of 1943, however, Saldanha ceased to be used by merchant shipping, though the 
minefield remained in operation until March 1945. On the night of 1 June 1944, parts of 
the minefield were blown when it was thought that a submarine had been detected in 
the bay. The Examination Service, however, found no evidence upon closer 
investigation. The Saldanha minefield was blown up in its entirety on 6 April 1945, as its 
recovery would prove too time-consuming and costly to justify.276 
 
Fig 2.8: A South African minesweeping vessel conducting a regular sweep, circa 1942277 
 The SDF assumed operational control for M/S duties at the principal South 
African ports from January 1940. By December 1939, fifteen M/S vessels were available 
to the SDF, after the conversion of some former commercial whalers and trawlers. The 
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process of conversion was, however, extremely time consuming, especially since the UK 
and South Africa agreed not to initially commission the Antarctic whalers for this 
purpose.278 These vessels were originally manned by RNVR personnel, but SDF 
personnel formally assumed this responsibility in 1940. The initial disposition of M/S 
vessels was as follows: seven at Cape Town, and two each at Durban, East London, Port 
Elizabeth and Simon’s Town. The M/S vessels were tasked with sweeping a number of 
predetermined channels, two miles in width, covering the approaches to the various 
ports from a point on the 100-fathom line. After the channels had been swept, they were 
declared clear of mines. The M/S vessels were furthermore armed with a 12-pounder 
gun, one or two Lewis guns and some depth-charges, though the vessels carried no asdic 
equipment. By April 1941 the M/S complement of the SDF rose to 37 vessels, with the 
planned requisition and conversion of additional whalers. The maximum number of 
South African M/S vessels, however, peaked at 37 vessels during the war (see Table 
2.2).279 
 
Fig 2.9: Naval men inspecting a German magnetic mine beached off Agulhas, 1940280 
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Name Type Fuel Gross Tonnage First Came into Service 
HMSAS Africana Special Coal 313 tons September 1939 
HMSAS Disa Trawler Coal 197 tons 15 September 1939 
HMSAS Richard Bennett Trawler Coal 227 tons 15 September 1939 
HMSAS Bluff Trawler Coal 262 tons 15 September 1939 
HMSAS David Haigh Trawler Coal 276 tons 19 September 1939 
HMSAS Babiana Trawler Coal 262 tons 23 September 1939 
HMSAS Oostewal Trawler Oil 179 tons 4 October 1939 
HMSAS Swartberg Trawler Oil 219 tons 4 October 1939 
HMSAS Crassula Trawler Coal 261 tons 25 October 1939 
HMSAS Algoa Bay Trawler Coal 270 tons 16 November 1939 
HMSAS Arum Trawler Coal 194 tons 12 December 1939 
HMSAS Nerine Trawler Coal 197 tons 16 December 1939 
HMSAS Aristea Trawler Coal 261 tons 23 December 1939 
HMSAS Natalia Whaler Coal 238 tons 4 April 1940 
HMSAS Grimwood Whaler Coal 219 tons 25 May 1940 
HMSAS Robinson Whaler Coal 196 tons 7 June 1940 
HMSAS Goulding Whaler Coal 224 tons 11 June 1940 
HMSAS Larsen Whaler Coal 162 tons 17 June 1940 
HMSAS Whytock Whaler Coal 166 tons 27 June 1940 
HMSAS Hektor Whaler Oil 247 tons 19 July 1940 
HMSAS Soetvlei Whaler Oil 234 tons 26 July 1940 
HMSAS Brakvlei Whaler Oil 233 tons August 1940 
HMSAS Southern Barrier Whaler Oil 344 tons 5 October 1940 
HMSAS Steenberg Whaler Oil 250 tons 6 November 1940 
HMSAS Stellenberg Whaler Oil 250 tons 8 November 1940 
HMSAS Kommetje Whaler Oil 252 tons 1 December 1940 
HMSAS Florida Whaler Oil 256 tons 12 December 1940 
HMSAS Nigel Whaler Oil 250 tons 10 March 1941 
HMSAS Springs Whaler Oil 249 tons 20 March 1941 
HMSAS Brakpan Whaler Oil 335 tons 10 April 1941 
HMSAS Krugersdorp Whaler Oil 198 tons 21 June 1941 
HMSAS Germiston Whaler Oil 197 tons 22 August 1941 
HMSAS Randfontein Whaler Oil 205 tons 7 October 1941 
HMSAS Parktown Whaler Oil 220 tons November 1941 
HMSAS Roodepoort Whaler Oil 315 tons 24 January 1942 
HMSAS Benoni Whaler Oil 221 tons 9 March 1942 
HMSAS Johannesburg Whaler Oil 228 tons 20 August 1942 
Table 2.2: South African M/S vessels operational in South African waters, 1939-1945281 
 By December 1940, the M/S strength of the SDF stood at 24 vessels. The best six 
formed the core of a new Mine Clearance Flotilla, a tactical unit created for deployment 
at a moment’s notice to search areas outside the ports and to clear known minefields. 
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The Mine Clearance Flotilla was formed because of the discovery of a magnetic 
minefield near Agulhas in May 1940. During May, six M/S vessels were ordered to 
sweep the area off Agulhas after the discovery of the minefield. By that December, the 
Mine Clearance Flotilla was still busy clearing the minefield due to inclement weather 
and the continued reappearance of mines. In spite of this, most of the mines were 
destroyed by natural causes and rough seas. The sweeping of this minefield continued 
until March 1941.  
On the discovery of new minefields off Cape Town and Cape Agulhas in March 
1942, the Mine Clearance Flotilla was once more dispatched. As the approaches to Cape 
Town harbour were threatened by the presence of these mines, the Mine Clearance 
Flotilla was ordered to sweep and search the approaches and their various channels. 
The Mine Clearance Flotilla once more encountered great difficulty while conducting its 
sweep, and only accounted for the destruction of a few mines. Inclement weather also 
affected the work of the M/S vessels, and by April, only parts of the minefield had been 
effectively cleared. For the remainder of the war, no further minefields were discovered 
around South Africa’s coastline. The M/S vessels settled into the monotonous task of 
conducting regular sweeps of the approaches to South African harbours. This task was  
successfully executed as no Allied or neutral vessels were lost to mines in Union ports 
during the war.282 On a number of occasions during the war, the M/S vessels also took 
part in combined operations aimed at the interception of Vichy convoys – most notably 
Operations Kedgeree and Bellringer in 1941. The last sweep by SANF M/S vessels in 
South African waters occurred at Durban and Cape Town on 31 August 1945, after 
which all M/S duties were suspended.283 
 At the outbreak of the war, the SAAF only possessed six modern aircraft and a 
fleet of sixty-three general purpose aeroplanes. Initially, there were five so-called 
fighter-bomber squadrons established at South African ports. The use of obsolete Furies 
and Hartebeest aircraft for this purpose, however, rendered them meaningless due to 
their unserviceability. Soon after the outbreak of the war, the SAAF took over eighteen 
Junker 86 aircraft from the South African Airways, which were all modified for use on 
coastal patrols.284 Each aircraft was armed with a complement of machine-guns, four 
250lb and eight 20lb bombs, and had an average operational range of 980 miles. By 
September, a further four Torpedo Bomber Reconnaissance (TBR) squadrons – 
consisting of Marylands, Blenheims and Beauforts – that were established at Durban 
(No. 13 Sqn SAAF), Port Elizabeth (No. 14 Sqn SAAF), Cape Town (No. 15 Sqn SAAF) and 
Walvis Bay (No. 16 Sqn SAAF). The SAAF instituted a series of regular coastal patrols 
from October 1940, with naval officers acting as observers on these flights. The 
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reconnaissance flights furthermore helped to investigate unidentified ships and 
submarine sightings, while escorting warships and troop transports into port.  
A general reorganisation in December resulted in the amalgamation of several 
flights. No. 13 Squadron and No. 14 Squadron became A and B Flights of No. 31 (Coastal) 
Squadron SAAF, while No. 15 Squadron and No. 16 Squadron were merged as A and B 
Flights of No. 32 (Coastal) Squadron SAAF. For operational purposes, these new 
squadrons were under the command of the Natal, Eastern Province and Cape Military 
Commands. In September 1940, a further reorganisation followed, and No. 33 (Coastal) 
Squadron SAAF was established at Port Elizabeth. By December, the operational control 
of all coastal flights had been centralised after the establishment of an SAAF Operational 
Command under the direction of Col H.G. Wilmott. During the first two years, the SAAF 
Coastal patrols undertook regular flights, and in June 1940, a system of twice-daily 
patrols was instituted along the South African coastline at a depth of 60-100 miles. This 
also included four regular patrols over the approaches to the ports.285 
 
Map 2.2: Approximate air cover over the South African coast, 1943 
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 Centralised control over SAAF coastal patrols was achieved after the 
establishment of Coastal Area Command. Each Fortress Command also had a measure of 
control over localised air patrols. The SAAF coastal patrols were only intensified once 
the Japanese and German submarine offensives started in 1942. During the months of 
June and July, several aircraft helped to patrol the southern extremities of the 
Mozambique Channel in order to assist with the location and attack of the Japanese 
submarines. Several Ansons and Venturas from the SAAF also provided increased 
coastal safeguarding following the start of the German submarine offensive off Cape 
Town in October.286 Both the UDF and South Atlantic Command were, however, acutely 
aware of the insufficient air cover available over the South African coastline. This was 
particularly problematic since most of the SAAF pilots were not trained in A/S work and 
coastal reconnaissance, and because of a general lack of aircraft. 
Squadrons Ansons Catalina’s Venturas Total 
22 Sqn SAAF 4 0 23 27 
23 Sqn SAAF 4 0 25 29 
25 Sqn SAAF 6 0 25 31 
27 Sqn SAAF 0 0 19 19 
29 Sqn SAAF 1 0 18 19 
259 Sqn RAF 0 7 0 7 
262 Sqn RAF 0 5 0 5 
265 Sqn RAF 0 7 0 7 
321 Sqn RAF 0 1 0 1 
Total 15 20 110 145 
Table 2.3: Strength returns of SAAF and RAF coastal squadrons, 1943287 
By mid-1942, Smuts had made an appeal to the British Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill for greater assistance. Britain thereafter provided several suitable aircraft – 
including Ansons, Beauforts and Venturas. A number of SAAF TBR squadrons were 
hence established across South Africa, which further strengthened the Union’s coastal 
patrols for the remainder of the war (see Table 2.3). 
After the introduction of group sailings from Cape Town to Durban in October 
1942, SAAF aircraft were increasingly employed to protect vessels travelling in a 
convoy. The addition, at various times during the war, of aircraft from the Royal Air 
Force (RAF) greatly increased the capacity and effectiveness of the SAAF coastal air 
patrol service, as well as its A/S capacity during combined operations. Up until 1945, 
several detachments from No. 209 Squadron RAF, No. 262 Squadron RAF, No. 265 
Squadron RAF and No. 321 Squadron RAF served in South Africa. Several dedicated 
flying-boat bases were established along the South African coastline – most notably at 
                                                             
286  Gordon-Cumming, Official History of the South African Naval Forces, pp. 25, 77, 79, 196. 
287  TNA, ADM 1/12643, Report by Captain C D Howard-Johnston on anti-submarine operations in the 
South Atlantic, 1943. 
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Langebaan and St Lucia. By the end of the war, SAAF aircraft increasingly formed a key 
component of combined A/S operations, and provided effective air cover along the 
entire South African coastline.288 
 
Fig 2.10: A SAAF Anson returning from a dawn coastal patrol, circa 1940289 
Conclusion 
The aspiration of South Africa to gain complete control over its naval and coastal 
defences coincided with the outbreak of the Second World War. South Africa was 
determined to manifest this desire on both political and military levels. The practical 
realities of this naval determinism, nonetheless, only came into effect after the 
establishment of the SDF in January 1940. The war, however, created an opportunity for 
the Union to once and for all successfully address the question of control over its naval 
and coastal defences. The war in effect served as the catalyst for this change.  
Despite the fact that the SDF and SANF served with exception with regard to 
South Africa’s naval and coastal defence during the war, the Union never truly exercised 
complete maritime control over its territorial waters. Throughout the war, South Africa 
was forced to rely on the Admiralty for operational, technical, administrative and 
logistic support and expertise in order to materialise and maintain the continued 
defence of South African waters. Moreover, it was principally the RN, with support from 
                                                             
288  Turner et al, War in the Southern Oceans, pp. 185, 109-110, 153-154, 203, 221, 283. 
289  South African National Museum of Military History, Masondo Reference Library. SA Navy Photo 
Collection, S.A. 429. 
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the nascent SDF and SANF, which conducted the majority of offensive and defensive 
naval operations in South African waters.  
The South African willingness and ability to adapt to each particular 
circumstance, and learn the appropriate lessons, outweighed any deficiencies in terms 
of expertise, personnel or equipment. By the end of the war, South Africa had in effect 
created a comprehensive system of naval and coastal defences, which helped the Allied 
forces to realise command at sea in the Southern Oceans. Chapter three looks at the 
ways in which the South African coastal defence systems were tested during the Axis 
maritime operations along its coastline, and especially during the sustained attacks 
between October 1942 and August 1943. As will be seen, the South African naval and 
coastal defences were able to deal with these attacks to a large degree, and the 
necessary countermeasures were activated to deal with each individual naval threat.  
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Chapter 3 
Axis raiders, mines and submarines off the  
South African coast, 1939-1945 
Introduction 
At the outbreak of the Second World War, the German High Command reached an 
important conclusion. It understood that the survival of Britain and the success of the 
Allied war effort were entirely dependent on the hauling of key logistical supplies by 
merchant shipping from across the British Empire over vast, often unprotected, sea 
lanes. If the Axis naval forces simply controlled the oceans and further ensured that the 
sinking of Allied commercial shipping outnumbered the capacity to replace them, the 
Allied war effort could effectively be crippled. 
During the war itself, the German naval focal point was the North Atlantic, while 
the Japanese naval focus was on the Indian and Pacific oceans. At times, sporadic naval 
operations were launched in more remote waters in the hope of achieving good sinking 
results and dividing Allied naval forces. When the sinking results in the North Atlantic 
area decreased due to effective Allied anti-submarine (A/S) measures, the Axis 
leadership strategically decided to launch a series of concentrated maritime operations 
in the South Atlantic and the western Indian Ocean. South African waters would become 
a particular target of this activity. The ensuing Axis naval operations thereupon 
managed to throw merchant shipping off the South African coast into disarray. It forced 
the Allies to focus their naval attention on the remote area off southern Africa to 
safeguard its merchant shipping. 
This chapter has three specific objectives. First, it will investigate the operational 
successes of the Axis raiders and mines off the South African coast between 1939 and 
1942. The second objective is to critically discuss the limited Japanese submarine 
operations in the Mozambican Channel in 1942. This discussion will take place in the 
context of the strategic German-Japanese Naval cooperation in the western Indian 
Ocean. Finally, the Axis submarine operations in South African waters – particularly the 
sustained U-boat operations from 1942 to 1943 – will be evaluated from a strategic 
point of view. This chapter thus provides fresh perspectives on the Axis maritime 
operations in South African waters during the war. 
3.1 Raiders, mines and opportunistic attacks  
In August 1939, GAdm Erich Raeder, the Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy 
(Oberbefehlshaber der Marine) anticipated the looming outbreak of war. He thus 
instructed his pocket-battleships to focus their operational efforts on the disruption and 
destruction of Allied merchant shipping. This was to be done according to the Prize 
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Regulations290 of the Kriegsmarine. Raeder further warned his officers to avoid an 
engagement with Allied naval forces except when it would further their key task of 
economic warfare. He emphasised that the pocket-battleships extend their operations 
to distant waters. This would mislead their opponents and create a general state of 
uncertainty. 
 
Fig 3.1: Grand Admiral Erich Raeder291 
Raeder was, however, certain to caution that the principal aim of their 
deployment was not the mere destruction of merchant tonnage. If the operations could 
force the Allied navies to protect their merchant shipping with superior forces, the 
sheer restriction of merchant shipping would greatly impair the Allied supply situation. 
Both the Graf Spee (Langsdorff) and Deutschland (von Fischel) left Wilhelmshaven 
towards the end of August and journeyed to the mid-Atlantic where they awaited 
further instructions. 
                                                             
290  The German Prize Regulations were based on the London Submarine Protocol of 1930, to which 
Germany subscribed in 1936. In brief, the Prize Regulations stated that German U-boats had to 
carry on the same stop-and-search procedure of merchant ships that surface warships had to 
observe. For a more detailed discussion see Keegan, Battle at sea: From man-of-war to submarine, 
pp. 223–224; Raeder, Grand Admiral, pp. 191, 293-295. Also see Bird, Erich Raeder. 
291  https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a5/Langhammer_-
_Erich_Raeder_1936.jpg  (Accessed on 29 June 2018). 
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After the war broke out, Raeder ordered the pocket-battleships to withdraw 
from their operational areas in light of France and Britain’s initial military and political 
restraint during the first month of the war. The Graf Spee subsequently travelled to the 
South Atlantic, where it remained most of September. On 23 September, however, 
Raeder informed Adolf Hitler that he would soon need to commit the pocket-battleships 
to active operations. This was because the inactivity affected both the supplies and the 
morale of the men. Hitler conceded, and on 26 September the Graf Spee and Deutschland 
were ordered to attack British shipping. The Deutschland, however, soon returned to 
Germany without any real operational accomplishments.292 
 In the first week of October, the Graf Spee sank the Clement (5,501 tons) off the 
coast of Brazil.  It then journeyed nearly 2,000 miles eastwards to operate in the mid-
South Atlantic and off the west coast of Africa. Between October and December, the Graf 
Spee frequently relocated between the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans when the Allied 
naval pressure became too strong in either. It did, however, manage to sink five 
merchantmen in South African waters. They were the Ashlea (4,222 tons), Trevanion 
(5,299 tons), Africa Shell (706 tons), Doric Star (10,086 tons) and the Tairoa (7,983 
tons). Over a period of ten weeks, the Graf Spee effected the sinking of a total of nine 
British ships that sailed independently, totalling 50,089 tons lost. Of this figure nearly 
56% was sunk in South African waters, constituting 28,296 tons.293  
On 14 December, however, the Graf Spee was shadowed by the British cruiser 
HMS Exeter, supported by the cruisers HMS Ajax and HMS Achilles, near the River Plate 
off Argentina in the South Atlantic. Although Raeder initially discouraged his pocket-
battleships from engaging Allied warships, Langsdorff opted to attack and soon opened 
fire on his pursuers. A fierce naval engagement followed, during which HMS Exeter was 
severely damaged. After several critical hits from HMS Exeter, specifically to its oil filter 
system, the Graf Spee soon broke off contact and made for neutral waters and the 
relative safety of Montevideo harbour in Uruguay. During the next few days, carefully, 
planted British reports – especially the fictitious arrival of the carrier HMS Ark Royal 
and the battlecruiser HMS Renown – convinced Langsdorff that escape into the open sea 
from Montevideo was infeasible. Hitler and Raeder subsequently agreed that Langsdorff 
should attempt to break through the blockade, but Hitler was not eager for Langsdorff 
to scuttle the battleship. The final decision was, however, left to Langsdorff. On the 
afternoon of 17 December, he decided to scuttle the Graf Spee soon after leaving port.294 
                                                             
292  Turner et al, War in the Southern Oceans, pp. 7-9; Raeder, Grand Admiral, p. 283-288. 
293  Gordon-Cumming, Official History of the South African Naval Forces, pp. 287-299; DOD Archives, 
Map Collection, File: War in the Southern Oceans maps. Chart and List of Ships Sunk Captured or 
Damaged in the Waters off Southern Africa, 1939-1945. 
294  Turner et al, War in the Southern Oceans, pp. 9-14; Raeder, Grand Admiral, p. 288-290. 
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 The Oberkommando der Marine further deployed approximately 26 disguised 
raiders,295 officially termed ‘auxiliary cruisers’ during the Second World War (see Table 
3.1). The Seekriegsleitung (SKL) adopted a specific policy with regard to the initial 
operational employment of the disguised raiders. Their chief aim was to divert Allied 
naval forces from their home waters and to inflict damage to shipping. This would be 
executed by forcing the Allies to adopt convoys and to deploy strong naval forces along 
trade routes in remote waters. They would also coerce the Allies into constantly 
employing their naval forces; scare away neutral shipping, and create a situation 
harmful to the Allies from an economic and financial point of view. Raeder hence gave 
the captains of the disguised raiders three instructions. They were to change their 
operational areas continually so as to surprise Allied shipping where least expected, not 
to attack escorted convoys, and to avoid any inevitable action with Allied naval forces. 
The disguised raiders were also ordered to wage their war against merchant shipping 
strictly according to the established Prize Regulations.296 
Name Atlantis Thor Pinguin Michel Komet 
Ops Number Schiff 16 Schiff 10 Schiff 33 Schiff 28 Schiff 45 
Displacement 7,860 GRT 3,862 GRT 7,766 GRT 8,000 GRT 3,200 GRT 
Surface Speed 
16 knots  (29.6 
km/h) 




14.8 knots (27.4 
km/h) 
14.8 knots (27.4 
km/h) 
Crew 349-351 men 349 men 401 men 395 men  274 men 
Armament 
6 x 15 cm ; 
1x 7,5 cm;  
2 x 3,7 cm;  
4x 2 cm AA; 
4 x torpedo 
tubes 
6 x 15 cm;  
1x 6 cm;  
2 x 3,7 cm;  
4x 2 cm AA; 
4 x torpedo 
tubes 
6 x 15 cm;  
1x 7,5 cm;  
2 x 3,7 cm; 
4x 2 cm; 
2 x torpedo 
tubes 
6 x 15 cm;   
1x 10,5 cm;  
4 x 3,7 cm;  
4 x 2 cm; 
6 x torpedo 
tubes 
6 x 15 cm;   
1x 6 cm;  
2 x 3,7 cm;  
4 x 2 cm; 
6 x torpedo 
tubes 
Miscellaneous 
2 x Heinkel  
He 114  
float planes;  
92 mines 
1 x Arado  
Ar 196  
float planes 
2 x Heinkel  
He 114  
float planes;  
300 mines 
2 x Arado  
Ar 196  
float planes; 
1 x LS4 boat  
2 x Arado  
Ar 196  
float planes; 
1 x LS2 boat; 30 
Mines 
Table 3.1: Statistical data of German raiders operational in South African waters297 
 The first operational disguised raider, the Atlantis (Rogge), left for the Cape and 
the Indian Ocean at the end of March 1940. The Thor (Kähler) followed in June, and also 
headed for the South Atlantic. 
                                                             
295  Throughout the war the disguised raiders bore certain operational numbers, and were referred 
to as such by the Kriegsmarine. The names by which they were know were, however, chosen by 
their respective captains. Those operational in the southern oceans were the Atlantis (Schiff 16); 
Orion (Schiff 36), Widder (Schiff 21), Thor (Schiff 10), Pinguin (Schiff 33), Komet (Schiff 45), 
Kormoran (Schiff 41), Michel (Schiff 28), Stier (Schiff 23) and Togo (Schiff 14). Turner et al, War 
in the Southern Oceans, p. 22. 
296  Turner et al, War in the Southern Oceans, pp. 21-23 
297  Statistical data collated from the website German Naval History, especially the individual pages 
dealing with the German Auxillary Cruisers during the Second World War (http://www.german-
navy.de/kriegsmarine/ships/auxcruiser/index.html). Website accessed on 5 June 2017; Data 
verified where possible with Turner et al, War in the Southern Oceans, pp. 260-261. 
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The operational area of the Atlantis’ comprised of the western Indian Ocean as 
far as 80° East. It was also allowed free reign in the eastern Indian Ocean, the South 
Atlantic and Australian waters as alternative operative areas. Its priority, however, was 
to mine the waters off Cape Agulhas and Cape St Francis on the South African coast. 
After that, it was instructed to mine the waters off Madagascar, especially near Fort 
Dauphin and Cape Ste Marie. During his voyage south, Rogge was not allowed to attack 
merchant shipping until he reached the trade route between Freetown in Sierra Leone, 
and the strategic maritime nodal point at the Cape of Good Hope. At this stage, Freetown 
served as an assembly point for all merchant shipping travelling to and from Europe, 
South America, the Middle East and the Far East. At Freetown, the slower merchantmen 
formed into convoys for their onwards journey, while the faster ships sailed 
independently.298  
On 3 May, Atlantis sank the Scientist (6,199 tons), but not before its wireless 
operator dispatched a ‘QQQQ’ signal.299 This signal was not picked up. The Atlantis 
arrived off Cape Agulhas on 10 May after doubling back along the shipping route from 
Australia. Throughout the night, the Atlantis dropped mines at six-minute intervals all 
along the coast of Cape Agulhas following a zig-zag course. During the evening, 92 mines 
were dropped in an area 5-20 miles off shore. The minefield was discovered by the 
keeper of the Agulhas lighthouse on 13 May after he witnessed a heavy explosion out to 
sea. This minefield, however, failed to damage any ships during the war.300  
 After the first successful mining operation off Cape Agulhas, Atlantis moved 
further north-east to operate along the Durban-Australia route. After a report that a 
raider disguised as a Japanese merchant ship was active in the Indian Ocean, the Atlantis 
changed her appearance to that of a Dutch merchantman. By the end of May, she 
relocated to the north to operate off the Durban-Batavia and Fremantle-Mauritius 
routes. Here she had some operational successes.301  
The Italians entered into the war on 10 June. This held grave consequences for 
Allied shipping through the strategic Suez Canal. British seaborne communication 
between the two vital campaign areas at the time – the Middle East and the Far East – 
was essentially severed. As a result, all vessels travelling to and from Britain and the Far 
East now had to traverse the longer route around the Cape of Good Hope. This added an 
                                                             
298  Gordon-Cumming, Official History of the South African Naval Forces, pp. 154-155; DOD Archives, 
UWH Civil, Box 342, File: Newspaper Articles Naval War. R. Littell, ‘The Cruise of the Raider 
ATLANTIS´ in Readers Digest, Nov 1953, pp. 69-73. 
299  The British Admiralty introduced a number of predetermined signals to indicate when shipping 
was attacked. The QQQQ signal signified ‘Armed merchantman wishes to stop me’, while RRRR 
and SSSS signals were used to report warships and U-boats respectively. See. Turner et al, War in 
the Southern Oceans, p. 24. 
300  Turner et al, War in the Southern Oceans, pp. 22-27; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 342, File: 
Translations of Extracts from German Books. Schiff 16 (Atlantis) by Frank and Rogge. 
301  Turner et al, War in the Southern Oceans, p. 29; Gordon-Cumming, Official History of the South 
African Naval Forces, p. 155. 
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estimated 10,000 sea miles to a voyage. Shipping was also more prone to attack by 
German and Italian raiders and submarines along these vast trade routes.302 By July, the 
Pinguin (Krüder) arrived in the South Atlantic, disguised as a Greek merchant vessel. 
The Pinguin was initially designated to operate in the Indian Ocean and Australian and 
Antarctic waters, with the Pacific and South Atlantic as alternatives. It was further 
instructed to lay mines off the coasts of Australia, India, South Africa and Madagascar. 
By the end of July, the SKL authorised Krüder to operate in the Cape waters while 
en route to his allotted area of assignment.303 On 26 August, Atlantis successfully 
attacked and captured the Norwegian merchantman Filefjell (7,616 tons) 300 miles to 
the south of Madagascar. Shortly after that, it sank the British Commander (6,901 tons) 
and the Morviken (5,008 tons). After these successes, Krüder was forced to exit the area 
after intercepting a radio message from Durban which revealed his presence. In an 
over-hasty decision, he decided to sink the Filefjell.304 The Pinguin subsequently 
relocated to an area 900 miles east-south-east of Madagascar to lie low. Unknown to 
Krüder, the Atlantis was also operational throughout August and September. Both 
Rogge and Krüder received a stern dressing down from SKL; Rogge for encroaching on 
Krüder’s operational areas, and Krüder for not relocating to a new operational area 
quickly enough. Both the Atlantis and Pinguin subsequently relocated to the Sunda 
Straits, where they continued offensive operations independently. The Pinguin 
afterwards journeyed to Australian waters where it and one of her captured prizes, the 
Passat, successfully mined the Bass Strait.305 
 In October, the pocket-battleship Admiral Scheer (Krancke) journeyed towards 
the South Atlantic. Here she rendezvoused with Thor on Christmas Day approximately 
600 miles to the north of the island of Tristan de Cunha. The codename for this secret 
rendezvous area was ‘Andalusien’.306 On 17 January 1941 Krancke captured the tanker 
Sandefjord (8,038 tons), whereafter it sank the Stanpark (5,103 tons) and Barneveld 
(5,597 tons) on 20 January. After replenishing from the tanker Nordmark at Andalusien, 
Krancke decided to exploit the lucrative waters of the Indian Ocean. After successfully 
rounding the Cape of Good Hope, the Scheer reached the Durban-Australia route in early 
February. After meeting up with the Atlantis on 14 February to the north-east of 
Mauritius, the Scheer journeyed further north-west and extended its patrols towards 
the east coast of Africa. Her presence in the Indian Ocean was reported on 21 February, 
                                                             
302  Turner et al, War in the Southern Oceans, p. 34 
303  Gordon-Cumming, Official History of the South African Naval Forces, pp. 161-163. 
304  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 342, File: Newspaper Articles Naval War. R. Littell, ‘The Cruise of 
the Raider ATLANTIS´ in Readers Digest, Nov 1953, pp. 69-73; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 342, 
File: Translations of Extracts from German Books. Schiff 16 (Atlantis) by Frank and Rogge. 
305  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 342, File: “Pinguin”. Die Kaperfahrt des Hilfskreuzers “Pinguin” 
1940/41 by Dr Hans Ulrich Roll – Meteorological officer of Pinguin; Turner et al, War in the 
Southern Oceans, pp. 37-44 
306  Raeder, Grand Admiral, p. 349; Gordon-Cumming, Official History of the South African Naval 
Forces, p. 153. 
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when the British merchant vessel Canadian Cruiser signalled an ‘RRRR’ report to the 
Headquarters of the East Indies Station.  
The arrival of the Scheer in the waters to the north of Madagascar had caught the 
East Indies Headquarters by surprise. Most of its close protection vessels were deployed 
off Kismayu in support of the East African Campaign. With the important convoy WS.5B 
off the coast of Mombasa, the East Indies Headquarters immediately dispatched HMS 
Glasgow, HMS Enterprise, HMS Hermes, HMS Capetown and HMS Emerald to investigate 
the reports. The Glasgow, Emerald, Hermes and Capetown were constituted as Force V – 
the hunting group, while Enterprise covered convoy WS.5B. A further distress signal was 
received from the Dutch Rantau Pandjang on 22 February at a position 280 miles from 
the scene of the first attack. After this report, a Walrus aircraft from HMS Glasgow 
spotted the Scheer travelling east-south-east. The Scheer, however, picked up the Allied 
radio intercepts about itself, and Krancke decided to quit the Indian Ocean promptly. By 
changing his course to south-south-east, Krancke was able to escape the clutches of the 
British warships. After rounding Cape Agulhas far to the south, the Scheer met the 
Kormoran (Detmers) and Nordmark at Andalusien, the secret rendezvous area. After 
successfully replenishing her supplies, Scheer travelled onwards to the North Atlantic 
and safely arrived in Bergen on 30 March 1941.307 
 Krüder left Andalusien in February. The SKL then ordered him to meet with the 
Komet (Eyssen) near Kerguelen Island. After coming together, the captains conferred to 
allocate new operational areas. The Pinguin would be active in the Arabian Strait, while 
the Komet would operate to the west of Australia. After the two ships had parted, the 
Pinguin travelled towards the Seychelles. On 24 April, it cut the trade route from India 
through the Mozambique Channel. The attack on the Empire Light (6,828 tons) and the 
Clan Buchanan (7,266 tons) exposed its presence in the area. The Headquarters of the 
East Indies Station forthwith dispatched the cruisers HMS Glasgow, HMS Leander and 
HMS Cornwall to pursue the Pinguin.  
On 7 May, Pinguin attacked the tanker British Emperor (3,633 tons) to the north-
east of Mombasa, which managed to successfully transmit a distress signal before 
sinking. This distress signal was picked up by HMS Cornwall which altered course 
towards the tanker’s last known location without delay. On the morning of 8 May, 
aircraft from HMS Cornwall sighted the Pinguin and pursued the raider. Late that 
afternoon, HMS Cornwall closed to within firing range of the raider. A short engagement 
followed. The Pinguin sank after receiving a direct hit which exploded amongst her 
                                                             
307  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 342, File: Translations of Extracts from German Books. Das 
glückhafte Schiff Kreuzerfahrten des ADMIRAL SCHEER; Turner et al, War in the Southern Oceans, 
pp. 63-69. 
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complement of sea mines.308 The remainder of the surface raiders hence relocated to 
the South Atlantic where the merchantmen pickings were superior.  
In May, the Atlantis headed for the Cape-Freetown route as the SKL believed that 
there were only weak Allied naval forces in the area. On 14 May it sank the British 
Rabaul (6,809 tons). After a close shave with both the battleship HMS Nelson and the 
carrier HMS Eagle close to St. Helena, Atlantis sank the British Trafalgar (4,530 tons) on 
24 May. Hereafter, the Atlantis operated off the South American coast. Throughout the 
remainder of 1941, the risks to the German raiders increased exponentially while the 
potential returns continued to diminish. In November during a conference with Hitler, 
Raeder explained that greater Allied countermeasures and the adoption of convoys had 
a detrimental impact on the effectiveness of German raiders. Despite this, Raeder 
planned to deploy a further four auxiliary cruisers in 1942 to operate against Allied 
shipping.309 
 In January 1942, Thor (Gumprich) sailed from Bordeaux. After unsuccessful 
confrontations with the South Atlantic whaling fleets, it succeeded in sinking the Greek 
Pagasitikos (3,942 tons) on 23 March. The episode took place approximately 1000 miles 
west of the Orange River mouth. Thor was then active in the South Atlantic and the 
Indian Ocean where she had some successes, albeit not in South African waters. In 
November, Thor was destroyed in the dockyard at Yokohama, Japan. Along with the 
tanker Uckermark and prize Leuthen, it was destroyed in an accidental explosion while 
being refitted.310 
# Date Attacked On/By Ship Tonnage Country Lat/Long 
1 16 Mar 1942 (Doggerbank) Alcyone 4,534 Dutch 33⁰ 59'S; 18⁰ 03'E 
2 2 May 1942 (Doggerbank) Soudan 6,677 Brit. 36⁰ 10'S; 20⁰ 22'E 
Total Merchants Sunk 2 
Total Tonnage Lost 11,211 tons 
Table 3.2: Merchant shipping lost to sea-mines in South African waters, 1942311 
The Doggerbank (Schneidewind) left Bordeaux in January with orders to lay 
mines off the South African coast. Between March and April the Doggerbank laid 155 
mines off Cape Town, Cape Agulhas and in the area 60 miles south-south-east of 
Agulhas. These minefields claimed five victims between March and May. The Alcyone 
                                                             
308  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 342, File: “Pinguin”. Die Kaperfahrt des Hilfskreuzers “Pinguin” 
1940/41 by Dr Hans Ulrich Roll – Meteorological officer of Pinguin; Dimbleby, Hostilities Only, pp. 
35-41. 
309  Raeder, Grand Admiral, pp. 344-367; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 342, File: Translations of 
Extracts from German Books. Schiff 16 (Atlantis) by Frank and Rogge. 
310  Gordon-Cumming, Official History of the South African Naval Forces, pp. 163-166. 
311  Gordon-Cumming, Official History of the South African Naval Forces, pp. 287-299; DOD Archives, 
Map Collection, File: War in the Southern Oceans maps. Chart and List of Ships Sunk Captured or 
Damaged in the Waters off Southern Africa, 1939-1945. 
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(4,534 tons) and Soudan (6,677 tons) were lost after striking these mines (see Table 
3.2), while the Dalfram (4,558 tons), Mangkalihat (8,457 tons) and destroyer depot-ship 
HMS Hecla (10,850 tons) received some damage. In total, 11,211 tons of shipping were 
lost to German mines in South African waters, which amounts to a mere 0.79% of the 
nearly 1,406,192 tons lost to Axis mines throughout the war. The Doggerbank remained 
in the South Atlantic for another two months, whereafter she travelled onwards to 
Japan.312 
 On 13 March, the Michel (Von Ruckteschell) left Germany with orders to operate 
in the South Atlantic and the western Indian Ocean. It was not, however, to attack Allied 
shipping south of Ascension Island. After several successes off St. Helena during May, 
Von Ruckteschell decided to relocate to Tristan da Cunha in June where the merchant 
shipping pickings proved negligible. After relocating towards the Gulf of Guinea, Michel 
sank the Union Castle liner Gloucester Castle (8,006 tons) on 15 July.  The liner had been 
travelling from Birkenhead to Cape Town. The following day, Michel scored a further 
success after sinking the tanker William F. Humphrey (7,982 tons). On 10 September she 
sank the American Leader (6,778 tons) 900 miles to the west of Cape Town. Two days 
later, the Empire Dawn (7,241 tons) was its next victim 840 miles west of Saldanha.313 
By February 1943 only Michel remained operational at sea. While en route to Japan in 
October, however, she was sunk by the American submarine USS Tarpon. After the 
sinking of the Michel, German raiders ceased to be considered a viable threat to Allied 
shipping for the rest of the war. 
 
Map 3.1: Shipping lost to German raiders and mines, 1939-1942 
                                                             
312  Turner et al, War in the Southern Oceans, pp. 22, 118-128; Gordon-Cumming, Official History of 
the South African Naval Forces, pp. 171-172. 
313  Turner et al, War in the Southern Oceans, pp. 144-148. 
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During the war, Axis raiders accounted for 133 Allied merchantmen sunk, which 
amounted to an estimated 829,644 tons lost. In South African waters alone, the German 
raiders sunk 11 ships worth 71,012 tons – nearly 8.5% of the total tonnage lost to Axis 
raiders during the war (see Table 3.3). The two pocket-battleships sank a further eight 
merchantmen worth 47,034 tons – which constitutes 6.35% of the total tonnage lost to 
Axis warships during the war. During the first four years of the war, the German raiders, 
including warships, caused a good deal of strife and angst for the Allies, particularly in 
South African waters. They certainly achieved their principal objectives – that of 
destroying shipping, forcing the adoption of convoys, creating a harmful economic and 
financial situation for the Allies, and compelling the deployment of strong naval forces 
to protect vast sea routes.314 




1 7 Oct 1939 (Graf Spee) Ashlea 4,222 Brit. 09⁰ 52'S; 03⁰ 28'W 
2 22 Oct 1939 (Graf Spee) Trevanion 5,299 Brit. 19⁰ 40'S; 04⁰ 02'E 
3 15 Nov 1939 (Graf Spee) Africa Shell 706 Brit. 24⁰ 48'S; 35⁰ 01'E 
4 2 Dec 1939 (Graf Spee) Doric Star 10,086 Brit. 19⁰ 10'S; 05⁰ 05'E 
5 3 Dec 1939 (Graf Spee) Tairoa 7,983 Brit. 21⁰ 38'S; 03⁰ 13'E 
6 3 May 1940 (Atlantis) Scientist 6,199 Brit. 19⁰55’S; 04⁰20’E 
7 26 Aug 1940 (Pinguin) Filefjell 7,616 Norw. 29⁰38’S; 45⁰11’E 
8 27 Aug 1940 (Pinguin) British Commander 6,901 Brit. 29⁰30’S; 46⁰06’E 
9 27 Aug 1940 (Pinguin) Morviken 5,008 Norw. 30⁰08’S; 46⁰15’E 
10 18 Jan 1941 (Scheer) Sandefjord 8,038 Norw. 11⁰S; 02⁰W 
11 20 Jan 1941 (Scheer) Stanpark 5,103 Brit. 09⁰00’S; 02⁰20’W 
12 20 Jan 1941 (Scheer) Barneveld 5,597 Dutch. 09⁰00’S; 02⁰20’W 
13 14 May 1941 (Atlantis) Rabaul 6,809 Brit. 19⁰26’S; 04⁰05’E 
14 24 May 1941 (Atlantis) Trafalgar 4,530 Brit. 25⁰17’S; 01⁰35’E 
15 23 Mar 1942 (Thor) Pagasitikos 3,942 Greek. 31⁰S; 01⁰W 
16 15 Jul 1942 (Michel) Gloucester City 8,006 Brit. 09⁰22’S; 01⁰38’E 
17 16 Jul 1942 (Michel) William F. Humphrey 7,982 Amer. 08⁰00’S; 01⁰00’E 
18 10 Sept 1942 (Michel) American Leader 6,778 Amer. 34⁰27’S; 02⁰00’E 
19 11 Sept 1942 (Michel) Empire Dawn 7,241 Brit. 32⁰27’S; 03⁰39’E 
Total Merchants Sunk 19 
Total Tonnage Lost 118,046 tons 
Table 3.3: Shipping lost to German raiders in South African waters, 1940-1942315 
  
                                                             
314  Data collated and reworked from Gordon-Cumming, Official History of the South African Naval 
Forces, pp. 287-299; Turner et al, War in the Southern Oceans, pp. 22, 149 
315  Gordon-Cumming, Official History of the South African Naval Forces, pp. 287-299; DOD Archives, 
Map Collection, File: War in the Southern Oceans maps. Chart and List of Ships Sunk Captured or 
Damaged in the Waters off Southern Africa, 1939-1945. 
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3.2 The Japanese submarine offensive in the Mozambique Channel 
In December 1941 VAdm Kurt Fricke, the Chief of Staff of the SKL, met with VAdm N. 
Nomura, the Japanese Naval Attaché in Berlin. The successful Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbour on 7 December, which heralded Japan’s entry into the war, meant that both the 
German and Japanese navies were eager to establish and delineate their respective 
operational areas around the globe. Influence in the Indian Ocean, however, held a 
particular appeal for both. 
The Japanese authorities initially suggested that the operational boundary 
should be fixed at the 70° East line of longitude, though the Germans preferred a 
diagonal boundary line stretching from the Gulf of Aden to the northern coast of 
Australia. The German authorities correctly gauged that the Japanese insistence on the 
70° East line of longitude was mainly connected with its territorial ambitions in Asia 
and the western Indian Ocean. The German proposal would have excluded Australia and 
Madagascar from the Japanese sphere of influence.316 By 18 January 1942, however, 
Germany, Italy and Japan agreed that the 70° East line of longitude would delineate the 
respective operational areas. The added provision was that naval operations in the 
Indian Ocean may be carried out beyond the agreed boundary by all Axis forces when 
operational situations required it. However vague the agreement seemed at the time, it 
brought the promise of greater cooperation in the maritime sphere between the Axis 
navies, especially regarding offensive operations in the Indian Ocean and ipso facto 
South African waters.317 
 On 10 February, Nomura met with Adm Otto Groos. Groos was Chief of Special-
Staff for War Economics and Economic Combat Measures in the Oberkommando der 
Wehrmacht318 (OKW) and the Chairman of the Military Commission of the Three Power 
Pact. Issues relating to direct cooperation between the Axis powers in the war were laid 
on the table. At the meeting, Nomura argued that rather than becoming too heavily 
committed in Russia, Germany should unite its efforts with Japan in trying to knock 
Britain out of the war altogether. The Japanese hoped that the Germans would launch an 
offensive in the Middle East. Such an assault would create favourable conditions for a 
Japanese offensive in the western parts of the Indian Ocean. Nomura argued that the 
                                                             
316  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 392, File: UWH Translations of Captured German Documents – 
German-Japanese High Level Documents on Strategy and Tactics. Minutes of meeting Chief SKL-
Nomura, 17 Dec 1941; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 392, File: UWH Translations of Captured 
German Documents – German-Japanese High Level Documents on Strategy and Tactics. German-
Japanese High Level Documents on Strategy and Tactics. 1/SKL Appreciation of Situation, 18 Dec 
1941; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 392, File: UWH Translations of Captured German Documents 
– German-Japanese High Level Documents on Strategy and Tactics. Minutes Chief of Staff SKL to 
Chairman Military Commission of Tripartite Pact, 19 Dec 1941. 
317  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 392, File: UWH Translations of Captured German Documents – 
German-Japanese High Level Documents on Strategy and Tactics. Copy of Military Agreement 
between Germany, Italy and Japan, 18 Jan 1942; Turner et al, War in the Southern Oceans, p. 115. 
318  Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. The OKW had nominal oversight over the Army, Navy 
and Air Force.  
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Middle East was the only area where military cooperation between Japan and Germany 
was feasible. If the Germans were not eager, Japan might very well lose interest in 
military collaboration in this geographical area altogether.319  
At a meeting held on 13 February, Raeder discussed the rapid Japanese advance 
in Burma and Indonesia and the predicted capture of Ceylon with Hitler. The Germans 
realised that the Japanese offensives would have devastating effects on British 
seapower and shipping in the Indian Ocean, as well as on oil supplies originating in the 
Persian Gulf. More importantly, the Allies would be forced to adopt heavily escorted 
merchant convoys, which would be more prone to submarine attack. An attack on key 
British positions around Suez could furthermore have a decisive influence on the 
outcome of the war, partly because the only graving docks to remain operative for the 
repair of the major Allied warships would be at the harbours of Durban and Simon’s 
Town.320 Later on in March, Raeder informed Hitler of the Japanese intentions to attack 
Madagascar after its planned capture of Ceylon. Raeder relayed that the Japanese 
wished to establish bases in Madagascar. From here, they could attack shipping in the 
Arabian Sea as well as the Indian Ocean seaboard stretching as far south as the Cape of 
Good Hope. For this plan to succeed, however, they needed German approval because it 
would have a unequivocal effect on Vichy France and its African colonies, as well as 
Portuguese East Africa. Notwithstanding, Hitler doubted that Vichy France would 
consent to the establishment of Japanese bases in Madagascar.321 
 Towards the end of March Nomura and Fricke met once more. During the 
encounter, Fricke explicitly pronounced his wish that the Japanese should start 
operations against Allied shipping in the northern Indian Ocean. Fricke argued that the 
most important Allied sea routes traversed this area. The routes to India would 
strengthen the India/Burma front, those to Iran would stand in support of the Russian 
front and the oilfields, and those to the Red Sea and Egypt were crucial for the North 
African theatre. Nomura agreed to these wishes despite his uncertainty pertaining to 
the Japanese Supreme Command’s strategic and operational intentions concerning this 
area. In addition, Fricke requested warning of any possible offensive operations in the 
Indian Ocean, especially those planned against Ceylon, the Seychelles and 
Madagascar.322  
                                                             
319  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 392, File: UWH Translations of Captured German Documents – 
German-Japanese High Level Documents on Strategy and Tactics. Report on discussion with 
Admiral Nomura from Chair Military Commission Tripartite Pact to Chief OKW, 17 Feb 1942; 
Turner et al, War in the Southern Oceans, p. 115. 
320  Raeder, Grand Admiral, pp. 363-364; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 312, File: Fuehrer 
Conferences on Naval Affairs 1942, Report to the Fuehrer, made by the Commander-in-Chief, Navy 
the afternoon of 13 Feb 1942. 
321  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 312, File: Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs 1942, Report by the 
Commander-in-Chief Navy to the Fuehrer at Headquarters ”Wolfsschanze” the evening of 12 Mar 
1942. Also see Thomas, ‘Imperial backwater or strategic outpost?’, pp. 1049-1074. 
322  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 392, File: UWH Translations of Captured German Documents – 
German-Japanese High Level Documents on Strategy and Tactics. Minutes of meeting between 
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At a further meeting held on 8 April, Nomura made an announcement. He 
disclosed that the Japanese naval authorities had decided to launch offensive operations 
off the African coast. The attacks would take place between the Arabian Sea and the 
Cape of Good Hope between June and July 1942. The main purpose of these operations 
would be to destroy British and American naval forces in the Indian Ocean by a group of 
up to five submarines and two armed merchant cruisers. While Fricke welcomed the 
news, he remained sceptical of the true intentions of the Japanese operations in this 
area. His concern stemmed from Nomura’s failure to provide any information on the 
timing of the attacks against Ceylon and Madagascar. Nomura did, however, once more, 
stress the importance of combined actions against the British in the Indian Ocean, and 
hoped for simultaneous German offensive pressure coming from a western direction. If 
this reinforcement was not forthcoming, Nomura deemed Japanese offensive pressure 
from the east futile. The Japanese wished for the desired operations to start as soon as 
possible. Fricke urged Nomura that their naval operations should begin at once, and 
without regard for the German operations. Time was, after all, needed for the British 
communications to be severed and for the resultant effects to materialise.323 
 On 14 April, Eugene Ott, the German Ambassador in Tokyo, informed the Reich 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joachim von Ribbentrop, of a probe directed at the Japanese 
Foreign Minister, Shigenori Togo. Ott had enquired as to whether the Japanese 
operations in the Indian Ocean were mere harassing measures, or part of a more 
general strategic plan. Togo intimated that the Japanese were indeed intent on 
harassing the British. He added that the provocation had a more general meaning “… 
[they] would also affect the western part of the Indian Ocean, so that Japanese conduct 
of the war would correspond with the German desire for a Japanese advance in the 
Indian Ocean in the direction of the Near East.”324 The German Ambassador was further 
able to confirm from a number of authoritative sources that the main interest of the 
Japanese High Command remained with the conquest of Burma, Ceylon and the Indian 
Ocean.325 
 By the beginning of April, the Japanese High Command decided that the time had 
arrived to honour their promise and to send naval forces to operate off the east coast of 
Africa. The Japanese, unlike their German and Italian counterparts, did not favour 
attacking merchant shipping alone. The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) admitted that its 
forces were ill-suited for a protracted naval war, and that the early annihilation of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Admiral Nomura and Chief of Staff SKL, 27 Mar 1942; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 392, File: 
UWH Translations of Captured German Documents – German-Japanese High Level Documents on 
Strategy and Tactics. Notes on main point of discussion Nomura-Fricke, 27 Mar 1942. 
323  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 392, File: UWH Translations of Captured German Documents – 
German-Japanese High Level Documents on Strategy and Tactics. Minutes of meeting between 
C/SKL and Japanese Naval Liaison Staff, 8 Apr 1942. 
324  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 392, File: UWH Translations of Captured German Documents – 
German-Japanese High Level Documents on Strategy and Tactics. Telegraphic report German 
Ambassador Tokyo to Reich Foreign Minister, 14 Apr 1942. 
325  Turner et al, War in the Southern Oceans, p. 116. 
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Allied fleets was thus paramount.326 As opposed to their German counterpart, the 
Japanese Submarine Fleet did not have a large number of ‘general purpose’ submarines. 
It entered the war with a limited submarine fleet of sixty vessels. Of these, forty-seven 
were of the I-class ‘fleet submarines’, which were developed to give the greatest 
strategic and tactical support to the capital ships of the IJN. The I-class submarines were 
known for their very high surface speeds, large fuel capacity, and their ability to carry 
either a midget submarine or small reconnaissance aircraft. All told, the I-class 
submarines displaced around 2000 tons, which adversely affected their 
manoeuvrability, diving and depth-keeping. This displacement prompted the Japanese 
High Command to restrict its deployment of submarines to operations which would 
have a definite impact on shortening the war.327 With respect to the overall strategy of 
the IJN during the war, the limited naval operations of its submarines against merchant 
shipping in the Mozambique Channel during mid-1942 should thus be seen as an 
isolated undertaking to appease an ever-demanding German ally. 
 The possibility of a Japanese occupation of Madagascar prompted the British 
defence planners to take action against the Vichy-controlled island in 1942. If the 
Japanese took over Madagascar, they would have ready access to the strategic harbour 
of Diego Suarez – situated roughly halfway along the strategic sea route between 
Colombo and Cape Town. This would have a detrimental effect on Allied shipping in the 
Indian Ocean as Japanese naval forces would then have a free hand to attack shipping 
along the entire east coast of Africa.328 In a letter to Franklin Roosevelt, Churchill stated 
that “A Japanese air, submarine, and/or cruiser base at Diego Suarez would paralyse our 
whole convoy route both to the Middle and Far East…”329 Smuts also considered 
Madagascar to be key to safety in the Indian Ocean especially regarding merchant 
shipping. He felt that a strategic decision about Madagascar’s occupation was required 
sooner rather than later. He further stated that the occupation of Diego Suarez would 
alone not deter possible Japanese aggression against Madagascar. In his opinion, the 
entire island, including the ports of Majunga and Tamatave, needed to be taken over. 
Churchill subsequently decided to carry out the occupation of Madagascar. Force 121, 
under the command of Maj Gen Robert Sturges, successfully seized Diego Suarez on 7 
May 1942. The occupation of Madagascar, however, took much longer, with the Vichy 
French forces only surrendering on 4 November after an armistice was signed.330 
                                                             
326  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 392, File: UWH Translations of Captured German Documents – 
German-Japanese High Level Documents on Strategy and Tactics. Minutes of meeting between 
C/SKL and Japanese Naval Liaison Staff, 8 Apr 1942. 
327  Batchelor and Batchelor, The Complete Encyclopedia of Submarines 1578-2006, pp. 258-263; DOD 
Archives, UWH Civil, Box 392, File: UWH Translations of Captured German Documents – German-
Japanese High Level Documents on Strategy and Tactics. 1/SKL Appreciation of Situation, 18 Dec 
1941. 
328  Van der Waag, A Military History of Modern South Africa, p. 202. 
329  Churchill, The Second World War , Vol. IV: The Hinge of Fate, pp. 197-198. 
330  Turner et al, War in the Southern Oceans, pp. 131-135, 142-143. 
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 The Japanese defence planners detached the 1st Division of the 8th Submarine 
Flotilla, then based at Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands and under the command of Capt 
N. Ishizaki, for the intended operation in the Mozambique Channel. The 1st Division 
consisted of three submarines: I-16 [Lt Cdr Y. Kaoryu]; I-18 [Cdr O. Kiyonori] and I-20 
[Cdr Y. Takashi]. A further two submarines – Capt Ishizaki’s flagship I-10 [Cdr K. 
Yasuchika] and I-30 [Cdr E. Shinobu] – were attached for the operation (see Table 3.4). 
The accompanying supply ships were the two armed merchant cruisers from the 24th 
Raider Squadron, the Aikoku Maru [RAdm (ret) O. Masao] and Hōkoku Maru [Capt (ret) 
A. Aritaka] (see Table 3.5).331 
Class Type A1 Type B1 Type C  
Ship I-10 I-30 1-16, 1-18, 1-20 
Displacement 2,919 tons 2,584 tons 2,554 tons 
Crew 100 94 101 
Speed  
(Surface) 
23.5 knots  
(43.5 km/h) 
23.5 knots  
(43.5 km/h) 




8 knots  
(15 km/h) 
8 knots  
(15 km/h) 




30,000 km @  
16 knots 
26,000 km @  
16 knots 




110 km @ 3 knots 178 km @ 3 knots 110 km @ 3 knots 
Armament 
6 × bow 533 mm  torpedo 
tubes 
18 × torpedoes 
1 × 140 mm  
deck gun 
2 × twin 25 mm Type 96 AA 
guns 
6 × bow 533 mm torpedo 
tubes 
17 × torpedoes 
1 × 140 mm  
deck gun 
2 × single 25 mm Type 96 
AA guns 
8 × 533 mm  Torpedo tubes 
20 × torpedoes 
1 × 140 mm   
deck gun 
2 × 25mm Type 96 AA guns 
Miscellaneous 1 × Yokosuka E14Y seaplane 
1 × Yokosuka E14Y 
seaplane 
1 × Type A Ko-Hyoteki-
class  
midget submarine 
Table 3.4: Statistical data on the Japanese submarines332 
                                                             
331  Turner et al, War in the Southern Oceans, pp. 135-136; Gordon-Cumming, Official History of the 
South African Naval Forces, p. 77; Hashimoto, Sunk: The Story of the Japanese Submarine Fleet, 
1942-1945, pp. 24, 38. Note that these sources only gave a very general description of the 1st 
Division, 8th Submarine Flotilla, Imperial Japanese Navy and its operation against the harbour of 
Diego Suarez, Madagascar. Further data was gathered from the Imperial Japanese Navy Page 
website (http://www.combinedfleet.com/). The detailed statistics, including the tabular 
movement of individual armed merchant cruisers and submarines, were particularly helpful. The 
links to the individual pages dealing with each of the submarines and armed merchant cruiser 
are listed below, and they were accessed between 24-27 April 2017. 
(http://www.combinedfleet.com/I-18.htm, http://www.combinedfleet.com/I-10.htm, 
http://www.combinedfleet.com/Hokoku_t.htm, http://www.combinedfleet.com/I-20.htm, 
http://www.combinedfleet.com/Aikoku_t.htm, http://www.combinedfleet.com/I-16.htm and 
http://www.combinedfleet.com/I-30.htm. 
332  Batchelor and Batchelor, The Complete Encyclopedia of Submarines, pp. 258-263; Statistical data 
collated from the website Imperial Japanese Navy Page, especially the pages dealing with the 
different classes of Japanese submarines (http://www.combinedfleet.com/type_a1.htm, 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
P a g e  | 96 
By late April, the submarines had arrived at Penang.  I-30 was ordered to travel 
towards Aden, where it arrived on 7 May. After its arrival, its aircraft reconnoitred the 
harbour. Two days later, the French harbour at Djibouti was also inspected, followed by 
Zanzibar and Dar es Salaam on 19 May. These reconnaissance forays failed to find any 
suitable targets, and the remainder of the submarines followed a southerly course from 
Penang across the Indian Ocean.  
In the wake of the submarines, the Aikoku Maru and Hōkoku Maru captured the 
Dutch tanker Genota (7,897 tons) to the south-southeast of the Indian Ocean island of 
Diego Garcia. On 20 May, I-10 launched its aircraft which reconnoitred Durban harbour 
and parts of the Natal coast. No protective measures were taken by the South African 
Air Force (SAAF) or the anti-aircraft defences situated around Durban. Despite a large 
number of merchantmen lying in the open roadstead of Durban – and the arrival of the 
battleship HMS Resolution – no attack on local merchant shipping followed. This was 
mainly due to the Japanese wishing to conceal their presence, as Ishizaki’s main aim 
remained the destruction of Allied warships.333 
Class Hōkoku Maru-class Ocean Liner 
Ship Aikoku Maru Hōkoku Maru 
Displacement 10,437 tons 10,438 tons 
Surface Speed 20.9 knots (38.7 km/h) 21.1 knots (39.1 km/h) 
Crew 133 men 150 men 
Armament 
8 × 140 mm L/50 deck guns 
4 × 25 mm Type 96  AA guns 
4 × 533 mm torpedo tubes 
8 × 150 mm L/40 deck guns 
2 × 76.2 mm L/40 AA guns 
4 × 533 mm torpedo tubes 
Miscellaneous 2 × Kawanishi E7K Floatplanes 2 × Kawanishi E7K Floatplanes 
Table 3.5: Statistical data on the Japanese armed merchant cruisers334 
 By the end of May, the submarines had arrived off the coast of northern 
Madagascar. An aircraft from I-10 investigated the anchorage of Diego Suarez on 29 
May. Upon its return, the aircraft reported that the following vessels were at anchor in 
the bay: a British battleship, HMS Ramillies, as well as two destroyers, two corvettes, a 
troopship, a hospital ship, a tanker, a merchantman and ammunition ship. Ishizaki, 
acutely aware of the prize pickings, ordered I-16, I-18 and I-20 to launch their midget 
submarines and attack the unsuspecting ships in the Diego Suarez harbour the 
following night. During the night of 30 May only the midget submarine from I-20, 
commanded by Lt A. Saburo, managed to infiltrate the harbour. It successfully attacked 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.combinedfleet.com/type_b1.htm, http://www.combinedfleet.com/type_c1.htm, 
http://www.combinedfleet.com/ships/type%20a. These webpages were accessed over the 
period 24-27 April 2017. 
333  Turner et al, War in the Southern Oceans, pp. 136-137; Hashimoto, Sunk, p. 24. 
334  Statistical data collated from the website Imperial Japanese Navy Page, especially the pages 
dealing with the Aikoku Maru (http://www.combinedfleet.com/Aikoku_t.htm) and the Hōkoku 
Maru (http://www.combinedfleet.com/Hokoku_c.htm). These webpages were accessed over the 
period 24-27 April 2017. 
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and damaged HMS Ramillies and shortly thereafter sunk the tanker British Loyalty 
(6,993 tons). Despite precautionary depth charges dropped by the British corvettes 
thereafter, the midget submarine remained undetected throughout the attack. The 
British Loyalty was later refloated and sunk elsewhere, while HMS Ramillies travelled to 
Durban for repairs. Shortly after this daring incursion, Saburo was forced to ground his 
midget submarine on the outer reef at Diego Suarez. On 2 June, Saburo and his 
crewmate were engaged by a party of Royal Marine Commandos after being spotted by 
locals the day before. Both men were killed during the attack. A further midget 
submarine launched from I-16 that night was declared missing in action soon 
afterwards.335  
 Following the relatively successful attack on Diego Suarez, Ishizaki divided his 
submarines into two groupings to attack merchant shipping at both ends of the 
Mozambique Channel. The first merchant vessel, the Elysia (6,757 tons), was lost on 5 
June through the combined efforts of the Aikoku Maru and Hōkoku Maru. A further three 
merchantmen, the Atlantic Gulf (2,639 tons), Melvin H. Baker (4,998 tons) and the 
Johnstown (5,086 tons) were sunk by the submarines on the same day. This brought the 
total tonnage sunk for the day to nearly 20,000 tons.336 Following these attacks, the 
Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of the Eastern Fleet and South Atlantic Station, ordered all 
merchant shipping in the Mozambique Channel – as well as those sailing north from 
Durban – to hug the coastline. It was hoped that the nominal protection of the air and 
surface forces of the Eastern Fleet would further deter Japanese attacks on merchant 
shipping. The fleet was based at Kilindini in Kenya and controlled all merchant shipping 
between Durban and the equator. The Eastern Fleet was in a rather precarious position, 
however, as it had only three corvettes and five destroyers with which to counter the 
Japanese submarines in the Mozambique Channel. SAAF A/S patrols, on the other hand, 
only extended as far north as Delagoa Bay. This reaffirmed that the Mozambique 
Channel was a definite chink in the armour of the Allied defences.337 
 A further nine merchant vessels were sunk in the Mozambique Channel during 
the following week. They were the Susak (3,889 tons), Wilford (2,158 tons), Christos 
Markettos (5,209 tons), Agios Georgios IV (4,847 tons), King Lud (5,224 tons), Mahronda 
(7,926 tons), Hellenic Trader (2,052 tons), Clifton Hall (5,063 tons) and the Supetar 
(3,748 tons).338 The sinkings prompted the Deputy C-in-C of the Eastern Fleet, RAdm 
Victor Danckwerts, to redirect troop convoys and fast unescorted merchantmen to take 
the alternative route along the east coast of Madagascar. At the same time, a number of 
                                                             
335  Wessels, ‘Die stryd teen Nippon’. pp. 222-241; Wessels, ‘South Africa and the War against Japan’ 
(http://www.samilitaryhistory.org/vol103aw.html); Turner et al, War in the Southern Oceans, p. 
137. 
336  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 340, File: Long naval history. Ships lost or damaged by enemy 
action in South African waters. 
337  Turner et al, War in the Southern Oceans, pp. 138-139. 
338  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 340, File: Long naval history. Ships lost or damaged by enemy 
action in South African waters. 
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warships were ordered to patrol off the two exits of the Mozambique Channel.339 At this 
point, Ishizaki’s submarines withdrew from the area and rendezvoused with the Aikoku 
Maru and Hōkoku Maru on 17 June to refit and resupply. In the meanwhile, I-30, which 
did not take part in the above mentioned attacks, was ordered to France, where she 
arrived at Lorient on 2 August.340  
# Date Attacked On/By Ship Tonnage Country Lat/Long 
1 5 Jun 1942 (Aikoku Maru) Elysia 6,757 Brit.  27⁰ 33'S; 37⁰ 05'E 
2 5 Jun 1942 (I-10) Atlantic Gulf 2,639 Pan.  21⁰ 03'S; 37⁰ 36'E 
3 5 Jun 1942 (I-10) Melvin H. Baker 4,998 Amer.  21⁰ 44'S; 36⁰ 38'E 
4 5 Jun 1942 (I-20) Johnstown 5,086 Pan.  13⁰ 12'S; 42⁰ 06'E 
5 6 Jun 1942 (I-16) Susak 3,889 Yugoslav  15⁰ 42'S; 40⁰ 58'E 
6 6 Jun 1942 (I-18) Wilford  2,158 Norw.  20⁰ 20'S; 36⁰ 47'E 
7 8 Jun 1942 (I-20) Christos Markettos 5,209 Greek  05⁰ 05'S; 40⁰ 53'E 
8 8 Jun 1942 (I-16) Agios Georgios IV 4,847 Greek  16⁰ 12'S; 41⁰ 00'E 
9 8 Jun 1942 (I-10) King Lud 5,224 Brit.  20⁰ S; 40⁰ E  
10 11 Jun 1942 (I-20) Mahronda 7,926 Brit.  14⁰ 37'S; 40⁰ 58'E 
11 11 Jun 1942 (I-20) Hellenic Trader 2,052 Pan.  14⁰ 40'S; 40⁰ 53'E 
12 12 Jun 1942 (I-20) Clifton Hall 5,063 Brit.  16⁰ 25'S; 40⁰ 10'E 
13 12 June 1942 (I-16) Supetar 3,748 Yugoslav  21⁰ 49'S; 35⁰ 50'E 
14 28 June 1942 (I-10) Queen Victoria 4,937 Brit.  21⁰ 15'S; 40⁰ 30'E 
15 29 June 1942 (I-20)  Goviken 4,854 Norw.  13⁰ 25'S; 41⁰ 13'E 
16 30 June 1942 (I-20) Steaua Romana 5,311 Brit.  09⁰S; 42⁰E 
17 30 June 1942 (I-10) Express 6,736 Amer.  23⁰ 30'S; 37⁰ 30'E 
18 1 July 1942 (I-10) Alchiba 4,427 Dutch  25⁰ 25'S; 34⁰ 49'E 
19 1 July 1942 (I-18) De Weert 1,805 Dutch  25⁰ 12'S; 35⁰ 36'E 
20 1 July 1942 (I-16) Eknaren 5,243 Swed. 17⁰S; 40⁰E 
21 6 July 1942 (I-18) Mundra 7,341 Brit.  28⁰ 45'S; 32⁰ 20'E 
22 6 July 1942 (I-10) Nymphe 4,504 Greek  15⁰ 48'S; 40⁰ 42'E 
23 8 July 1942 (I-10) Hartismere 5,498 Brit.  18⁰ 00'S; 01⁰ 22'E 
Total Merchants Sunk 23 
Total Tonnage Lost 110,252 tons 
Table 3.6: Merchantmen lost in the Mozambique Channel, Jun-Jul 1942341 
 The Japanese submarines resumed their operations in the Mozambique Channel 
towards the end of June. This coincided with a renewed report of an unidentified 
aircraft spotted over Durban. Though I-10 was operational off the Natal coastline at this 
stage, the aircraft incident remains mere speculation. In the following week, a further 
                                                             
339  Turner et al, War in the Southern Oceans, pp. 137-140. 
340  Statistical data collated from the website Imperial Japanese Navy Page, especially the pages 
dealing with the Aikoku Maru (http://www.combinedfleet.com/Aikoku_t.htm), the Hōkoku Maru 
(http://www.combinedfleet.com/Hokoku_c.htm) and I-30 (http://www.combinedfleet.com/I-
30.htm). These webpages were accessed over the period 24-27 April 2017. 
341  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 340, File: Long naval history. Ships lost or damaged by enemy 
action in South African waters. 
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ten merchent vessels were sunk. Among them were the Queen Victoria (4,937 tons), 
Goviken (4,854 tons), Steaua Romana (5,311), Express (6,736 tons), Alchiba (4,427 tons), 
De Weert (1,805 tons), Eknaren (5,243 tons), Mundra (7,341 tons), Nymphe (4,504 tons) 
and the Hartismere (5,498 tons). By the second week of July, the Japanese submarines 
had left their operational area in the Mozambique Channel and had returned to their 
bases at Penang by the beginning of August.  
The Japanese submarine offensive in the Mozambique Channel had been highly 
successful (see Table 3.6). For the loss of only two midget submarines, Ishizaki’s force 
was able to cripple a British battleship and sink more than 100,000 tons of merchant 
shipping in the space of two months. The Japanese operation once more highlighted the 
vulnerability of the remote British lines of communication through the Mozambique 
Channel, which for the most part was protected by a few Allied air patrols and A/S 
vessels.342  
 
Map 3.2: Shipping lost to the Japanese submarine offensive, 1942 
By August, the promise of greater cooperation between the German and Japanese 
navies severely diminished, as Nomura informed Col Gen Alfred Jodl, the Chief of the 
Operations Staff of the OKW, that the IJN would no longer partake in remote operations. 
The Japanese withdrawel was partly the result of the arrival of the monsoon season, a 
dire need for an overhaul of some ships, as well as a direct increase in its operational 
losses throughout 1942.343 For the remainder of the war, the Japanese submarines did 
                                                             
342  Turner et al, War in the Southern Oceans, pp. 140-143; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 340, File: 
Long naval history. Ships lost or damaged by enemy action in South African waters. 
343  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 392, File: UWH Translations of Captured German Documents – 
German-Japanese High Level Documents on Strategy and Tactics. Minutes of meeting between 
Jodl, Nomura, Bansai at Fuehrer HQ, 8 Aug 1942; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 392, File: UWH 
Translations of Captured German Documents – German-Japanese High Level Documents on 
Strategy and Tactics. Minutes of meeting Chief SKL-Nomura, 11 Aug 1942. 
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not undertake any further planned offensive operations in the western Indian Ocean 
and in particular the Mozambique Channel and South African waters. 
All told, the limited Japanese submarine offensive was simply a means to an end 
for the German High Command. The promise of greater Japanese-German naval 
cooperation in the western Indian Ocean was conclusively all but theoretical.344 Instead, 
by convincing the Japanese to launch a submarine offensive in the Indian Ocean in mid-
1942, the Germans had in fact created a definite diversionary effect that worked in their 
favour. The Allied attention was now split between the campaigns in North Africa and 
Madagascar, and the protection of shipping off the West African and American 
seaboards. The result was that an attack on merchant shipping off the coast of Cape 
Town would not be expected. 
3.3 The German U-boat offensives off the South African coast 
In February 1941, after the German sinking results in the North Atlantic diminished 
considerably, the Befehlshaber der U-Boote (BdU) decided that the time for sending a 
number of type IX U-boats to operate in the South Atlantic was opportune. These 
submarines were to operate predominantly off Freetown. At this stage of the war, Karl 
Dönitz argued that the BdU focus all of their energy on the prosecution of the U-boat 
war in the North Atlantic, and not on far-flung operations in the remote corners of the 
globe. In his memoirs, however, Dönitz categorically stated that Hitler and the political 
leadership of Germany failed to understand this strategy, and in essence, the basic 
fundamentals of U-boat warfare.345 The BdU also made use of secret replenishment 
points in the Central Atlantic, particularly ‘Andalusien’. These secret replenishment 
points allowed for surface supply ships to rendezvous with U-boats and replenish their 
ammunition and logistical stores. In a greater sense, the replenishments enabled the U-
boats to undertake two successive patrols in an operational area without returning to 
their bases in the Bay of Biscay, which could be as distant as 2,800 miles. 
The system of double patrols proved extremely effective with some seven U-
boats sinking more than seventy-four ship in the first half of 1941. During this period U-
69 (Metzler) travelled south along the African coast and mined the ports of Lagos and 
Takoradi in the Gulf of Guinea, after which the mines claimed several victims. This 
prompted the British Admiralty to close these ports temporarily. During the months of 
May and June, a total of 119 ships (635,635 tons) were sunk in the North Atlantic and 
the operational area off Freetown. Between July and August, the sinking results off 
Freetown dropped considerably, as there were only eight to twelve U-boats operational 
in this area at that time. The heavy losses of merchant vessels off Freetown persuaded 
the British Admiralty to reduce Allied shipping activity in the area to a minimum. The 
Admiralty would also redirect traffic to the relative safety of the Pan-American safety 
                                                             
344  Raeder, Grand Admiral, pp. 363-364. 
345  Doenitz, Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days, pp. 149,152. 
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zone, an area then still closed to U-boats for political reasons. The very dense American 
commercial shipping off Freetown further complicated U-boat operations in the area, as 
they were naturally not allowed to attack neutral shipping. Following the loss of a 
unidentified surface supply ship, Dönitz redeployed the mainstay of his U-boats to 
operations in the North and Eastern Atlantic. Here, the merchant sinking potential 
continued to be substantial.346 
 
Fig 3.2: Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz347 
 By October, only two U-boats remained operational off Freetown with enough 
fuel left to continue operations until forced to resupply from the Atlantis and Python 
(Lüders). After first operating off the coast of Freetown, U-126 (Bauer) subsequently 
sailed to the coast of Guinea, while U-68 (Merten) proceeded to Walvis Bay via 
Ascension and St. Helena. On its way to South-West Africa, U-68 sank the British tanker 
Darkdale (8,145 tons) off St. Helena, as well as a further two British merchantmen, the 
Hazelside (5,279 tons) and Bradford City (4,925 tons). The U-boat arrived off Walvis Bay 
on 11 November and observed no sea traffic. On 13 November, it sailed northwards and 
rendezvoused with the Atlantis south of St. Helena Island for replenishment. The 
Atlantis thereafter travelled northwards to resupply U-126 to the north-west of 
Ascension Island. On 22 November, however, the Atlantis was surprised en route and 
subsequently sunk by the cruiser HMS Devonshire. The survivors from the Atlantis were 
rescued by U-126. The Python, along with U-124 (Mohr) and U-129 (Clausen) also 
                                                             
346  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 220, File: Union War Histories Translations 14a. U-boat Operations 
of the Axis Powers in S.A. Waters compiled, by Dr Jurgen Rohwer, 1954; Doenitz, Memoirs: Ten Years 
and Twenty Days, pp. 176-177. 
347  https://www.awesomestories.com/images/user/26ccc15ca95b2329dae33452c36a6a27.jpg 
(Accessed 6 March 2018). 
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received instructions to assist with transporting the survivors, despite all being initially 
earmarked for an operation in Cape Town waters. Two days previously, the Python had 
resupplied U-124 and U-129 near the Saint Peter and Saint Paul Archipelago in the 
central equatorial area of the Atlantic Ocean. On her way to the rendezvous, U-124 also 
sank the cruiser HMS Dunedin (4,850 tons).348 
 
Fig 3.3: German U-boat crew assisting the survivors of a sunken merchantman349 
 The survivors of Atlantis were transferred to the Python during the rendezvous 
with U-126. The Python was then ordered to remain in the South Atlantic as she had 
enough fuel and provisions to support the remaining four operational U-boats in the 
area. The BdU decided that U-124, U-129, U-68 – all of the type IX class – and U-A 
(Eckermann) should launch a surprise operation in the waters off Cape Town, after 
replenishing their supplies from the Python. This operation, however, came to nothing. 
On the afternoon of 1 December, after having resupplied U-68, and while busy 
resupplying U-A, Python was surprised and successfully engaged by HMS Dorsetshire 
after Ultra intelligence had pinpointed her location. While U-68 and U-A managed to 
escape the attack from HMS Dorsetshire by diving, the crew of the Python opted to 
scuttle the ship.  
                                                             
348  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 220, File: Union War Histories Translations 14a. U-boat Operations 
of the Axis Powers in S.A. Waters, compiled by Dr Jürgen Rohwer, 1954; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, 
Box 341, File: U-boat matters. Questions and answers submitted by UWH section to 
Fregattenkapitän Gunter Hessler re U-boat warfare in South African waters.  
349  http://www.conspiracy-cafe.com/apps/blog/show/42936580-u-196-the-mystery-continues-
gold-bullion-uranium-loot (Accessed on 6 March 2018). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
P a g e  | 103 
The attacks on the Atlantis and Python, both while they were resupplying U-boats, 
were a matter of grave concern to the BdU and the SKL. They were convinced that 
direction-finding alone could not have guided the British warship to the exact location 
of the German supply vessels, though the raider code was never broken by the Allies. 
The crews of the Atlantis and Python were subsequently transferred to the four U-boats, 
whereafter they started their return journeys to the Bay of Biscay. During the return 
trip, U-124 managed to sink the American merchantman Sagadahoc (6,275 tons). The 
four U-boats then rendezvoused close to the Cape Verde Islands with four Italian 
submarines that had sailed from Bordeaux. These were the Pietro Calvi (Olivieri)350, 
Giuseppe Finzi (Giudice)351, Enrico Tazzoli (di Cossato)352 and Luigi Torelli (De 
Giacomo)353. The Italian submarines helped to transport the crews of the Atlantis and 
Python to their bases in the Bay of Biscay. All eight submarines had arrived at their 
respective bases by the end of December.  
The destruction of the Atlantis and Python meant that surface vessels could no 
longer supply U-boats in the South Atlantic, which necessitated the temporary shelving 
of all plans for offensive operations in the waters off Cape Town. At this stage, it was 
also more economical to employ U-boats in operations off the American seaboard. The 
American entry into the war had incontrovertibly opened several new avenues of attack 
with the promise of rich merchant spoils and much shorter operational distances.354 
The sinking results of the U-boats operating in the North Atlantic off the American 
seaboard, as well as the Caribbean, had, however, decreased somewhat substantially. 
The BdU concluded in July 1942 that the reduction had occurred to such an extent that it 
was no longer worthwhile considering these areas as the main theatre for sustained U-
boat operations. This was mainly due to the introduction of Allied convoys and effective 
A/S measures in these waters. The BdU hence adopted a policy of pursuing U-boat 
operations in distant waters, provided that the sinking results and prospects of success 
in these areas justified the economic use of force in such operations. They had the added 
advantage of coercing the Allies into spreading their A/S forces across the globe to 
engage the U-boats wherever they appeared. The main weight of the U-boat operations 
thereupon shifted to the mid-Atlantic. The renewed focus was on attacking convoys to 
and from Britain, as these areas were devoid of good air cover.  
                                                             
350  Regia Marina Italiana – The Italian Navy in World War II (Website Accessed on 9 May 2017) 
http://www.regiamarina.net/detail_text_with_list.asp?nid=84&lid=1&cid=13.  
351  Regia Marina Italiana – The Italian Navy in World War II (Website Accessed on 9 May 2017) 
http://www.regiamarina.net/detail_text_with_list.asp?nid=84&lid=1&cid=21. 
352  Regia Marina Italiana – The Italian Navy in World War II (Website Accessed on 9 May 2017) 
http://www.regiamarina.net/detail_text_with_list.asp?nid=84&lid=1&cid=42. 
353  Regia Marina Italiana – The Italian Navy in World War II (Website Accessed on 9 May 2017) 
http://www.regiamarina.net/detail_text_with_list.asp?nid=84&lid=1&cid=44. 
354  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 220, File: Union War Histories Translations 14a. U-boat Operations 
of the Axis Powers in S.A. Waters, compiled by Dr Jürgen Rohwer, 1954; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, 
Box 341, File: U-boat matters. Questions and answers submitted by UWH section to 
Fregattenkapitän Gunter Hessler re U-boat warfare in South African waters. 
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At least thirty new U-boats were delivered per month during July, August and 
September 1942, mainly due to the clearing of arrears in U-boat construction from the 
previous year. The arrival of these new U-boats enabled the BdU to promptly resume 
operations against Allied convoys in the North Atlantic. The increase in forces 
furthermore allowed for U-boats to deliver surprise attacks in distant waters. The first 
three areas selected for the sporadic subsidiary operations were the waters off Trinidad 
in the Caribbean, Freetown, and a sudden onslaught in the waters off Cape Town. Dönitz 
had hoped to cause a diversionary effect with these distant interventions, pressurising 
the Allies into splitting their defensive forces between protecting the North Atlantic, the 
Eastern American seaboard, the Caribbean and the extensive African coast bordering 
the Indian and Atlantic oceans. The Japanese submarine offensive in the Mozambican 
Channel had naturally also contributed to this diversionary effect.355 
 
Fig 3.4: A German U-boat refuelling from a supply ship in the South Atlantic356 
                                                             
355  Doenitz, Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days, pp. 237-238; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 341, 
File: U-boat matters. Questions and answers submitted by UWH section to Fregattenkapitän Gunter 
Hessler re U-boat warfare in South African waters. 
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 By July 1942 the waters off Cape Town were still considered virgin waters by the 
BdU. The area had remained devoid of any noteworthy submarine activity, apart from 
U-68’s brief foray to the coast of South West Africa in November 1941. Prior to 1942, the 
BdU also did not favour sending single U-boats to operate off the southern African coast 
as their independent actions would alert the Allies and force them to adopt stringent 
A/S measures in these waters. Moreover, a single submarine operating in the Cape 
Town waters would not reach satisfactory sinking results needed to justify its 
deployment in such distant reaches. The BdU further realised that an operation off Cape 
Town could only materialise once sufficient numbers of U-boats were available to 
launch a concentrated attack and sustain it for an indefinite period to allow for 
satisfactory sinking results. Dönitz and the BdU, however, maintained that the primary 
focus of the U-boat war remained the sinking of Allied merchant shipping, and not 
merely the tying down of Allied forces through diversionary U-boat attacks.357 
Class Type IXC Type IXD2 
Displacement 1,540 tons 2,150 tons 
Crew 48-56 men 55-63 men 
Speed  
(Surface) 
18.3 knots  
(33.8 km/h) 




7.3 knots  
(13.5 km/h) 




13450 miles @  
10 knots 




63 miles @ 4 knots 57 miles @ 4 knots 
Armament 
6 × Torpedo tubes 
21 torpedoes 
1 × 10.5 cm  deck gun 
1 × 3.7 cm AA gun 
1 × 2.0 cm AA gun 
6 × Torpedo tubes 
24 torpedoes 
1 × 10.5 cm  deck gun 
1 × 3.7 cm AA gun 
1 × 2.0 cm AA gun 
Table 3.7: Statistical data on German U-boats operational in South African waters358 
 Between October and November, the Allies committed the majority of their 
escort fleets to the protection of the North African and Mediterranean waters. This 
action was the result of the unfolding campaign in North Africa, which further enticed 
Dönitz to strike towards the proverbial ‘soft underbelly’ of South Africa. The BdU, 
however, appreciated the logistical complications associated with operations in such 
distant waters, especially after the loss of the Atlantis and Python. As early as 1941, it 
                                                             
357  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 341, File: U-boat matters. Questions and answers submitted by UWH 
section to Fregattenkapitän Gunter Hessler re U-boat warfare in South African waters. 
358  Statistical data collated from the website Uboat.net, especially the individual pages dealing with 
the various U-boats types used during the Second World War (http://uboat.net/types/). Website 
accessed on 5 June 2017; data verified where possible with Turner et al, War in the Southern 
Oceans, p. 257. 
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experimented with the use of supply U-boats (milch cows359) in provisioning 
submarines on remote operations. Furthermore, by August, the BdU had a large enough 
number of the type IXC U-boats at its disposal, which exponentially increased the 
duration of U-boat operations. Hence, when operating in conjunction with the milch 
cows, the offensive employment of U-boats now extended to areas previously devoid of 
any sustained U-boat operations. Dönitz furthermore hoped to extend U-boat operations 
to cover the African ports in the Indian Ocean, but accepted that this would only be 
possible by October when the new type IXD2 U-boats came into service (see Table 
3.7).360  
 
Fig 3.5: German U-boats operational in the Southern Oceans, circa 1941361 
 By August, the BdU had earmarked four type IXC U-boats for the surprise 
onslaught in the Cape Town waters. The Eisbär group was ordered to strike a decisive 
blow at shipping in the waters off Cape Town during October. The wolf pack consisted 
of U-68 (Merten), U-172 (Emmermann), U-504 (Poske) and U-156 (Hartenstein), and 
was accompanied by the milch cow U-459 (Wilamowitz-Möllendorf). Dönitz argued that 
the U-boats were to remain in the operational area off Cape Town until approximately 
                                                             
359  Also known as U-tankers, these boats were used to replenish wolf packs while operational. The 
U-tankers carried spare parts, a doctor, technicians, food stores, ammunition and extra fuel oil, 
which they used to replenish U-boats upon instruction from the BdU. See DOD Archives, UWH 
Civil, Box 341, File: U-boat matters. Report on experience gained by U-459 refuelling 15 U-boats, 21 
Mar – 15 May 1942; Busch, U-Boats at War, pp. 144–145; Turner et al, War in the Southern 
Oceans, p. 158. 
360  Doenitz, Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days, pp. 276–283; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 341, 
File: U-boat matters. Questions and answers submitted by UWH section to Fregattenkapitän Gunter 
Hessler re U-boat warfare in South African waters. 
361  https://i.pinimg.com/originals/63/cb/4c/63cb4c85b064964801aedc05d462a4e1.jpg; 
https://i.pinimg.com/originals/e4/6b/57/e46b57467a65f1221dd4ec9fc3e2a04f.jpg (Accessed 
on 6 March 2018). 
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the end of October. The aim was to disrupt and destroy merchant shipping and achieve 
the necessary sinking results required to make such a far-flung operation a success. A 
fresh batch of U-boats would then relieve the Eisbär group and continue operations in 
this area. After the Eisbär boats had sailed for Cape Town from their base at Lorient in 
late August, they had to cover approximately 6 000 sea miles before they reached the 
operational waters off Cape Town.362  
 To ensure maximum surprise, the SKL required the U-boats to remain 
undetected for their entire voyage to Cape Town. The SKL argued throughout 
September that the most important factor to consider was the strategic effect which the 
Eisbär group would achieve. This included throwing the traffic off the coast of South 
Africa into such a state of confusion that sea traffic around the Cape of Good Hope would 
halt. South African ports would then become clogged with ever-increasing numbers of 
merchant shipping seeking shelter. Be that as it may, only surprise could ensure this 
strategic effect. The BdU and Dönitz, however, argued that the most important factor to 
consider during the entire operation would be the actual sinking results achieved by the 
Eisbär pack. Dönitz thus argued that the Eisbär boats should attack shipping during 
their entire approach voyage to Cape Town. The ultimate goal of the operation, as 
Dönitz argued, was a short, sharp, U-boat offensive, which could yield the highest 
possible sinking results in the shortest possible time without incurring too many U-boat 
losses. The SKL and BdU eventually reached a compromise and decided that the U-boats 
could attack merchant shipping during their approach voyage to Cape Town, but only 
between the equator and 5° south.363 Dönitz’s reply to this debacle was that the 
strategists were once again out to “tickle” the enemy. To this he added, “Unfortunately I 
do not know of a single case, when an enemy had been tickled to death.”364 
During their voyage south, the Eisbär boats attempted – albeit unsuccessfully – to 
attack convoy SL 119 which was making its way to Freetown. While each U-boat 
continued its journey south independently, the wolf pack travelled in an extended 
harrow bone formation spread out across a vast distance. In this way, it was able to 
remain undetected and able to increase the chances for opportunistic attacks against 
Allied shipping. The U-boats were to replenish their supplies from U-459 on 20 
September at a position approximately 20° south of the equator. While en route to 
rendezvous with U-459, U-156 sank the British troopship Laconia (19,965 tons) on 12 
September. This chapter does not deal with the sinking of the Laconia, but it is of 
                                                             
362  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 341, File: U-boat matters. Questions and answers submitted by UWH 
section to Fregattenkapitän Gunter Hessler re U-boat warfare in South African waters; DOD 
Archives, UWH Civil, Box 341, File: U-boat matters. Operation Order “Eisbär”, 1 Aug 1942; DOD 
Archives, UWH Civil, Box 341, File: U-boat matters. Report on experience gained by U-459 
refuelling 15 U-boats, 21 Mar – 15 May 1942; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 341, File: U-boat 
material. Report on U-boat policy & ops in South African waters by Walter Meyer. 
363  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 341, File: U-boat material. Report on U-boat policy & ops in South 
African waters by Walter Meyer. 
364  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 341, File: U-boat matters. Questions and answers submitted by UWH 
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interest to note that Dönitz ordered the remainder of the Eisbär boats to assist in 
rescuing the survivors. Only once two Vichy French boats were despatched to help 
assist with the rescue of survivors, were the U-boats recalled from the rescue 
operation.365  
 
Fig 3.6: U-156 and U-507 assisting survivors from the Laconia, 15 Sept 1942366 
On 16 September, an indiscriminate Allied bombing attack damaged U-156 to such 
an extent that the BdU recalled it from the Eisbär group. The BdU rapidly replaced U-156 
with U-159 (Witte) as the U-boat was then operational in the equatorial area off the 
mouth of the Congo River. The Eisbär boats rendezvoused with U-459 between 22 and 
24 September to the south of St Helena, where each U-boat successfully replenished its 
supplies. This included 100-110 tons of fuel, four tons of lubricating oil and enough food 
stocks and other essential supplies for 30 days. The remainder of the U-boats’ journey 
south occurred without incident, and the Eisbär group arrived off the coast of Cape 
Town during the first week of October.367 
On the night of 6/7 October 1942, Emmermann managed to infiltrate his U-boat 
successfully into Cape Town harbour’s roadstead. After conducting a reconnaissance, he 
found it to be empty of Allied merchant vessels. The BdU had initially ordered the Eisbär 
group to commence their attack on the shipping off Cape Town on the night of 8/9 
                                                             
365  Turner et al, War in the Southern Oceans, pp. 161-167. 
366  https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:U-156_37-35_Laconia_1942_09_15.jpg (Accessed on 6 
March 2018). 
367  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 220, File: Union War Histories Translations 14a. U-boat Operations 
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October, but after receiving Emmermann’s report, it was decided to postpone the attack 
to the night of 10/11 October. In the meantime U-68 trailed several steamers while 
steadily approaching Cape Town harbour. During the evening of 7/8 October, Merten 
received Emmermann’s report stating that the roadstead was empty. Merten forthwith 
informed the BdU of the changing tactical situation in the waters off Cape Town. At that 
point, the U-boats were authorised to launch their attacks at midnight on 8 October. 
Local intelligence sources indicated that Cape Town harbour retained up to 50 ships 
anchored at any time, and the BdU believed that a surprise attack by two U-boats could 
achieve more than the desired results, after which the remaining U-boats were free to 
take offensive action. The U-boat commanders and the BdU were furthermore 
convinced that the South African defences would be caught totally unaware, for it 
seemed that neither their wireless transmissions nor their presence was detected.368 
 
Fig 3.7: A U-boat watching its target sink in the Southern Oceans369 
                                                             
368  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 341, File: U-boat material. Extracts from war diary U-159 (Helmut 
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The resulting U-boat offensive succeeded in sinking 13 merchantmen within the 
first three days of operations. They were the Chikasaw City (6,196 tons), Firethorn 
(4,700 tons), Boringia (5,821 tons), City of Athens (6,558 tons), Clan Mactavish (7,631 
tons), Sarthe (5,271 tons), Swiftsure (8,206 tons), Gaasterkerk (8,679 tons), 
Koumoundouros (3,598 tons), Examelia (4,981 tons), Coloradan (6,557 tons), Belgian 
Fighter (5,403 tons) and Orcades (23,456 tons).370 The U-boat pickings were initially 
child’s play. But as the surprise gained during the initial attack started to dwindle, and 
the South African and Allied counter-measures were activated, Dönitz ordered the 
Eisbär group to extend their operational area to as far afield as Port Elizabeth and 
Durban.  
The initial attacks on the merchant shipping off Cape Town were facilitated by the 
fact that the majority of South African lighthouses were still functioning at full capacity, 
while most merchantmen sailed independently around the South African coast. Because 
of this complacency present in South Africa, very few A/S vessels and aircraft were 
operational off the coast of South Africa by October. Bad weather, however, set in on 13 
October, which forced the submarines further afield, with U-159 venturing as far as 40° 
south in search of merchant vessels.371 
Shortly after the commencement of Operation Eisbär, U-68 and U-172 were forced 
to commence their return voyage. This occurred even before they had managed to fire 
all of their torpedoes.372 The BdU subsequently decided that U-504 and U-159 would 
move further south and south-east of Cape Town where they managed to sink several 
more vessels over the period of 13 October to 3 November.373 Its targets included the 
Empire Nomad (7,167 tons), Empire Chaucer (5,970 tons), City of Johannesburg (5,669 
tons), Anne Hutchinson (7,176 tons), Ross (4,978 tons), Laplace (7,327 tons), La Salle 
(5,462 tons), Empire Guidon (7,041 tons), Reynolds (5,113 tons) and the Porto Alegre 
(5,187 tons). After these attacks, U-504 and U-159 also had to turn back to their bases in 
France. During their return voyages, the Eisbär boats succeeded in sinking a further 
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371  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 341, File: U-boat matters. Questions and answers submitted by UWH 
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three merchantmen: the Aldington Court (4,891 tons), Llandilo (4,966 tons) and the Star 
of Scotland (2,290 tons) (see Table 3.8).374 
# Date Attacked On/By Ship Tonnage Country Lat/Long 
1 7 Oct 1942 (U-172) Chikasaw City 6,196 Amer. 34⁰ 05'S; 17⁰ 16'E 
2 7 Oct 1942 (U-172) Firethorn 4,700 Pan. 34⁰ 10'S; 17⁰ 07'E 
3 7 Oct 1942 (U-172) Koumoundouros 3,598 Greek 34⁰ 00'S; 17 ⁰30'E 
4 7 Oct 1942 (U-159) Boringia 5,821 Brit. 35⁰ 09'S; 16⁰ 32'E 
5 8 Oct 1942 (U-159) Clan Mactavish 7,631 Brit. 34⁰ 53'S; 16⁰ 45'E 
6 8 Oct 1942 (U-68) Sarthe 5,271 Brit. 34⁰ 50'S; 18⁰ 40'E 
7 8 Oct 1942 (U-68) Swiftsure 8,206 Amer. 34⁰ 40'S; 18⁰ 25'E 
8 8 Oct 1942 (U-68) Gaasterkerk 8,679 Dutch 34⁰ 20'S; 18⁰ 10'E 
9 8 Oct 1942 (U-68) Examelia 4,981 Amer. 34⁰ 52'S; 18⁰ 30'E 
10 8 Oct 1942 (U-504) City of Athens 6,558 Brit. 33⁰ 40'S; 17⁰ 03'E 
11 9 Oct 1942 (U-159) Coloradan 6,557 Amer. 35⁰ 47'S; 14⁰ 34'E 
12 9 Oct 1942 (U-68) Belgian Fighter 5,403 Belg. 35⁰ 00'S; 18⁰ 30'E 
13 10 Oct 1942 (U-172) Orcades 23,456 Brit. 35⁰ 51'S; 14 ⁰ 40'E 
14 13 Oct 1942 (U-159) Empire Nomad 7,167 Brit. 37⁰ 50'S; 18⁰ 16'E 
15 17 Oct 1942 (U-504) Empire Chaucer 5,970 Brit. 40⁰ 20'S; 18⁰ 30'E 
16 23 Oct 1942 (U-504) City of Johannesburg 5,669 Brit. 33⁰ 20'S; 29⁰ 30'E 
17 26 Oct 1942 (U-504) Anne Hutchinson 7,176 Amer. 33⁰10'S; 28⁰ 30'E 
18 29 Oct 1942 (U-159) Ross 4,978 Brit. 38⁰ 51'S; 21⁰ 40'E 
19 29 Oct 1942 (U-159) Laplace 7,327 Brit. 40⁰ 33'S; 21⁰ 35'E 
20 29 Oct 1942 (U-159) La Salle 5,462 Amer. 40⁰ 00'S; 21⁰ 30 'E 
21 31 Oct 1942 (U-504) Empire Guidon 7,041 Brit. 30⁰ 40'S; 34⁰ 20'E 
22 31 Oct 1942 (U-504) Reynolds 5,113 Brit. 30⁰ 00'S; 35⁰ 10'E 
23 3 Nov 1942 (U-504) Porto Alegre 5,187 Braz. 35⁰ 27'S; 28⁰ 02'E 
24 31 Oct 1942 (U-172) Aldington Court 4,891 Brit. 30⁰ 20'S; 02⁰ 10'W 
25 2 Nov 1942(U-172) Llandilo 4,966 Brit. 27⁰ 03'S; 02⁰ 59'W 
26 13 Nov 1942 (U-159) Star of Scotland 2,290 Amer. 26⁰ 30'S; 00⁰ 20'W 
Total Merchants Sunk 26 
Total Tonnage Lost 170,294 tons 
Table 3.8: Merchantmen lost to the Eisbär Group, Oct-Nov 1942375 
A batch of the new type IXD2 U-boats, captained by experienced commanders, was 
commissioned between August and September. This allowed Dönitz’s hope for U-boat 
operations to extend to cover the African ports in the Indian Ocean, to be realised. The 
BdU decided that these boats relieve the Eisbär group to maintain constant pressure on 
the shipping off South Africa. The first of the U-boats, U-179 (Sobe) sailed by mid-
August, and without the knowledge of the BdU, it caught up to and joined the Eisbär 
                                                             
374  Gordon-Cumming, Official History of the South African Naval Forces, pp. 287-299; DOD Archives, 
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group in the waters off Cape Town. On 8 October, as the Eisbär boats launched their 
attacks, U-179 sank the Pantelis (3,845 tons). The fate of U-179 was, however, sealed. 
Shortly after, depth charges were dropped from the British destroyer HMS Active and 
sank the U-boat. For the remainder of the Second World War, the BdU believed that U-
179 had been sunk by Allied bombers off the coast of Ascension Island, while on her 
return voyage to Lorient. Three more type IXD2 U-boats, U-178 (Ibbeken), U-181 (Lüth) 
and U-177 (Gysae), left Lorient between 8 and 17 September and arrived in the waters 
off Cape Town at the end of October. During the following six weeks, they operated off 
the east coast of South Africa and travelled as far as Lourenço Marques in the 
Mozambique Channel.376 
These type IXD2 U-boats collectively formed part of the first U-cruiser operation in 
the Southern Oceans and were extremely successful during their deployment (see Table 
3.9). They managed to sink 25 merchant ships: Aegeus (4,538 tons), Mendoza (8,233 
tons), East Indian (8,159 tons), Trekieve (5,244 tons), Hai Hing (2,561 tons), Plaudit 
(5,060 tons), K.G. Meldahl (3,799 tons), Excello (4,969 tons), Louise Moller (3,764 tons), 
Gunda (2,241 tons), Scottish Chief (7,006 tons), Corinthiakos (3,562 tons), Pierce Butler 
(7,191 tons), Alcoa Pathfinder (6,797 tons), Mount Helmos (6,481 tons), Dorington Court 
(5,281 tons), Jeremiah Wadsworth (7,176 tons), Evanthia (3,551 tons), Nova Scotia 
(6,796 tons), Cleanthis (4,153 tons), Llandaff Castle (10,799), Amarylis (4,328 tons), 
Saronikos (3,548 tons), Empire Gull (6,408), and Sawahloento (3,085 tons).377 The 
British Auxiliary Cruiser Nova Scotia had transported 800 Italian civilian internees on 
board, and fearing a repeat of the Laconia incident, the BdU ordered the U-boats not to 
attempt a rescue operation. By mid-November, the SKL obligated all remaining German 
submarines off the South African coast to return to the North Atlantic and the 
Mediterranean. Here they would be expected to attack Allied shipping after the 
successful American landings in North Africa during Operation Torch.378 
During October, the Italian submarine Ammiraglio Cagni (Liannazza)379 travelled 
from its Mediterranean base to its operational area to the south-west coast of Africa and 
the waters off Cape Town. On 29 November the Ammiraglio Cagni sank the Argo (5,550 
tons), whereafter it had to start its return journey to Bordeaux. During this voyage, the 
submarine was successfully provisioned by U-459, after which it operated off the Saint 
Peter and Saint Paul Archipelago before returning to base in February 1943. During the 
period between 7 October and 14 December 1942, eight U-boats and one Italian 
                                                             
376  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 341, File: U-boat matters. Questions and answers submitted by UWH 
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submarine sank 53 merchantmen, for the loss of only one U-boat. The sinking results 
were thus an approximate 5.88 merchant vessels sunk per U-boat, with a striking 
314,419 tons of merchant shipping lost off the South African coast. The BdU was thus 
able to prove to the SKL that operations as far south as the waters off the South African 
coast were not only possible, but could yield good sinking results.380 
# Date Attacked On/By Ship Tonnage Country Lat/Long 
1 8 Oct 1942 (U-179) Pantelis 3,845 Greek 34⁰ 20'S; 17⁰ 50'E 
2 31 Oct 1942 (U-177) Aegeus 4,538 Greek 32⁰ 30'S; 16⁰ 00'E 
3 1 Nov 1942 (U-178) Mendoza 8,233 Brit. 29⁰ 20'S; 32⁰ 13'E 
4 3 Nov 1942 (U-181) East Indian 8,159 Amer. 37⁰ 23'S; 13⁰ 34'E 
5 4 Nov 1942 (U-178) Trekieve 5,244 Brit. 25⁰ 46'S; 33⁰ 48'E 
6 4 Nov 1942 (U-178) Hai Hing 2,561 Norw. 25⁰ 55'S; 33⁰ 10'E 
7 8 Nov 1942 (U-181) Plaudit 5,060 Pan. 36⁰ 00'S; 26⁰ 32'E 
8 10 Nov 1942 (U-181) K.G. Meldahl 3,799 Norw. 34⁰ 59'S; 29⁰ 45'E 
9 13 Nov 1942 (U-178) Louise Moller 3,764 Brit. 30⁰ 50'S; 35⁰ 54'E 
10 13 Nov 1942 (U-181) Excello 4,969 Amer. 32⁰ 23'S; 30⁰ 07'E 
11 19 Nov 1942 (U-181) Gunda 2,241 Norw. 25⁰ 40'S; 33⁰ 53'E 
12 19 Nov 1942 (U-177) Scottish Chief 7,006 Brit. 30⁰ 39'S; 34⁰ 41'E 
13 20 Nov 1942 (U-181) Corinthiakos 3,562 Greek 25⁰ 42'S; 33⁰ 27'E 
14 20 Nov 1942 (U-177) Pierce Butler 7,191 Amer. 29⁰ 40'S; 36⁰ 35'E 
15 21 Nov 1942 (U-181) Alcoa Pathfinder 6,797 Amer. 26⁰ 45'S; 33⁰ 10'E 
16 24 Nov 1942 (U-181) Dorington Court 5,281 Brit. 27⁰ 00'S; 34⁰ 45'E 
17 24 Nov 1942 (U-181) Mount Helmos 6,481 Greek 26⁰ 38'S; 34⁰ 58'E 
18 27 Nov 1942 (U-178) Jeremiah Wadsworth 7,176 Amer. 39⁰ 25'S; 22⁰ 23'E 
19 28 Nov 1942 (U-181) Evanthia 3,551 Greek 25⁰ 13'S; 34⁰ 00'E 
20 28 Nov 1942 (U-177) Nova Scotia 6,796 Brit. 28⁰ 30'S; 33⁰ 00'E 
21 30 Nov 1942 (U-181) Cleanthis 4,153 Greek 24⁰ 29'S; 35⁰ 44'E 
22 30 Nov -1942 (U-177) Llandaff Castle 10,799 Brit. 27⁰ 20'S; 33⁰ 40'E 
23 2 Dec 1942 (U-181) Amarylis 4,328 Pan. 28⁰ 14'S; 33⁰ 24'E 
24 7 Dec 1942 (U-177) Saronikos 3,548 Greek 24⁰ 46'S; 35⁰ 30'E 
25 12 Dec 1942 (U-177) Empire Gull 6,408 Brit. 26⁰ S; 35⁰ E 
26 14 Dec 1942 (U-177) Sawahloento 3,085 Dutch 31⁰ 02'S; 34⁰ 00'E 
Total Merchants Sunk 26 
Total Tonnage Lost 138,575 tons 
Table 3.9: Merchantmen lost to the first U-cruiser operation, Oct-Dec 1942381 
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Map 3.3 Shipping lost to German and Italian submarines, 1942 
In December, the SKL requested that the BdU maintain pressure along the South 
African coast. It also ordered a new U-boat operation to continue to harass the shipping 
along the extended Allied supply routes. The BdU appreciated that the type IXC U-boats, 
used by the Eisbär group, proved ill-suited for operations in distant waters. Their 
limited fuel capacity was insufficient even when refuelled along the way by a milch cow, 
and this significantly reduced their deployment to an operational area. 
Notwithstanding, the BdU was once more forced to despatch four type IXC U-boats for 
the operations off Cape Town as no type IXD2 U-boats were available. The BdU assigned 
U-506 (Würdemann), U-516 (Wiebe), U-509 (Witte) and U-160 (Lassen), to form the 
core of the Seehund Group, with the milch cow U-459 once more attached to the pack. 
The U-boats departed from their bases in the Bay of Biscay in December 1942 and 
January 1943, after which they replenished their supplies from U-459 approximately 
600 miles to the south of St Helena Island.  
The Seehund group travelled south without incident and arrived in the 
operational area off Cape Town at the end of January and the beginning of February. The 
arrival of U-182 (Clausen), the only available type IXD2 U-boat, further bolstered the 
strength of the Seehund group. The operational conditions in the South African waters 
had, however, drastically changed since October 1942. The deterioration of these 
conditions was in part due to the heightened South African and Allied A/S measures, 
strong radar protection and the introduction of escorted convoys along the South 
African coast.382 
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The sinking results of the Seehund Group were, however, negligible for the entire 
time during which the U-boats were operational off the South African coast. During the 
initial deployment of the Seehund Group between Cape Town and Port Elizabeth, its 
sinking results were exceptionally poor. During this period, only five ships were sunk: 
the Queen Anne (4,937 tons), Helmspey (4,764 tons), Deer Lodge (6,187 tons), Llanashe 
(4,836 tons) and the Dutch submarine tender Colombia (10,782). By the beginning of 
March, the Seehund group were ordered further eastwards towards the waters off 
Durban and Lourenço Marques where there was more potential for merchant spoils. 
During the whole of March, only ten merchantmen were sunk: the Nirpura (5,961 tons), 
Empire Mahseer (5,087 tons), Harvey W. Scott (7,176 tons), Marietta E. (7,628 tons), 
Sabor (5,212 tons), James B. Stephens (7,176 tons), Tabor (4,768 tons), Richard D. 
Spaight (7,177 tons), Aelybryn (4,986 tons), and the Nortun (3,663 tons). 
# Date Attacked On/By Ship Tonnage Country Lat/Long 
1 10-Feb-1943 (U-509) Queen Anne 4,937 Brit. 34⁰ 53'S; 19⁰ 51'E 
2 11-Feb-1943 (U-516) Helmspey 4,764 Brit. 34⁰ 22'S; 24⁰ 54'E 
3 17-Feb-1943 (U-516) Deer Lodge 6,187 Amer. 33⁰ 46'E; 26⁰ 57'E 
4 17-Feb-1943 (U-182) Llanashe 4,836 Brit. 34⁰ 00'S; 28⁰ 30'E 
5 27-Feb-1943 (U-516) Colombia  10,782 Dutch 33⁰ 36'S; 27⁰ 29'E 
6 3-Mar-1943 (U-160) Nirpura 5,961 Brit. 32⁰ 47'S; 29⁰ 47'E 
7 3-Mar-1943 (U-160) Empire Mahseer 5,087 Brit. 32⁰ 01S; 30⁰ 48'E 
8 3-Mar-1943 (U-160) Harvey W. Scott 7,176 Amer. 31⁰ 54'S; 30⁰ 37'E 
9 4-Mar-1943 (U-160) Marietta E. 7,628 Brit. 31⁰ 49'S; 31⁰ 11'E 
10 7-Mar-1943 (U-506) Sabor 5,212 Brit. 34⁰ 30'S; 23⁰ 10'E 
11 8-Mar-1943 (U-160) James B. Stephens 7,176 Amer. 28⁰ 53'S; 33⁰ 18'E 
12 9-Mar-1943 (U-506) Tabor 4,768 Norw. 37⁰ 30'S; 23⁰ 15'E 
13 10-Mar-1943 (U-182) Richard D. Spaight 7,177 Amer. 28⁰ S; 37⁰ E 
14 11-Mar-1943 (U-160) Aelybryn 4,986 Brit. 28⁰ 30'S; 34⁰ 00'E 
15 20-Mar-1943 (U-516) Nortun 3,663 Pan. 27⁰ 35'S; 14⁰ 22'E 
16 2-Apr-1943 (U-509) City of Baroda 7,129 Brit. 27⁰ 56'S; 15⁰ 21'E 
17 5-Apr-1943 (U-182) Aloe 5,047 Brit. 32⁰ 37'S; 37⁰ 50'E 
Total Merchants Sunk 17 
Total Tonnage Lost 102,516 tons 
Table 3.10: Merchantmen lost to the Seehund Group, Feb-Apr 1943383 
By the end of March, the Seehund Group was ordered back to the operational area 
to the west of Cape Town. On their onward journey towards Port Nolloth and Walvis 
Bay, only a further two merchant vessels were sunk. These were the City of Baroda 
(7,129 tons) and Aloe (5,047 tons). Hereafter the U-boats were forced to turn back to 
their bases as their supplies ran out. During the return voyage, U-182 was sunk by the 
American destroyer USS Mackenzie on 16 May. The remainder of the U-boats, however, 
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safely reached their bases between 3 and 11 March. It is evident that the sinking results 
of the Seehund Group were less striking, and indeed convincing, than the results 
obtained by the Eisbär Group and the first U-cruiser operation during 1942 (see Graph 
3.1). Between February and April, the Seehund Group and U-182 sunk a total of only 17 
merchantmen, a mere 102,516 tons of shipping (see Table 3.10).384 
 
Graph 3.1: Comparative successes of the Eisbär Group, the first U-cruiser 
operation, and the Seehund Group 
By 1943, the main Italian submarine operations were directed against shipping off 
the Brazilian coast. On 20 February, however, an Italian submarine, the Leonardo da 
Vinci (Gazzana), left Bordeaux and arrived in South African waters at the beginning of 
April. During its operational deployment, the Leonardo da Vinci succeeded in sinking 
five merchantmen: the Lulworth Hill (7,628 tons), Sembilan (6,566 tons), Manaar (8,007 
tons), John Drayton (7,177 tons) and the Doryssa (8,078 tons). The Italian submarine 
was, however, lost during its return voyage through the combined efforts of the British 
destroyer HMS Active and the frigate HMS Ness (see Table 3.11).385  
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# Date Attacked On/By Ship Tonnage Country Lat/Long 
1 19 Mar 1943 (L. Da Vinci) Lulworth Hill 7,628 Brit. 10⁰ 10's; 01⁰ 00'E 
2 17 Apr 1943 (L. Da Vinci) Sembilan 6,566 Dutch 31⁰ 30'S; 33⁰ 30'E 
3 18 Apr 1943 (L. Da Vinci) Manaar 8,007 Brit. 30⁰ 59'S; 33⁰ 00'E 
4 21 Apr 1943 (L. Da Vinci) John Drayton 7,177 Amer. 32⁰ 10'S; 34⁰ 50'E 
5 25 Apr 1943 (L. Da Vinci) Doryssa 8,078 Brit. 37⁰ 03'S; 24⁰ 03'E 
Total Merchants Sunk 5 
Total Tonnage Lost 37,456 tons 
Table 3.11: Merchantmen lost to Italian submarine operations, Mar-Apr 1943386 
 
Fig 3.8: The top U-boat aces in South African waters during the war  
– Karl-Friederich Merten, Wolfgang Lüth, Helmut Witte387 
By April, only U-182 remained operational off the South African coast. The BdU 
decided that a large number of IXD U-boats, which had become available during 
February and March, would be despatched to relieve the Seehund group, and 
collectively formed part of the second U-cruiser operation in the Southern Oceans. The 
extended fuel capacity of these U-boats allowed for greater operational freedom in 
distant waters. On 9 February, U-180 (Musenberg) – one of only two experimental type 
IXD1 U-boats – left the Bay of Biscay destined for Madagascar. Musenberg was ordered 
to rendezvous with the Japanese submarine, I-29 (Kinashi) off Madagascar and deliver 
the Indian dissident Subhas Bose. During her voyage to the rendezvous, U-180 sank the 
Corbis (8,132 tons) on 18 April. After the successful delivery of Bose on 26 April, U-180 
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remained operational off the South African coast until 26 May without any further 
results.388  
Over the period of 9 April to 3 May, a further nine type IXD2 U-boats made for the 
operational area in the South African waters. They included U-177 (Gysae), U-178 
(Dommes) U-181 (Lüth), U-195 (Buchholz), U-196 (Kentrat), U-197 (Bartels), U-198 
(Hartmann), U-402 (Freiherr von Forstner) and U-511 (Schneewind). The first of these 
U-boats arrived in the operational area towards the end of April, with U-177, U-181, U-
198 and U-402 sinking a number of merchant vessels between Cape Town and the 
Mozambique Channel. During May alone, seven merchantmen were sunk by these U-
boats. They were the Nailsea Meadow (4,962 tons), Tinhow (5,232 tons), Northmoor 
(4,392 tons), Sicilia (1,633 tons), Storaas (7,886 tons), Agwimonte (6,697 tons) and the 
Hopetarn (5,231 tons). The main reason behind the sudden successes appears to have 
been the greater speed which could be reached by the type IXD2 U-boats. In June, a 
further five merchantmen were sunk: the Salabangka (6,586), Dumra (2,304 tons), 
William King (7,176 tons), Harrier (193 tons), and the Sebastian Cermeno (7,194 tons). 
By the end of that month, the U-boats had replenished their stores from the German 
surface tanker, the Charlotte Schliemann, well to the south of the island of Mauritius.389 
After restocking, the U-boats relocated to new operational areas, which saw the 
submarines working towards the east coast of South Africa in a quadrant between 
Durban, Lourenço Marques, the Mozambique Channel, Mauritius and Madagascar. This 
new operational area at once proved more profitable, with the U-boats sinking a further 
14 merchantmen.390 Included were the Michael Livanos (4,774 tons), Breiviken (2,669 
tons), Hydraios (4,476 tons), Jasper Park (7,129 tons), Leana (4,743 tons), Alice F. 
Palmer (7,176 tons), Mary Livanos (4,771 tons), Robert Bacon (7,191 tons), City of 
Canton (6,692 tons), Pegasus (9,583 tons), Mangkalihat (8,457 tons), City of Oran 
(7,323), Efthalia Mari (4,195 tons) and the Empire Stanley (6,921 tons) (see Table 
3.12).391 
  
                                                             
388  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 342, File: Newspaper Articles Naval War. ‘Gold gab für man Bose’ in 
Muenchner Illustrierte, 13 Mar 1954; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 220, File: Union War Histories 
Translations 14a. U-boat Operations of the Axis Powers in S.A. Waters compiled by Dr Jürgen 
Rohwer, 1954. 
389  Gordon-Cumming, Official History of the South African Naval Forces, pp. 287-299; DOD Archives, 
Map Collection, File: War in the Southern Oceans maps. Chart and List of Ships Sunk Captured or 
Damaged in the Waters off Southern Africa, 1939-1945. 
390  Turner et al, War in the Southern Oceans, pp. 219-237; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 220, File: 
Union War Histories Translations 14a. U-boat Operations of the Axis Powers in S.A. Waters 
compiled by Dr Jürgen Rohwer, 1954. 
391  Gordon-Cumming, Official History of the South African Naval Forces, pp. 287-299; DOD Archives, 
Map Collection, File: War in the Southern Oceans maps. Chart and List of Ships Sunk Captured or 
Damaged in the Waters off Southern Africa, 1939-1945. 
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# Date Attacked On/By Ship Tonnage Country Lat/Long 
1 18-Apr-1943 (U-180) Corbis 8,132 Brit. 34⁰ 56'S ; 34⁰ 03'E 
2 11-May-1943 (U-402) Nailsea Meadow 4,962 Brit. 32⁰ 04'S ; 29⁰ 13'E 
3 11-May-1943 (U-181) Tinhow 5,232 Brit. 25⁰ 15'S ; 33⁰ 30'E 
4 17-May-1943 (U-198) Northmoor 4,392 Brit. 28⁰ 27'S ; 32⁰ 43'E 
5 27-May-1943 (U-181) Sicilia 1,633 Swed. 24⁰ 31'S ; 35⁰ 12'E 
6 28-May-1943 (U-177) Storaas 7,886 Norw. 34⁰ 57'S ; 19⁰ 33'E 
7 28-May-1943 (U-177) Agwimonte 6,697 Amer. 34⁰ 57'S ; 19⁰ 33'E 
8 29-May-1943 (U-198) Hopetarn 5,231 Brit. 30⁰ 50'S ; 39⁰ 32'E 
9 1-Jun-1943 (U-178) Salabangka 6,586 Dutch 31⁰ 08'S ; 31⁰ 18'E 
10 5-Jun-1943 (U-198) Dumra 2,304 Brit. 28⁰ 15'S ; 33⁰ 20'E 
11 6-Jun-1943 (U-198) William King 7,176 Amer. 30⁰ 25'S ; 34⁰ 15'E 
12 7-Jun-1943 (U-181) Harrier 193 Brit. 25⁰ 50'S ; 33⁰ 20'E 
13 27-Jun-1943 (U-511) Sebastian Cermeno 7,194 Amer. 29⁰ 00'S ; 50⁰ 10'E 
14 4-Jul-1943 (U-178) Michael Livanos 4,774 Greek 22⁰ 52'S ; 36⁰ 47'E 
15 4-Jul-1943 (U-178) Breiviken 2,669 Norw. 21⁰ 50'S ; 37⁰ 50'E 
16 6-Jul-1943 (U-198) Hydraios 4,476 Greek 24⁰ 44'S ; 35⁰ 12'E 
17 6-Jul-1943 (U-177) Jasper Park 7,129 Brit. 32⁰ 52'S ; 42⁰ 15'E 
18 7-Jul-1943 (U-198) Leana 4,743 Brit. 25⁰ 06'S ; 35⁰ 33'E 
19 10-Jul-1943 (U-177) Alice F. Palmer 7,176 Amer. 26⁰ 30'S ; 44⁰ 10'E 
20 11-Jul-1943 (U-178) Mary Livanos 4,771 Greek 15⁰ 40'S ; 40⁰ 45'E 
21 14-Jul-1943 (U-178) Robert Bacon 7,191 Amer. 15⁰ 25'S ; 41⁰ 13'E 
22 16-Jul-1943 (U-178) City of Canton 6,692 Brit. 13⁰ 52'S ; 41⁰ 10'E 
23 23-Jul-1943 (U-197) Pegasus 9,583 Swed. 28⁰ 05'S ; 37⁰ 40'E 
24 1-Aug-1943 (U-198) Mangkalihat 8,457 Dutch 25⁰ 06'S ; 34⁰ 14'E 
25 2-Aug-1943 (U-196) City of Oran 7,323 Brit. 13⁰ 45'S ; 41⁰ 16'E 
26 5-Aug-1943 (U-177) Efthalia Mari 4,195 Greek 24⁰ 21'S ; 48⁰ 55'E 
27 17-Aug-1943 (U-197) Empire Stanley 6,921 Brit. 27⁰ 08'S ; 48⁰ 15'E 
Total Merchants Sunk 27 
Total Tonnage Lost 153,718 tons 
Table 3.12: Merchantmen lost to the second U-cruiser operation, Apr-Aug 1943392 
Between 8 and 20 August, the U-boats used up most of their supplies and were 
obliged to return home. During this period, U-197 was lost after being bombed by Allied 
aircraft just south of Madagascar on 20 August. The remaining U-boats had arrived in 
Bordeaux by mid-October. Between 18 April and 17 August, the U-boats of the second 
U-cruiser operation accounted for 27 merchant ships sunk, totalling 153,718 tons of 
shipping lost. Despite more active South African and Allied counter-measures, Dönitz’s 
U-boats managed to sink 44 merchant ships off the coast of South Africa during the 
whole of 1943, amounting to a total of 256,243 tons of shipping lost. In October, the 
Faneromeni (3,404 tons) was sunk by the Japanese submarine I-37 in the Mozambique 
Channel. This was the last merchantman lost in South African waters for the year 1943. 
                                                             
392  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 340, File: Long naval history. Ships lost or damaged by enemy 
action in South African waters. 
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The Italian and Japanese submarines added six more merchantmen to this tally, 
amounting to a further 40,860 tons of shipping lost. Altogether the Axis submarine 
offensives accounted for 50 merchant vessels sunk in 1943, totalling 297,103 tons of 
shipping lost.393 
 
Map 3.4: Shipping lost to Axis submarines, 1943 
For the remainder of the Second World War, more notably from September 1943, 
the BdU ceased to regard the region off the South African coast as a viable operational 
area. It argued that the submarines earmarked for offensive operations in the Far East 
would have to pass through South African waters before they could reach their far-
eastern bases at Penang and Surabaya. This would provide the U-boats with ample 
opportunity to attack Allied merchant shipping along the South African coastline during 
their journeys to and from the east. The A/S measures had become so efficient around 
the South African coast – especially the well-organised air patrol service by the SAAF 
and Royal Air Force – that the U-boats found it increasingly difficult to operate 
successfully against merchant shipping. There were, however, exceptions to the rule.394 
During the course of 1944, four U-boats, U-862 (Timm), U-852 (Eck), U-198 (Waldegg) 
and U-861 (Oesten), managed to sink eight Allied merchant ships, accounting for 42,267 
tons of shipping lost. The merchant vessels that had been sunk comprised of the 
Dahomian (5,277 tons), Columbine (3,268 tons), Director (5,107 tons), Radbury (3,614), 
Empire Lancer (7,037 tons), Nairung (5,414 tons), Wayfarer (5,086 tons) and the 
Berwickshire (7,464 tons). The Point Pleasant Park (7,136 tons) was sunk by U-510 
                                                             
393  Turner et al, War in the Southern Oceans, p. 240; Gordon-Cumming, Official History of the South 
African Naval Forces, p. 83. 
394  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 220, File: Union War Histories Translations 14a. U-boat Operations 
of the Axis Powers in S.A. Waters compiled by Dr Jürgen Rohwer, 1954; Turner et al, War in the 
Southern Oceans, pp. 238-255. 
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(Eick) on 23 February 1945. This was the last Allied merchantman sunk off the South 
African coast during the war (see Table 3.13).395  
# Date Attacked On/By Ship Tonnage Country Lat/Long 
1 1 Apr 1944(U-852) Dahomian 5,277 Brit. 34⁰ 25'S ; 18⁰ 19'E 
2 16 Jun 1944(U-198) Columbine 3,268 Brit. 32⁰ 44'S ; 17⁰ 22'E  
3 14 Jul 1944(U-198) Director 5,107 Brit. 24⁰ 30'S ; 35⁰ 44'E 
4 13 Aug 1944(U-862) Radbury 3,614 Brit. 24⁰ 20'S ; 41⁰ 45'E 
5 16 Aug 1944(U-862) Empire Lancer 7,037 Brit. 15⁰ S ; 45⁰ E 
6 18 Aug 1944(U-862) Nairung 5,414 Brit. 15⁰ S ; 42⁰ E 
7 19 Aug 1944(U-862) Wayfarer 5,086 Brit. 14⁰ 30'S ; 42⁰ 20'E 
8 20 Aug 1944(U-861) Berwickshire 7,464 Brit. 30⁰ 58'S ; 38⁰ 50'E 
9 23 Feb 1945 (U-510) Point Pleasant 7,136 Brit. 29⁰ 42'S ; 09⁰ 58'E 
Total Merchants Sunk 9 
Total Tonnage Lost 49,403 tons 
Table 3.13: Merchantmen lost to German U-boats, 1944-1945396 
 
Map 3.5: Shipping lost to German U-boats, 1944-1945 
Conclusion 
During the Second World War, the Axis naval forces effectively operated off the South 
African coast between 1939 and 1945, with the main operations materialising from June 
                                                             
395  Gordon-Cumming, Official History of the South African Naval Forces, pp. 287-299; DOD Archives, 
Map Collection, File: War in the Southern Oceans maps. Chart and List of Ships Sunk Captured or 
Damaged in the Waters off Southern Africa, 1939-1945. 
396  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 340, File: Long naval history. Ships lost or damaged by enemy 
action in South African waters. 
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1942 to August 1943. The Axis maritime operations in South African waters accounted 
for 158 ships sunk, amounting to a staggering 910,638 tons of shipping lost. Of this 
number, the mines accounted for 1.23% (11,211 tons) of shipping lost and 
raiders/warships for 13.70% (124,803 tons). The submarines were responsible for a 
startling 85.06% (774,624 tons). When isolated to South African figures alone, the 
percentages seem blatantly impressive. When juxtaposed against total shipping losses 
throughout the Second World War to Axis maritime operations, however, the sinking 
results in South African waters are less remarkable. The global shipping losses to Axis 
maritime operations came to a substantial 17,662,733 tons of shipping lost. The 
detailed global results of shipping tonnage lost involve mines – 1,406,192 tons; 
raiders/warships – 1,569,319 tons and submarines – 14,687,231 tons. As mentioned 
previously, the sinking results in South African waters, when compared to the global 
results of the Axis maritime operations, are less notable. In fact, the losses to Axis mines, 
raiders/warships and submarines in South African waters form a mere 0.79%, 7.95%, 
5.27% of the global results respectively (see Table 3.14). Thus only 5.15% of the global 
losses to Axis maritime operations can be attributed to coordinated actions in South 
African waters, which did not even amount to 0.37% of the gross registered tonnage of 
merchant ships traversing the Cape sea route during the war. 
 
Maritime losses in 
South African waters 
Global maritime 
losses 
Maritime losses in South African 
waters expressed as a percentage 
of global maritime losses 
Mines 11,211 tons  1,406,192 tons 0.79% 
Raiders/Warships 124,803 tons  1,569,310 tons 7.95% 
Submarines 774,624 tons  14,687,231 tons 5.27% 
Total 910,638 tons  17,662,733 tons 5.15% 
Table 3.14: Comparative results of maritime losses in South African  
waters and globally, 1939-1945 
 The success of the Axis maritime operations in South African waters should, 
however, not be measured in mere tonnage and percentages alone, but rather in terms 
of the strategic and operational effect which it created. The Axis maritime operations 
succeeded in causing a significant amount of trouble and anxiety for the Allies, 
particularly in South African waters. Above all the principal aim was achieved – that of 
destroying shipping, forcing the adoption of convoys, and creating a dire economic and 
financial situation for the Allies by forcing the deployment of strong naval forces to 
protect vast sea routes. From October 1942, the operational conditions in South African 
waters deteriorated considerably due to South African and Allied A/S operations. In 
fact, by August 1943, the SKL and BdU had ceased to consider South African waters as a 
viable operational area with sufficient sinking potential.  
To some degree, the maritime intelligence war waged off southern Africa 
informed both the Axis maritime operations and Allied countermeasures in said waters. 
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This aspect of the Second World War is investigated in chapter four. It will soon become 
evident that the maritime intelligence war was extremely complex in nature, and 
involved a number of diverse role-players. 
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Chapter 4 
The maritime intelligence war in southern Africa, 1939-1945 
Introduction 
Maritime intelligence played a crucial role during the course of the naval war in South 
African waters. Following the outbreak of the war, Germany attempted to initiate covert 
contact with the South African political opposition on several occasions.  
After establishing viable radio contact with Germany, the Ossewabrandwag (OB) 
– which translates to Ox-wagon Sentinel, an anti-British and pro-German organisation, 
in particular started transmitting both political and military intelligence to Berlin. 
Subsequent to the establishment of the FELIX Organisation in mid-1942, there was a 
marked increase in maritime intelligence gathered by the OB and relayed to Berlin. The 
operational value of this source of maritime intelligence, however, remained 
questionable for the remainder of the war in southern Africa. The Cape Naval 
Intelligence Centre (CNIC) proved the main player in the Allied sphere of maritime 
intelligence in southern Africa during the war. The CNIC formed a vital link in the 
overall Allied maritime intelligence organisation during the war. It did so by presiding 
over both operational intelligence and counterintelligence during the prosecution of the 
naval war off the South African coast.  
Chapter four has three broad objectives, the first of which is to investigate 
instances of sabotage and subversion within the naval sphere in South Africa during the 
war. This will occur predominantly in the context of the initial operational contacts 
established between the OB and Germany during the first few years of the war. The 
second aspect involves a critical discussion of the role, functioning and effectiveness of 
the FELIX Organisation in southern Africa during the war. Here, the particular focus is 
on the Organisation’s contribution to the gathering and distribution of maritime 
intelligence to Germany. Finally, the purpose, organisation, and success of the CNIC in 
southern Africa during the war will be examined. Specific emphasis will be placed on 
the operations of each of its core sections – Tracking, Operational Intelligence, Security, 
Naval Press Relations and Censorship. 
4.1 Sabotage, subversion and the initial South African contacts with Germany 
Piet van der Schyff, erstwhile historian and archivist of the OB,397 argues that two 
pertinent questions arise regarding the OB and its possible contact with Nazi Germany 
during the war. First, was there definite contact between the OB and Germany during 
the war? Second, if such contact existed, what was the nature and extent thereof? The 
                                                             
397  For more information on the Ossewabrandwag see Marx, Oxwagon Sentinel; Van der Schyff, 
Geskiedenis van die Ossewa-Brandwag. 
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answer to the first question is straightforward. The OB maintained regular contact with 
Germany throughout the war, mainly due to its pro-Nazi and anti-British stance. The 
second question, however, needs further investigation, especially with regard to how it 
related to the maritime intelligence war waged in southern Africa.398 
 The first definite contact established between Germany and the OB was through 
Will and Marietjie Radley. They were a South African couple who was unable to leave 
Germany after the declaration of war. The Radleys had become involved in the German 
propaganda machine when they joined the broadcasting corps of Radio Zeesen, which 
transmitted anti-war propaganda to South Africa.399 In January 1940, Dr Rudolph 
Karlowa, a senior diplomat at the German Foreign Ministry, summoned the couple. He 
requested that Marietjie return to South Africa with a message from the German 
Government to the leader of the official parliamentary opposition in the Union. After 
careful investigation of the political situation within South Africa, the German 
Government decided to support Dr D.F. Malan and his National Party. Their decision 
was a result of the perceived negligible influence of Barry Hertzog and Dr Hans van 
Rensburg.400 The Radleys subsequently agreed to the request, whereafter Marietjie 
memorised the following message: 
Die Duitse Ryksregering sal by voltrekking van vrede met die Unie van Suid-
Afrika, sy nasionale gebied erken en waarborg, soos dit bestaan uit die Kaap 
Provinsie, Oranje Vrystaat, Transvaal en Natal, sowel as [die] drie 
protektorate, Swaziland, Basutoland en Bechuanaland. Die 
Duitseryksregering sal [ook] verklaar dat Duitsland nie sal belangstel indien 
die Unie van Suid-Afrika sy nasionale gebied sal uitbrei tot wat vandag 
bekend staan as Suid Rhodesië nie. Duitsland oorweeg nie die 
totstandkoming van ŉ aparte staat op Afrikaanse bodem nie, en erken die 
Unie van Suid-Afrika as die leidende blanke staat in die Suid-Afrikaanse 
lewensruimte.  
The German Government will, upon the declaration of peace with the Union of 
South Africa, recognise and guarantee its territorial sovereignty, comprising 
the Cape Province, Orange Free State, Transvaal and Natal, along with the 
three protectorates of Swaziland, Basutoland and Bechuanaland. The German 
Government will also have no reservations should the Union of South Africa 
decide to increase its territory by incorporating Southern Rhodesia. Germany 
is not considering the establishment of a separate state in Africa, and 
                                                             
398  Van der Schyff, Die Ossewa-Brandwag en die Tweede Wêreldoorlog, p. 96. 
399  Van der Schyff, Die Ossewa-Brandwag en die Tweede Wêreldoorlog, p. 101. For more information 
on Radio Zeesen and its radio transmissions to South Africa during the war see NWU, RAM Div, 
OB Archive, Transkripsies/Bandopname. Dr Eric Holm. Also see Marx, ‘Dear Listeners in South 
Africa’, pp. 148-172. The DOD Archives contains a virtually complete collection of the Zeesen 
broadcasts, contained in the Zeesen Broadcasts WW II archival group (consisting of 15 archival 
boxes worth of documents, covering the period 1941-1945).  
400  Van der Schyff, Die Ossewa-Brandwag en die Tweede Wêreldoorlog, pp. 101-102. 
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recognises the Union of South Africa as the leading white state in the South 
African sphere of influence.401 
 Marietjie Radley travelled to South Africa during the middle of February. After 
failing to make contact with Malan, she instead delivered the message to Van Rensburg, 
the soon-to-be leader of the OB. Van Rensburg promised to pass it onto Malan. The 
message, however, never reached Malan, and the German Foreign Office subsequently 
asked Will Radley to deliver a follow-up message to him. If Radley failed to meet with 
Malan, the message could be passed on to Van Rensburg for later delivery to Malan.402 
The details of the second message were as follows: 
Die Duitse Regering herbevestig sy voorneme en aanbod aan die Suid-
Afrikaanse Volk soos vervat in die onderneming wat deur mev. Marie 
Radley oorgedra is in Januarie 1940. 
Indien ŉ gewapende opstand teen die oorlogspoging sou ontstaan in Suid-
Afrika, en die opstandelinge wapens benodig, kan Duitsland die wat vry 
geword het nadat die Spaanse Burgeroorlog ŉ aantal maande tevore ten 
einde geloop het, bekom en voorsien. Hoewel nie nuut nie is dit nog goed 
bruikbaar en dit kan in Noord-Afrika afgelewer word om dan verder self 
vervoer te word. Van sy eie wapens kon Duitsland egter niks afstaan nie 
aangesien dit alles tuis benodig word. 
Die Duitse Regering sal graag kontak met die opstandsbeweging wil hou, en 
hulle is welkom om probleme te bespreek. 
The German Government reconfirms its intentions and offer to the South 
African nation that which was contained in the message passed on by Mrs. 
Marie Radley in January 1940. 
In the event of possible armed resistance breaking out against the war effort 
in South Africa, and if weapons be required for the resistance, Germany is able 
to obtain and provide weapons used during the Spanish Civil War that has 
ended some months before. Despite not being new, the weapons are still 
serviceable and can be delivered to North Africa from where they can then be 
transported south through own means. Germany is unable to deliver its own 
weapons as they are needed on the home front. 
The German Government wishes to maintain contact with the resistance 
movement, and it is welcome to discuss its problems.403 
                                                             
401  Radley and Radley, Twee Poorte, pp. 28-29. 
402  Van der Schyff, Die Ossewa-Brandwag en die Tweede Wêreldoorlog, p. 102. 
403  Radley and Radley, Twee Poorte, p. 109. 
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 Will Radley arrived in South Africa on 6 May 1940. With the South African Police 
(SAP) in hot pursuit, he made for Bloemfontein. Here Radley, like his wife, delivered the 
message to Van Rensburg with a request that he pass it on to Malan. Radley was, 
however, arrested and interned. In spite of this, he was released in December after 
agreeing to distance himself from any subversive activities.  
This second message thus initially failed to reach Malan. By December, Radley 
managed to personally deliver the same message to Malan, who read it but never acted 
upon it.404 As to why Malan never acted on the German offer, Radley has the final word: 
“[Dit] kon eindelose smart en bloedvergieting tot gevolg gehad het, met baie onsekere 
kanse op sukses… ek dink nie dat Dr Malan met die boodskap wat ek gebring het enige 
iets sou kon of sou wou uitrig nie.” [... It would have caused endless sorrow and bloodshed, 
with very slim chances of success… I also don’t think that Dr Malan could have or would 
have wanted to do anything with the message that I passed on to him.]”405 
 
Fig 4.1: Marietjie and Will Radley – couriers between Germany and South Africa406 
 There is some evidence suggesting that a rudimentary German espionage 
organisation existed in Cape Town, and for that matter, the whole of South Africa, 
during 1940. Hendrik Hickman, who worked at the Globe Engineering Works in Cape 
Town harbour at the time, made known that a secret organisation employed him to 
report on all shipping that passed through the port. A student from the University of 
Cape Town, one ‘Rehbein’, acted as Hickman’s handler throughout 1940. Hickman was, 
however, rather uncertain of the command structure of the organisation he worked for. 
                                                             
404  Van der Schyff, Die Ossewa-Brandwag en die Tweede Wêreldoorlog, p. 103. Incidentally, these two 
German attempts to contact Malan so early in the war evaded his most recent biographer, Lindie 
Koorts. See Koorts, DF Malan and the Rise of Afrikaner Nationalism. 
405  Radley and Radley, Twee Poorte, p. 110.  
406  NWU, RAM Div, OB Archive, Photo Collection. F00660_3 – M. Radley; NWU, RAM Div, OB Archive, 
Photo Collection. F00660_5 – W. Radley. 
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Of what he was certain, though, was that the organisation comprised of ardent Nazis 
and national socialists.  
Hickman’s employment in the port evidently aided his surveillance of Allied 
shipping. He reported his findings every night via a signal lamp from his home in 
Somerset West towards the Helderberg. His messages included the names of the 
individual Allied vessels, their departure time from the port, and in which direction they 
were travelling. Hickman reported that he had been aboard HMS Prince of Wales and 
HMS Repulse. He was furthermore convinced, rather unrealistically, that his reports on 
these vessels had led to their sinking by the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) soon 
thereafter.  
While working at the docks, Hickman also regularly helped to sabotage Allied 
vessels in the harbour through structural or mechanical damage. In 1941, however, he 
discontinued his work on the Cape Town docks, as well as ending his covert reporting 
on shipping. He did so in order to commence his studies at Stellenbosch University, 
where he became an active member of the OB. Hickman’s testimony is, withal, 
somewhat problematic. He maintained that he worked on the docks and reported on a 
large number of Allied shipping that was sunk near Cape Point. This, however, could 
only have occurred during the operations of the Eisbär Group in October 1942 (see 
Chapter 3, page 110). At that stage he was already a student at Stellenbosch 
University.407 
 German Intelligence next attempted to establish contact with the South African 
opposition through Hans Rooseboom. Rooseboom was a German-born South African 
journalist who, like the Radleys, was unable to exit Germany after the outbreak of the 
war. In September 1940, the Abwehr – German military intelligence – recruited 
Rooseboom as an agent. He was ordered to travel to South Africa and report back on the 
internal political situation in the Union. He was to maintain contact with Germany 
through a contact in the Netherlands.408 Rooseboom’s arrival in the Union did not go 
unnoticed by the British Secret Intelligence Service. The British Secret Intelligence 
Service – more commonly known as MI6 –followed his movements closely.  
The fall of the Netherlands in May 1940 severed Rooseboom’s original link with 
Germany, and he had to re-establish contact with the Abwehr through the German 
Embassy in Lourenço Marques. Shortly hereafter, the SAP arrested Rooseboom and 
imprisoned him at Leeuwkop Internment Camp. During his confinement, Rooseboom 
was able to establish contact with Germany through a smuggled-out message passed on 
to a stewardess on the Woermann Shipping Line. The message not only reported his 
capture and subsequent internment, but also communicated shipping movements and 
                                                             
407  NWU, RAM Div, OB Archive, Transkripsies/Bandopname. H.T. Hickman. 
408  Van der Schyff, Die Ossewa-Brandwag en die Tweede Wêreldoorlog, pp. 103-104. For more on 
Hans Rooseboom’s journey back to South Africa, which unfortunately contains no information 
about his contact with the Abwehr, see Rooseboom, Die Oorlog Trap My Vas. 
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the so-called unrest at Baviaanspoort.409 Two days after delivery of the message to the 
Abwehr, Radio Zeesen broadcasted the information which Rooseboom had divulged. As 
a result of this broadcast, the Transvaal leadership of the OB approached Rooseboom 
with a request to act as their official contact with Germany. Rooseboom agreed to the 
request, and the OB organised his escape, after which he went into hiding. He 
subsequently built up a rudimentary intelligence organisation, and sporadically 
transmitted messages from the OB to Germany.410 
 The first particular message which the OB transmitted to Germany through 
Rooseboom comprised seven specific questions and requests from the South Africans 
regarding Germany’s attitude to the Union. They were:  
Sal Duitsland die Unie beset as hy die oorlog wen? 
Sal Duitsland skadevergoeding van Suid-Afrika eis? 
Sal Duitsland Simonstad opeis, soos die Engelse? 
Wat is Duitsland se planne jeens Suidwes Afrika? 
Dat Smuts en sy helpers as oorlogmisdadigers verhoor sou woord. 
Dat die mishandeling van krygsgevangenes in Baviaanspoortkamp volledig 
ondersoek en die skuldiges gestraf sal word. 
Dat, wanneer ŉ nuwe regering in die Unie aangewys word, Duitsland 
voorlopig en na onderlinge oorleg goedkeuring moet verleen aan die nuwe 
Eerste Minister of President. 
Would Germany occupy South Africa if they won the war? 
Would Germany claim damages from South Africa? 
Would Germany, like Britain, take control of Simon’s Town? 
What are Germany’s plans for South West Africa? 
                                                             
409  TNA, KV 2/941, Rooseboom, Hans. 46a – Extract from CSDIC/WEA Final Report on AHLRICHS re 
ROOSEBOOM, 4 Feb 1946. The unrest at Baviaanspoort, or as some Afrikaans sources state – ‘Die 
slag van Baviaanspoort’, originated when the internees refused to surrender one of their own to 
the camp authorities. After a tense stand-off, the UDF surrounded the camp and forcefully 
removed the internee they were after. The internees severely criticized the UDF for their forceful 
approach during the debacle, though they have failed to mention that they themselves were 
armed and fought back. It was hoped that Rooseboom’s message would in some way orother 
generate support and empathy for the internees at Baviaanspoort. 
410  NWU, RAM Div, OB Archive, Transkripsies/Bandopname. Hans Rooseboom. 
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Smuts and his supporters should be tried as war criminals. 
That a full investigation must be launched into the mistreatment of internees 
at the Baviaanspoort Camp, and the guilty parties must receive the 
appropriate punishment. 
That upon the election of a new Union Government, Germany authorise the 
appointment of a new South African Prime Minister or President.411 
The German response to the foremost OB questions was as follows: 
Nee, Duitsland sal nie Suid-Afrika beset nie, maar hulle eis dat ŉ 
goedgesinde Nasionale regering aan bewind sal kom en dat daar behoorlike 
samewerking moet wees. Alleen as so ŉ Nasionale regering dit verlang, sal 
Duitsland bereid wees om troepe te stuur. 
Duitsland sal wel skadevergoeding eis, maar dan as belasting uitsluitend vir 
alle persone wat nie kan bewys dat hulle ŉ nasionale beweging in Suid-
Afrika ondersteun het nie, dat hulle teen oorlogsdeelname was. 
Nee, Duitsland is bewus daarvan dat dit vir Suid-Afrika ŉ pynlike saak is, 
dat daar ŉ vreemde moondheid op hulle grondgebied is. Hulle sal 
Simonstad ontruim en aan die SA Vloot oorlaat, maar as dit nodig sou word, 
sou hulle ŉ ooreenkoms met Suid-Afrika aangaan om een van die eilande 
voor die kus as basis uit te bou. 
Duitsland eis ŉ verklaring waarin Suid-Afrika erken dat Suidwes-Afrika 
onwettig en onder valse voorwendsels van Duitsland afgeneem is, en dat dit 
in beginsel aan Duitsland teruggegee word. Onder heersende 
omstandighede en vanweë baie Afrikaners in die gebied, sou hulle eis dat 
Duits as ŉ landstaal erken word en dat ŉ ooreenkoms aangegaan sal word 
oor watter regte Duitsland en Suid-Afrika daar sou uitoefen. 
No, Germany will not occupy South Africa, but they demand that a Nationalist 
government assume power to ensure good cooperation. Germany will only 
send troops at the request of the Nationalist government. 
Germany will claim war damages in the form of a tax, but only from people 
who cannot prove that they were part of a nationalist movement in South 
Africa or against the war in general. 
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No, Germany is aware that it is a terse point for South Africa that a foreign 
power has a foothold on its territory. It will evacuate Simon’s Town and leave 
it to the South African Navy, but if necessary, it will come to an agreement 
with South Africa to establish a base on one of the islands off the South African 
coast. 
Germany demands a statement from South Africa in which it acknowledges 
that South West Africa was illegally taken from Germany and that it should be 
returned to Germany in principle. Due to the prevailing conditions, and 
because of a significant number of Afrikaners in the territory, Germany 
demands that German be recognised as an official language. Germany also 
demands an agreement with South Africa regarding who will exercise which 
powers in the territory.412 
 
Fig 4.2: Hans Rooseboom, front row, second from right, while interned at Leeuwkop413 
 Hans Rooseboom, codename PETERS,414 became the principal link through 
which the OB maintained regular contact with Germany during the first few years of the 
war. Initially, coded messages sent to Lourenço Marques appeared as death notices in 
English newspapers – principally the Sunday Times. Once a homemade radio transmitter 
became operational, Rooseboom ceased to use the English newspapers as a means of 
covert communication. The mere turn-around time of intelligence passed between the 
Union and Lourenço Marques via the Sunday Times had proved problematic, especially 
                                                             
412  Van der Schyff, Die Ossewa-Brandwag en die Tweede Wêreldoorlog, p. 105. NWU, RAM Div, OB 
Archive, Transkripsies/Bandopname.  
413  NWU, RAM Div, OB Archive, Photo Collection. F00005_3 – H. Rooseboom. 
414  Visser, OB: Traitors or Patriots?, pp. 88-90. Visser, interestingly, fails to identify PETERS as 
Rooseboom in the book. 
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as it was outdated by the time it arrived in Berlin. Some of the information that Van 
Rensburg and the OB passed on to Rooseboom for transmission to Germany involved 
the movement of Allied shipping along the South African coast. Van der Schyff writes 
about this, but does not elaborate on the extent of this information. He merely adds that 
Van Rensburg never reported on the movement of shipping that carried South African 
soldiers.415  
The Rooseboom Organisation effectively operated between April 1941 and 
March 1942, until an apparent dispute between Rooseboom and elements within the OB 
occurred. The primary cause of this disagreement was that Rooseboom and Van 
Rensburg had a difference of opinion on the military and political character of news 
passed on to Lourenço Marques.416 The arrival of Lothar Sittig, codename FELIX, during 
1942, was the second cause underlying the Rooseboom dilemma. This was because 
Rooseboom was the preferred agent through whom the OB hoped to maintain contact 
with Germany.417  
 By the latter half of 1942, Van Rensburg had tasked one of his most trusted 
lieutenants, Heimer Anderson, to assume complete control over all OB communications 
with Germany. Anderson, along with Sittig, did not get on well with Rooseboom, and 
vehemently distrusted him.418 Due to this mistrust, Anderson advised Van Rensburg to 
sever all contact with Rooseboom. Despite several attempts by Rooseboom to contact 
the OB leadership and plead his case, the OB officially distanced themselves from him. 
The organisation even contemplated his assassination should he turn state-witness.  
Rooseboom went underground for the remainder of the war. For some time after 
September 1942, he operated a separate radio transmitter with Herbert Wild on a farm 
between Pretoria and Johannesburg, though the nature and extent of his 
communications with Germany during this period remain unclear. Rooseboom 
apparently made a deal with the Smuts Government at the end of the war not to 
prosecute him, as neither the British or South African security services arrested or 
interrogated him.419 The nature and effectiveness of the Rooseboom organisation 
                                                             
415  Van der Schyff, Die Ossewa-Brandwag en die Tweede Wêreldoorlog, p. 105. For more information 
on the homemade radio transmitter see: NWU, RAM Div, OB Archive, 
Transkripsies/Bandopname. J.H. Barnard. 
416  TNA, KV 2/941, Rooseboom, Hans. 43a – Copy of Interim Report on MASSER, mentioning 
ROOSEBOOM, 26 Oct 1945; TNA, KV 2/941, Rooseboom, Hans. 44a – Copy of Interim Report on 
Walter Paul Kraizizek, 31 Oct 1945. 
417  Visser, OB: Traitors or Patriots? p. 90. 
418  For more on Van Rensburg’s distrust of Rooseboom and their dispute see NWU, RAM Div, OB 
Archive, Transkripsies/Bandopname. J.H. McDonald; NWU, RAM Div, OB Archive, 
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SITTIG and MASSER, 27 Jul 1943; TNA, KV 2/941, Rooseboom, Hans. 13a – Extract from BIB report 
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remain questionable, particularly regarding the naval intelligence war, since MI6 only 
picked up on his activities in mid-1942.  
 The formation of the militant Stormjaers movement within the OB during 
February 1940, thanks to the untiring efforts of Abraham Spies in particular, signalled 
the beginning of organised sabotage and subversion within South Africa. Spies ordered 
each of the OB Commandos within the Transvaal and Free State to create a core section 
of Stormjaers within their ranks. The Stormjaer movement never found favour in the 
Cape Province, and a so-called ‘Wag-afdeling’ [guard section] was instead established. 
The Stormjaers and Wag-afdeling, however, never cooperated, and functioned 
completely independently of one another.420 A former policemen, George Visser, 
provided an accurate description of the aim of the movement. He said, “Just as the 
German Nazi Party had the Schutz Staffel – SS – so had the Ossewabrandwag the 
Stormjaers ready to storm forward as their militant action front when the time seemed 
ripe.”421 Van Rensburg, while acknowledging the existence of the Stormjaers, described 
them as a parallel movement: “… they were half in and half out of the O.B. Let us call it 
parallel to and connected with! They numbered some seven or eight battalions, carrying 
on a semi-independent and hardly peaceful existence.”422 Spies is more direct when he 
states, “The Stormjaers [were] actually organised to be ready to execute a coup d’état in 
the case of a German victory, or to conduct active resistance against Smuts.”423  
 The Stormjaers were undeniably involved in acts of sabotage and subversion in 
South Africa throughout the war. These actions often involved theft, occasional 
murders, the planting of bombs, the cutting of telegraph wires, and to assist with 
numerous escape and evasion attempts from internment camps.424 The Stormjaers may 
have conducted several minor acts of sabotage at South African harbours during the 
war similar to that which Hickman described. But there was at least one notable 
incident of attempted sabotage in the naval sphere that could have held serious 
repercussions for both the Allies and South Africa had it succeeded.  
By mid-1942, two members of the Stormjaers, Kokkie van Heerden and Dawid 
Scribante, travelled to Durban. Their objective was to blow up the Durban Graving Dock. 
Van Heerden and Scribante conducted active surveillance of the Durban Graving Dock, 
whereafter they started to stockpile enough dynamite and clocks to enable delayed 
detonations. At this stage, their target was the SS Île de France, a French ocean-liner, 
which was in the Durban Graving Dock for refit and repairs. The two men managed to 
get to the wire fence surrounding the Graving Dock, but then realised that the planting 
                                                             
420  Van der Schyff, Die Ossewa-Brandwag en die Tweede Wêreldoorlog, pp. 83-87. 
421  Visser, OB: Traitors or Patriots?, p. 29. 
422  Van Rensburg, Their Paths Crossed Mine, p. 184. 
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of the explosives would prove far too dangerous as the approaches were well lit. They 
did not make another attempt at blowing up the Graving Dock, and subsequently buried 
the explosives in the backyard of the house of an OB supporter in Durban. While this act 
of sabotage was unsuccessful, it proves the sheer vulnerability of the South African 
ports during the war – where OB and Stormjaer men, often working for the Union 
Government, could pass in and out of sensitive areas of key national importance with 
the explicit intention of committing acts of sabotage. 425 
4.2 The Trompke Network, the FELIX Organisation and maritime intelligence 
The final, and most enduring contact between the OB and Germany was through a 
German citizen with the name of Lothar Sittig. Sittig arrived in South Africa well before 
the war and worked mainly in the agriculture sector in the Cape Province. The Union 
Government detained him at the Leeuwkop Internment Camp at the outbreak of war. In 
1941, however, he escaped with fellow compatriot Nils Pasche.426 After their arrival in 
Lourenço Marques in June, Sittig made contact with the German Embassy, and came 
under the influence of the Consul-General Paul Trompke and a Consul on his staff, 
Luitpold Werz. Werz was in the service of the German Foreign Office, but primarily ran 
the German espionage ring in southern Africa during the war.427  
According to Van der Schyff, the German government was perturbed about the 
political situation in South Africa, mainly since there was little to no coordination 
between or action by the anti-war movements. Moreover, previous attempts at 
establishing a viable link with Afrikaner resistance movements through the Radleys and 
Rooseboom had proved unsuccessful. Similarly ineffectual were the endeavours made 
by the German Government through Robey Leibbrandt, who was infiltrated into South 
Africa during Operation Weissdorn. Leibbrandt in fact only created more problems for 
the OB, and the National Socialist Rebels – a group that he had formed – played no role 
in gathering or transmitting naval intelligence.428  
It was the arrival of Olaf Andresen in Lourenço Marques in 1941, that did, 
however, signal the beginning of a change in the relations between the OB and Germany 
– particularly in the sphere of espionage. The OB had sent Andresen to Lourenço 
Marques. Andresen was explicitly despatched to deliver a secret report to Trompke, 
detailing the existence of the militant Stormjaers organisation within the OB. The 
Stormjaers, according to this report, were capable of conducting various forms of 
sabotage, and regularly held secret military training exercises. The report further spoke 
                                                             
425  NWU, RAM Div, OB Archive, Transkripsies/Bandopname. D.J.F. Scirbante. 
426  NWU, RAM Div, OB Archive, Transkripsies/Bandopname. L. Sittig. 
427  TNA, KV 2/202, Elferink, Lambertus. 152a – Interim Report on WERZ, Luitpold, 31 Oct 1945; 
Fokkens, ‘Afrikaner Unrest within South Africa during the Second World War’, p. 140. 
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of armed rebellion, underground resistance, and a possible coup d’état. It concluded 
that Van Rensburg – the new leader of the OB – knew about, and was actively involved 
in, the organisation.429 
 
Fig 4.3: Lothar Sittig, the infamous FELIX, photographed after the war430 
 Andresen’s report signalled a drastic change in the way in which Germany 
viewed the OB. Germany considered the OB to have transformed from a cultural to a 
more militant organisation. According to Sittig, this communiqué prompted Werz to 
communicate with Van Rensburg directly. Werz subsequently sent Sittig to South Africa 
to establish contact with the leader of the OB. His assignment was comprised of four key 
aspects. He had to deliver a personal message from the German government to Van 
Rensburg and establish direct radio contact with Germany. He was also expected to 
maintain the secret code for, and act as the principal contact with, Van Rensburg, and 
report on all political and military matters within South Africa.431  
In January 1942, Sittig crossed the Mozambican border at Komatipoort, but the 
SAP arrested him once on South African soil. According to Sittig, an unknown source 
leaked the complete details of his intended border crossing, leading to his subsequent 
arrest. He remained at the Baviaanspoort Internment Camp until his escape at the 
beginning of April,432 after which he delivered the intended message to Van Rensburg. 
                                                             
429  NWU, RAM Div, OB Archive, Transkripsies/Bandopname. L. Sittig; NWU, RAM Div, OB Archive, L. 
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The notice read: “The German Government wishes to once more try and establish direct, 
and reliable, contact between Germany and the Ossewabrandwag, especially with the 
view of supplying weapons.”433 
 Sittig reported the successful delivery of the message to Van Rensburg with three 
successive advertisements appearing in the South African newspaper, The Star. It was 
Pasche, another escaped German internee working at the German Consulate in 
Lourenço Marques, who picked up the three coded advertisements. Pasche, generally 
considered a close associate of Sittig, detected a message that read, “Judy, dachshund, 
lost Commissioner Street Johannesburg, reward will be paid. Phone…” He then informed 
Werz of Sittig’s success.434  
The OB, with the help of Reijer Groeneveld, soon manufactured its own radio 
transmitter, and used it to establish direct contact with Germany in July 1942. Van 
Rensburg maintained exclusive, personal control over the radio contact with Germany, 
despite several attempts by factions within the OB to gain insights and control over this 
communication channel.435 Sittig subsequently transmitted Van Rensburg’s reply to 
Werz, who passed it on to Berlin. The message stated “Van Rensburg asks for 
intensification of German propaganda for Ossewabrandwag. Stormjaers very active but 
decisive action impossible without German assistance. Suggestion that coastal town be 
bombarded [personal suggestion by Sittig].”436 
 Initially, there were only one-way transmissions between Sittig and Germany. 
Berlin was, however, concerned about the code and wavelengths that Sittig used in his 
transmissions to Berlin. This was because they were the same as those used by 
Rooseboom, and which were considered compromised. After the split occurred with 
Rooseboom, Sittig requested a new secret code for wireless transmissions to Germany. 
Pasche personally delivered this new code to Sittig after Werz instructed him to journey 
to the Union and assist in the transmission of political and military intelligence. The 
German Foreign Office once more changed the code, with the new code largely based on 
Morse code with further derivations in the figure groups. Another German agent, 
Lambertus Elferink, codename HAMLET, delivered the new code to Van Rensburg. Sittig 
soon began to use it to transmit to Germany. By August 1943, radio contact between 
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Sittig and Germany became more regular, and two-way transmissions occurred two to 
three times per week.437  
There are indications that Hans Masser, another escaped German internee, 
wished to establish a second radio transmitter for sending political and military 
intelligence to Germany. He would do so through Rooseboom’s connection Wild, 
thereby circumventing the OB and Sittig network completely. Werz, however, did not 
receive these proposals with enthusiasm, and the scheme never materialised.438 Sittig 
was convinced that the Allied intelligence services never broke the codes which he and 
Pasche used throughout the war. The available evidence, however, suggests the 
contrary, since the Allied intelligence services were well aware of Sittig’s existence and 
transmissions from 1942. The National Archives of the United Kingdom (UK) preserves 
a number of the decrypted copies of these wireless transmissions, which further 
reinforces this standpoint.439 
 
Fig 4.4: The radio transmitter built by Reijer Groenewald and operated by FELIX440 
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 From the outset, the German Foreign Office requested all possible information on 
shipping movements in southern Africa. The particular data required included the 
number of ships coming into port, their names whenever possible, their cargo, tonnage, 
destination and any other information considered of interest.441 While the reporting of 
such information from Lourenço Marques was rather straightforward, Sittig had a more 
difficult time gathering the required information from the South African ports. One 
particular challenge was that the location from which he regularly transmitted – close to 
Vryburg in the former Western Transvaal – was quite a distance from the coast. Sittig 
could thus not conduct personal surveillance of the ports. Instead, he had to rely on 
second-hand information gathered by OB sympathisers who worked at the South 
African ports.  
The interrogation of Walter Kraizizek, a known German agent, provide some 
insight into how Sittig obtained much of his naval intelligence. He states that Van 
Rensburg informed him that Sittig depended on Department of Railways and Harbours 
(SAR&H) employees who were OB members. These members were strategically 
positioned at the Durban and Cape Town Harbours to regularly report on shipping 
movements. Once Van Rensburg received the relevant shipping information, which was 
sent north via rail once per week, he passed it on to Sittig for transmission to 
Germany.442 By the time the information had reached Germany too much time had 
passed, so the reports had little to no operational value. This is an assessment shared by 
some contemporary historians.443 Moreover, when considering that viable two-way 
transmissions between Sittig and Berlin only commenced in July 1943, the operational 
value of the shipping information he passed on is questionable. From August 1943, the 
Seekriegsleitung (SKL) and Befehlshaber der U-Boote (BdU) also ceased to regard South 
African waters as a viable operational area, particularly since it lacked sufficient sinking 
potential.444 
 By November 1943, Berlin instructed Sittig to exclusively report on political 
matters within the Union, as they were concerned that his lengthy transmission might 
lead to his discovery. FELIX, however, chose to ignore Berlin’s orders somewhat, and 
continued to transmit military information to Germany. These reports rarely contained 
matters of naval intelligence. Instead, they imparted information on the movement of 
South African troops and armament production in the Union. In one particular instance, 
they relayed particulars about the monthly consumption of potatoes in 48 South African 
military camps. In return, Germany regularly transmitted sabotage instructions to Sittig. 
Throughout the first half of 1944, it continued to emphasise the importance of closer 
collaboration between Sittig and Van Rensburg. The intelligence passed through to 
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Berlin by Sittig continued to prove irrelevant until such time that regular transmissions 
ceased by the middle of 1944. Its insignificance was predominantly a result of the fact 
that the tide of the war in the Southern Oceans had drastically turned some months 
before.445  
 In mid-1942 Sittig made a proposal to Berlin. He suggested that he could 
transmit shipping intelligence obtained from Cape Town and Durban directly to U-boats 
operational in the Southern Oceans. Berlin was slow to respond, and by January 1943, 
Sittig once more pointed out the Achilles heel of these naval operations. He stated that 
the weak point remained the tenuous link between the source of the intelligence, the 
wireless station and the operational U-boats – hence his suggestion to transmit shipping 
intelligence directly to the U-boats. By February, Berlin had confirmed that Sittig would 
receive a special code in a short time, but by April the scheme was turned down after 
careful examination proved it impractical.446  
Hugh Trevor-Roper was an officer who worked at the Radio Security Service 
(RSS) of the SIS during the war. According to the British historian Edward Harrison, 
Roper concluded that the naval intelligence supplied by the German espionage 
networks in southern Africa was not valuable enough to assist the U-boats operating in 
South African waters.447 Moreover, Sittig’s proposal seems impractical, particularly 
since the BdU, and Dönitz in particular, maintained daily contact with the operational U-
boats, and passed on the relevant intelligence reports from the B-Dienst when 
applicable.448 
 Between 1942 and 1943, Sittig made several appeals to Berlin for the 
transference – by U-boat – of weapons for sabotage, several wireless sets and spare 
parts, a qualified wireless technician, as well as a large sum of money for sustenance 
purposes. After delivery, the U-boat would return to Germany with a consignment of 
diamonds and a representative from the OB to cooperate with the authorities in Berlin, 
especially with regard to broadcasting propaganda back to the Union. Heimer Anderson 
was initially earmarked to travel to Germany as the OB representative, largely due to his 
close personal relationship with Van Rensburg and his involvement in the Sittig 
transmissions. By September 1943, Sittig had suggested a number of possible points 
along the South African coastline where the transfer could take place. He somewhat 
optimistically informed Berlin that the area between Mossel Bay and George was 
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Kriegsmarine, Signals Intelligence and the Development of the B-Dienst’, pp. 521-546. 
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particularly well suited as most of the local inhabitants were OB supporters.449 Sittig 
eventually convinced Berlin that the best location for the landing by a German 
submarine would be at Cape St Francis. This area is situated near Port Elizabeth, at a 
spot close to the mouth of the Seekoei River. Despite lengthy transmissions regarding 
the above, nothing ever came of the scheme, and by the end of 1943, Berlin ceased to 
regard it as a viable operation.450 
 
Fig 4.5: The secret rendezvous location near Cape St Francis451 
 Sittig, however, remained somewhat sceptical of the real value of his 
transmissions to Germany. He was confident that Radio Zeesen utilised the political 
matters he reported on for propaganda purposes. But he was less confident of the value 
of the military matters he reported on. This was particularly the case since he was 
convinced that Adm Wilhelm Canaris buried the Abwehr intelligence reports emanating 
from southern Africa to such an extent that the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht came to 
distrust the source of intelligence. He did, however, maintain that the value of the 
military intelligence passed on to Germany by the OB was high. According to Sittig, 
several members of both the Stormjaers and the OB served in the Union Defence Force 
(UDF) and SAP and instinctively passed on valuable military intelligence for 
transmission to Germany.452 Van Rensburg, however, prevented the transmission of 
military intelligence that would directly endanger South African lives, despite several 
objections to the contrary from within the OB and from Germany. This very matter 
formed the basis of the disagreement between Van Rensburg and Rooseboom 
mentioned previously – and the eventual disillusionment of Pasche. According to Sittig, 
certain OB members continued to hope for direct German military intervention in South 
                                                             
449  TNA, KV 2/939, Lothar SITTIG/Nils PAASCHE. 79a – Copy of First Report on German Espionage in 
the Union of South Africa, 25 Sept 1943. For more on the apparent contact between South Africans 
and U-boats during the war see the highly dubious Mahncke, U-Boats & Spies in Southern Africa. 
450  TNA, KV 2/939, Lothar SITTIG/Nils PAASCHE. 194a – Extracts from Third Report German 
Espionage in the Union of South Africa, 25 May 1944. 
451  Author’s personal photo collection. 
452  Also see Shear, ‘Colonel Coetzee's War’, pp. 222-248. 
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Africa. Germany, however, never contemplated this, and Van der Schyff maintains that 
Van Rensburg would have militantly opposed any such attempt.453  
 It is incorrectly stated by Van der Schyff that the final contact between the OB 
and Germany occurred in January 1944 when Groeneveld received a last non-encoded 
message from Germany. It was only by mid-1944 that Groeneveld received the final 
message from Berlin, though by this stage of the war the value of Sittig and his political 
reports had diminished to such an extent that it was of no real use to Germany.454 A 
British Security Service (MI5) officer working on the Sittig case perhaps has the final 
word on the operational effectiveness of his intelligence reports during the war. He 
states that: 
The most surprising fact with regard to the whole organisation is that … 
Sittig and his agents have produced little information of real value. It is 
almost inconceivable to believe that anywhere else in the world, German 
agents as well-placed as Sittig and his associates, in close contact with an 
opposition leader of high standing, would not produce information which 
would be of vital interest to the Abwehr. Sittig has produced occasional 
inaccurate shipping information and political gossip which could be culled 
from the columns of any South African newspaper.455 
4.3 South Africa, British naval intelligence, and the counterintelligence war 
Before the outbreak of the war, the British Naval Intelligence organisation in South 
Africa consisted of a Staff Officer Intelligence (SO (I)), with a small staff, which operated 
from the Castle in Cape Town. In February 1939, Maj Charles Ransome RM assumed the 
position of SO (I) Cape Town. He became responsible for political intelligence, industrial 
intelligence, and port intelligence. These were acquired by keeping close contact with 
the UK High Commissioner and the British Trade Commissioner in South Africa, as well 
as the Intelligence Officers of the Royal Navy (RN) Africa Station based in Simon’s Town. 
Furthermore, the secretary of the SO (I) Cape Town kept a complete record of all naval 
and merchant shipping movements in South African waters. With the help of his staff, 
Ransome ensured the extraction of supplemental naval information from the South 
African press, the Lloyd’s Shipping Index, local shipping agents, and from the monthly 
reports submitted by the Reporting Officers within the Cape Intelligence Area (see Map 
4.1 and Fig 4.6).456  
                                                             
453  Van der Schyff, Die Ossewa-Brandwag en die Tweede Wêreldoorlog, pp. 110-114. 
454  Van der Schyff, Die Ossewa-Brandwag en die Tweede Wêreldoorlog, p. 114. 
455  TNA, KV3/10. German Espionage in South Africa, 1939-1945. German intelligence activities in 
South Africa during the Second World War. 
456  TNA, ADM 1/27176. Naval Intelligence Organisation South Africa. Cape Town Intelligence Centre – 
Report of Working, 1933. 
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By 1938, and owing to the impending global war, the CNIC started plotting the 
movement of all German, Japanese and Italian merchant vessels in the Southern Oceans, 
as well as all potential armed merchant cruisers and commerce raiders. The SO (I) Cape 
Town subsequently reported the movement of each foreign warship to the Admiralty, 
and when such a vessel left the region, it was reported to the SO (I) into whose area it 
moved. The SO (I) Cape Town collected all of these reports and then drafted a daily 
intelligence summary which was forwarded to the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) Africa 
Station for transmission to RN vessels within its area of command. At the time of the 
Munich Crisis, the C-in-C Africa Station identified six retired RN Officers for service on 
the staff of the SO(I) Cape Town. After an initial call-up in 1938, Ransome’s staff had 
been placed on a complete war footing by 30 August 1939. It comprised of additional 
sections, principally concerned with Tracking, Operational Intelligence, Security, Naval 
Press Relations and Censorship.457 To gain a complete understanding of the functioning 
of the CNIC during the war, each of the above sections will be discussed separately. 
 
Fig 4.6: Pre-war organisation of the Cape Intelligence Area Reporting Officers458 
                                                             
457  TNA, ADM 1/31006. History and Organisation of the Naval Intelligence Centre Cape Town. 
General Organisation and Expansion from Peace to War Footing. 
458  TNA, ADM 1/31006. History and Organisation of the Naval Intelligence Centre Cape Town. 
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Map 4.1: The Cape Intelligence Area, 1939-1942 
4.3.1 The Tracking Section 
 The establishment of a separate Tracking Section in September 1939 allowed for 
the centralised control over all shipping movements. The Tracking Section maintained a 
Merchant Shipping Plot, which included up to date data on the last known positions of 
all merchant vessels in the Cape Intelligence Area. Moreover, the introduction of the 
VESCA459 system allowed for the regular updating of the Merchant Shipping Plot. 
Ransome received all ‘IN’ VESCA messages from the designated Reporting Officers 
within the Cape Intelligence Area, in addition to those from adjacent areas where 
shipping was known to head for South African waters. The Admiralty, as well as the 
authorities at the various ports of destination, received all ‘OUT’ VESCA messages from 
Ransome in Cape Town. Ransome was also responsible for transmitting all VESCAs from 
Lourenço Marques and Beira onwards due to the high cable charges in Portuguese East 
Africa. Because of the sudden increase in its organisation and operational 
responsibilities (see Fig 4.7), the CNIC relocated to a new building in Dock Road, near 
the main entrance to the Cape Town harbour. The new property, known as Seaward 
House, was also the headquarters of the Seaward Defence Force (SDF). Between 
November 1939 and October 1940, there were several increases in the staff of the CNIC 
due to the continuous increment of cypher work.460 
                                                             
459  After the outbreak of the war in Europe the British Admiralty adopted the Lloyds reporting 
system, and hence modified it to meet wartime needs and augment it by including reports from 
routing officers, intelligence centers and additional reporting officers to permit a reasonably 
accurate plot of all merchant shipping world-wide. This system was called the "VESCA" (Vessel 
and Cargo) system. See US Navy Department, History of Convoy and Routing, p. 63. 
460  TNA, ADM 1/31006. History and Organisation of the Naval Intelligence Centre Cape Town. 
Tracking Section. 
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Fig 4.7: Organisation of the Cape Naval Intelligence Centre, 1940-1942461 
 Towards the end of 1940, Ransome established a Central Communications Office 
under his direct control at the CNIC. The Central Communications Office assumed 
responsibility for the receipt, dispatch and distribution of all signals. These signals were 
addressed to the SO (I) Cape Town, Naval Liaison Officer, Naval Control Service Officer, 
the Sea Transport Officer at Cape Town, as well as the Director of the SDF and the RN 
Authorities in Cape Town and Simon’s Town respectively. Additionally, Ransome’s 
Cypher Staff handled all Admiralty general messages, East Indies Station messages, “Q” 
messages462, VESCA signals, routeing instructions, disposition signals, enemy reports, all 
high-grade cyphers and all other coded messages. The Central Communications Office 
was also responsible for relaying these messages to all other concerned parties within 
the sphere of the CNIC. As he was based in Cape Town, Ransome personally controlled 
all VESCA messages originating from Cape Town, and by 1940 introduced a message 
system known as VELOX. This messaging system allowed for confidential shipping 
                                                             
461  TNA, ADM 1/31006. History and Organisation of the Naval Intelligence Centre Cape Town. 
Appendix III. 
462  The “Q” code is a standardised collection of three-letter codes, all of which start with the letter 
"Q". It is an operating signal initially developed for commercial radiotelegraph communication on 
the Morse code. Codes in the range QOA–QQZ and QRA–QUZ are reserved for maritime use as 
well as all services. During the Second World War, German radio teleprinter networks were 
utilized to establish and maintain circuit connections. Also see Khan, ‘Codebreaking in World 
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information to pass between ports and Reporting Officers in the Cape Intelligence Area 
(see Fig 4.9). The VELOX telegrams were essentially a coded and re-coded message. It 
was comprised of the VELOX in plain language; the ship’s signal letter along with a 
dummy letter; the estimated time of arrival, and the time of origin and date in plain 
language.463 
 The Central Communications Office, furthermore, oversaw the distribution of 
shipping information to all Allied vessels in South African harbours as well as those at 
sea. All Allied merchant shipping within South African harbours received a briefing on 
relevant shipping information just before their departure. As a result, the Merchant 
Shipping Plot in each vessel was a direct replica of that kept in Ransome’s office. 
Ransome supplied this information in the form of Cape Area Intelligence Notes and 
other Intelligence Summaries. These incorporated detailed information on all merchant 
ships in South African harbours including Lourenço Marques and Beira and all ships 
travelling between South African ports. Further details encompassed vessels due to 
arrive at South African ports from adjoining intelligence areas; lists of ships sailing from 
South African ports after each Allied vessel departed, and ships approaching the Cape 
Intelligence Area from adjacent areas that the Allied vessels may encounter.  
A further system of Daily Encounter signals sent from Simon’s Town ensured 
that all Allied vessels at sea could maintain accurate and up to date shipping plots. 
These messages, derived according to a system of squares, proved unsatisfactory, and 
by 1941 a new method of passing information to Allied vessels at sea had come into 
effect. This system embodied a series of signals for shipping travelling from South 
African ports, known as AS and ES messages for the South Atlantic Station, FS messages 
for the Freetown area, and MS messages for the East Indies. The AS signals reported on 
all northbound shipping in the Atlantic Ocean, while the ES signals reported on all 
eastbound shipping in the Indian Ocean. The AS and ES signals remained in use until 
August 1942. After this, the SO Mercantile Movements at Combined Headquarters 
assumed the responsibility for tracking duties as well as reporting all known shipping 
movements to Allied vessels for the remainder of the war.464 
 In March 1942, the headquarters of the C-in-C South Atlantic were relocated to 
Simon’s Town. This transfer severely altered the operational boundaries of the Cape 
Intelligence Area (see Map 4.2). The Eastern Boundary hence extended from the South 
Pole up to 35°E meridian to the coast of Africa, and from these along the coast to the 
northern border of Portuguese East Africa. The Western Boundary extended from the 
South Pole up to the meridians of 26°W and 40°S, and from there along the parallel 10°S 
to the coast of Africa near the mouth of the Congo River. Though the land boundary in 
                                                             
463  TNA, ADM 1/31006. History and Organisation of the Naval Intelligence Centre Cape Town. 
Tracking Section. 
464  TNA, ADM 1/31006. History and Organisation of the Naval Intelligence Centre Cape Town. 
Tracking Section. 
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the north remained undefined, Angola and Portuguese East Africa were considered to 
form the natural northern boundary.  
A Combined Headquarters was established in Cape Town during the month of 
August 1942 in the Old University buildings in Cape Town. The CNIC also moved from 
Seaward House to the Combined Headquarters. The Tracking Section was subsequently 
removed from Ransome. He was thus no longer responsible for collating information 
regarding the movement of shipping. The Mercantile Movements Section at Combined 
Headquarters, under the control of an SO from the South Atlantic Station, assumed 
responsibility for this task. This led to a marked reduction in the staff of the CNIC in 
1942 and 1943.465 
 
Map 4.2: The Cape Intelligence Area, 1942-1945 
 The arrival of Lt Cdr J.S. Bennet in Simon’s Town in March 1940 marked the 
beginning of the RN “Y” Organisation in South Africa during the war. The “Y” 
Organisations in general formed the foundation of all British wartime Signals 
Intelligence (SIGINT) work. Their explicit focus was on the interception and deciphering 
of Axis wireless communications.466 Bennet was appointed as the SO (Y) on the staff of 
the C-in-C South Atlantic.467 He and his staff immediately established a continuous 
watch over each wireless transmission passing through the “Y” Station in Simon’s Town. 
They also copied all similar traffic originating from the known South African “Y” Station 
located at Robert’s Heights in Pretoria. The “Y” Station in Pretoria fell under the direct 
control of Major J. Kreft, the then Deputy Director of Military Intelligence in South 
                                                             
465  TNA, ADM 1/31006. History and Organisation of the Naval Intelligence Centre Cape Town. 
General Organisation and Expansion from Peace to War Footing. 
466  Also see Harrison, ‘British Radio Security and Intelligence, 1939-43’, pp. 53-93; Rohwer, ‘Signal 
Intelligence and World War II’, pp. 939-951. 
467  N.A. Stott, ‘South Africa's secret war’ (http://www.samilitaryhistory.org/vol111ns.html). 
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Africa.468 After reaching an agreement with the South African Post Office (SAPO), Bennet 
agreed to the creation of a High-Frequency/Direction Finding (HF/DF)469 station near 
Milnerton in Cape Town. This station became effective on 19 April, and fell under the 
control of the SAPO. Thereafter a second HF/DF station, along with a “Y” Station, was 
established in Durban at the end of April. By June 1941, a third HF/DF station had come 
into operation at Bulawayo in Southern Rhodesia. Shortly hereafter Brig H.J. Lenton, the 
Union Postmaster-General, approved the transfer of the Milnerton HF/DF Station to 
Bennet and his “Y” Organisation.  
Saboteurs regularly interfered with communications between these stations by 
simply cutting the trunk lines which connected them to one another. The result was that 
on several occasions all of the HF/DF Stations in the Union were completely isolated 
from one another for lengthy periods of time. These interruptions adversely affected all 
interception work. After wireless sets were installed at the HF/DF stations at Simon’s 
Town, Durban and Bulawayo, the situation improved somewhat. In the event of further 
sabotage, a simple slide-rule code, established by Bennet, allowed these stations to 
communicate intercepted bearings and instructions rapidly to Simon’s Town.470 
 Following the commencement of the Japanese submarine operations in the 
Mozambique Channel in June 1942, the “Y” Organisation in South Africa was able to help 
intercept wireless transmissions from IJN vessels. This occurred despite the fact that 
none of the operators in the Union were being trained in reading Japanese naval codes. 
After the “Y” operators studied the code, they were able to identify and cover all 
Japanese transmissions and pass it on to the Government Code and Cypher School 
(GC&CS) at Bletchley Park for further deciphering. The signals intercepted by the HF/DF 
stations in the Union (see Map 4.3), could then be used to pinpoint the exact location of 
the Japanese wireless transmissions. As a result, a constant track of the IJN vessels 
operational in the Mozambique Channel during 1942 could be maintained. The 
operators were able to achieve this without relinquishing their normal watch on the 
German naval frequencies during this period.471  
In May, the Admiralty made a further request. The “Y” Organisations under the 
overall control of the South African Director of Military Intelligence, Col Ernst 
                                                             
468  TNA, WO 208/5111. South Africa General. Telegram from C-in-Ci Middle East to War Office, 7 Mar 
1942. 
469  HF/DF is a type of radio direction finder used during the war. HF/DF was primarily employed to 
catch enemy radios while they transmitted over HF and great distances. Once several bearings 
were obtained from a number of HF/DF stations, these were laid out on specially prepared charts 
and intersection lines drawn to indicate the approximate position of the wireless transmission. 
See Scott, ‘South Africa's secret war’ (http://www.samilitaryhistory.org/vol111ns.html). 
470  TNA, ADM 1/26888. “Y” Organisation in South Africa. Report by Staff Officer (Y) on “Y” 
Organisation, 24 Jun 1943. 
471  TNA, WO 208/5156. “Y” Committee South Africa. Memo from Chairman ‘Y’ Board on ‘Y’ Services in 
South Africa, 3 Oct 1942. 
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Malherbe,472 should copy all wireless traffic between Lisbon and Lourenço Marques. 
The same should be done with Vichy French traffic from Madagascar. The information 
would then be forwarded to the Admiralty at Whitehall. This process was achieved 
through forwarding a copy of the intercepted messages and bearings to Bennet in 
Simon’s Town from Pretoria by surface mail, as no high-speed receiving gear was 
available there.473  
Following the instalment of a recording apparatus at the Simon’s Town “Y” 
Station, the situation somewhat improved. Poor reception and limited staff, however, 
affected the amount of traffic handled. The arrival of an assistant SO (Y) by the end of 
1941, along with a number of trained RN telegraphists, allowed Bennet to cover his 
increasing commitments to a larger degree. By June, a further HF/DF station – built and 
manned by the SAPO – had become operational in Port Elizabeth.474 
 By the end of April 1942, Lenton had appealed to the C-in-C South Atlantic to 
allow Bennet to inspect his “Y” Organisation, and draw up a report with suggestions for 
improvements in its operations. The Postmaster-General’s “Y” Organisation comprised 
of a control station at Sunningdale near Johannesburg, and two HF/DF stations located 
at Bloemfontein and Komatipoort. A number of mobile direction finding units also 
supplemented the work of these stations. The principal aim of Lenton’s “Y” Organisation 
was to intercept all illegal transmissions within the Union, and to assist in general 
internal security work.475 During Bennet’s inspection, he established that these stations 
had little to no operational success. This was mainly due to a lack of organised search 
and coordination efforts, as knowledge regarding the highly specialised nature of work 
was also wanting.476 Lenton therefore suggested that his “Y” Organisation revert to 
being under the control of Bennet in Simon’s Town.477  
 An immediate advantage of this new arrangement was that all HF/DF stations in 
the Union were now concerned with naval interception duties. At the same time, the 
former SAPO stations could focus purely on commercial interception work when 
necessitated by the Admiralty.478 Moreover, the staff of the SO (Y) Organisation could 
                                                             
472  For more on the wartime organisation and functioning of the office of the DMI see Malherbe, 
Never a Dull Moment; Van Deventer, ‘Die Ontwikkeling van 'n Militêre Inligtingsvermoë’, pp. 86-
103.  
473  TNA, ADM 1/26888. “Y” Organisation in South Africa. Memo on Y and RSS in South Africa, 16 Mar 
1942. 
474  TNA, ADM 1/26888. “Y” Organisation in South Africa. Report by Staff Officer (Y) on “Y” 
Organisation, 24 Jun 1943. 
475  TNA, ADM 1/26888. “Y” Organisation in South Africa. Memo on Y and RSS in South Africa, 16 Mar 
1942. 
476  TNA, ADM 1/26888. “Y” Organisation in South Africa. Report by Staff Officer (Y) on “Y” 
Organisation, 24 Jun 1943. 
477  TNA, WO 208/5156. “Y” Committee South Africa. Minute to DMI, 19 Aug 1942; TNA, WO 
208/5156. “Y” Committee South Africa. Minute from Y Board with enclosed paper on formation of 
Y Committee in South Africa, 13 Aug 1942.  
478  TNA, WO 208/5111. South Africa General. South Atlantic ‘Y’ Organisation, 12 Dec 1942. 
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now concentrate exclusively on naval “Y” work. The reorganisation took place as 
follows:  
 The control station at Sunningdale closed down, and all equipment and 
operators moved to Durbanville, near Cape Town, where a new control station 
was established. This relocation allowed for more effective management of the 
control station by the SO (Y) and his staff. 
 The HF/DF station at Bloemfontein was subsequently connected to the SO “Y” 
Organisation in Simon’s Town by a trunk line. This allowed for centralised 
control over its functioning. 
 A system of indexing cards, documenting all unknown call-signs and other useful 
information, was instituted at the Central Post Office in Cape Town. All logs and 
other matter were forwarded to the SO (Y).479 
 It is of particular interest to note that the Admiralty maintained complete control 
over the “Y” Organisation in South Africa throughout the war, mainly due to security 
reasons and distrust of certain elements within the UDF. From the outbreak of the war, 
Bennet and his staff proved wary of Malherbe’s “Y” Organisation. The principal reason 
for their suspicion was the fact that the messages that passed through his station at 
Roberts Heights, were prone to compromise owing to the existence of known 
subversive elements within the UDF.480 Moreover, the existence of two largely similar 
“Y” Organisations within South Africa, one controlled by the Deputy Director of Military 
Intelligence in Pretoria and the other by the SO (Y) in Simon’s Town, proved 
unacceptable, especially from an operational approach. The Admiralty was especially 
opposed to this state of affairs, particularly due to the duplication of work and constant 
concerns over security. Consequently, these two organisations never merged during the 
war, largely due to the continued operational distrust shown by the Admiralty towards 
the UDF.481 
 By August 1942, the “Y” Organisation had undergone further restructuring due 
to the opening of the Combined Headquarters in Cape Town (see Fig 4.8). The SO (Y) 
and his staff relocated to the Combined Headquarters. Lenton authorised the instalment 
of a number of private wires that connected the Cable and Wireless Office, the 
Durbanville Control Station, the Central Communications Office, the various Operations 
Rooms at Combined Headquarters, and the private residence of the SO (Y) with one 
another. In this way, greater cooperation was ensured. Moreover, the “Y” Station at 
Simon’s Town served as the control station for the entire “Y” Organisation in South 
                                                             
479  TNA, WO 208/5111. South Africa General. South Atlantic ‘Y’ Organisation, 12 Dec 1942. 
480  Also see Shear, ‘Colonel Coetzee's War’, pp. 222-248; Van der Waag, A Military History of Modern 
South Africa, p. 180; Fedorowich, ‘German Espionage and British Counter-Intelligence in South 
Africa’, p. 229. 
481  TNA, WO 208/5156. “Y” Committee South Africa. Draft telegram to Chairman ‘YI’ Board from 
Chairman ‘Y’ Board, 3 Oct 1942; TNA, WO 208/5156. “Y” Committee South Africa. Minute from Y 
Board with enclosed paper on formation of Y Committee in South Africa, 13 Aug 1942; TNA, WO 
208/5156. “Y” Committee South Africa. Letter from ME to MI8, 13 May 1942. 
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Africa, with all trunk lines from the HF/DF stations from across the Union terminating 
there. This office was also equipped with receivers and a wireless transmitter for 
uninterrupted communication should the trunk lines fail. The office operated around 
the clock, with all plotting and other “Y” intelligence disseminated from there onwards 
for operational purposes. 
 
Fig 4.8: The SO “Y” Organisation in South Africa during the war482 
During the latter half of 1942, there was a notable growth in the importance of 
the SO “Y” Organisation in the Union. Its increased significance was a direct 
consequence of the intensified German U-boat campaign in South African waters. The 
various HF/DF stations successfully plotted the locations and movements of the German 
U-boats while they were operating off the South African coast. Following an official visit 
from Capt H.R. Sandwith RN to the Union in November, and upon his recommendation, 
the Admiralty expressed their intention of installing new measuring equipment and 
building of an entirely new HF/DF Station at Durbanville.483 
                                                             
482  TNA, WO 208/5111. South Africa General. South Atlantic ‘Y’ Organisation, 12 Dec 1942; TNA, WO 
208/5156. “Y” Committee South Africa. Memo from Chairman ‘Y’ Board on ‘Y’ Services in South 
Africa, 3 Oct 1942. 
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Map 4.3: The local “Y” Organisation and principal HF/DF stations in southern Africa, 
along with the general centre of illegal transmissions in the Union 
 The new HF/DF Station at Durbanville opened in March 1943. It proved 
immensely successful in connection with receiving and intercepting wireless 
communication, and ensuring improved coordination. The Durbanville “Y” Station 
especially maintained a continuous watch over all German, Italian, Japanese, French and 
Portuguese naval frequencies of vessels operational in Southern Oceans. It directed the 
control station at Durbanville to the frequencies on which such transmissions were 
heard. This station also recorded all high-speed commercial traffic from Lisbon to 
Lourenço Marques, as well as traffic intercepted from Rome.484 Intercepted traffic of 
this nature was then cabled to the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) at Whitehall and 
the GC&CS at Bletchley Park for information and operational purposes. The station also 
maintained constant monitoring over Union transmissions for internal security reasons.  
During this period, an enhanced alarm flash circuit was installed at all HF/DF 
stations, which allowed the control station at Cape Town to communicate with its six 
substations within ten to fifteen seconds after the fixing of an illicit wireless 
transmission. As a result, Bennet and his staff were able to obtain accurate bearings of 
                                                             
484  TNA, KV3/10. German Espionage in South Africa, 1939-1945. German intelligence activities in 
South Africa during the Second World War. 
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all Axis naval vessels operating along the South African coast, which greatly assisted in 
the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) measures and operations in these waters.485 
 In August 1943, Bennet’s “Y” Organisation proved instrumental in obtaining a 
rudimentary plot of the wireless set operated by Sittig. By intersecting the bearings 
taken by several HF/DF stations in the Union, the plot indicated that Sittig transmitted 
from a position close to the border with the then Bechuanaland. In order to gain an 
accurate plot of the Sittig wireless set, a number of mobile DF units searched the area 
for nine days without locating the transmitter. Their inability to do so was largely due to 
several technical difficulties encountered with the harsh terrain. The fact that the 
Vryburg area was known to be a hotbed of OB support was equally problematic.  
During this period, Bennet’s “Y” Organisation also picked up on the proposed 
rendezvous between Sittig and a U-Boat near Cape St Francis. By November, Smuts had 
given his blessing for a renewed drive to make a concerted move against the FELIX 
transmitter. Lenton and Maj Michael Ryde, the deputy MI5/MI6 representative in the 
Union, planned the operation in December. Nonetheless, it was temporarily put on hold 
in January 1944 for a number of political reasons. In February, a renewed operation 
against the FELIX transmitter was planned between Lenton, Ryde and Bennet, though 
this plan also never came to fruition. Its failure was partly due to growing British inter-
agency rivalries as well as continued concerns over the political loyalties of various 
Union officials. Instead, Bennet issued a raid of his own near Vryburg, without the 
consent of Ryde. The raid proved a dismal failure as the FELIX wireless set was not 
located. The planned swoop was also outside of Bennet’s normal operational domain.486 
During the rest of the war, no concerted move was made against the FELIX Organisation 
in South Africa, and Sittig managed to successfully evade the security authorities well 
after the cessation of hostilities in 1945.487 
4.3.2 The Operational Intelligence Section 
 By November 1940 the formation the Enemy Reports Department (ERD) at the 
CNIC had led to the centralisation of all operational intelligence from SIGINT. This 
intelligence included information on Allied and neutral warships, merchant shipping 
and convoys, as well as German, Italian and Japanese surface raiders, warships, 
submarines and blockade runners in South African waters. The officer in charge of this 
department was known as the Enemy Reports Officer. This officer concurrently acted as 
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the Boarding Officer and the Naval Liaison Officer to all Allied warships calling at Cape 
Town. 
The staff of the ERD kept a constant plot of all Axis and Allied shipping 
movements in the Cape Intelligence Area, as well as in adjoining areas. The department 
obtained the required information from HF/DF bearings. These were received from the 
SO “Y” and his organisation, as well as from enemy reports obtained from RRR, QQQ and 
SSS messages passed along by Allied merchant shipping. In some instances, the 
boarding of shipping in Cape Town harbour supplemented these reports.488  
The staff of the ERD painstakingly sifted through all information received, and 
regularly published a Cape Area Naval Intelligence Pamphlet. Copies of the pamphlets, 
commonly known as ‘Enemy Reports’, were circulated among all Allied vessels which 
called at Cape Town, Simon’s Town, East London, Port Elizabeth, and Durban. These 
pamphlets contained a wealth of information on the Axis shipping operational in the 
Cape Intelligence Area. They included possible sketches and photographs of the vessels, 
along with full particulars of tonnage, fuel capacities, and last known movements. These 
reports proved extremely valuable for RN and South African Naval Forces (SANF) 
vessels hunting Axis merchant raiders, submarines, and blockade runners during the 
war, and also when investigating suspicious vessels at sea.  
Following the establishment of close liaison between the Coastal Area Command 
and CNIC in 1941, regular contact was maintained between the ERD and a South African 
Air Force (SAAF) Intelligence Officer at headquarters. This led to the establishment of a 
system of photographing all merchant shipping in South African waters, which helped to 
identify certain suspicious vessels. The Enemy Reports Officer also proved instrumental 
in the requisitioning of Vichy shipping at East London and Port Elizabeth during the 
war.489 
 The ERD carried out the above duties until August 1942, whereafter Ransome 
and his staff moved to the Combined Headquarters in Cape Town. The Operational 
Intelligence Department (OID) hence assumed responsibility for all operational 
intelligence, and worked in close liaison with Bennet and his “Y” Organisation in this 
regard. Through direction finding bearings, sighting reports, and from sinking reports, 
these two departments managed to compile fairly accurate tracking charts of all U-boats 
operational in South African waters.490 After the commencement of the sustained 
German U-boat offensives in October 1942, the OID also helped to interview and 
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interrogate the survivors of sunken merchantmen. This work continued unabated until 
mid-1943, when the German U-boat attacks gradually ceased. As a result, the OID 
drafted a comprehensive report on U-boat attacks in South African waters for the 
Admiralty.491  
 
Fig 4.9: Wartime organisation of the Cape Intelligence Area Reporting Officers492 
Throughout this period, the OID cooperated closely with the Naval Operations 
Department and War Room at Combined Headquarters, as well as with the General 
Officer Commanding (GOC) Coastal Area Command and his Intelligence staff. The result 
was a comprehensive report on the movements of all Axis naval vessels in the area, 
which greatly assisted the RN, SDF/SANF, SAAF and Royal Air Force in providing 
                                                             
491  TNA, ADM 1/31006. History and Organisation of the Naval Intelligence Centre Cape Town. 
Operational Intelligence. 
492  TNA, ADM 1/31006. History and Organisation of the Naval Intelligence Centre Cape Town. 
Appendix II. 
DNI Admiralty














































Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
P a g e  | 155 
adequate cover for, and routing of, merchant convoys. It also allowed for the launching 
of combined operations against all Axis naval vessels operational in South African 
waters.493 By 1944 the OID produced fortnightly intelligence summaries, which detailed 
all U-boat attacks on merchant shipping in South African waters. These reports included 
all sightings, counter-attacks by surface units or aircraft, direction finding bearings and 
all daily dispositions given through by the Admiralty. The ERD and OID rendered 
sterling service throughout the course of the naval war in the Cape Intelligence Area.494 
4.3.3 The Security Section 
 In September 1939, Ransome’s staff was increased to include a Defence Security 
Officer (Naval) (DSO (N)). Initially, the DSO (N) was mainly concerned with the 
monitoring of known communists while keeping a comprehensive record of suspected 
enemy agents and subversive elements within South Africa. Shortly after the offices of 
the SO (I) Cape Town moved to Seaward House, there was a marked increase in naval 
information passed on to the CNIC from South Africans loyal to the war effort and the 
Smuts Government. These citizens reported on those parts of South African society who 
actively worked against the Union’s war effort in the naval sphere. Of particular interest 
were those in the employ of the SAP, the UDF and the broader Public Service.495 All 
Security Officers from naval vessels berthed in Cape Town were required to report to 
the DSO (N) upon arrival, who conveyed all anti-sabotage information and provided a 
detailed overview of the current political situation in the Union. The DSO (N) also 
initiated local deception plans to disguise the future movements of all naval and 
merchant shipping.496 
 In December 1939, all South African harbours and adjoining dockyards – bar 
Simon’s Town, which fell under British legislation – were declared prohibited areas 
under Section 85 of the South African Defence Act of 1912.497 The legislation 
furthermore outlined the duties and responsibilities of the various Dock commandants 
and their staff. The introduction of entry and exit permits to dockyards, as well as the 
issuing of boarding permits for naval vessels, helped to control the movement of 
personnel at Union harbours. This system remained in operation until March 1942. 
After this, the Dock Commandants and SANF agreed to a system of Naval Identity Cards 
for Officers, and Pay and Identity Books for Naval Ratings wishing to gain access to 
dockyards and for boarding shipping. Henceforth, boarding permits were required for 
all civilians wishing to board naval vessels as well. The SAR&H Police also guarded all 
entrances to the dockyards and scrutinised boarding passes and permits. This system, 
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however, created a shortage of SAR&H Police for patrols within the inner docks.498 The 
creation of the Essential Service Protection Corps in 1939, largely made up of military 
veterans, helped to guard key installations both within and outside the docks and other 
important installations in the Union. Guards were placed on the gangways of all 
merchant shipping. These guards also mainly consisted of ex-soldiers, who were vetted 
by both the Criminal Investigation Department of the SAP and the DSO (N) up to 1942, 
whereafter the Port Security Police took over this responsibility.499 
 By mid-October 1942, Smuts had instructed Defence Headquarters to form a 
dedicated Port Security Force, upon the recommendation of Col W.H.A. Webster – the 
former MI5/MI6 representative in the Union. Several representatives of the concerned 
Departments and Services attended the meeting held in Pretoria during October and 
discussed all existing protective measures in force at union ports since the outbreak of 
war.500 The meeting agreed that the new GOC Coastal Area Command assume complete 
control over the field security at each Union harbour. Control over field security would 
be similar to that which existed in British ports, though amended for South African 
conditions, and each concerned Department/Service would continue functioning as at 
present. The main functions of the Field Security Unit would be counterespionage work, 
the prevention of the leakage of sensitive information, the investigation and prevention 
of sabotage, and the interrogation of suspects. In addition, a senior Railway Officer, with 
intimate knowledge of railway and harbour conditions in the Union was appointed. This 
person fromed part of the staff of the GOC Coastal Area Command, and acted as a liaison 
officer in lieu of harbour defence.501 
 The appointment of Directors of Port and Shipping at Cape Town and Durban, 
and Dock Commandants at East London and Port Elizabeth, occurred at the beginning of 
November 1942.502 The Directors of Port and Shipping also all acted as liaison officers. 
On 26 November 1942, an Internal Security Meeting of the Cabinet was held in Pretoria. 
Here, it was decided that the new Port Security Organisation would comprise of 
committees at each Union port, and would replaced the now defunct Intelligence 
Records Bureau. These committees would consist of representatives from Naval 
Intelligence, Military Intelligence, Naval Censorship, Essential Service Protection Corps, 
Dock Commandants, Railway Police, SAP and officials from Customs and Immigration. 
Later on, representatives from the Ministry of War Transport (MWT) and War Shipping 
                                                             
498  TNA, ADM 1/31006. History and Organisation of the Naval Intelligence Centre Cape Town. 
Security. 
499  Fokkens, The Role and Application of the Union Defence Force, p. 116; Fokkens, ‘Afrikaner Unrest 
within South Africa during the Second World War’, pp. 134-135. 
500  DOD Archives, CGS War, Box 38, File: Port and Dock Security Measures. Memorandum of Meeting 
held at DHW re Docks Field Security, 15 Oct 1942; DOD Archives, CGS War, Box 38, File: Port and 
Dock Security Measures. Extract from Col Webster’s report on security at the Port of Cape Town, 
undated (probably Jun 1940). 
501  DOD Archives, CGS War, Box 38, File: Port and Dock Security Measures. Notes of meeting held at 
DHQ in connection with the proposed formation of a Port Security Unit, 15 Oct 1942. 
502  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 24, File: SA Railways and Harbours Departmental Civil War 
History Vol VIII. Ports & Shipping. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
P a g e  | 157 
Administration, as well as the US Naval Attaché, sat in on these meetings. The objectives 
of these committees were to discuss all problems relating to the security of ports and 
shipping and to establish collective measures which would improve the security at each 
port. They would also to keep the GOC Coastal Area Command informed of all matters 
which affected port security. This would be executed through the respective Fortress 
Commanders. To its credit, the Port Security Organisation functioned successfully from 
the time of its formation until the end of the Second World War.503 
 
Fig 4.10: A guard aboard a merchant ship at a South African harbour during the war504 
 During the war, cases of sabotage and suspected sabotage in the naval sphere 
were dealt with in two distinct ways. First, a special committee convened by each 
harbour’s administration, handled sabotage cases involving docked merchant shipping. 
Second, sabotage cases detailed by vessels at sea were the concern of the MWT or the 
naval authorities at the port where first reported. In each case, however, the DSO (N) 
forwarded any reports of sabotage to the Admiralty for information. After January 1944, 
all sabotage accounts were also forwarded to the Director-General of MI5 for 
information. Following the commencement of the German submarine operations in 
South African waters in October 1942, the DSO (N) toured the entire coastal area. He 
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delivered lectures on U-boat recognition to the Coast Watchers organisation and local 
fishermen. The DSO (N) also issued instructions in the Africa Pilot to merchant seamen 
on how to approach the South African coast in open boats in the case of an emergency, 
and what procedures to follow once making landfall.505 
4.3.4 The Naval Press Relations Section 
 Before the war, the officer on the staff of the SO (I) Cape Town responsible for 
Press Censorship, Press Relations, and Naval Publicity, was closely connected with 
publicity matters. This person therefore had a knack for dealing with the South African 
press. The Naval Press Officer (NPO) had two responsibilities. Firstly, he had to censor 
all naval material and information made available to the media. Secondly, he had to 
arrange facilities for the media to procure naval information made available for 
publication. This was, however, only possible through the development of good 
personal relations with the editors and members of the South African Press Corps, 
broadcast personnel, film production managers, authors, and all relevant Union 
Government Departments. Moreover, the Naval Press Office of the CNIC had to carry out 
all of the duties normally performed by the Naval Information Division of the Admiralty.  
In addition, the NPO was responsible for the duties of the Naval Advisory Staff of the 
Ministry of Information in the UK.  
From April 1940, Port NPOs assumed similar duties at Durban, East London and 
Port Elizabeth, and were responsible for all local press and related liaison duties. By 
March 1942, the appointment of an Assistant NPO at Cape Town greatly improved the 
day-to-day operation of the Naval Press Office. The Assistant NPO was a former editor at 
a prominent South African newspaper. The post was, however, abolished by November 
1943, only to be reinstated in April 1945. It is worthy to note that the Naval Press Office 
and its sub-offices in South Africa, along with all matters connected with naval publicity, 
developed without any direct assistance from the Admiralty. Only after the NPO had 
visited London in December 1944 for training purposes, did the Admiralty regularly 
supply the Naval Press Office with suitable material. An assortment of books, articles 
and photos were hence distributed among Allied sailors.506 
 The NPO also had the responsibility of arranging Press visits to Allied naval 
vessels that called at South African ports, and in some cases, arranged special trips to 
sea for the South African reporters. This organisation showed no discrimination in this 
regard, and despite different political outlooks, even extended invites to reporters from 
Afrikaans newspapers which were conspicuously opposed to both the Smuts 
Government and the war. A number of carefully censored articles thus appeared in 
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English and Afrikaans newspapers, primarily due to a good working relationship 
established by the NPO with both the RN and the SANF. 
 
Fig 4.11: A journalist aboard a visiting Allied naval vessel during the war507 
The photography of dock areas was similarly controlled by the NPO. The Naval 
Press Office applied certain statutory powers contained under Local Emergency War 
regulations to enforce compliance. Photography in dock areas, for instance, was only 
authorised when an officer of the Naval Press Office escorted the photographer. 
Needless to say, this responsibility placed an immense strain on the office of the NPO. 
The NPO also carried out all Press relation and censorship duties for the SANF upon a 
direct request from the Director of the SANF. The NPO furthermore had to maintain 
close liaison with the Navy League of South Africa, the Navy War Fund Committees as 
well as other maritime inclined bodies in the Union. The Naval Press Office further 
helped to organise the naval section of the Victory Cavalcade staged in Cape Town in 
April 1944, as well as the Navy Week held during the same year. Both the former and 
the latter exhibited the work of the RN, Fleet Air Arm and the SANF to the South African 
public.508 
 The basis of press control during the war, especially with regard to publishing 
the movements of shipping, was the statutory prohibition contained under Section 
91(1) of the Defence Act of 1912. It read “… no information with respect to the 
movements or dispositions of the Union Defence Forces or other of His Majesty’s Forces, 
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or of His Majesty’s ships shall be published in any newspaper, magazine, book, 
pamphlets or by any other means…”509 Despite this legislation, there was no effective 
machinery to deal with or control the publication of information dealing with merchant 
shipping. The signing of the Voluntary Censorship Agreement took place in June 1940.  
This occurred as a result of negotiations carried out with the press by the South African 
Bureau of Information. The Agreement formalised control over the press and prohibited 
the publication of any news of a maritime nature without prior reference to the NPO.510 
In return, news of a maritime nature was provided to the press by the NPO whenever 
possible. Despite the Voluntary Censorship Agreement being nothing more than a 
gentleman’s agreement, all parties, including the anti-war newspapers, honoured the 
agreement throughout the war. The Union Government thus never enforced compulsory 
naval censorship during the war. This was largely the result of the good personal 
relationship between the various newspaper editors and the Naval Press Office.511 
 
Fig 4.12: Allied wartime propaganda posters aimed at preventing  
careless talk about shipping512 
 As a result of the increased losses of merchant ships in South African waters, the 
Naval Press Office initiated a ‘Don’t Talk Campaign’ in 1942. The campaign was carried 
out in an endeavour to prevent careless talk about naval and shipping matters (see Fig 
4.12). The danger that careless talk held for the safety of Allied shipping was 
accentuated by anti-British elements active in South Africa, as well as the Trompke 
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Network known to operate out of Lourenço Marques.513 The NPO started the ‘Don’t Talk 
Campaign’ in all earnest in February, with the explicit object of stopping loose talk on 
shipping matters. The campaign ran throughout the Union, and became commonly 
known as the ‘Don’t Talk about Ships or Shipping’ campaign. The NPO employed a 
variety of means to convey its message, including posters, notices in trains and buses, 
articles and advertisements in the press, radio broadcasts and films, to name a few. The 
South African Bureau of Information provided the necessary funding, and a large 
segment of the South African public supported the campaign during the war.514 
4.3.5 The Naval Censorship Section 
 After the establishment of the Union Censorship Office in November 1939, an 
officer on Ransome’s staff was appointed as the full-time Naval Censorship 
Representative (NCR) in the office of the Chief Censor. Because the office of the Chief 
Censor, Brig H.J. Lenton – the Union Postmaster General – was located in Cape Town, it 
allowed for closer cooperation with the CNIC. The Cape Intelligence Centre received 
censorship reports on a daily basis, which were subsequently scrutinised by the NCR.515 
The NCR reported on any naval interest, and then passed on the information by signal 
or letter to other interested authorities. The CNIC also gave constant guidance to 
Shipping Agents regarding general censorship requirements by the regular issuing of a 
Cape Area Naval Intelligence Pamphlet, titled ‘Communication between Shipping 
Agents’. This system continued until 1943, when it was replaced by two separate 
pamphlets issued by the MWT representative in Cape Town. They were the ‘Oversea 
Communications’ and ‘Internal Communications’ Cape Area Naval Intelligence 
Pamphlets. The MWT Representative scrutinised and considered all censorship reports, 
and closely cooperated with the CNIC about censorship matters. The MWT 
Representative dealt with internal matters that involved cases where Shipping and 
Clearing Agents passed along information involving vessels improperly, while Maj F.M. 
Bramall RM, the new SO (I) Cape Town since March 1943, dealt with all matters 
regarding oversea communications.516  
 The NCR assisted the Allied and South African naval authorities in enforcing the 
naval censorship where breaches of the censorship rules occurred. The major 
scapegoats in this regard were ships’ personnel and troops calling at South African 
ports in troop transports which breached censorship rules through the posting of 
letters while ashore.517 The NCR hence delayed the posting of these letters by 14 days 
and sent a stereotyped letter to the Master/Captain of the vessel informing him of the 
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breach of censorship for further action. More serious cases where codes were arranged 
to communicate future shipping movements were forwarded to the MWT 
Representative in Cape Town, or to the appropriate authorities at the next port of call, 
for the required disciplinary action.  
Throughout the war, there was good cooperation between the NCR and the 
Union Censorship Office. The NCR was furthermore responsible for preparing all Port 
Intelligence Reports during the war. He was also accountable for other special 
operational intelligence reports, such as the interception of Vichy shipping and the 
Madagascar campaign, and circulating these reports within the Cape Intelligence 
Area.518 
Conclusion 
The Axis influence on the maritime intelligence war in southern Africa proved negligible 
from the start. The initial contacts established between Germany and the OB were found 
to be haphazard, especially since the Germans desired to establish contact with Malan 
rather than with Van Rensburg. In addition, these contacts had no immediate bearing on 
the maritime war in South African waters.  
The arrival of Rooseboom and Sittig in South Africa had a marked influence, as 
both agents at various stages passed along shipping intelligence to Berlin via the 
Trompke Network in Lourenço Marques. Once Sittig established direct contact with 
Berlin, he was able to transmit both political and military intelligence without 
interference by Werz. The operational value of the military intelligence passed along by 
Sittig to Berlin was, however, extremely questionable, especially since the shipping 
intelligence was substantially outdated by the time it was transmitted to Germany. 
Besides, two-way transmissions between Sittig and Berlin were only established in July 
1943, which was shortly before the SKL and BdU ceased to consider South African 
waters as a viable operational area. The shipping intelligence passed on to Berlin by the 
FELIX Organisation after July 1943 thus held no direct operational value to Dönitz and 
his U-boat Commanders for the rest of the war.  
The CNIC, under the control of the SO (I) Cape Town, was the main role player in 
the Allied maritime intelligence war fought in southern Africa between 1939 and 1945. 
The CNIC formed a vital link in the overall Allied maritime intelligence organisation 
during the war by presiding over both operational intelligence and counterintelligence 
in the Cape Intelligence Area. The various sub-departments of the SO (I) Cape Town, 
namely Tracking, Operational Intelligence, Security, and Naval Press Relations and 
Censorship, worked in unison during the pursuit of the naval war. The “Y” Organisation 
in South Africa in particular, proved indispensable in detecting the locations of all Axis 
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naval vessels in South Africa during the war, while also listening in on the illicit wireless 
transmissions in the Union and Mozambique.  
Measuring the true operational value of the CNIC during the war forms the focus 
of the final chapter of this dissertation. Ascertaining its worth, however, is only possible 
by investigating the nature, extent and successes of the ASW operations in South African 
waters during this period. These aspects are thus discussed in chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5 
The anti-submarine war off Southern Africa, 1942-1944 
Introduction 
It was the commencement of the first sustained German U-boat operation in October 
1942 that awakened the need for dedicated anti-submarine warfare (ASW) measures in 
South African waters. Before this, the full effect of the naval war was rather distant. The 
unreality of war resulted in an undeniable indifference regarding the adoption of ASW 
measures.  
The resultant U-boat offensives off the southern African coast between October 
1942 and August 1943, compelled the South African and British naval authorities to 
adopt a series of ASW measures. These steps were aimed at reducing the number of 
merchant sinkings in the waters off South Africa. The ASW measures implemented after 
October 1942 resulted in a notable decrease in the number of merchants sunk along the 
South African coast from 1943 onwards. Moreover, three German U-boats were sunk 
between 1942 and 1944. These sinkings provided another tangible measure of the 
success of the ASW measures in place along the South African coast from October 1942.  
The two objectives of this final chapter are wide ranging. In the first place, the 
evolution of the ASW in South African waters is scrutinised. This is done through the 
comparison of the ASW measures in place before the commencement of the main U-boat 
offensive in October 1942, with those prevalent during 1944 when the U-boat offensives 
in said waters ceased all-together. Secondly, the effectiveness of the ASW measures off 
the South African coast will be evaluated. Apart from the obvious diminishing merchant 
losses, the sinkings of the three German submarines in 1942 (U-179), 1943 (U-197) and 
1944 (UIT-22) will be discussed. These U-boats were arguably sunk at the beginning, 
the height, and at the end of the German submarine offensives in South African waters. 
They thus reflect positively on the improvements made apropos ASW in these waters 
throughout the period concerned. 
5.1 Lacklustre attitudes, the start of the U-boat offensives, and a chance sinking  
The Eisbär group commenced their attack on the shipping off Cape Town on 7 October 
1942. Among them were U-68 (Merten), U-172 (Emmermann), U-504 (Poske) and U-159 
(Witte). Before launching the submarine offensive, the B-Dienst estimated Cape Town 
harbour to contain up to 50 anchored ships at any given time. Furthermore, the 
Befehlshaber der U-Boote (BdU) believed that a surprise attack by the Eisbär boats on 
shipping in the Cape Town harbour could achieve significant sinking results, owing to 
the element of surprise. Surprisingly, both the U-boat commanders and the BdU were of 
the opinion that the South African defences were unprepared for a sudden onslaught on 
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merchant shipping in the waters off Cape Town. This was most likely because it seemed 
to them that neither their wireless transmissions nor their presence was detected while 
travelling south.519  
 In the days preceding the launching of the surprise attacks, U-68 and U-172 
conducted several brazen reconnaissance sorties into Table Bay and the approaches to 
Cape Town harbour. During these forays, the two U-boat commanders were soon able to 
gauge both the extent and the state of readiness of the South African coastal defences.520 
Carl Emmermann’s account of the evident unpreparedness off Cape Town is 
enlightening: 
The picture which the town and harbour presented was so beautiful and 
so peaceful that we stayed a few hours on the surface and called up the 
crew one by one to the bridge to enjoy the sight. Cape Town at that 
moment was busy with an air-raid exercise. There were a few target 
planes circling above the brilliantly illuminated city, and the long groping 
fingers of the searchlights tried to catch them in their beams. The picture 
reminded us of the scenes in our German towns at the beginning of the 
war: everything indicated that here people felt they were remote from 
hostilities … Brilliant sunshine on the roadstead, the sea as smooth as a 
mirror, only a strong swell making it difficult to keep the U-boat at a 
steady depth. We were only a few hundred metres from the main 
shipping channel, ships were passing close by and quite unaware of the 
nearness of the enemy. Quite undisturbed, we were able to take bearings 
of the entrance and exit channels and study the harbour installations.521 
 Unbeknown to the BdU, U-172 launched surprise attacks on two unsuspecting 
merchantmen on the morning of 7 October. These strikes resulted in the sinking of the 
Chikasaw City (6,196 tons) and the Firethorn (4,700 tons). The sinkings, however, went 
unnoticed, as neither the Chikasaw City nor Firethorn managed to transmit distress 
signals prior to their sinkings. The Combined Headquarters in Cape Town were only 
informed of these sinkings after their survivors were picked up the following afternoon 
and evening.522 For the remainder of the day, the U-boats refrained from attacking any 
more merchants. After receiving the order to attack that night, the U-boats managed to 
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sink the Boringia (5,821 tons), Koumoundouros (3,598 tons), Gaasterkerk (8,679 tons), 
and Clan Mactavish (7,631 tons). By daybreak on 8 October, the Eisbär boats could 
account for nearly 33,000 tons of shipping sunk off Cape Town. The success of the 
surprise attacks was, however, short-lived. The South African coastal defences were in 
fact not entirely unprepared for the sudden onslaught on the merchant shipping off its 
coastline.523 
 During the early hours of 8 October, the South African and Allied authorities 
activated all ASW measures. These followed the receipt of several reports of explosions 
and light flashes near the Cape Point lighthouse. A single Ventura from No. 23 Torpedo 
Bomber Reconnaissance (TBR) South African Air Force (SAAF) Squadron was 
dispatched to investigate these reports. Shortly after daybreak, the aircraft sighted the 
wreckage of the Gaasterkerk 20 miles south-west of Cape Point. Four lifeboats with 
some survivors were also identified. Soon after that, the South Atlantic Station 
dispatched a corvette, HMS Rockrose, and two destroyers, HMAS Nizam and HMS 
Foxhound. They were sent to a general area off Cape Point to assist in the rescue of 
survivors, as the sinkings of Boringia and Clan Mactavish had also became known. The 
U-boat attacks during that morning were rather brazen as they operated on the surface, 
but increasing aerial patrols forced them to remain submerged. Throughout the 
morning, the Venturas from No. 23 SAAF TBR Squadron maintained a continuous patrol 
off Cape Point and assisted in pinpointing the location of survivors adrift in lifeboats.524 
 
Fig 5.1: A Ventura in service with the SAAF during the war525 
 During the course of the morning’s air patrols, there were two separate instances 
during which South African aircraft succesfully engaged U-boats in the waters off Cape 
Town. After a U-boat was spotted 130 miles to the west of Cape Town, a Ventura 
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engaged it and dropped four 250 lb depth charges in its vicinity after it submerged. This 
attack received a stern rebuff from the Commander Coastal Air Defences, who regarded 
it a waste of bombs. The second attack occurred soon after midday when a Ventura 
observed a U-boat at periscope depth some miles off Green Point. Due to a 
communications breakdown within the Ventura – partly caused by the transmission of 
an outgoing signal – there was a considerable delay before releasing the four 250 lb 
depth-charges in the vicinity of the U-boat. It is of interest to note that none of the four 
U-boats operational in the area reported being attacked by aircraft on 8 October. During 
the remainder of the afternoon, the Venturas from No. 23 TBR SAAF Squadron flew 
several more reconnaissance sorties in the hope of spotting more survivors and locating 
the U-boats. They were assisted by three Albacores from the Royal Navy (RN) Fleet Air 
Arm (FAA), deployed to South Africa to help bolster its coastal defences and for convoy 
escort duties.526 
 Two RN destroyers, HMS Active and HMS Arrow, sailed shortly before midday 
from Simon’s Town to assist in locating and picking up survivors from the Clan 
Mactavish. All South African Naval Forces (SANF) anti-submarine (A/S) vessels were, 
however, retained to keep constant control of the perimeter of the Cape Town 
anchorage. The exception was HMSAS Vereeniging, which accompanied the Mine 
Clearance Flotilla while they once more swept the area near Cape Point which the 
Doggerbank had mined that April. During the course of the day, the Union Defence Force 
(UDF) and South Atlantic Station issued several pertinent ASW orders due to the 
intensifying U-boat operations off Cape Town. To start with, the use of all coastal and 
harbour navigation lights, radio beacons and fog signals were discontinued with 
immediate effect. While the use of Saldanha harbour since June reduced the daily 
number of ships in Table Bay to an average of twenty, a system of double-banking 
provided ten extra berths within the Cape Town harbour that day. This considerably 
reduced the number of merchants lying in the undefended roadstead. Moreover, some 
of the sailings planned for the following days were postponed. A wireless message was 
also sent to all shipping in South African waters. They were told not to approach within 
seventy miles of Cape Town during the hours of darkness.527 
 That night, all the Venturas from No. 23 TBR SAAF Squadron were grounded, as 
they lacked the required equipment for night operations. The RN vessels operational off 
Cape Town, however, had a very busy night hunting the U-boats and looking for 
survivors. During the night of 8/9 October U-68 managed to sink a further four 
merchants, the Sarthe (5,271 tons), Swiftsure (8,206 tons), Examelia (4,981 tons) and 
Belgian Fighter (5,403 tons). The other U-boats had a less successful evening, as the 
hunters appeared to become the hunted.  
                                                             
526  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 339, File: Gordon-Cumming U-Boat Material. South Atlantic Station 
War Diary, Oct 1942; Turner et al, War in the Southern Oceans, p. 175. 
527  Turner et al, War in the Southern Oceans, p. 175. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
P a g e  | 168 
During that night Emmermann once more navigated his U-boat to the 
approaches of Table Bay with the hope of scoring another surprise attack. As soon as 
the U-boat entered the approaches, Emmermann heard distinct propeller noises which 
signalled an impending attack. HMS Rockrose attacked U-172 in an area approximately 
70 miles to the west of Hout Bay. While HMS Rockrose did not manage to sink U-172 
during the night, it did force Emmermann to remain submerged for an extended time. 
This meant that the U-boat could not recharge its batteries, nor sufficiently ventilate the 
boat, before daylight.528 Emmermann’s logbook provides a vivid account of HMS 
Rockrose’s attack during the night: 
2020 – Asdic impulses can be heard on my set… am creeping along. 
2037 – 12 depth-charges, ineffectively released. Slight damage, chiefly to 
fuses. Gyrocompass failing. Lid on tube IV not tight. Shortly after, two 
further patterns of 12 each, farther away. 
2100 – Two U-boat chasers clearly audible, alternately on my course, 
trying to locate me. 
0100 – U-boat chasers continue near my boat. They operate very skilfully, 
in spite of my constant doubling here and there. 
0500 – No longer possible to surface while it is dark. Conditions for 
listening and locating are ideal, as the sea is smooth. Every little noise 
made in the boat produces reaction.529 
 On the same night, the destroyers HMAS Nizam, HMS Foxhound and HMS Active 
were operational approximately 60 miles to the west of Dassen Island travelling on a 
course roughly South by East. Initially, the vessels were dispatched to help collect 
survivors from the City of Athens (6,558 tons). Shortly before midnight, however, HMS 
Active – under the command of Lt Cdr Michael Tomkinson – obtained a radar contact on 
a bearing of 150° at a distance of 2,500 yards.530 Unbeknown to the Eisbär group, U-179 
(Sobe) had sailed from the equator at such a high speed, that he had arrived in the 
waters off Cape Town in time for the unexpected attacks. After successfully sinking the 
Pantelis (3,845 tons) on 8 October, U-179 was caught off guard and sunk by HMS Active 
on the same night (see Map 5.1).531 In an extract from the Proceedings of the U-Boat 
Assessment Committee, there is an unmatched account of the attack and sinking of U-
179. The report states: 
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Shortly after, an asdic contact right ahead at a range of 1,600 yards was 
obtained and a large U-boat sighted on the surface, inclination 20° [to the] 
right.  
The U-boat appeared to be stopped, presumably charging her batteries. 
Speed was increased to 25 knots and course altered slightly to starboard 
to bring [the] U-boat broader on the beam. At 800 yards the target was 
illuminated by searchlight, and fire was opened by B gun, no hits however 
being scored. The U-boat dived when range was 500 yards. 
[HMS] Active altered towards and steadied on a course about 5° ahead of 
[the] U-boat’s conning tower. The U-boat passed down the port side at 
close range on a converging course and was attacked with a 10-charge 
pattern by eye, set to 50 and 150 feet. The charges are reported to have 
burst all around the U-boat, the swirl and bubbles caused by its diving 
still being clearly visible. The depth-charge party reported that the U-boat 
was blown to the surface as a result of the attack and then disappeared, 
but this cannot be confirmed. No contact was obtained in spite of a search 
carried out throughout the night. A large patch of diesel oil came to the 
surface which, by dawn, was some 3 miles in length and half a mile wide. 
No wreckage was found.532 
 
Map 5.1: Location of the sinking of U-179 
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 A post-war report from Emmermann confirms the loss of U-179. The BdU did not 
realise that U-179 was lost in the waters off Cape Town, and for some time believed that 
it was sunk near Ascension Island on its return voyage. Emmermann wrote:  
During this chase we clearly heard the sounds of another U-boat being 
sunk. After a bad depth-charge volley, we were able to pick up the sound 
of sinking quite clearly. On my return, I voiced my opinion that it may 
have been U-179 (Sobe). Apparently U-179, quite unaware, had slap-bang 
run right into the first furious wave of defensive actions taken by the 
enemy and thus sealed her doom.533 
 
Fig 5.2: Ernst Sobe – the ill-fated commander of U-179534 
 While the U-boat pickings were initially easy off Cape Town, the surprise gained 
during the initial attacks started to dwindle by 10 October. The immediate activation of 
the combined South African and Allied ASW measures ensured that the full extent of the 
surprise attack in the waters off Cape Town did not materialise. As a result, there was 
no indiscriminate massacre of anchored shipping as predicted by the BdU. The U-boats 
had a staggering success by sinking 14 merchantmen (100,902 tons) in a mere four 
days. Despite this, Donitz ordered the Eisbär group to extend their operational areas to 
the waters off Port Elizabeth and Durban.535 His decision was as a direct result of the 
ASW measures encountered from 8 October onwards. These measures negated the 
operational advantage gained by the initial surprise attacks, which equally revealed 
several cracks in the South African coastal defences. In truth, before the commencement 
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of the first sustained U-boat offensive in October, the ASW measures employed in South 
African waters were somewhat haphazard. They were also embryonic in nature, and 
curtailed by several factors which warrant further discussion. 
 First, there was some prior warning of a possible move of a group of German U-
boats into the South Atlantic by the end of August. The Headquarters of the South 
Atlantic Station, however, remained unsure of the exact time and area in which to 
expect an attack on merchant shipping. Throughout September, the Submarine Tracking 
Room at Whitehall continued to warn the Combined Headquarters in Cape Town of the 
southward movement of a group of U-boats through continued wireless 
interceptions.536 The sinking of the British troopship Laconia (19,965 tons) on 12 
September near Ascension Island, also served to confirm the presence of a group of U-
boats travelling southward. While Combined Headquarters in Cape Town thus knew of 
the impeding U-boat attack in the Southern Oceans, there were insufficient SANF and 
RN A/S vessels in South Africa to justify pre-emptive offensive patrols.537  
Any pre-emptive action by the British or South African authorities, moreover, 
would have alerted German agents in Cape Town that the Allies were aware of the 
impending attack. This naturally created a somewhat tense situation at Combined 
Headquarters. Whereas the defence planners continued to expect an attack on merchant 
shipping off Cape Town from the end of September onwards, the ASW measures in 
South African waters remained inactive until the U-boat attack commenced. The fact 
that the sinkings of the Chikasaw City and Firethorn initially went unnoticed, highlighted 
the point that both the South African and British authorities only became aware of the 
presence of the Eisbär group by 8 October, and only after a report of the first sinkings. 
This obliviousness is, however, not unexpected, considering Tait and his staff’s stance. 
Their conviction was “that the first news of the presence of enemy raiders, whether 
surface or submarine, in the area will be the report of their first attack.”538 
 Second, because the Axis threat to Allied shipping off the South African coast had 
not materialised by mid-1942, an apathetic attitude was prevalent in the Union 
regarding coastal defence. The fact that the Department of Railways and Harbours 
(SAR&H) only switched off the non-essential harbour and coastal lights during that June 
– after the commencement of the Japanese submarine offensive in Mozambican waters –  
highlights the dismal state of affairs.539 By 4 October, an intelligence appreciation from 
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the South Atlantic Station had failed to report the presence of the U-boats moving south 
towards Cape Town. This was only days before the Eisbär group launched their surprise 
attack. It would seem as if Tait and his staff were also lulled into a false sense of 
security. The feeling of confidence in their safety prevailed despite the various naval 
intelligence sources indicating the southward movement of a number of U-boats in the 
Atlantic Ocean since the end of August.540 The focus of the South African and British 
naval authorities was, instead, on the Indian Ocean, and the presumed threat posed by a 
further Imperial Japanese Navy operation in these waters.541  
 Third, the intelligence appreciation furthermore advised that there was an 
insufficient number of naval forces in South African waters. The consideration of 
launching an offensive operation in the case of a U-boat attack on merchant shipping 
was therefore dismissed. Incidentally, the intelligence appreciation acknowledged that 
the only defence against possible attacks against the trade routes off Cape Town was to 
either adopt a policy of escorting group sailings and convoys or to enforce a system of 
evasive routing. The crux of the matter was, however, that without an adequate number 
of naval vessels available in South African waters, these intended measures were 
impossible to execute.542  
 By October, the South Atlantic Station could account for only one dedicated A/S 
vessel, the Flower-class corvette HMS Rockrose. By good fortune, two destroyers from 
the Eastern Fleet, HMAS Nizam and HMS Foxhound, were also in Simon’s Town for refit. 
The arrival of two further destroyers, HMS Arrow and HMS Active, which called at 
Simon’s Town on their way to Freetown, also bolstered the meagre naval forces. From 8 
October, these five vessels operated continuously against the Eisbär group to locate and 
destroy the U-boats, while also assisting in picking up survivors from the merchant 
sinkings. The arrival of three vessels drastically strengthened the naval forces 
operational off Cape Town. They were a Free French corvette, the Commandant 
Detroyat, on 10 October, and two more RN destroyers that arrived the following day: 
HMS Thyme and HMS Cyclamen. By the end of the month, the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-
C) Eastern Fleet, VAdm (Sir) James Somerville, dispatched a further six destroyers, 
along with four corvettes and an A/S whaler, for service with the South Atlantic Station. 
Throughout this period, SANF vessels mainly assisted in the defence of the South 
African harbours, and in specific instances helped to collect survivors along the coast. 
The sheer size of the operational area off the South African coast created a situation 
unfavourable to the productive employment of naval vessels in the pursuit of ASW and 
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the proposed escort duties. This is especially true when taking into account the fact that 
the submarine attacks extended towards Port Elizabeth and Durban later on in 
October.543 
 
Fig 5.3: Vice Admiral (Sir) James Somerville – C-in-C Eastern Fleet (1942-1944)544 
 Fourth, by mid-1942, there was minimal air cover available over the extensive 
South African coastline. The situation was so dire that Smuts approached Churchill in an 
attempt to create awareness of the weak air cover over the vital sea route around the 
Cape of Good Hope. Smuts requested Churchill to have the deficiencies in South African 
equipment and aircraft addressed. In return, the Union would provide crews to operate 
the new aircraft. To some degree, the Joint Air Training Scheme, established in South 
Africa during the war, provided the required training to air and ground crews employed 
on coastal defence work.  
Smuts also reminded Churchill of the vital importance of the maritime nodal 
point off Cape Town, and stated that it “is so vital to our war strategy that all provision 
against attack and even casual raids should be urgently made.”545 Churchill 
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subsequently instructed the Joint Planning Staff of the War Cabinet to investigate and 
prepare a report on the air defence of South Africa. Two successive reports from the 
Joint Planning Staff highlighted the dismal situation which existed in the Union 
regarding air defences. It also put forward some proposals to rectify the matter. 
Location Existing Programme Proposed Programme 
Cape Town/Cape Peninsula 
1 X Fighter squadron 
2 X TBR flights 
2 X Fighter squadrons 
2 X TBR squadrons 
Port Elizabeth/East London 
1 X Fighter squadron 
1 X TBR flight 
2 X Fighter squadrons 
1 X TBR squadron 
Durban/Adjoining Area 
1 X Fighter squadron 
1 X TBR flight 
2 X Fighter squadrons 
2 X TBR squadrons 
South West Africa/Angola 
Littoral 
2 X TBR flights None 
Mozambique/East Africa 
Littoral 
3 X TBR flights 1 X TBR squadron 
General Union Reserve 
1 X Fighter squadron 
1 X Bomber squadron 
2 X Fighter squadron 
1 X Bomber squadron 
Total 
Requirements 
4 X Fighter squadrons 
3 X TBR squadrons 
1 X Bomber squadron 
6 X Fighter squadrons 
6 X TBR squadrons 
1 X Bomber squadron 
Table 5.1: Proposed expansion of the SAAF in lieu of coastal defence, 1942546 
By the end of May, the SAAF could account for only 27 operational aircraft within 
the Union to conduct coastal and other patrols. This number excluded training aircraft 
and those on operational duty across Africa, and consisted of Mohawks, Beauforts, 
Marylands and Ansons. The South African requirements were, however, somewhat 
unrealistic, notably since it proposed that the United Kingdom (UK) provide the SAAF 
with a further thirteen squadrons for use in the aerial defence of the Union (see Table 
5.1).547 The Joint Planning Staff provided a counter-proposal to Churchill, where they 
suggested that the provision of Venturas could provide the SAAF with both a coastal 
bombing and medium reconnaissance ability. They concluded that 36 Venturas were 
ready for immediate delivery to the Union from the United States of America and that a 
further 36 Venturas would follow suit. In addition to the 72 Venturas, the arrival of an 
Royal Air Force (RAF) Catalina squadron in South Africa would provide a further, much-
needed, long-range reconnaissance and offensive ability. Thus, by the time the Eisbär 
group struck off Cape Town, there was considerably more air cover available along the 
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South African coast. Unfortunately, most of the SAAF crews remained untrained on the 
Venturas, especially in the general aspects of ASW.548 
 
Fig 5.4: An RAF Catalina attached to Coastal Area Command at Durban.549 
 Last, before October, only a limited number of group sailings were in operation 
along the west coast of South Africa for ships travelling along the Cape Town–Freetown 
shipping route. Group sailings, by definition, comprised a number of merchant ships 
that travelled together in an attempt to reduce losses. Group sailings were, however, not 
escorted by naval vessels. When naval vessels escorted group sailings, it became a 
convoy. Air cover, whether complete or partial, interestingly, had no bearing on this 
definition.550 By October the majority of the merchantmen had travelled independently 
along the South African coastline, in a general area up to 300 miles offshore. The size of 
the operational area that needed to be patrolled by South African and British naval and 
air forces on a daily basis was immense. This meant that protecting merchant shipping 
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against U-boat attacks proved an exceptionally difficult, if not impossible, task. 
Moreover, the state of affairs in South Africa had worsened as a result of the limited air 
cover and naval escorts available.551 Shortly before the Eisbär group launched their 
attacks off Cape Town, the Admiralty instructed Tait to order all vessels travelling 
through and approaching South African waters, to revert to travelling in groups with 
naval escorts when possible. The irony of this order was not lost to Tait. He simply did 
not have the required number of destroyers, corvettes, and trawlers under his 
command to provide the required escort duties.552 
5.2 Defensive measures, lessons learned, and an operational success 
It was the notable successes achieved by the Eisbär group during October 1942, which 
prompted the BdU to dispatch several more U-boats to operate in South African waters. 
These U-boats operated off the east coast of South Africa between Durban and Lourenço 
Marques and were particularly successful. By the end of November, the Seekriegsleitung 
(SKL) had ordered the remaining U-boats operational off southern Africa to return to 
the North Atlantic, to help oppose the American landings in North Africa during 
Operation Torch. The BdU had, however, succeeded in proving to the SKL that 
operations as far south as the waters off Cape Town were possible, and that such 
undertakings could yield good sinking results. Between October and December, eight U-
boats sunk 53 Allied merchant ships, for the loss of only one U-boat. These impressive 
results prompted the SKL to order the BdU to send a fresh batch of U-boats to operate 
off Cape Town at the start of 1943. The aim was to achieve similar sinking results.553 
 The Seehund group arrived off Cape Town during February 1943, though their 
sinking results were virtually negligible for its entire operational period. Between 10 
February and 2 April, the six U-boats attached to the Seehund group only managed to 
sink a total of seventeen merchant ships in South African waters. The operational 
results of the Seehund Group were thus inauspicious, although no U-boat was lost 
during this period. From April onwards, the BdU intermittently dispatched U-boats to 
operate off the southern African coast, which on occasion were moderately successful. 
The U-boats were also increasingly active towards the east coast of South Africa during 
the course of 1943. They operated in a quadrant that extended from Durban to 
Lourenço Marques, the Mozambique Channel, Mauritius and Madagascar. Between 18 
April and 17 August, these U-boats accounted for 27 merchants sunk, with the loss of 
only one U-boat recorded towards the end of August. For the remainder of the war, 
however, the BdU ceased to regard the area off the South African coast as a viable 
working area. As an alternative, it argued that the U-boats earmarked for operations in 
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the Far East had ample opportunity to attack Allied merchant shipping off the South 
African coastline while journeying to and from their new operational areas.554 
 
Graph 5.1: Decreasing merchant shipping losses in South African waters, 1942-1943555 
 It is evident that there was a drastic change in the operational conditions in 
South African waters from October 1942 to August 1943. Both the South African and 
British naval authorities adopted a number of stringent ASW measures aimed at 
curtailing the losses of merchant shipping around the South African coast. The steady 
decline in the number of merchant shipping lost off the South African coast during the 
first months of 1943 has a direct correlation with the improved ASW measures 
implemented after the first U-boat attacks of October 1942 (see Graph 5.1). There were 
several so-called ‘lessons learnt’ during the initial German submarine operations off 
South Africa. These allowed both the UDF and the South Atlantic Station to evaluate 
their initial response and implement improved ASW measures to prevent the same 
situation from reoccurring. In this regard, the surprise attacks launched by the Eisbär 
group, along with the South African and British response, served as the nadir of ASW in 
South Africa during the war. The implementation of the following four ASW measures 
best explains the decrease in the number of merchant sinkings in these waters. 
                                                             
554  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 220, File: Union War Histories Translations 14a. U-boat Operations 
of the Axis Powers in S.A. Waters compiled by Dr Jurgen Rohwer, 1954. 
555  Gordon-Cumming, Official History of the South African Naval Forces, pp. 287-299; DOD Archives, 
Map Collection, File: War in the Southern Oceans maps. Chart and List of Ships Sunk Captured or 





















































































Shipping Sunk 25 24 4 0 5 15 3 7 5 10 4
Tonnage Lost 166235 130816 17369 0 31506 96290 20308 36033 23453 59204 26896
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 Firstly, following the opening attacks of the Eisbär group, the Headquarters of 
the South Atlantic Station immediately established group sailings for all outgoing 
merchant vessels travelling along South Africa’s west coast. Inbound merchant shipping, 
however, mostly sailed independently, and formed the mainstay of the subsequent 
vessels sunk in said waters.556 By March 1943, Tait and his staff had divided the 
problem of trade protection in South African waters into two broad categories (see Map 
5.2). The first category involved the protection of slower moving merchant vessels 
travelling along the South African coast. Tait and his staff decided to use Walvis Bay as 
an assembly port for all eastbound merchant shipping approaching the South African 
coast. This would afford the vessels maximum protection.  
The Admiralty had initially hoped to form all eastbound vessels travelling to 
South Africa from South America and along West Africa into escorted convoys. Such a 
measure, however, proved unfeasible. Once the merchant shipping arrived at Walvis 
Bay, it travelled in a coastal convoy to either Cape Town, Durban or one of the other 
Union ports. The eastbound merchant vessels destined for other distant ports travelled 
in escorted convoys to a deep sea dispersal point, either off Cape Town or Durban. After 
this, they continued their onward journeys independently. Tait and his staff utilised 
Lourenço Marques as a holding and bunkering port – as well as a convoy assembly point 
– for all westbound merchant shipping approaching South African waters. A coastal 
convoy thus operated between Lourenço Marques and Durban for all westbound 
shipping, under the nominal protection of both surface and air escorts. The westbound 
shipping destined for ports outside the Union, travelled in a convoy to a deep sea 
dispersal point off Walvis Bay, whereafter the vessels continued their journeys 
independently.557 
 The second category which Tait and his staff had to consider, involved the so-
called ‘special ships.’ The special ships comprised of all troop transports, important 
naval vessels and all other shipping whose great speed precluded their inclusion into 
the ordinary slow convoys. Such eastbound vessels approached the South African coast 
from varying positions, with air escort provided at the earliest possible time. Most of 
this shipping formed into convoys at Saldanha or Cape Town and travelled under escort 
to a deep water dispersal point to continue their onward journey. The vessels that 
proceeded along the South African coast sailed independently, with a dedicated surface 
and air escort. All westbound shipping either first called at Durban for logistical 
purposes, or travelled directly to Cape Town with an air escort provided as soon as it 
                                                             
556  Roskill, The War at Sea: Volume III – The Offensive (Part II), p. 86. 
557  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 339, File: Gordon Cumming U-boat material. The Commanders-in-
Chief South Atlantic and Eastern Fleet, Report on the safety of shipping in South African waters, 30 
Mar 1943. 
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was available. Those calling at Durban sailed independently along the South African 
coast with a surface and air escort.558  
 
Map 5.2: Convoy assembly points, deep sea dispersal points,  
and the major convoy routes along the South African coast 
 This particular convoy system remained in use along the South African coast 
until 16 September 1943. After this point, the use of convoys temporarily ceased owing 
to a decrease in merchant sinkings along the South African coast. The resurgence of U-
boat attacks in the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean in 1944 prompted Tait to once 
more reinstate convoys in South African waters on 26 March that year. This was, 
however, only a temporary measure, and shipping soon again travelled independently 
in Union waters.559 
                                                             
558  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 339, File: Gordon Cumming U-boat material. The Commanders-in-
Chief South Atlantic and Eastern Fleet, Report on the safety of shipping in South African waters, 30 
Mar 1943. 
559  DOD Archives, CSD, Box 15, File: Group sailing operations Union waters. Note on commencement 
and ceasing of group sailings, 1944; DOD Archives, CSD, Box 15, File: Policy (escort groups). Note 
on commencement and ceasing of group sailings, 1944; DOD Archives, CSD, Box 43, File: SANF 
Anti-submarine Warfare Committees. Minutes of A/S Sub-Committee meeting coastal area 
headquarters, 12 Mar 1943. 
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 Number of Convoys Monthly Total 
Walvis Bay to Cape Town 4 per month 44 merchant vessels 
Cape Town to Durban 4 per month 48 merchant vessels 
Cape Town to deep sea dispersal 6 per month 20 merchant vessels 
Durban to deep sea dispersal 8 per month 144 merchant vessels 
Durban to Cape Town 4 per month 36 merchant vessels 
Cape Town to Walvis Bay 4 per month 45 merchant vessels 
Durban to Lourenço Marques 4 per month 12 merchant vessels 
Lourenço Marques to Durban 4 per month 12 merchant vessels 
Total 38 convoys per month 361 merchant vessels in convoy 
Table 5.2: Convoys operational in South African waters, 1943-1944560 
 Secondly, in theory, the adoption of convoys seemed the ultimate answer for 
ensuring the protection of seaborne trade around the South African coastline. In 
practise, however, the afore-mentioned convoys required both a surface and air escort 
in order to ensure maximum protection from U-boat attacks. By March 1943 the South 
Atlantic Station estimated that it needed at least eight naval escort groups to provide 
the required defensive protection for the convoys operational off South Africa (see 
Table 5.2). At the bare minimum, Tait and his staff predicted that the adequate 
protection needed by each convoy was at least two corvettes and three trawlers. At that 
stage, the South Atlantic Station could only account for seven corvettes and 21 trawlers. 
This figure included a number of naval vessels attached from the Eastern Fleet to the 
South Atlantic Station for service in South African waters. To meet the minimum 
requirements of escorts per convoy, Tait and his staff were thus short of nine corvettes 
and three trawlers. Alarmingly, the estimated escorts did not include any provision for 
the protection of special ships or troop convoys. Destroyers usually provided such 
protection. The South Atlantic Station was, however, dependent on the Eastern Fleet 
and the West Africa Station to provide the required naval vessels in this regard. Tait 
subsequently requested the Admiralty to reinforce the South Atlantic Station with nine 
corvettes, three trawlers and six destroyers.561 
 These reinforcements were slow to materialise. But the detachment of several 
larger SANF A/S vessels to South Atlantic Station at the end of 1942 to assist in escort 
duties drastically strengthened Tait’s defensive capabilities (see Graph 5.2). As from 
January 1943, one of the five escort groups operational along the South African coast 
was the sole responsibility of the SANF A/S vessels. These vessels rendered valuable 
service, and mainly escorted ships between Cape Town and Durban. Following the 
                                                             
560  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 339, File: Gordon Cumming U-boat material. The Commanders-in-
Chief South Atlantic and Eastern Fleet, Report on the safety of shipping in South African waters, 30 
Mar 1943. 
561  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 339, File: Gordon Cumming U-boat material. The Commanders-in-
Chief South Atlantic and Eastern Fleet, Report on the safety of shipping in South African waters, 30 
Mar 1943. 
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introduction of group sailings between Durban and Mombasa after September 1943, the 
South African A/S Vessels also rendered escort work along the east coast of Africa. For 
the next eighteen months, the South African A/S vessels formed part of the 3rd and 4th 
Escort Groups and rendered sterling work throughout without encountering any enemy 
contacts.562 By the end of July 1943, the strength of the escort vessels available to Tait 
marginally increased to 33. These naval vessels included eleven corvettes and 22 
trawlers.  
 
Graph 5.2: Total number of convoys, including average number of ships  
and escorts per convoy, in South Africa waters, Mar-Aug 1943563 
The strength of the escort force further increased after the arrival of nine more 
frigates in the same month. The quality of the escort vessels was, however, dubious, as 
many of the vessels arrived at the South Atlantic Station with significant defects and 
                                                             
562  DOD Archives, CSD, Box 15, File: Policy (escort groups). CSD Approval of exchange with RN of A/S 
vessels, 15 Nov 1943; DOD Archives, CSD, Box 15, File: Policy (escort groups). Personal 
correspondence between CSD and GOC coastal area re SANF vessels and A/S warfare, 30 Oct 1942; 
DOD Archives, CSD, Box 15, File: Policy (escort groups). Correspondence between CSD and 
SANOi/c Durban re SANF A/S vessels on escort duties, 28 Apr 1943; DOD Archives, CSD, Box 15, 
File: Policy (escort groups). Correspondence between CSD and SANOi/c Durban re participation of 
SANF vessels in convoy escorts from SA ports, 23 Jan 1943. 
563  TNA, ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic War Diary, January to October 1943. South Atlantic War 
Diary, Mar 1943; TNA, ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic War Diary, January to October 1943. South 
Atlantic War Diary, Apr 1943; TNA, ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic War Diary, January to October 
1943. South Atlantic War Diary, May 1943; TNA, ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic War Diary, 
January to October 1943. South Atlantic War Diary, Jun 1943; TNA, ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic 
War Diary, January to October 1943. South Atlantic War Diary, Jul 1943; TNA, ADM 199/2334. 


















Mar 1943 Apr 1943 May 1943 Jun 1943 Jul 1943 Aug 1943
Number of convoys 30 31 37 24 24 23
Ships per convoy 9.7 6.96 7.05 8.25 6.12 5.6
Escorts per convoy 2.9 2.35 2.89 3.79 3.83 3.52
Number of convoys Ships per convoy Escorts per convoy
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with antiquated ASW equipment. Throughout 1943 and 1944 the strength of the escort 
force fluctuated, especially after the reopening of the Mediterranean for merchant 
shipping in August 1943.564 
 
Fig 5.5: An RAF Catalina on an anti-submarine patrol off the South Africa coast565 
 Thirdly, the provision of air escorts further helped to ensure the protection of 
seaborne trade, as well as naval vessels, travelling around the South African coast 
during the war. Aircraft from the RAF, as well as the FAA, increasingly assisted the SAAF 
in this regard from the end of 1942. As the maritime war continued along the South 
African coast throughout 1943, the South African contribution in lieu of the provision of 
coastal air escorts notably increased. 
A number of RAF Catalina squadrons, which principally operated from 
Langebaan and St Lucia, were utilised in all long-range escort work. At times, the RAF 
Catalinas made use of Durban and Kosi Bay as well, with several aircraft also operating 
from inland aerodromes located at Darling near Cape Town and St. Albans near Port 
Elizabeth. All short-range escort work remained the responsibility of the SAAF Ventura 
squadrons operating from Darling, St. Albans, Walvis Bay and Durban. Several smaller 
detachments operated from George, Mtubatuba and the Eerste River near Cape Town 
when required.566 The establishment of dedicated merchant shipping routes along the 
                                                             
564  TNA, ADM 1/12643, Anti-Submarine Operations – South Atlantic Station. Report of Captain 
Howard-Johnston’s Visit to the Cape, Oct 1943. 
565  DOD Archives, Photographic Repository. 841000346 - RAF Catalina of 262 Sqn. 
566  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 339, File: Gordon Cumming U-boat material. The Commanders-in-
Chief South Atlantic and Eastern Fleet, Report on the safety of shipping in South African waters, 30 
Mar 1943; TNA, AIR 9/190, Anti U-boat Warfare – African Shipping. Memorandum by the 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
P a g e  | 183 
entire South African coastline further allowed the SAAF and RAF/FAA squadrons to 
provide adequate air cover to all merchant and naval shipping travelling along these 
designated routes (see Graph 5.3).567 
 
Graph 5.3: Coastal air patrols employed on anti-submarine work  
and convoy escort duties, 1943568 
 The need for continuous air cover along the South African coastline in 1943 was 
ever pressing. Both the SAAF and RAF/FAA realised that in order to meet this need, they 
required more operational aircraft. By March, Tait and his staff estimated a requirement 
of at least 24 more Catalinas for operational service in South Africa. They further called 
for the four SAAF Ventura squadrons in South Africa to be bolstered by an additional 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Secretary of State for Air re Anti-submarine air protection of convoys on the west coast of Africa and 
the Indian Ocean, 25 Jan 1943. 
567  DOD Archives, CSD, Box 43, File: SANF Anti-submarine Warfare Committees. Minutes of A/S Sub-
Committee meeting coastal area headquarters, 12 Mar 1943; DOD Archives, CSD, Box 43, File: 
SANF Anti-submarine Warfare Committees. Report by Officer Commanding HMSAS Gannet re U-
boat warfare in the South Atlantic, 10 Jun 1943; DOD Archives, CSD, Box 25, File: SANF Escort 
Force exercises. Proposed Atlantic convoy instructions re action to counter U-boats anti-asdic 
tactics. 
568  TNA, ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic War Diary, January to October 1943. South Atlantic War 
Diary, Apr 1943; TNA, ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic War Diary, January to October 1943. South 
Atlantic War Diary, May 1943; TNA, ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic War Diary, January to October 
1943. South Atlantic War Diary, Jun 1943; TNA, ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic War Diary, 
January to October 1943. South Atlantic War Diary, Jul 1943; TNA, ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic 
War Diary, January to October 1943. South Atlantic War Diary, Aug 1943; TNA, ADM 199/2334. 
South Atlantic War Diary, January to October 1943. South Atlantic War Diary, Sept 1943; TNA, 
























Apr 1943 May 1943 Jun 1943 Jul 1943 Aug 1943 Sep 1943 Oct 1943
SAAF 343 449 413 298 448 233 86
RAF/FAA 90 108 155 112 118 71 19
Total 433 557 568 410 566 304 105
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two squadrons, which would bring the total number of operational Venturas in the 
Union up to over a 100. 
 
Required Strength Actual Strength Deficiency 
Aircraft Squadrons Aircraft Squadrons Aircraft Squadrons 
Catalina 117 13 57 7 60 6 
Hudson 0 0 32 2 0 0 
Ventura 62 5 38 3 24 2 
Wellington 48 3 1 1 47 2 
Liberator 12 1 0 0 12 1 
Total 239 22 128 13 143 11 
Table 5.3: Aircraft requirements in South Africa569 
In reality, however, the situation was far from adequate. A small number of 
aircraft had to carry a considerably large operational load during the course of 1943. As 
a result, there was an operational deficiency of nearly 143 aircraft in South Africa. These 
were desperately needed in the ASW sphere (see table 5.3). Additionally, the South 
Atlantic Station regarded the Venturas in service with the SAAF as entirely 
unsatisfactory for inshore escort work. They also felt that the current South African 
policy of exchanging Ventura crews between service in the Middle East and off the 
South African coast was unacceptable. The operational experience gained by SAAF 
personnel in the Middle East, they argued, had no bearing on the operational conditions 
encountered off the South African coastline. After Van Ryneveld became aware of the 
matter, and upon the implementation of remedial action, all SAAF Ventura crews 
operational in the Union received adequate training in A/S as well as escort work.570 
 Coastal air patrols, particularly on A/S work and escort duties, remained a 
regular feature along the South African coast until about October 1943. An investigation 
of the South Atlantic Station war diaries between April and August 1943 highlights the 
fact that coastal air patrols – particularly those on escort duties – provided some 
immunity to merchant shipping from attack by U-boats. In truth, only in a few instances 
between June and July were escorted convoys with air cover attacked along the South 
African coast (see Map 5.3). The majority of merchant shipping attacked in South 
African waters during this period did not travel in convoy, did not have any air cover, 
and were attacked at night. Tait and his staff argued that these incidents by themselves 
                                                             
569  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 339, File: Gordon Cumming U-boat material. The Commanders-in-
Chief South Atlantic and Eastern Fleet, Report on the safety of shipping in South African waters, 30 
Mar 1943. 
570  TNA, AIR 9/190, Anti U-boat Warfare – African Shipping. Memorandum by the Secretary of State 
for Air re Anti-submarine air protection of convoys on the west coast of Africa and the Indian Ocean, 
25 Jan 1943; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 339, File: Gordon Cumming U-boat material. The 
Commanders-in-Chief South Atlantic and Eastern Fleet, Report on the safety of shipping in South 
African waters, 30 Mar 1943. 
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proved the real value of coastal aerial escorts.571 From August to October, two 
occurrences prompted the number of coastal air patrols to decrease exponentially. They 
were the marked decrease in merchant sinkings along the South African coast, and the 
apparent withdrawal of U-boats from operations in South African waters (see Graph 
5.4). 
 
Map 5.3: Extent of air cover available to convoys along the African coastline, 1943572 
                                                             
571  TNA, AIR 9/190, Anti U-boat Warfare – African Shipping. Anti-U-boat protection in the Cape Area, 
9 Jun 1943; DOD Archives, CSD, Box 43, File: SANF Anti-Submarine Warfare Committees. U-boat 
Warfare in the South Atlantic – Analysis of Attack by U-boat, 10 Jun 1943. 
572  TNA, AIR 9/190, Anti U-boat Warfare – African Shipping. Memorandum by the Secretary of State 
for Air re Anti-submarine air protection of convoys on the west coast of Africa and the Indian Ocean, 
25 Jan 1943. Map drawn by the author, from information contained in the afore-mentioned 
document. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
P a g e  | 186 
 
Graph 5.4: Total number of coastal air patrols off the South African coastline, 1943573 
 There was thus no longer an operational need to provide continuous air cover 
along the South Africa coast, especially since all convoys in these waters ceased on 16 
September. Between April and September, at least 2838 coastal air patrols took place 
along the South African coast. Their breakdown of sorties was as follows: escort duties – 
78.92%; A/S patrols – 13.74%; searches for survivors – 5.53%; and special investigation 
patrols – 1.79%.574 The changing operational situation also prompted the British 
authorities to withdraw all RAF and FAA squadrons in South Africa, except for No. 262 
RAF Squadron which continued to be based at Durban with a detachment at 
Langebaan.575 
                                                             
573  TNA, ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic War Diary, January to October 1943. South Atlantic War 
Diary, Apr 1943; TNA, ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic War Diary, January to October 1943. South 
Atlantic War Diary, May 1943; TNA, ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic War Diary, January to October 
1943. South Atlantic War Diary, Jun 1943; TNA, ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic War Diary, 
January to October 1943. South Atlantic War Diary, Jul 1943; TNA, ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic 
War Diary, January to October 1943. South Atlantic War Diary, Aug 1943; TNA, ADM 199/2334. 
South Atlantic War Diary, January to October 1943. South Atlantic War Diary, Sept 1943. 
574  TNA, ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic War Diary, January to October 1943. South Atlantic War 
Diary, Apr 1943; TNA, ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic War Diary, January to October 1943. South 
Atlantic War Diary, May 1943; TNA, ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic War Diary, January to October 
1943. South Atlantic War Diary, Jun 1943; TNA, ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic War Diary, 
January to October 1943. South Atlantic War Diary, Jul 1943; TNA, ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic 
War Diary, January to October 1943. South Atlantic War Diary, Aug 1943; TNA, ADM 199/2334. 
South Atlantic War Diary, January to October 1943. South Atlantic War Diary, Sept 1943. 
575  TNA, ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic War Diary, January to October 1943. South Atlantic War 
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Graph 5.5: Total number of D/F fixes and reported attacks on U-boats, 1943576 
 Last, the formation of a Combined Operations Room at Combined Headquarters 
in Cape Town, manned by members of both the UDF and South Atlantic Station, ensured 
unity of action throughout the planning and execution of ASW measures and operations 
in South African waters. The operational experience gained by both the South African 
and Allied air and naval forces throughout 1942 and 1943, furthermore assured that a 
swift, calculated, decision-making process underpinned the hunt for German U-boats 
still operational off the South African coast during the remainder of the war.577 By 1943, 
                                                             
576  TNA, ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic War Diary, January to October 1943. South Atlantic War 
Diary, Jan 1943; TNA, ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic War Diary, January to October 1943. South 
Atlantic War Diary, Feb 1943; TNA, ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic War Diary, January to October 
1943. South Atlantic War Diary, Mar 1943; TNA, ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic War Diary, 
January to October 1943. South Atlantic War Diary, Apr 1943; TNA, ADM 199/2334. South 
Atlantic War Diary, January to October 1943. South Atlantic War Diary, May 1943; TNA, ADM 
199/2334. South Atlantic War Diary, January to October 1943. South Atlantic War Diary, Jun 
1943; TNA, ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic War Diary, January to October 1943. South Atlantic 
War Diary, Jul 1943; TNA, ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic War Diary, January to October 1943. 
South Atlantic War Diary, Aug 1943; TNA, ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic War Diary, January to 
October 1943. South Atlantic War Diary, Sept 1943; TNA, ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic War 
Diary, January to October 1943. South Atlantic War Diary, Oct 1943. 
577  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 339, File: Gordon Cumming U-boat material. The Commander-in-
Chief South Atlantic and eastern fleet, Report on the safety of shipping in South African water, 30 
March 1943; DOD Archives, Diverse, Group 1, Box 123, File: Coast 22 (O) Organisation general. 
Letter from air headquarters East Africa to OC Advanced Operations Section air headquarters East 
Africa re operation control to be exercised by the Advanced Operations Section, air headquarters, 
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the Combined Headquarters received ample warning from the Admiralty of the 
presence of U-boats travelling to and from their operational areas off South Africa and 
further afield. Additionally, throughout 1943, the High-Frequency/Direction Finding 
(HF/DF) stations belonging to the SO “Y” Organisation in South Africa obtained 
increasingly accurate plots of the U-boats operational along the Union’s coast through 
intercepting their wireless transmissions (see Graph 5.5). This naturally allowed 
Combined Headquarters to allocate and dispatch the appropriate naval and air forces 
for offensive operations aimed at locating and destroying the U-boats active in South 
African waters.578  
 Despite the major improvements in ASW measures discussed supra, Tait and 
Somerville identified several matters relating to ASW that remained problematic. To 
some extent, these circumstances contributed to the continued loss of merchant 
shipping to U-boat operations in the Southern Oceans throughout 1943. First, it was 
argued that the quality and experience of convoy commanders employed in South 
African waters remained wanting throughout. Unfortunately, the cream of the RN 
officers regarded service with the South Atlantic Station as a backwater posting, far-
removed from the ‘real’ naval war and not conducive to promotion. Tait and Somerville 
were only too aware that an experienced convoy commander, with adequate A/S 
vessels and staff under his command, proved crucial when under attack by U-boats.579  
 Second, the continued illumination of some coastal lights, such as the Cape 
Agulhas lighthouse, helped the U-boats to identify targets, and establish their positions 
along the South African coastline. A clear example was the sinking of the merchantman 
Queen Anne (4,937 tons) on 10 February 1943, which had been silhouetted by the 
illuminated beam coming from the Cape Agulhas lighthouse. After June 1942, only the 
lighthouses at Cape Point and Cape Agulhas remained fully lit, while the SAR&H ordered 
the extinguishing of the remaining non-essential coastal lights. All harbour, shore and 
street lights were also reduced in illumination and screened from seaward. By mid-
February 1943, however, the remaining coastal lights in operation had been reduced in 
power and illumination. 
By the end of September, Coastal Area Command had reviewed the blackout 
conditions enforced along the South African coast and drastically altered them. The 
improved operational conditions prompted Coastal Area Command to alter the blackout 
conditions greatly, and even suspend the blackouts at Port Elizabeth and East London 
                                                             
578  DOD Archives, CGS War, Box 265, File: Sitreps coastal area. Most secret cypher between Coastcom 
and Dechief Fortcoms, 21 Aug 1943. 
579  DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 339, File: Gordon Cumming U-boat material. The Commanders-in-
Chief South Atlantic and Eastern Fleet, Report on the safety of shipping in South African waters, 30 
Mar 1943. 
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altogether. By 31 May 1945, all coastal lighting along the South African coastline 
reverted to its normal peacetime illumination strength.580 
 Third, during some stages, the SAAF and RAF aircraft, which provided cover for 
the convoys, travelled too far away from the ships they were protecting. As a result, a 
revised, close-escort programme came into being for aircraft accompanying convoys, 
whereby circuits of 20, 10 and 5 miles had to be maintained by the aircraft. This allowed 
for close air support to the convoy, while some of the aircraft conducted long-range 
reconnaissance ahead and to the flanks of the convoy in the search for U-boats.581  
Fourth, there were several improvements in shore–ship wireless transmissions, 
which was facilitated by the greater number of wireless stations available along the 
South African coast by the latter half of 1943. Despite this, communications between 
merchant shipping and shore-based establishments in the Union remained wanting. As 
a result, news of U-boat attacks were trasnmitted too late to activate the appropriate 
ASW measures.582 Lastly, several of the convoy escorts operational in South African 
waters, predominantly South African trawlers, were too slow to conduct efficient A/S 
sweeps around the convoys, let alone keep up with the convoy itself. Their speed was 
thus a considerable risk to the protection of the convoys around the South African coast 
throughout the war.583 
 In July 1943, the Admiralty dispatched Capt D.C. Howard-Johnston RN, an expert 
who was shaping policy to deal with the new Type XXO high speed U-boats, to South 
Africa. He was to assist and advise the staff of the South Atlantic Station and Coastal 
Area Command on the conduct of A/S operations, as well as the control and training of 
these forces. Howard-Johnston arrived in South Africa on 28 July, and directly reported 
to the Combined Headquarters in Cape Town. Without delay, he acquainted himself 
with the state of A/S operations in the South African waters. During the course of his 
stay, Howard-Johnston visited all RN and SANF vessels employed on escort and A/S 
duties and each of the RAF and SAAF operational squadrons. He also called on all South 
                                                             
580  DOD Archives, CGS War, Box 38, File: Blackouts and lighthouses. Harbour and Coast Lights, 19 Jun 
1942; DOD Archives, CGS War, Box 38, File: Blackouts and lighthouses. Correspondence between 
Secretary of Defence and Minister of Justice re black-out conditions coastal area, 29 Sept 1943; DOD 
Archives, CGS War, Box 38, File: Blackouts and lighthouses. Letter from C-in-C South Atlantic to 
CGS, 31 May 1945. 
581  DOD Archives, CFAD, Box 12, File: Cape Fortress Intelligence Summary. Cape Fortress intelligence 
summary no. 10, 4 Dec 1942 (Appendix A – Anti-submarine warfare); DOD Archives, CFAD, Box 
12, File: Intelligence – Attacks on U-boats and submarines. Lecture on A/S warfare by Wing 
Commander Lombard, 22 Feb 1943. 
582  DOD Archives, CGS War, Box 226, File: W.T. stations: Ship to shore & ship to aircraft. Letter from 
Harlech to Smuts re Admiralty Policy with regard to wireless communication, 9 Mar 1943. 
583  DOD Archives, CSD, Box 25, File: SANF Escort Force exercises. Proposed Atlantic convoy 
instructions re action to counter U-boats anti-asdic tactics; DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 339, 
File: Gordon Cumming U-boat material. The Commanders-in-Chief South Atlantic and Eastern 
Fleet, Report on the safety of shipping in South African waters, 30 Mar 1943; DOD Archives, CGS 
War, Box226, File: Wireless stations (communications with). Secret note on the interception of 
illicit communications, 2 Nov 1939. 
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African and British shore establishments, fortress commands, operational headquarters 
and training establishments situated along the South African coast between Simon’s 
Town and St Lucia. During these visits, he readily discussed current tendencies in A/S 
operations. He additionally spent a considerable amount of time on talks, lectures and 
small tactical games for which he utilised the British A/S experience in the Western 
Approaches as an example. Over and above this, he issued a report to the Admiralty on 
his visit. The assessment included an evaluation of the South Atlantic Station from an 
A/S point of view – particularly at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war.584 
 At the strategic level, Howard-Johnston was concerned that the Combined 
Headquarters in Cape Town controlled all convoys and A/S operations. The 
centralisation of control particularly perturbed him. He compared the control of 
operations at sea in the Mozambique Channel from Cape Town to that of the command 
over similar operations between Gibraltar and Sardinia from Plymouth. He argued that 
Durban was, in effect, the true operational centre along the South African coast.  
The reinforcement of the South Atlantic Station by modern A/S vessels was 
recommended, along with the improved quality of air cover available across southern 
Africa. According to Howard-Johnston, both of the above, along with the wireless 
interceptions from the HF/DF stations, opened up the possibility of dedicated offensive 
operations aimed at the destruction of U-boats. At the operational level, Howard-
Johnston was particularly impressed with the SO “Y” Organisation in South Africa. He 
commended the tireless efforts of the HF/DF stations in locating U-boats operational 
along the coast. Throughout August, the South Atlantic Station also experimented in 
fitting various RN vessels with HF/DF equipment. This greatly increased their offensive 
possibilities when working in conjunction with the shore-based HF/DF stations. During 
the month of his stay, three RN frigates, generally larger, faster and more seaworthy 
than corvettes, arrived at the South Atlantic Station. The HMS Kale, HMS Tay and HMS 
Derg were each fitted with the latest experimental HF/DF gear. 
Howard-Johnston further stated that a series of combined operations had been 
instituted off the South African coast. During these operations, both aircraft and naval 
vessels had conducted sweeps of areas where U-boats would likely operate. While he 
was at Cape Town, two such operations occurred: Operation KITBAG and Operation 
HAVERSACK. Howard-Johnston deduced that the observed reduction in seaborne traffic 
in South African waters had opened up the ability of regular offensive action by air and 
                                                             
584  TNA, ADM 1/12643, Anti-Submarine Operations – South Atlantic Station. Report of Captain 
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surface forces without depriving merchant shipping of the nominal forces required for 
escorting convoys.585 
 Howard-Johnston did not spare the South Atlantic Station on his criticism of the 
alarming state of affairs prevalent at a tactical level. His principle concern was that the 
surface escorts, particularly the SANF vessels, lacked adroitness when a U-boat attack 
on a convoy commenced. Moreover, he was alarmed at the slow speed of these vessels, 
as well as the outdated nature of their A/S equipment. Leaving no doubt as to his 
opinion, he argued that there was no appropriate strategic policy with regard to ASW, 
and that the rudimentary tactical policy in place was largely based on the Atlantic 
Convoy Instructions of 1943. It was thus a policy altogether unsuited for South African 
waters and its unique operational conditions. 
Howard-Johnston was particularly alarmed that this state of affairs continued to 
exist after the three years of naval war, and two separate U-boat offensives off the South 
African coast. He pointed out the need for the appointment of an A/S Officer on the staff 
of the South Atlantic Station to coordinate all A/S work, as well as regular visits by 
officers with practical A/S experience to help with training and operations. 
Under Howard-Johnston’s watch, a tactical policy applicable to local operational 
circumstances was drawn up. In brief, the tactical policy focussed on avoiding attacks by 
U-boats as far as possible through appropriate A/S measures. At the same time, the 
surface and air units would be informed of the appropriate offensive actions to take in 
the event of an attack on a U-boat. Howard-Johnston was satisfied that most of the 
recommendations which he made to Tait and his staff were well received, and 
subsequently put into action in South African waters. One of the immediate results of 
the improvements in ASW during the latter half of 1943 stands out. It is the location and 
destruction of U-197 towards the end of August, which coincided with Howard-
Johnston’s visit to the Union.586 
 Between 16 and 18 August 1943, a number of HF/DF stations in South Africa 
picked up several wireless transmissions sent between the BdU, U-181 (Lüth), U-197 
(Bartels) and U-196 (Kentrat). The sole purpose of these indiscriminate wireless 
transmissions was to arrange a routine rendezvous between the three U-boats for the 
exchange of a new secret cypher called ‘Bellatrix’, as well as for further operational 
instructions. On 19 August, U-181 met U-197 in an area approximately 100 miles to the 
south of Cape St Marie in Madagascar. Lüth subsequently took it upon himself to meet 
up with Kentrat 280 miles south-west of his current position. The two U-boats met the 
following day, during which they picked up a wireless transmission from Bartels stating 
that an aircraft had attacked him. It was the Combined Headquarters in Cape Town 
                                                             
585  TNA, ADM 1/12643, Anti-Submarine Operations – South Atlantic Station. Report of Captain 
Howard-Johnston’s Visit to the Cape, Oct 1943. 
586  TNA, ADM 1/12643, Anti-Submarine Operations – South Atlantic Station. Report of Captain 
Howard-Johnston’s Visit to the Cape, Oct 1943. 
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which had utilised the former wireless interceptions to accurately pinpoint the position 
of U-197 in the southern extremity of the Mozambican channel. The location of the U-
boat was fixed to an operational area approximately 250 miles south-west of Cape St 
Marie in Madagascar. Catalinas from No. 259 RAF Squadron in St Lucia were ordered to 
work at the limits of their endurance by joining the search for the U-boat. The aircraft 
subsequently rebased to Tulear in south-western Madagascar, which they continued to 
use as a forward operating base throughout the operation.587 
 
Fig 5.6: Robert Bartels – the commander of U-197588 
 Shortly after midday on 20 August, Catalina C/259, piloted by Flt Lt O. Barnett, 
sighted U-197. The U-Boat had surfaced approximately 300 miles to the south-west of 
Cape St Marie. Barnett immediately launched an attack and succeeded in dropping at 
least six depth-charges on U-197. An unequivocal reply came from the U-boat in the 
form of machinegun and canon fire throughout the attack, though the Catalina received 
no damage. Barnett realised the success of his attack as the U-boat critically listed to 
port while leaking a substantial amount of diesel oil.589 The U-boat submerged for a 
brief while in the afternoon, whereafter it surfaced and once more tried to engage the 
Catalina. In the meanwhile, Barnett had dropped smoke- and flare-floats, while awaiting 
the arrival of more aircraft from St Lucia. Throughout the afternoon Barnett continued 
to circle U-197, keeping constant visual contact with the stricken U-boat. Later in the 
afternoon, shortly before dark, Catalina N/265, piloted by Flt Off C.E. Robin, joined 
Barnett and commenced a final onslaught on U-197. During this final attack, Robin made 
                                                             
587  Turner et al. War in the Southern Oceans, pp. 234-235. 
588  https://uboat.net/men/commanders/43.html (Accessed 6 May 2018). 
589  TNA, ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic War Diary, January to October 1943. South Atlantic War 
Diary, Aug 1943. 
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three runs during which six depth-charges managed to find their targets successfully. 
This final attack proved fatal, and Bartels and his U-boat disappeared below the surface 
for one last time, leaving only a large patch of diesel oil behind to confirm the successful 
kill (see Map 5.4).590 
 
Map 5.4: Location of the sinking of U-197 
 While the sinking of U-197 proved the first sole air success during the course of 
the naval war in the Southern Oceans,591 it also highlighted the great strides made 
regarding ASW in these waters. The ASW measures in force by August 1943 certainly 
stand in stark contrast to those implemented during October 1942. The establishment 
of convoys, the provision of adequate air and naval escorts, as well near continuous A/S 
and coastal air patrols along the South African coastline, had effectively robbed the U-
boats of their initial operational advantage. This is evident through the near monthly 
reduction in the number of merchant sinkings in South African waters. While the U-
boats still scored some operational successes, these were few and far between. More 
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importantly, however, the UDF and South Atlantic Station had succeeded in securing 
control over the operational initiative in the Southern Oceans. This control was mainly 
imposed through the increasing interception and pinpointing of U-boat positions by the 
HF/DF stations in the Union. The sinking of U-197 also ushered in an entirely new phase 
in the naval war, one where the UDF and South Atlantic Station moved over to the 
offensive and instituted a number of combined operations aimed at the destruction of 
U-boats. 
5.3 Reduced sinkings, combined operations, and the culmination of the naval war 
The BdU ceased to regard the waters off the South African coast as a viable operational 
area from September 1943. It was initially argued by the BdU that the submarines 
earmarked for offensive operations in the Far East would inevitably pass through South 
African waters before reaching their far-eastern bases at Penang and Surabaya. This 
would provide the U-boats with ample opportunity to attack Allied merchant shipping 
along the South African coastline, which would take place during their journeys to and 
from their new operational areas. This line of argument is more or less accurate. 
However, one cannot separate the disregard shown by the BdU for the South African 
coast as an operational area from the drastically improved ASW measures in these 
waters. In point of fact, the ASW measures in place in the Southern Oceans by the latter 
half of 1943 had been so efficient that the U-boats found it increasingly difficult to 
operate successfully against merchant shipping. There were, however, exceptions to the 
rule, with nine merchantmen lost off the South African coast between March 1944 and 
February 1945 (see Graph 5.6).592 
 Stephen Roskill has a hypothesis about the triumph in the war against the U-
boats. He asserts that the decisive victory was the result of the adoption of the largely 
defensive strategy of sailing merchant shipping in convoys, and providing such convoys 
with strong surface and air escorts. He further states that the British desire to assume 
the offensive against the U-boats during the first two years of the war was not well 
thought through and ultimately disastrous. The persistent employment of a large 
number of RN vessels to hunt U-boats in the vast oceans spaces, he argued, was 
counterproductive. This was because the vessels could do better by providing escort 
duties to the large number of ocean-going convoys. It is a known fact that these hunting 
groups achieved negligible successes during the naval war, especially since it led to the 
dispersal of the slender naval resources available to the Allies for ASW. Besides, the 
dispersal of these slender resources resulted in the ineffective escorting of convoys, 
which naturally led to heavy operational losses on the part of merchant shipping in 
particular. Furthermore, several tactical opportunities were missed to engage the U-
boats which attacked the convoys. The failure to enter into combat was due to the lack 
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of sufficient escort forces. The initial belief that bomber aircraft could largely defeat the 
U-boat peril through strategic bombing campaigns was misconstrued. This was so 
particularly since focusing aerial attacks against the Axis submarine bases – rather than 
protecting and escorting convoys on the open sea – did not prove to yield the required 
operational results during the war. According to Roskill, the most effective way of 
defeating the U-boat peril was to focus the operational attention on the area in which 
the U-boats were most likely to attack merchant shipping, and then launch a series of 
combined operations aimed at locating and destroying said U-boats.593 
 
Graph 5.6: Decreased merchant shipping losses in South African waters, 1943-1945594 
 From the end of August 1943, the primary concern of the South Atlantic Station 
was the interception and destruction of U-boats travelling between Germany and the 
Far East as they rounded the Cape of Good Hope. Tait and his staff realised that the 
chances of success in the pursuit of this endeavour was negligible. Yet they did profess 
that certain operational exigencies experienced by the U-boats while traversing the 
Cape of Good Hope worked in their favour. The large operational distances between 
Germany and the Far East, as well as the small reserve of fuel carried by each U-boat, 
meant that even moderate damage caused to a U-boat during an attack could ensure 
eventual operational results. Even if the A/S hunting forces did not obtain a 
straightforward kill, any attack on a U-boat ensured that it expended extra fuel. All told, 
the essence of these attacks was to harry the U-boats to a point of exhaustion. Gordon-
Cumming makes an interesting assertion. He maintains that while both SANF and RN 
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vessels formed part of each of the carefully planned combined operations in South 
African waters, it was only SAAF and RAF aircraft that managed to locate the U-boats 
and attack them during the course of these operations. Nevertheless, the combined 
operations required a great deal of unity of action and purpose to ensure their 
success.595 
 By the latter half of 1943, the SAAF and RAF pilots involved in A/S sorties around 
the South African coast became somewhat adept at the tactical and operational 
intricacies that underpinned an aerial attack on a U-boat. A Cape Fortress Intelligence 
Summary of December 1942 highlights the fact that a pilot about to strike a U-boat has 
only a small window of time during which to decide how to approach the attack. 
The intelligence summary identified six important factors that pilots had to 
consider during an assault on a U-boat. First, within fifteen seconds of diving, the 
submarine would have travelled at least 150 feet. Second, fifteen seconds after diving, 
the submarine would be at an average depth of 45 feet. Third, the conning-tower would 
have deviated a distance of 10 feet to either side, with the turning circle of the U-boat 
becoming sharper as time lapses. Fourth, the psychological reaction of a U-boat skipper 
is to crash-dive and turn either to port or starboard in an effort to put the greatest 
distance between him and the aircraft. Fifth, submarines are more likely to crash-dive 
as opposed to normal dive upon attack. And last, as a submarine is approximately 200 
feet long, 20 feet wide, and 16 feet high, aircraft should set their depth charges to 
explode at a depth of 50 feet and then drop them at 30 foot intervals in order to ensure 
success during an attack. If pilots kept the above six factors into account, they were only 
required to worry about the time it would take their aircraft to reach the spot where the 
U-boat had dived, as this naturally affected the position where they could drop their 
depth-charges. The intelligence summary finally cautioned the pilots that not all U-boats 
dived when attacked by aircraft and that some preferred to fight it out with the aircraft 
using their AA guns.596 
 Under the auspices of the Commander Coastal Air Defences, A/S training for 
SAAF pilots in 1943 became more practical. The unique operational conditions along 
the South African coastline were a primary factor of this. In an A/S lecture delivered by 
a certain Wg Cdr Lombard in February 1943, the South African pilots were reminded of 
the importance of keeping a constant visual lookout while on A/S patrols. Lombard 
encouraged the pilots to establish a definite lookout system among their crews and to 
rotate the member on lookout every 30 minutes to avoid fatigue. The lecture 
furthermore dismissed the idea that locating a U-boat came down to the individual luck 
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596  DOD Archives, CFAD, Box 12, File: Cape Fortress Intelligence Summary. Cape Fortress Intelligence 
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of each aircraft crew. He reminded the pilots of that which experience had proven: that 
the most effective aircraft in terms of ASW were those whose crews were the most 
efficient and well-trained. The lecture further suggested that aircraft in patrols aimed at 
locating U-boats should fly at a maximum height of 5,000 feet, and depending on cloud 
cover, adjust their height to fly just below it. Pilots were also encouraged to use cloud 
cover to their advantage, and conceal their impending attack by only breaking cover 
two miles from the U-boat. The highly specialised nature of ASW, in general, was once 
more emphasised by Lombard, while he cautioned the pilots to remain continuously 
aware of the seriousness of the U-boat peril along the South African coast. Lombard, in 
conclusion, wished the pilots ‘Good Hunting’, and stated that “success will be yours if 
you keep yourself in constant training.”597 
 The series of combined operations launched in South African waters from the 
latter half of 1943 arguably heralded in the culmination of the A/S operations off the 
South African coast for the remainder of the war. Between November 1943 and August 
1944, there were at least eight such combined operations launched with the sole 
intention of locating and destroying U-boats traversing the Cape of Good Hope. 
Throughout this period, both South African and British naval, air and ground forces 
cooperated in the execution of the combined operations. The individual operations 
were: BARRAGE598 (9 Nov 1943); BUSTARD599 (3 Dec 1943); WOODCUTTER600 (4 Jan 
1944); WICKETKEEPER601 (8 Mar 1944); THROTTLE602 (31 May 44); STEADFAST603 
(12 Jun 1944); TRICOLOUR604 (5 Jul 1944); and VEHEMENT605 (4 Aug 1944) (see Table 
5.4). These operations were the result of the increasing successes evolving from the 
interception of wireless transmissions of the U-boats by the HF/DF stations in the 
Union. Of these eight operations, only two, WICKETKEEPER and TRICOLOUR, managed 
to locate and engage U-boats.606 A detailed discussion of Operation WICKETKEEPER in 
particular, will reveal the unprecedented success of the combined operations along the 
                                                             
597  DOD Archives, Commander Fortress Air Defence (CFAD), Box 12, File: Attacks on U-boats and 
submarines. Lecture on A/S warfare by Wing Commander Lombard, 22 February 1943. 
598  DOD Archives, Diverse, Group 1, Box 125, File: Barrage II. Circular from C-in-C South Atlantic to 
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600  DOD Archives, Diverse, Group 1, Box 125, File: Woodcutter. Operation Woodcutter ops order, 1 Jan 
1944. 
601  DOD Archives, Diverse, Group 1, Box 125, File: Operation Wicketkeeper. Operation Wicketkeeper, 
8 Mar 1944. 
602  DOD Archives, Diverse, Group 1, Box 126, File: Operation “Throttle”. Operation Throttle ops order, 
30 May 1944. 
603  DOD Archives, Diverse, Group 1, Box 126, File: Operation “Steadfast”. Operation Steadfast ops 
order, 12 Jun 1944. 
604  DOD Archives, Diverse, Group 1, Box 126, File: Operation Tricolour (location + destruction U-
boat). Message from Admiralty to C-in-C SA re Operation Tricolour, 25 Jul 1944. 
605  DOD Archives, Diverse, Group 1, Box 123, File: Operation Vehement. Operational order for 
Operation Vehement, 5 Aug 1944. 
606  Gordon-Cumming, Official History of the South African Naval Forces, pp. 89-91. 
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South African coast during the war. WICKETKEEPER was the only one of the operations 
during which a U-boat was successfully located, tracked, attacked and sunk. 
 Operation WICKETKEEPER Operation TRICOLOUR 
Period 8-11 March 1944 5-8 July 1944 






Object Location + destruction of U-boats Location + destruction of U-boat 
Naval Forces 
HMS Lady Elsa 
HMS Lewes 
HMS Norwich City 








22 SAAF Sqn (Mtubatuba) 
23 TBR SAAF Sqn (Phesantekraal) 
25 SAAF Sqn (Port Elizabeth) 
27 TBR SAAF Sqn (Phesantekraal) 




Yes, visually and through D/F on several 
occasions 
Yes, visually and through D/F 
Target Engaged 
Yes, U-178 depth-charged by a Ventura on 
8 March, and UIT-22 strafed and depth-
charged throughout 11 March 
Yes, engaged on two separate occasions by 
aircraft during which U-boat was strafed 
and depth-charged 
Outcome UIT-22 successfully sunk 
Unidentified U-boat severely damaged, not 
sunk 
Table 5.4: Comparison between Operations WICKETKEEPER and TRICOLOUR607 
 By the beginning of March 1944, the operational conditions off the South African 
coast once more changed. Both the UDF and South Atlantic Station had been lulled into a 
false sense of security since September 1943. As a result of this feeling of safety, there 
was a marked reduction in the number of coastal air patrols along the seaboard. 
Independent sailings between Cape Town and Durban were also reintroduced. The 
operational conditions, however, soon underwent change. In November 1943, the BdU 
ordered U-178 (Spahr), then based at Penang in the Far East, to return to Europe. It was 
to expend its torpedoes on the voyage home across the Indian Ocean. By the end of 
December, U-178 had refuelled from the Charlotte Schliemann 200 miles to the south of 
Mauritius. It had then travelled onwards with the explicit aim of making good a 
rendezvous with UIT-22 (Wunderlich) to the south of Cape Town. While journeying 
south, American aircraft attacked UIT-22 near Ascension Island and caused 
considerable damage and a loss of fuel. The planned meeting between U-178 and UIT-22 
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was the result of this attack, with Spahr ordered to refuel Wunderlich’s damaged U-
boat.608 
 
Fig 5.7: Karl Wunderlich – the commander of UIT-22609 
 On 5 March, the HF/DF stations in the Union established such a good fix on the 
indiscriminate wireless transmissions of U-178, that the UDF and South Atlantic Station 
ordered an immediate A/S operation with the sole aim of locating and destroying the 
westbound U-boat. The combined operation, with the appropriate codename 
WICKETKEEPER, started on 8 March. It saw sterling cooperation between both British 
and South African naval, air and ground forces (see Map 5.5).610 Two SANF vessels, 
HMSAS Southern Barrier and HMSAS Roodepoort, immediately left Cape Town and 
proceeded to patrol an area roughly 140 miles south-south-west of Cape Agulhas. 
Concurrently, HMS Lady Elsa, HMS Lewes and HMS Norwich City extended their patrol 
60 miles further south. Meanwhile, several SAAF and RAF aircraft flew A/S patrols in 
the hope of locating U-178. On 8 March, a Ventura from No. 25 SAAF Squadron sighted 
U-178 approximately 350 miles to the south of Port Elizabeth. The aircraft attacked U-
178 with five depth-charges after it had dived. The U-boat, however, received no 
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damage, and Spahr continued his journey to the intended rendezvous with an increased 
sense of vigilance after the attack.611 
 
Map 5.5: Operation WICKETKEEPER and the sinking of UIT-22 
 The staff of the South Atlantic Station correctly judged that the intensive aerial 
patrols would coerce Spahr into travelling further away from the coast. They thus 
ordered all aircraft involved in WICKETKEEPER to extend their patrols 60 miles further 
south and west over the following days. On the morning of 11 March, a Catalina from 
No. 262 RAF Squadron operating out of Langebaan, spotted something 600 miles to the 
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south of Cape Point. The aircraft, piloted by Flt Lt F.T. Roddick, identified UIT-22, and 
not U-178 as expected. Roddick initiated an attack on UIT-22 post-haste. Wunderlich, 
showing no intention to dive, responded with a salvo of anti-aircraft fire from his U-
boat. During the ensuing attack, Roddick managed to drop five depth-charges on UIT-22 
which all met their intended target. While listing heavily, UIT-22 submerged amidst a 
large patch of oil. After a few minutes, the U-boat once more surfaced, but accurate 
machinegun fire from Roddick compelled Wunderlich to dive once more. During the 
attack, Roddick’s Catalina received some damage from the accurate anti-aircraft fire laid 
down by Wunderlich, and he soon had to return to base. Two more Catalinas relieved 
Roddick, and when UIT-22 surfaced for one last time, Flt Lt A.H. Surridge and Flt Lt E.S.S. 
Nash simultaneously attacked the U-boat with depth-charges and machinegun fire.612 
The fate of UIT-22 was hence sealed. Spahr, in a fitting conclusion, best described the 
deteriorating operational conditions for the U-boats in South African waters when he 
answered his own question: “Where is one safe nowadays on the high seas? 
Nowhere.”613 
 
Fig 5.8: Flt Lt Nash homing in on UIT-22 during the final attack614 
                                                             
612  DOD Archives, SAAF War Diaries, Box 124, File: A4 (23 Sqn Jan–Dec 1944). 23 Squadron SAAF 
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 The fact that only nine merchantmen were lost in South African waters between 
April 1944 and February 1945 bears testimony to the efficiency of the combined 
operations in the Southern Oceans, particularly since these operations removed the 
operational initiative from the U-boats. For the remainder of the war, A/S activities off 
South Africa were limited to the combined operations mentioned before. Moreover, the 
Admiralty, in particular, was very pleased with the successes of ASW off the Union’s 
coast. In a mid-1944 message to Tait, after the apparent success during Operation 
TRICOLOUR, they stated “… [as] this is the second consecutive operation in which a U-
boat passing through your area has been successfully located and probably destroyed… 
[it] reflects [positively on] the high standard of operational control.”615 During the 
remainder of the war, the South Atlantic Station busied itself with continuous training 
and A/S exercises involving all RN and SANF vessels and shore establishments, as well 
as RAF and SAAF squadrons.616 
 It is Pierre van Ryneveld, however, who has the final word on the sterling 
cooperation that existed between the South Atlantic Station and the greater UDF in the 
pursuit of the ASW off the South African coast between 1942 and 1944. In a personal 
letter to Tait, shortly before his departure as C-in-C South Atlantic Station, Van Ryneveld 
writes: 
I wish to convey the deep appreciation of the SANF for your generous 
tribute. In the relinquishment of your command the SANF feel that they 
are indeed losing a friend whose sympathetic guidance has been of 
inestimable value to the service. I cannot let this opportunity pass without 
paying tribute to your services to the UDF from the Army and Air Force 
angle. I am not unmindful of the fact that it was due entirely to your 
wisdom and initiative that the Combined Headquarters of Coastal Areas 
was brought into being. It is this step that proved such a major factor in 
the cooperation and smooth working of the combined staffs of the Royal 
Navy and Coastal Area of the UDF, and [which has] been instrumental in 
promoting the general efficiency in guarding the coasts of the Union.617 
Conclusion 
Before the commencement of the first sustained German U-boat offensive off the South 
African coast, there prevailed a somewhat uninspired attitude in the Union towards 
ASW. The fact that the South African and British naval authorities professed that they 
would only become aware of the presence of U-boats off South Africa upon receipt of 
                                                             
615  DOD Archives, Diverse, Group 1, Box 126, File: Operation Tricolour (location + destruction U-
boat). Message from Admiralty to C-in-C SA re Operation Tricolour, 25 Jul 1944. 
616  TNA, ADM 1/17587, A/S Organisation in South Africa. Report on the A/S Organisation in South 
Africa by Lt Cdr R.N. Hankey, 16 Apr 1945. 
617  DOD Archives, Diverse, Group 1, Box 123, File: Organisation – General. Personal correspondence 
from CGS to C-in-C South Atlantic, 2 Jun 1944.  
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the first reports of their attacks, points this out to a degree. Once these attacks 
materialised, and upon the activation of the appropriate Allied ASW defensive 
measures, the Eisbär group steadily lost its initial operational edge. This advantage had, 
of course, been gained during their surprise attacks of October 1942. 
There was a marked evolution in ASW measures employed in South African 
waters between October 1942 and August 1943. These measures have a direct 
correlation with the sharp decline in the number of merchants lost in said waters. There 
were several main developments concerning ASW. These involved the establishment of 
group sailings and escorted convoys along the Union’s coast; the provision of adequate 
surface and air escorts for these convoys; and the introduction of regular surface and air 
A/S patrols. Other signs of progress included the increasing effectiveness of the HF/DF 
stations in pinpointing the location of U-boats operational along coast; and the 
establishment of a Combined Operations Room at the Combined Headquarters in Cape 
Town, which formalised and centralised control over all ASW measures and operations 
in South Africa. Finally, combined operations were introduced from the end of 1943 
with the explicit purposes of locating and destroying U-boats.  
 These ASW measures ensured that the UDF and the South Atlantic Station 
regained the operational initiative and control over South African territorial waters and 
the vital shipping lanes that passed through it. It is important to realise that without 
British materiel and operational support regarding ASW, the South African authorities 
could hardly have achieved any notable successes owing to a lack of trained personnel 
and outdated equipment. Providentially, both the UDF and the South Atlantic Station 
made a stark realisation. They became aware of the fact that only through a continuous 
process of evaluating the theoretical and operational approaches to ASW – due to the 
ever-changing operational exigencies – could success in the naval war against U-boats 
be guaranteed. The outcome was that both South African and British military personnel 
received constant training concerning ASW. The training often came from British A/S 
experts. This ensured that the personnel kept abreast of the evolution of ASW. 
The best criterion by which to judge the successes of ASW in South African 
waters, however, remains the sinking of the three German U-boats in the Southern 
Oceans between 1942 and 1944. The sinkings of U-179, U-197 and UIT-22, arguably 
occurred at the beginning, at the height, and at the end of the German U-boat offensives 
in South African waters. They thus positively reflect on the vast improvements made 
regarding ASW is these waters. Ironically, however, these were British operational 
successes. No South African naval or air unit was involved in any of the three final acts 
that resulted in the sinkings of the U-boats in South African waters. South Africa thus 
wholly relied on British naval and air support to help secure its territorial waters, as 
well as the strategic shipping lanes that passed around its coastline.  
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Conclusion 
The purpose of this study is to provide a critical, comprehensive analysis of the Axis and 
Allied maritime operations around the southern African coast between 1939 and 1945. 
In doing so, it introduces a fresh, in-depth discussion of the topic, based on extensive 
archival research in South Africa and the United Kingdom, as well as a wealth of 
secondary source material. The broad topic has been investigated using a number of 
research objectives that focussed on specific aspects related to the greater maritime 
war waged off the South African coast. These particular aspects encompass the rival 
Axis and Allied maritime strategies in the Southern Oceans, the development of the 
South African coastal defence system, the Axis maritime operations, the maritime 
intelligence war, and, finally, the anti-submarine (A/S) war waged off the southern 
African coast during the Second World War. This is the first study to attempt an analysis 
of these characteristics of the maritime war. 
 For the full extent of these Axis and Allied maritime strategies in South African 
waters to be grasped, one has to accept that shipping forms the foundation of 
understanding the rival maritime strategies. The availability of merchant shipping for 
key imports and exports to and from the Union proved crucial to the continued 
functioning of the South African war economy between 1939 and 1945. Sourcing this 
shipping, however, proved immensely problematic. This was because South Africa often 
desired more imports than the Allied shipping programmes could provide. The 
introduction of a number of control measures, such as a priority rating system and the 
establishment of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, helped to incrementally 
ease the Union’s wartime shipping problems to manageable proportions. 
 The strategic location of South Africa astride the main maritime trade routes 
around the Cape of Good Hope ensured that a large number of naval and merchant 
vessels visited its harbours throughout the war. The Union naturally had to exercise 
control over all the shipping which visited its ports. At the same time, it had to make 
adequate provision for the victualling and repair of all naval and merchant vessels 
calling at Union harbours. The establishment of the South African Ports Allocation 
Executive and the appointment of the Controller of Ship Repairs helped the South 
African authorities to exercise adequate control over the large numbers of naval and 
merchant shipping visiting its ports. The South African contribution to the larger Allied 
war effort in this regard continues to remain under-appreciated. 
 The outbreak of the Second World War coincided with the South African desire 
to gain complete control over its naval and coastal defences. South Africa was 
determined to realise this desire on both political and military levels, though the 
practical realities of this naval determinism only came into effect after the 
establishment of the Seaward Defence Force (SDF) in January 1940. The war naturally 
created an opportunity, and served as a catalyst, for the Union to successfully address 
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the question of control over its naval and coastal defences. The matter of control of 
Simon’s Town, however, was deferred until well into the 1950s. Even though the SDF 
and South African Naval Forces (SANF) to a minimal degree served with exception in 
South Africa’s naval and coastal defence, the Union never truly exercised complete 
maritime control over its territorial waters. Throughout the war, South Africa had to 
rely on the British Admiralty for operational, technical, administrative and logistic 
support. This support was needed to realise and maintain command of South African 
territorial waters and the maritime trade routes passing along its coastline. 
 While the Royal Navy (RN) retained command of the high seas, it relinquished 
control of the South African ports and coasts to the SDF and SANF. South Africa simply 
wasn’t in a position to exercise any command over its territorial waters during the war. 
In point of fact, it was the RN that conducted the majority of offensive and defensive 
wartime naval operations in South African waters.  
The South Africans, however, demonstrated both willingness and ingenuity to 
adapt to each peculiar operational circumstance. These qualities, and their ability to 
learn the appropriate lessons, made up for any deficiencies regarding expertise, 
personnel or equipment throughout the war. By August 1945, South Africa had created 
a comprehensive system of naval and coastal defences, which helped the Allied forces to 
realise command at sea in the Southern Oceans. The true measure of the effectiveness of 
the South African naval and coastal defences was the occurrence of the Axis maritime 
operations along its coastline, which reached a peak between October 1942 and August 
1943. 
 Both the Oberkommando der Marine (OKM) and the Seekriegsleitung (SKL) 
realised the strategic importance of the Cape Town/Freetown shipping route. They 
maintained that far-flung operations in the Southern Oceans could prove feasible if 
there was sufficient sinking potential to justify such distant naval operations. The Axis 
naval forces effectively operated off the South African coast between 1939 and 1945, 
with the main operations occurring from June 1942 to August 1943. By the end of the 
war, the Axis maritime operations accounted for 158 ships sunk in South African 
waters. This amounted to a staggering 910,638 tons of merchant and naval shipping 
lost. Of this number, naval mines accounted for 1.23% (11,211 tons), raiders/warships 
for 13.70% (124,803 tons), and submarines for an astonishing 85.06% (774,624 tons) 
of all shipping lost. When the figures in South African waters are isolated, the results 
seem impressive. However, when compared to the global outcome of the Axis maritime 
operations, the sinking results in South African waters are far less significant. In fact, the 
losses to Axis maritime operations in South African waters form a mere 5.15% of the 
global losses to Axis maritime operations. 
 The success of the Axis maritime operations in South African waters cannot be 
quantified in percentages and mere tonnage lost.  Axis triumphs should rather be 
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evaluated in terms of the strategic effect that they created during the war. Their 
operations succeeded in causing a notable amount of inconvenience and anxiety for the 
Allies. Above all, the principal aim was achieved. This involved destroying shipping and 
forcing the adoption of convoys. The Axis powers also created a grim economic and 
financial set of circumstances for the Allies by forcing the deployment of strong naval 
forces to protect vast sea routes. From October 1942, the operational conditions in 
South African waters deteriorated considerably due to South African and Allied anti-
submarine (A/S) operations. As a matter of fact, by August 1943, the SKL and 
Befehlshaber der U-Boote (BdU) ceased to consider South African waters as a viable 
operational area with sufficient sinking potential to justify such distant operations. 
 The maritime intelligence war waged in southern Africa during the Second 
World War informed both the Axis maritime operations and Allied countermeasures to 
some degree. The maritime intelligence war was, however, incredibly complex in 
nature, and involved multiple role-players.  
The Axis influence on the maritime intelligence war in southern Africa proved 
negligible from the start. The initial contacts established between Germany and the 
Ossewabrandwag were haphazard in nature. This was principally a consequence of the 
German desire to establish contact with the leader of the official parliamentary 
opposition – D.F. Malan – rather than Hans van Rensburg. These initial contacts also had 
no immediate bearing on the maritime war in South African waters. It was indeed only 
Hans Rooseboom, and later Lothar Sittig, who had some degree of an influence on the 
maritime intelligence war in South Africa. Both agents at various stages passed along 
shipping intelligence to Berlin via the Trompke Network in Lourenço Marques, although 
the value of this intelligence was questionable. 
 Once Sittig established direct contact with Berlin, he was able to transmit both 
political and military intelligence without interference from the German Embassy in 
Lourenço Marques. Moreover, the operational value of the military intelligence passed 
along by Sittig to Berlin remained exceedingly questionable. This was a result of the 
shipping intelligence being largely outdated by the time it was transmitted to Berlin. 
Apart from this complication, two-way transmissions between Sittig and Berlin were 
only established in July 1943, shortly before the SKL and BdU ceased to consider South 
African waters as a viable operational area. The shipping intelligence passed on to 
Berlin by the FELIX Organisation after July 1943 thus held no direct operational value to 
Karl Dönitz and his U-boat Commanders for the remainder of the war. 
 The Cape Naval Intelligence Centre (CNIC) proved to be the leading role player in 
the Allied maritime intelligence war fought in southern Africa between 1939 and 1945. 
Located in Cape Town, the CNIC formed a vital link in the overall Allied maritime 
intelligence organisation during the war. It presided over both operational intelligence 
and counterintelligence in the Cape Intelligence Area. The various sub-departments of 
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the CNIC in Cape Town worked in unison during the prosecution of the naval war. These 
included tracking, operational intelligence, security, and naval press relations and 
censorship. The “Y” Organisation in South Africa, and in particular its High-
Frequency/Direction Finding (HF/DF stations), proved indispensable in pinpointing the 
locations of all Axis naval vessels in South African waters. It also listened in on the illicit 
wireless transmissions in the Union and Mozambique. The successes of the A/S 
operations in the Southern Oceans are without a doubt directly related to the 
operational successes of the “Y” Organisation. 
 Before the onset of the first sustained German U-boat offensive off the South 
African coast in 1942, there existed a clear attitude of indifference in the Union with 
regards to anti-submarine warfare (ASW). The fact that the South African and British 
naval authorities disclosed that they would only become aware of the presence of U-
boats in the Southern Oceans upon receipt of the first reports of their attacks, highlights 
this indifference to some degree. Once these naval attacks materialised, however, and 
upon the activation of the appropriate Allied ASW measures, the Eisbär group steadily 
lost the inceptive operational advantage gained during their surprise attacks of October 
1942. 
 Moreover, there was a growing sophistication in the ASW measures employed in 
South African waters between October 1942 and August 1943. These measures 
furthermore had a direct correlation with the sharp decline in the observed loss of 
merchantmen in these waters. The main developments concerning ASW were the 
establishment of group sailings and escorted convoys along the Union’s coast; the 
provision of adequate surface and air escorts for these convoys; the introduction of 
regular surface and air A/S patrols, and the increasing effectiveness of the HF/DF 
stations in pinpointing the location of U-boats operational along the coast. Additionally, 
the establishment of a Combined Operations Room in Cape Town formalised and 
centralised control over all ASW measures and operations in the Southern Oceans. The 
introduction of combined operations from the end of 1943 – with the explicit purpose of 
locating and destroying U-boats operating along the South African coast – was the final 
development regarding ASW in these waters. 
 Thanks to these ASW measures, the Union Defence Force (UDF) and the RN’s 
South Atlantic Station had regained the operational initiative and control over South 
African territorial waters and the associated vital shipping lanes by the end of 1943. 
However, without British materiel and operational support, the South African defence 
authorities could hardly have achieved any notable ASW successes. This was due to a 
lack of the trained personnel and their outdated equipment. The UDF and the South 
Atlantic Station did nonetheless make an important realisation. They understood that 
success in the naval war could only be achieved through a continuous process of 
evaluating the theoretical and operational approaches to ASW due to the ever-changing 
operational exigencies in the Southern Oceans. As a result, both South African and 
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British naval personnel received constant training concerning ASW, often from British 
A/S experts. This ensured that they kept abreast of global developments associated with 
ASW. 
 The best measure of success regarding ASW in South African waters remains the 
sinking of the three German U-boats between 1942 and 1944. The sinkings of U-179, U-
197 and UIT-22, which arguably occurred at the start, the height, and at the termination 
of the German U-boat offensives in South African waters, positively reflects on the vast 
improvements made regarding ASW in these waters. These sinkings were, however, 
British operational successes, for no South African naval or air units were involved in 
any of the three final acts that resulted in the sinkings of these U-boats. South Africa 
thus wholly relied on British naval and air support to secure its territorial waters and 
the strategic shipping lanes that passed around its coastline. 
 When evaluating the all-encompassing nature of the Axis and Allied maritime 
operations around the southern Africa coast during the war, several concrete 
conclusions can be drawn. First and foremost, Neidpath was indeed correct when he 
stated that the three keys for continued control over the Indian Ocean was British 
possession of the Cape of Good Hope, Aden and Singapore. Moreover, continued Allied 
control over Gibraltar, Egypt and the Middle East was also crucial, largely because it 
guarded access over the principal maritime trade routes passing through the 
Mediterranean to the Atlantic and Indian oceans. The Italian entry into the war in June 
1940, and the concomitant closure of the strategic Mediterranean shipping route soon 
thereafter, along with the Japanese and American entry into the war in December 1941, 
and the fall of Singapore in February 1942, combined to create a dire military, economic 
and logistical situation for the greater Allied war effort. Control over the remaining two 
keys to the Indian Ocean, Aden and the Cape of Good Hope, thus assumed levels of 
strategic importance, largely due to the observed interconnectivity of the Allied war 
effort. Axis and Allied naval operations in the Atlantic Ocean during the ‘Battle of the 
Atlantic’ did also not occur in a vacuum, but had a marked influence of the naval war in 
the Indian and Pacific oceans at a strategic and operational level. The maritime trade 
routes rounding the Cape of Good Hope, which linked both the Atlantic and Indian 
oceans as well a key military theatres with one another, immediately became crucial to 
the larger Allied war effort. The Union of South Africa and the vital maritime trade 
routes that rounded its coast remained crucial to the Allied war effort until the 
reopening of the Mediterranean shipping route in 1943. The important contribution of 
South Africa to the larger Allied war effort in this regard, however, continues to remain 
underappreciated. 
 Second, the principal Axis maritime operations, which occurred between October 
1942 and August 1943, actually coincided with the period during which there was a 
marked decline in merchant and naval vessels calling at South African ports (see Graph 
1.8, page 34). The apparent sinking potential that South African waters held during 
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1942, and which initially prompted the OKM and SKL even to consider such distant 
naval operations, was thus an anomaly. In fact, the height of the sinking potential in 
South African waters occurred during the 1940/1941 fiscal year, when 11,082 
merchant and naval vessels, totalling some 46,831,026 gross tons, called at Union ports.  
 Third, it remains unsurprising that the OKM and SKL failed to obtain accurate 
naval intelligence detailing the unique shipping conditions in the Southern Oceans. The 
fact that two-way transmissions between Lothar Sittig and Berlin only realised in July 
1943, coupled with the questionable operational value of the naval intelligence 
transmitted to Berlin, serves as ample evidence to highlight the ineffective nature of the 
Axis intelligence network in southern Africa. The Trompke Network in Lourenço 
Marques, and the FELIX Organisation in South Africa, thus had a negligible impact on 
the Axis maritime operations in the Southern Oceans. 
 Fourth, even though the war served as the catalyst for South Africa to obtain 
complete authority over its naval and coastal defences, the Union never truly exercised 
total control over its maritime domain. South Africa had neither the operational 
capacity nor naval expertise needed to realise complete command of its territorial 
waters. It thus had to rely on the Admiralty for operational, technical, administrative 
and logistic support throughout the war. It was, in fact, the RN that conducted the 
majority of offensive and defensive naval operations in South African waters during the 
war. Nevertheless, by the end of the war, South Africa had created a comprehensive 
system of naval and coastal defences, which helped the Allied forces to realise its 
command of the Southern Oceans. More importantly, South Africa realised complete 
control over its maritime and coastal defences during the war. 
Despite the impressive nature of the Union’s naval and coastal defences, their 
deterrent value throughout the war remains debatable. It is true that the Axis naval 
forces never directly attacked a South African port during the war. This fact should, 
however, preferably be ascribed to the principal aim of the Axis maritime operations in 
the Southern Oceans, rather than to the deterrent value of the naval and coastal 
defences. Moreover, when considering that neither the fixed coastal nor naval defences 
ever fired a shot in anger during the war, their apparent deterrent value is somewhat 
negated. This begs the question whether there was not an over investment in the South 
African coastal and naval defences during the war. The available resources might well 
have been applied elsewhere to better serve the Allied war effort. 
Fifth, in general, however, the UDF emerged from the war far stronger and better 
equipped in terms of its naval and coastal defences. The Second World War, in fact, 
served as the catalyst for this marked change, with Britain providing key military 
equipment and assistance to the UDF throughout the war. The Army and the Air Force 
also naturally benefited from the war in terms of the procurement of modern arms and 
aircraft. This far-sightedness should well be accredited to Smuts, who continuously 
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pressed for greater South African participation in the larger Allied war effort. The result 
of this increased participation could to a large degree be measured in the 
transformation of the UDF from an ageing peacetime defence force in 1939, to one that 
could project offensive power across the African subcontinent and further afield by the 
cessation of hostilities in 1945. Moreover, the wartime experience of South African 
sailors, airmen and soldiers served the UDF well after the war, as South Africa assumed 
a far greater role in safeguarding its own sovereignty. 
 Sixth, the success of the Axis maritime operation in the Southern Oceans remains 
contentious. The OKM and SKL maintained that far-flung operations in South African 
waters could be justified through sufficient sinking potential and operational successes. 
Nevertheless, the sinking results are not as convincing (see Table 3.14, page 121). There 
is, in fact, an apparent disconnect between the sinking potential and actual sinking 
results obtained by the Axis naval forces in South African waters during the war (see 
Table 3.14, page 121; Graph 1.8, page 34). 
The success of the Axis maritime operations in South African waters is, however, 
best evaluated with regards to the strategic effect that it created. Moreover, these far-
flung operations achieved their principal aim – that of destroying merchant shipping, 
forcing the adoption of convoys, and creating an adverse economic and financial 
position for the Allies. Besides this, it also compelled the RN to deploy strong naval 
forces to protect vast sea global trade routes, as well as those passing around the Cape 
of Good Hope. As the operational conditions in South African waters steadily 
deteriorated during the latter half of 1942, the SKL and BdU ceased to consider South 
African waters as a viable operational area with sufficient sinking potential needed to 
justify the distant naval operations. 
 Seventh, the Allied intelligence network in southern Africa proved instrumental 
in the successful pursuit of the maritime war in the Southern Oceans. The CNIC formed 
an indispensable link in the overall Allied maritime intelligence organisation during the 
war. It did so by presiding over both operational intelligence and counterintelligence in 
the Cape Intelligence Area. The untiring efforts of the “Y” Organisation in South Africa 
during the war, prevented the Axis naval forces from ever gaining the operational upper 
hand in the Southern Oceans. The successes of the A/S operations in the Southern 
Oceans also has a direct correlation with the wartime operational successes of the “Y” 
Organisation in South Africa. 
 Finally, the sinking of the three German U-boats in South African waters between 
1942 and 1944 remained the optimal way to ascertain ASW successes in the Southern 
Oceans. These sinkings also positively reflect on the vast improvements made regarding 
ASW in the Southern Oceans. It is, however, an undeniable reality that these sinkings 
remained British operational successes, and they should thus be evaluated as such. 
South Africa was entirely reliant on British naval and air support to secure its territorial 
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waters and the strategic shipping lanes around the Cape of Good Hope. Without such 
support – and due to its lack of trained personnel and outdated equipment – the South 
African military authorities could hardly have achieved any significant ASW successes. 
The evolution of ASW measures in the Southern Oceans ultimately culminated in 
denying the Axis naval forces from obtaining the operational initiative and control in 
South African waters. 
 In conclusion, this dissertation demonstrates the all-encompassing nature and 
extent of the maritime war waged off southern Africa during the Second World War. 
This study further finds that the Axis and Allied maritime operations in the Southern 
Oceans were extremely complex in nature, especially when considering the several 
strategic, military and economic aspects that underpinned them. In gaining an 
understanding of these complex operations, the dissertation draws together several of 
the interrelated aspects that have formed the foundation of the maritime war waged off 
the South African coast. In doing so, this study builds on several previous studies. These 
analyses have generally not succeeded in recognising the apparent interrelatedness. 
Instead, they have provided only a compartmentalised discussion on single aspects 
associated with the maritime war. 
This study is novel in that it provides an unrivalled analysis of the Axis and Allied 
maritime operations in South African waters during the war. While addressing several 
previously disregarded aspects of the South African involvement in the Second World 
War, the dissertation definitely refocuses attention on the importance of the maritime 
trade routes passing along the South African coastline. The current importance of these 
trade routes, along with the accompanying issues of maintaining command at sea along 
the entire African coastline, are demonstrated by growing concerns over maritime 
insecurity in the Southern Oceans during the twenty-first century. 
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Diverse, Group 1, Box 125, File: Operation Wicketkeeper. Messages and Sitreps 
concerning Operation Wicketkeeper, Mar 1944. 
Diverse, Group 1, Box 126, File: Coastal appreciations general. A Japanese attack 
on South Africa: An appreciation from the enemy point of view, 29 Sept 1942. 
Diverse, Group 1, Box 126, File: Coastal appreciations general. Most secret 
communication between DECHIEF and OPPOSITELY regarding the scales of attack 
by sea and air in South African waters, 8 Apr 1943. 
Diverse, Group 1, Box 126, File: Operation “Throttle”. Operation Throttle ops 
order, 30 May 1944. 
Diverse, Group 1, Box 126, File: Operation “Steadfast”. Operation Steadfast ops 
order, 12 Jun 1944. 
Diverse, Group 1, Box 126, File: Operation Tricolour (location + destruction U-
boat). Message from Admiralty to C-in-C SA re Operation Tricolour, 25 Jul 1944. 
Diverse, Group 1, Box 127, File: Appreciations navy. C-in-C South Atlantic 
appreciation of the naval situation in the Cape area, 4 Oct 1942. 
6.1.3 Chief of the General Staff (War) 
CGS War, Box 38, File: Coast Defence Guns. Secret Proposal for the Modernisation 
of Coast Defences, 22 Jun 1938. 
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CGS War, Box 38, File: Coast Defence Equipment. Secret Policy on Coast Defence, 
16 Sept 1939. 
CGS War, Box 38, File: Port and Dock Security Measures. Extract from Col 
Webster’s report on security at the Port of Cape Town, undated (probably Jun 
1940). 
CGS War, Box 38, File: Port and Dock Security Measures. Memorandum of Meeting 
held at DHW re Docks Field Security, 15 Oct 1942. 
CGS War, Box 38, File: Port and Dock Security Measures. Notes of meeting held at 
DHQ in connection with the proposed formation of a Port Security Unit, 15 Oct 
1942. 
CGS War, Box 38, File: Blackouts and lighthouses. Correspondence between Tait 
and Van Ryneveld re coastal blackouts, 19 Jun 1942. 
CGS War, Box 38, File: Blackouts and lighthouses. Circular from Office of the C-in-
C South Atlantic Station (Tait) to Naval Liaison Officers at Durban, East London, 
Port Elizabeth and Cape Town re harbour and coast lights, 19 Jun 1942. 
CGS War, Box 38, File: Blackouts and lighthouses. Correspondence between 
Secretary of Defence and Minister of Justice re black-out conditions coastal area, 29 
Sept 1943. 
CGS War, Box 38, File: Blackouts and lighthouses. Letter from C-in-C South 
Atlantic to CGS, 31 May 1945. 
CGS War, Box 122, File: Raiders. Secret report on possible operation of Italian 
submarines in the Indian Ocean, 3 Jul 1940. 
CGS War, Box 122, File: Raiders. Most secret cable between DECHIEF and 
COASTCOM re sinking of German submarine off Cape Town, 9 Oct 1942. 
CGS War, Box226, File: Wireless stations (communications with). Secret note on 
the interception of illicit communications, 2 Nov 1939. 
CGS War, Box 226, File: W.T. stations: Ship to shore & ship to aircraft. Letter from 
Harlech to Smuts re Admiralty Policy with regard to wireless communication, 9 
Mar 1943. 
CGS War, Box 265, File: Sitreps coastal area. Most secret cypher between Coastcom 
and Dechief Fortcoms, 21 Aug 1943. 
CGS War, Box 265, File: Sitreps coastal area. Most secret Sitrep from Dechief Cape 
Town to Coastcom, 7 Mar 1944. 
6.1.4 Chief of the General Staff (Group 2) 
CGS, Group 2, Box 209, File: CGS/367/13/9. DCGS to Director of Training and 
Operations, 3 Aug 1939. 
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6.1.5 Commander Seaward Defences 
CSD, Box 15, File: Group sailing operations Union waters. Note on commencement 
and ceasing of group sailings, 1944. 
CSD, Box 15, File: Policy (escort groups). Note on commencement and ceasing of 
group sailings, 1944. 
CSD, Box 15, File: Policy (escort groups). CSD Approval of exchange with RN of A/S 
vessels, 15 Nov 1943. 
CSD, Box 15, File: Policy (escort groups). Personal correspondence between CSD 
and GOC coastal area re SANF vessels and A/S warfare, 30 Oct 1942. 
CSD, Box 15, File: Policy (escort groups). Correspondence between CSD and 
SANOi/c Durban re SANF A/S vessels on escort duties, 28 Apr 1943. 
CSD, Box 15, File: Policy (escort groups). Correspondence between CSD and 
SANOi/c Durban re participation of SANF vessels in convoy escorts from SA ports, 
23 Jan 1943. 
CSD, Box 25, File: SANF Escort Force exercises. Proposed Atlantic convoy 
instructions re action to counter U-boats anti-asdic tactics. 
CSD, Box 43, File: SANF Anti-submarine Warfare Committees. Minutes of A/S Sub-
Committee meeting coastal area headquarters, 12 Mar 1943. 
CSD, Box 43, File: SANF Anti-submarine Warfare Committees. Report by Officer 
Commanding HMSAS Gannet re U-boat warfare in the South Atlantic, 10 Jun 1943. 
CSD, Box 43, File: SANF Anti-Submarine Warfare Committees. U-boat Warfare in 
the South Atlantic – Analysis of Attack by U-boat, 10 Jun 1943. 
6.1.6 Secretary for Defence 
DC, Box 1973, File DC 396/38: SNO to Secretary for Defence, 28 Sept 1939. 
DC, Box 1973, File DC 396/38: Secretary for Defence to SNO, 30 Sept 1939. 
6.1.7 Union War Histories (Civil) 
UWH Civil, Box 1, File: The Five-Year Defence Plan, 1947. 
UWH Civil, Box 12, File: SA War Economy 1939-1945. Procurement of Supplies – 
SA Purchasing Organisation in USA. 
UWH Civil, Box 16, File: The War Time Shipping Problem. Introduction and 
Background to the Shipping Crisis of 1942/1943. 
UWH Civil, Box 16, File: The War Time Shipping Problem. Shipment of Union 
Government Cargo from the United Kingdom. 
UWH Civil, Box 16, File: The War Time Shipping Problem. The Beginning of 
Shipping Control over Commercial Cargo. 
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UWH Civil, Box 16, File: The War Time Shipping Problem. Clearing the 
Accumulation of Commercial Cargo, and the commencement of Combined Shipping 
Adjustment Board Procedure, Jun-Dec 1942. 
UWH Civil, Box 16, File: The War Time Shipping Problem. The Effect of Combined 
Shipping Procedure upon the Responsibilities of the Union High Commissioner’s 
Office 1942-1944. 
UWH Civil, Box 23, File: SA Railways and Harbours Departmental Civil War 
History Vol VIII – Addenda to Volumes I and II Ports and Shipping. Port 
Development. 
UWH Civil, Box 23, File: SA Railways and Harbours Departmental Civil War 
History Vol VIII – Addenda to Volumes I and II Ports and Shipping. Memorandum 
on the Ship Repair Organisation. 
UWH Civil, Box 23, File: SA Railways and Harbours Departmental Civil War 
History Vol VIII – Addenda to Volumes I and II Ports and Shipping. Establishment 
and Functioning of Controller of Ship Repairs. 
UWH Civil, Box 24, File: SA Railways and Harbours Departmental Civil War 
History Vol VIII. Ports & Shipping. 
UWH Civil, Box 25, File: Shipping Repairs. South Africa’s Achievement in Wartime 
Shipping Repairs. 
UWH Civil, Box 35, File PO/29. South African Purchasing Commission Inception 
and Organisation, 1940-1947. 
UWH Civil, Box 36. File: Shipping. Statement of Shipments from the United 
Kingdom during the Period Jan to Dec 1943. 
UWH Civil, Box 60, File: C 38. Wartime Shipping Problem. 
UWH Civil, Box 73, File: Year Book, Section XI. Shipping. 
UWH Civil, Box 86, File: MS 11. Coast Defence Policy, undated. 
UWH Civil, Box 107, File War/C/131: Coordination of Allied War Effort – Control 
of Supply and Shipping. Telegram from Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 
London, to Minister for External Affairs, Cape Town, 27 Jan 1942. 
UWH Civil, Box 107, File War/C/131: Coordination of Allied War Effort – Control 
of Supply and Shipping. Telegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 
London, to the Minister of External Affairs, Cape Town, 28 Jan 1942. 
UWH Civil, Box 107, File War/C/131: Coordination of Allied War Effort – Control 
of Supply and Shipping. Telegram from High Commissioner, London, to Minister 
for External Affairs, Cape Town, 2 Mar 1942. 
UWH Civil, Box 108, File: Import Control. Priority Rating. 
UWH Civil, Box 108, File: Import Control. Shipping Term Allocation. 
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UWH Civil, Box 110, File: Import Control. Shipping Term System. 
UWH Civil, Box 110, File: Procurement. Steel Shipment and Orders at Hand. 
UWH Civil, Box 110, File: Shipping. Shipment of Steel Supplies. 
UWH Civil, Box 111, File: Import Control. Certificates of Essentiality. 
UWH Civil, Box 111, File: Import Control. Priority Rating Shipping. 
UWH Civil, Box 111, File: Shipping. Position in 1945. 
UWH Civil, Box 112, File: Import Control. Priority Rating in Relaxation to 
Shipping. 
UWH Civil, Box 113, File: Shipping – Shipping for July and August 1942. 
Telegrams from South African Litigation, Washington to PrimeSec Pretoria, 22 Jul 
1942. 
UWH Civil, Box 113, File: Shipping – Position in June 1942. Telegram from 
Oppositely, London, to South African Litigation, Washington 17 Jun 1942. 
UWH Civil, Box 114, File: Priority Rating. Backlog of Cargo from UK. 
UWH Civil, Box 220, File: Union War Histories Translations 14a. U-boat 
Operations of the Axis Powers in S.A. Waters compiled by Dr Jurgen Rohwer, 1954. 
UWH Civil, Box 240, File 215: Union Coast Defences. South African Naval Forces, 
15 Aug 1940. 
UWH Civil, Box 312, File: Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs 1942. Report to 
the Fuehrer, made by the Commander-in-Chief, Navy the afternoon of 13 Feb 1942. 
UWH Civil, Box 312, File: Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs 1942. Report by 
the Commander-in-Chief Navy to the Fuehrer at Headquarters ”Wolfsschanze” the 
evening of 12 Mar 1942. 
UWH Civil, Box 339, File: Gordon-Cumming U-Boat Material. Miscellaneous notes, 
undated. 
UWH Civil, Box 339, File: Gordon-Cumming U-Boat Material. South Atlantic 
Station War Diary, Oct 1942. 
UWH Civil, Box 339, File: Gordon-Cumming U-Boat Material. Extract from 
Proceedings of U-boat Assessment Committee (Volume 9), Sept-Dec 1942. 
UWH Civil, Box 339, File: Gordon-Cumming U-Boat Material. Report on U-boat 
Activities in South African Waters, Oct-Dec 1942. 
UWH Civil, Box 339, File: Gordon Cumming U-boat material. The Commanders-in-
Chief South Atlantic and Eastern Fleet, Report on the safety of shipping in South 
African waters, 30 Mar 1943. 
UWH Civil, Box 340, File: Long naval history. Ships lost or damaged by enemy 
action in South African waters. 
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UWH Civil, Box 341, File – U-Boat matters. Questions and answers submitted by 
UWH section to Fregattenkapitän Gunter Hessler re U-boat warfare in South 
African waters. 
UWH Civil, Box 341, File: U-boat matters. Report on experience gained by U-459 
refuelling 15 U-boats, 21 March – 15 May 1942. 
UWH Civil, Box 341, File: U-boat matters. Operation Order “Eisbär”, 1 Aug 1942. 
UWH Civil, Box 341, File: U-boat material. Report on U-boat policy & ops in South 
African waters by Walter Meyer. 
UWH Civil, Box 341, File: U-boat material. Extracts from war diary U-159 (Helmut 
Witte), 24 Aug 1942 – 5 Jan 1943.  
UWH Civil, Box 341, File – U-boat material. Comments on war diary U 159 (Helmut 
Witte). 
UWH Civil, Box 341, File: U-boat matters. Extract from letter from Carl 
Emmermann on Operation Eisbär, 17 Oct 1953. 
UWH Civil, Box 341, File – U-boat material. Report on my experiences on board U-
68 on voyage to Cape Town from middle of August to middle of December 1942 by 
Walter Meyer.  
UWH Civil, Box 341, File: U-boat matters. Emmermann (U-172) on Operation 
Eisbär.  
UWH Civil, Box 342, File: Newspaper Articles Naval War. ‘Gold gab für man Bose’ 
in Muenchner Illustrierte, 13 Mar 1954. 
UWH Civil, Box 342, File: Newspaper Articles Naval War. R. Littell, ‘The Cruise of 
the Raider ATLANTIS´ in Readers Digest, Nov 1953, pp. 69-73. 
UWH Civil, Box 342, File: Translations of Extracts from German Books. Schiff 16 
(Atlantis) by Frank and Rogge. 
UWH Civil, Box 342, File: “Pinguin”. Die Kaperfahrt des Hilfskreuzers “Pinguin” 
1940/41 by Dr Hans Ulrich Roll – Meteorological officer of Pinguin. 
UWH Civil, Box 342, File: Translations of Extracts from German Books. Das 
glückhafte Schiff Kreuzerfahrten des ADMIRAL SCHEER. 
UWH Civil, Box 392, File: UWH Translations of Captured German Documents – 
German-Japanese High Level Documents on Strategy and Tactics. Minutes of 
meeting Chief SKL-Nomura, 17 Dec 1941. 
UWH Civil, Box 392, File: UWH Translations of Captured German Documents – 
German-Japanese High Level Documents on Strategy and Tactics. 1/SKL 
Appreciation of Situation, 18 Dec 1941. 
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UWH Civil, Box 392, File: UWH Translations of Captured German Documents – 
German-Japanese High Level Documents on Strategy and Tactics. Minutes Chief of 
Staff SKL to Chairman Military Commission of Tripartite Pact, 19 Dec 1941. 
UWH Civil, Box 392, File: UWH Translations of Captured German Documents – 
German-Japanese High Level Documents on Strategy and Tactics. Copy of Military 
Agreement between Germany, Italy and Japan, 18 Jan 1942. 
UWH Civil, Box 392, File: UWH Translations of Captured German Documents – 
German-Japanese High Level Documents on Strategy and Tactics. Report on 
discussion with Admiral Nomura from Chair Military Commission Tripartite Pact to 
Chief OKW, 17 Feb 1942. 
UWH Civil, Box 392, File: UWH Translations of Captured German Documents – 
German-Japanese High Level Documents on Strategy and Tactics. Minutes of 
meeting between Admiral Nomura and Chief of Staff SKL, 27 Mar 1942. 
UWH Civil, Box 392, File: UWH Translations of Captured German Documents – 
German-Japanese High Level Documents on Strategy and Tactics. Notes on main 
point of discussion Nomura-Fricke, 27 Mar 1942. 
UWH Civil, Box 392, File: UWH Translations of Captured German Documents – 
German-Japanese High Level Documents on Strategy and Tactics. Minutes of 
meeting between C/SKL and Japanese Naval Liaison Staff, 8 Apr 1942. 
UWH Civil, Box 392, File: UWH Translations of Captured German Documents – 
German-Japanese High Level Documents on Strategy and Tactics. Telegraphic 
report German Ambassador Tokyo to Reich Foreign Minister, 14 Apr 1942. 
UWH Civil, Box 392, File: UWH Translations of Captured German Documents – 
German-Japanese High Level Documents on Strategy and Tactics. Minutes of 
meeting between Jodl, Nomura, Bansai at Fuehrer HQ, 8 Aug 1942. 
UWH Civil, Box 392, File: UWH Translations of Captured German Documents – 
German-Japanese High Level Documents on Strategy and Tactics. Minutes of 
meeting Chief SKL-Nomura, 11 Aug 1942. 
6.1.8 Map Collection 
File – War in the Southern Oceans maps. Chart and List of Ships Sunk Captured or 
Damaged in the Waters off Southern Africa, 1939-1945. 
6.1.9 Photographic Archive 
841000346 – RAF Catalina of 262 Sqn. 
781004773 – F/Lt E.S.S. Nash attacking U-Boat Uit22 with his Catalina Aircraft. 
6.1.10 South African Air Force War Diaries 
SAAF War Diaries, Box 122, File: A4 (22 Sqdn Jan – May 1944). 22 Squadron SAAF 
war diary Mar 1944. 
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SAAF War Diaries, Box 124, File: A4 (23 Sqn Jan–Dec 1944). 23 Squadron SAAF 
war diary Mar 1944. 
SAAF War Diaries, Box 125, File: A3 (25 Sqdn Jul ’43 – Mar ’44). 25 Squadron 
SAAF War Diary Mar 1944. 
SAAF War Diaries, Box 125, File: A3 (25 Sqdn Jul ’43 – Mar ’44). 25 Squadron 
SAAF War Diary Mar 1944, Secret UBAT report (Appendix B). 
SAAF War Diaries, Box 127, File: D2 (262 Squadron Sept 42 – May 44). 262 
Squadron RAF war diary Mar 1944. 
SAAF War Diaries, Box 127, File: D2 (262 Squadron Sept 42 – May 44). 262 
Squadron RAF war diary Mar 1944, Secret UBAT report – Flt Lt Roddick 
(Appendix). 
SAAF War Diaries, Box 182, File: A1 (SAAF war diary CCAD). CCAD coastal area 
headquarters war diary Mar 1944. 
6.2 South African National Museum of Military History 
6.2.1 Masondo Reference Library – Photo Collection 
SA Navy Photo Collection, S.A. 410. 
SA Navy Photo Collection, S.A. 429. 
SA Navy Photo Collection, S.A. 470. 
SA Navy Photo Collection, S.A. 659. 
SA Navy Photo Collection, S.A. 987. 
SA Navy Photo Collection, S.A. 1231. 
SA Navy Photo Collection, S.A. 1628. 
SA Navy Photo Collection, S.A. 1651. 
SA Navy Photo Collection, S.A. 1657. 
SA Navy Photo Collection, S.A. 5044. 
SA Navy Photo Collection, S.A. 5219. 
6.3 North-West University, RAM Division (Potchefstroom) 
6.3.1 Ossewabrandwag Archive (OB Archive) 
6.3.1.1 Correspondence Archive 
A.F. Schulz Versameling. Nazisme in Andalusia Interneringskamp, 9 Okt 1940 – 22 
Nov 1944.  
L. Sittig Collection. Lyste met kodes, ongedateer. 
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L. Sittig Collection. Kontak tussen die Ossewabrandwag en die Duitse Regering, 
1942-1944. 
L. Sittig Collection. 3(a) – N.O. Pasche, 12 Aug 1986 
6.3.1.2 Audio Archive 
Transkripsies/Bandopname. H.J.R. Anderson. 
Transkripsies/Bandopname. J.H. Barnard. 
Transkripsies/Bandopname. H.T. Hickman. 
Transkripsies/Bandopname. Dr Eric Holm. 
Transkripsies/Bandopname. J.H. McDonald. 
Transkripsies/Bandopname. H. Rooseboom. 
Transkripsie/Bandopname. D.J.F. Scribante. 
Transkripsies/Bandopname. L. Sittig. 
Transkripsies/Bandopname. A.S. Spies. 
6.3.1.3 Photo Archive 
F00005_3 – H. Rooseboom. 
F00660_3 – M. Radley. 
F00660_5 – W. Radley. 
F01069_5 – L. Sittig. 
M0011 – Radiosender. 
6.4 The National Archives of the United Kingdom 
6.4.1 Records of the Admiralty 
ADM 1/10262. Memorandum on the possible conversion of South Atlantic whalers 
for A/S duties, Mar 1939. 
ADM 1/10262. Treasury Inter-Service Committee – Proposal to requisition 
Whalers, 18 Mar 1940. 
ADM 1/10262. Remarks on the Underwater Defence of Cape Town, Simonstown, 
East London, Port Elizabeth, Durban and Saldanha Bay, 14 Feb 1942. 
ADM 1/10262. Circular by Director of Local Defences re South African Boom 
Defences, 23 Mar 1942. 
ADM 1/10262. Naval Cypher from F.O.i.c. Simonstown to C-in-C South Atlantic re 
Shipment of Boom Defences to Union, Mar 1942. 
ADM 1/10262. Naval Cypher from Admiralty to F.O.i.c. Simonstown re Importance 
of the Development of Saldanha Bay, 16 Mar 1942. 
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ADM 1/10262. Naval Cypher from F.O.i.c. Simonstown to Admiralty re Union 
Government commitment to Boom Defences, 13 May 1942. 
ADM 1/12101, Anti-U-boat warfare. Measures required to meet the U-boat threat 
in South Atlantic, 7 Dec 1942. 
ADM 1/12643. Report by Captain C D Howard-Johnston on anti-submarine 
operations in the South Atlantic, 1943. 
ADM 1/26888. “Y” Organisation in South Africa. Memo on Y and RSS in South 
Africa, 16 Mar 1942. 
ADM 1/26888. “Y” Organisation in South Africa. Report by Staff Officer (Y) on “Y” 
Organisation, 24 Jun 1943. 
ADM 1/26888. “Y” Organisation in South Africa. Report by Staff Officer (Y) on “Y” 
Organisation, 24 Jun 1943. 
ADM 1/27176. Naval Intelligence Organisation South Africa. Cape Town 
Intelligence Centre – Report of Working, 1933. 
ADM 1/13288. South Atlantic R.D.F. Instructions, 1 May 1943. 
ADM 1/15276. Secret Correspondence between C-in-C South Atlantic and SANF re 
the manning of A/S Fixed Defences in South Africa, 22 Jun 1943. 
ADM 1/15276. Naval Cypher from Admiralty to C-in-C South Atlantic re A/S Fixed 
Defences in South Africa, 8 Oct 1943. 
ADM 1/15276. Memorandum on the Axis use of Midget Submarines, 19 Jan 1943. 
ADM 1/15276. Circular from Director of Anti-Submarine Warfare re HDAs in 
South Africa, 5 May 1943. 
ADM 1/12643, Anti-Submarine Operations – South Atlantic Station. Report of 
Captain Howard-Johnston’s Visit to the Cape, Oct 1943. 
ADM 1/31006. History and Organisation of the Naval Intelligence Centre Cape 
Town. General Organisation and Expansion from Peace to War Footing. 
1/31006. History and Organisation of the Naval Intelligence Centre Cape Town. 
Tracking Section. 
ADM 1/31006. History and Organisation of the Naval Intelligence Centre Cape 
Town. Operational Intelligence. 
ADM 1/31006. History and Organisation of the Naval Intelligence Centre Cape 
Town. Security. 
ADM 1/31006. History and Organisation of the Naval Intelligence Centre Cape 
Town. Naval Press Relations. 
ADM 1/31006. History and Organisation of the Naval Intelligence Centre Cape 
Town. Naval Censorship. 
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ADM 1/31006. History and Organisation of the Naval Intelligence Centre Cape 
Town. Appendix I. 
ADM 1/31006. History and Organisation of the Naval Intelligence Centre Cape 
Town. Appendix II. 
ADM 1/31006. History and Organisation of the Naval Intelligence Centre Cape 
Town. Appendix III. 
ADM 1/17587, A/S Organisation in South Africa. Report on the A/S Organisation 
in South Africa by Lt Cdr R.N. Hankey, 16 Apr 1945. 
ADM 116/4344. SNO to Admiralty, 3 Sept 1939. 
ADM 116/4344. SNO to Admiralty, 6-7 Sept 1939. 
ADM 116/4344. SNO to Admiralty, 9 Sept 1939. 
ADM 116/4344. SNO to Admiralty, 13 Sept 1939. 
ADM 116/4344. SNO to Admiralty, 21 Sept 1939. 
ADM 116/4499. Defence Plan for Ports in the Union of South Africa, 23 Feb 1942. 
ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic War Diary, January to October 1943. South 
Atlantic War Diary, Jan 1943. 
ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic War Diary, January to October 1943. South 
Atlantic War Diary, Feb 1943. 
ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic War Diary, January to October 1943. South 
Atlantic War Diary, Mar 1943.  
ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic War Diary, January to October 1943. South 
Atlantic War Diary, Apr 1943. 
ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic War Diary, January to October 1943. South 
Atlantic War Diary, May 1943.  
ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic War Diary, January to October 1943. South 
Atlantic War Diary, Jun 1943. 
ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic War Diary, January to October 1943. South 
Atlantic War Diary, Jul 1943.  
ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic War Diary, January to October 1943. South 
Atlantic War Diary, Aug 1943. 
ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic War Diary, January to October 1943. South 
Atlantic War Diary, Sept 1943. 
ADM 199/2334. South Atlantic War Diary, January to October 1943. South 
Atlantic War Diary, Oct 1943. 
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ADM 223/530. Naval Cypher from S.O.I. Simonstown to C-in-C South Atlantic re 
Bellringer, 13 Nov 1941. 
6.4.2 Record of the Air Ministry, the Royal Air Force, and related bodies 
AIR 9/190, Anti U-boat Warfare – African Shipping. Memorandum by the 
Secretary of State for Air re Anti-submarine air protection of convoys on the west 
coast of Africa and the Indian Ocean, 25 Jan 1943. 
AIR 9/190, Anti U-boat Warfare – African Shipping. Anti-U-boat protection in the 
Cape Area, 9 Jun 1943. 
6.4.3 Records of the Cabinet Office 
CAB 84/46, Air Defence on South Africa and Madagascar. Personal Telegram from 
Smuts to Churchill, 5 Jun 1942. 
CAB 84/46, Air Defence on South Africa and Madagascar. Report by the Joint 
Planning Staff on the Air Defence of South Africa and Madagascar, 7 Jun 1942. 
CAB 84/46, Air Defence on South Africa and Madagascar. Note by the Secretary of 
the Joint Planning Staff on the South African Air Force, 12 Jun 1942. 
CAB 120/474, South Africa: correspondence with Field-Marshal Smuts. Note to 
Prime Minister on Air Defence of South Africa, 16 Jun 1942. 
6.4.4 Records of the War Office 
WO 106/4934. South African Coastal Defence, 24 Nov 1940. 
WO 208/5111. South Africa General. Telegram from C-in-Ci Middle East to War 
Office, 7 Mar 1942. 
WO 208/5111. South Africa General. South Atlantic ‘Y’ Organisation, 12 Dec 1942. 
WO 208/5156. “Y” Committee South Africa. Letter from ME to MI8, 13 May 1942. 
WO 208/5156. “Y” Committee South Africa. Minute from Y Board with enclosed 
paper on formation of Y Committee in South Africa, 13 Aug 1942.  
WO 208/5156. “Y” Committee South Africa. Minute to DMI, 19 Aug 1942. 
WO 208/5156. “Y” Committee South Africa. Memo from Chairman ‘Y’ Board on ‘Y’ 
Services in South Africa, 3 Oct 1942. 
WO 208/5156. “Y” Committee South Africa. Draft telegram to Chairman ‘YI’ Board 
from Chairman ‘Y’ Board, 3 Oct 1942.  
6.4.5 Records of the Security Service 
KV 2/202, Elferink, Lambertus. 152a – Interim Report on WERZ, Luitpold, 31 Oct 
1945. 
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KV 2/925, Leibbrandt, Robey. 67a – From Col. Webster attaching replies to 
questionnaire, copies of photograph, memorandum re LEIBRANDT’s activities, 1 
Jun 1942. 
KV 2/939, Lothar SITTIG/ Nils PAASCHE. 79a – Copy of First Report on German 
Espionage in the Union of South Africa, 25 Sept 1943. 
KV 2/939, Lothar SITTIG/ Nils PAASCHE. 121b – Copy of Second Report on 
German Espionage in the Union of South Africa, 27 Nov 1943. 
KV 2/939, Lothar SITTIG/ Nils PAASCHE. 194a – Extracts from Third Report 
German Espionage in the Union of South Africa, 25 May 1944. 
KV 2/940 – Kolb, Hubert. 55a – Interim Report on Walter Paul Kraizizek. 
KV 2/941, Rooseboom, Hans. 37a – Copy of information from BJ 135893. 
KV 2/941, Rooseboom, Hans. 11a – Copy of cable received from Pretoria re 
ROOSEBOOM, SITTIG and MASSER, 27 Jul 1943;  
KV 2/941, Rooseboom, Hans. 13a – Extract from BIB report on German Espionage 
in the Union of South Africa re ROOSEBOOM, 25 Sept 1943. 
KV 2/941, Rooseboom, Hans. 43a – Copy of Interim Report on MASSER, 
mentioning ROOSEBOOM, 26 Oct 1945. 
KV 2/941, Rooseboom, Hans. 44a – Copy of Interim Report on Walter Paul 
Kraizizek, 31 Oct 1945. 
KV 2/941, Rooseboom, Hans. 46a – Extract from CSDIC/WEA Final Report on 
AHLRICHS re ROOSEBOOM, 4 Feb 1946. 
KV3/10. German Espionage in South Africa, 1939-1945. German intelligence 
activities in South Africa during the Second World War. 
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